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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the current Brazilian oil sectorǯs institutional and regulatory 
governance structure and its impact on four variables: investment, production, technology - 
innovation and the strategic control of oil. These variables are fundamental for the development 
of the oil industry and they are mentioned in Brazilian laws as central aspects to be continually 
developed. A prospective analysis of the 2010 reform in the Brazilian oil regulatory framework 
is a major part of the thesis because the alterations are relatively recent and have not as yet 
produced a set of consistent and statistically significant data.  
The research adopts a multidisciplinary perspective, using the institutional, reflexive 
and responsive theoretical frameworks and a methodology based on the examination of the 
legislation, semi-structured interviews and a historical comparative study of international 
regulatory governance in the oil sector to draw two main conclusions.  
First, the new Brazilian regulatory framework will have significant drawbacks in three 
of the four variables: investments, production and technology-innovation, essentially because of 
its excessively interfering and rigid approach, based on command and control regulations. 
Second, despite allowing an increasing strategic control over oil in some specific situations, this 
goal could have been attained in a manner that would have avoided the shortcomings in the 
other variables.  
Based on this understanding, the thesis makes recommendations to overcome the 
identified drawbacks. In line with the responsive and reflexive conceptual frameworks, the 
proposals consider that regulations in a dynamic and changeable sector as the oil industry 
should avert intrusiveness and imperative commands. They should rather advocate a versatile 
and interactive regulatory approach, steering and guiding the different stakeholders to socially 
desirable outcomes.       
  
 1 
PART I - LEGAL AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE 
ANALYSIS 
1 - INTRODUCTION 
The date was symbolic, the 7th of September of ʹͲͲͺ, Brazilǯs independence day, commemorating the countryǯs break with Portugal, ͳͺ͸ years earlier. A former union leader 
from the poor north-eastern part of the country who had become the first Workerǯs Party 
President of Brazil now delivered a poetic opening message: ǲFortunate is the nation that can 
look with pride to its past and with hope to its future...ǳ2 
Lula, the charismatic Brazilian President from 2003 to 2011, continued his speech in an 
almost messianic tone: ǲI had the privilege of glimpsing this future in the open sea of Espirito Santoǯs coast. ) saw with my very own eyes and felt with my bare hands, at Platform ͵Ͷ of our 
cherished Petrobras, the oil that has started to flow from the pre-salt.ǳ3 With a prophetic air, he 
then enthusiastically announced: ǲThe pre-salt is a passport to the future!ǳ  
The statement made front-page news the following day. Photos of President Lula 
holding up his nine fingered hands blackened with pre-salt oil soon dominated the Brazilian 
media.4 
His gesture was highly symbolic. It echoed President Vargas when, 56 years earlier, in a 
campaign for the creation of the Brazilian national oil company, he had proudly showed to 
Brazilians that they could indeed produce their own oil, despite pessimistic predictions forecasting otherwise. Lula also sent a message to the world of his governmentǯs 
                                                          
2 Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Pronunciamento à nação do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 
em cadeia nacional de rádio e TV, por ocasião das comemorações do Dia 7 de Setembro (Presidency of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil 2008) available at: <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-
presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/2o-mandato/2008/2o-semestre/07-09-2008-
pronunciamento-a-nacao-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-em-cadeia-nacional-de-
radio-e-tv-por-ocasiao-das-comemoracoes-do-dia-7-de-setembro/view > accessed 15 September 2014. 
3 Ibid. 
4 President Lula lost one of his fingers when he worked as a press operator in an automobile factory.   
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accomplishments. Most importantly, however, he implicitly announced that oil exploration in 
Brazil would thereafter have his hands on it, his stamp, his direction.  
The prospects were encouraging indeed. Pre-salt offshore reservoirs, which span an 
area of 149,000 square kilometres 4 to 6 miles below sea level, underneath 2,000 metres of 
thick layers of salt, would place Brazil among the countries with the biggest reserves on the 
planet.5 The Brazilian national oil company, Petrobras, was certainly in the best position to 
exploit it. It had been breaking successive production and technological records and its soaring 
shares placed it amongst the 12 largest companies in the world by market capitalisation.6  
President Lula claimed that the exceptionally favourable conditions of the massive pre-
salt oil discoveries required an urgent change in Brazilian oil regulations, given the leading role 
that the oil sector was expected to have in the country. Its GDP share had already grown from 
3% in 1998 to 12% in 2007. Forecasts pointed to a further increase to 20% by 2020.7  Oil would 
most certainly assume central strategic importance for Brazil and management, control and governance of its industry would gain relevance accordingly. Brazilǯs increasing international 
prominence as a leading emerging market also made this economic shift worthy of international 
concern for its global repercussions.  
In 2010 the government promoted several statutory changes in the Brazilian oil sector, 
with the primary aims of achieving increasing governmental strategic resource control and 
ensuring that future Brazilian generations could share the benefits from the discovery of these 
oil reserves. The new regulatory regime reversed the previous trend towards market reforms 
and instead increased regulatory interference in the Brazilian oil sector. It allegedly vested 
strategic control of oil endowments in the state and shifted the contractual method from a 
                                                          
5  Oxford Analytica, ǮThe )mpact of Pre-Salt: A Long-Term Perspectiveǯ ȋA Report Prepared for 
PETROBRAS, 2010) 4. 
6  Amrita Sen and others, ǮBrazil's Strugglesǯ Energy Aspects - In Focus 
<https://www.energyaspects.com/publications/view/brazils-struggles> accessed 15 June 2015 4. 
7 Edmar Luiz  de Almeida and Vinícius Accurso, ǮGovernment take e Atratividade de )nvestimentos na 
Exploração e Produção de (idrocarbonetos no Brasilǯ Discussion Paper Ͳʹ/ʹͲͳ͵ - Grupo de Economia da 
Energia 
<http://www.gee.ie.ufrj.br/index.php/component/cck/?task=download&file=textos_discussao_arquivo&
id=452>  3. 
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concession agreement to that of production-sharing with operational exclusivity. Statutory 
provisions established a social fund for the distribution of the proceeds from oil production.  
The state oil company, Petrobras, in turn, started facing successive regulatory 
challenges, which thereafter impacted on its profitability. These challenges included 
government subsidies and price controls, as well as strict ǲlocal contentǳ rules that required it to 
enter into supply contracts with Brazilian companies.  
Unlike most other sectors, such as macroeconomics, where there has been a continuity 
of policies between President Lula and his predecessor, in regulated sectors there has been a 
noticeable shift.8 The changes vested increased planning and formulation functions in entities 
directly linked to the Presidential office, relegating sectoral agencies with typical regulatory 
functions. The modifications in the oil sector have been more acute and interventionist if 
compared with other regulated sectors, especially since 2010.9 
Six years after President Lulaǯs historic speech, the prospects of the oil sector are not 
looking favourable. Five years have lapsed without public tenders and in the pre-saltǯs first 
auction only 11 companies registered and one bid was made. Petrobrasǯ annual output has 
dropped in 2012 and 2013.10 It is considered the most highly indebted oil company in the world 
and its shares have lost a fifth of their value, as of April 2014, compared to the time when the 
pre-salt discovery was announced.11 The mismatch between initial forecasts, in 2008, and the 
                                                          
8 Cf. Bruno Conde Caselli, ǮRedesenho institucional e arranjos contratuais: Uma análise da regulação e da ind’stria de petróleo e gás natural no upstream brasileiroǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de 
Janeiro 2012); and Edmar Lisboa Bacha and Regis Bonelli, ǮUma interpretação das causas da 
desaceleração econômica do Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ ʹͷ Revista de economia política ͳ͸͵, referred in Luiz Marcelo Martins Almeida, Luiz Alberto Nascimento Campos filho and Lourdes Casanova, ǮThe Brazilian )nstitutional Environment: The )mpact on Companiesǯ Strategies in the Oil and Gas Sectorǯ ȋʹͲͳͳȌ Faculty 
and Research Working Paper - INSEAD. 
9 Cf. M Tina Dacin, Christine Oliver and Jean Paul Roy, ǮThe legitimacy of strategic alliances: An institutional perspectiveǯ ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ ʹͺ Strategic Management Journal ͳ͸ͻ and W Richard Scott, Institutions 
and organizations (Sage 2001) referred in Luiz Marcelo Martins Almeida, Luiz Alberto Nascimento Campos filho and Lourdes Casanova, ǮThe Brazilian )nstitutional Environment: The )mpact on Companiesǯ Strategies in the Oil and Gas Sectorǯ ȋʹͲ11) Faculty and Research Working Paper - INSEAD 25.  
10 http://www.petrobras.com/en/magazine/post/2013-net-income-of-r-23-57-billion.htm/ accessed 18 
August 2014. 
11 The companyǯs shares dropped significantly further after a corruption scandal affected Petrobras at the 
end of 2014. The statistic has been intentionally left to a period prior to the corruption scandal to show 
the influence of other factors in the plunge. Cf. Amrita Sen and others, ǮBrazil's Strugglesǯ Energy Aspects - 
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current reality has cast doubts over the design of the Brazilian oil regulatory framework and its capacity to contribute to the countryǯs development.  
This thesis examines such key changes in the oil sectorǯs regulatory framework in Brazil 
since the discovery of pre-salt reservoirs, in 2007. The main research aim is the assessment of 
the new institutional and regulatory governance structures from the perspective of regulatory 
theory and the impact of the current regulations on four key variables: investment, production, 
technology-innovation and strategic control of oil. These four variables are fundamental to the 
long lasting development of the oil industry12 and they are mentioned throughout Brazilian laws 
as central elements to be fostered and continually improved.13  
The analysis primarily focuses on the upstream segment.14 Investments here are considered according to the classical economic terminology as the sum of inventoriesǯ variation 
with gross fixed capital formation directed to the oil industry. Technology and innovation are 
understood in their broadest sense as the amount of specialised scientific knowledge and 
expertise, which accrue to future increases of production levels. Production, in turn, is the 
amount of oil barrels produced at the upstream level. The focus will go far beyond mere 
production level estimates, concentrating instead on the institutional mechanisms and factors 
that affect production and on elements that induce or hinder it. The analysis of the strategic 
control of oil considers the possibility of greater influence over the production process and 
towards the appropriation of wealth coming from the exploration of oil activities. This was the 
connotation given by government officials to the term ǲstrategic controlǳ when proposing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
In Focus <https://www.energyaspects.com/publications/view/brazils-struggles> accessed 15 June 2015 
4. 
12 Cf. Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); Nadeja M Victor, ǮOn measuring the performance of national oil companies ȋNOCsȌǯ ȋProgram on Energy and Sustainable Development: Working Paper # ͸Ͷ, 
2007);Daniela Couto Martins, A Regulação da Indústria do Petróleo: segundo o modelo constitucional 
brasileiro (Fórum 2013); and Luiz Cezar Quintans(ed), Contratos de Petroleo Concessao e Partilha 
Propostas e Leis para o Pre-Sal (B. Biz Editores 2011).  
13 Cf. Chapter I, Art.1 of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997). 
14 The upstream segment comprises the phases of exploration and production. Cf. Gavin Bridge and 
Philippe Le Billon, Oil (John Wiley & Sons 2013) 37. 
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2010 reforms.15 By doing so, the aim is to analyse whether or not regulations contribute to this increasing strategic control of oil, in line with the governmentǯs intention in ʹͲͳͲ.     
A discussion of the 2010 reforms in the Brazilian oil regulatory framework forms a 
major part of the thesis through a prospective analysis because the alterations in the oil 
framework are relatively recent and have not as yet produced a set of consistent and 
statistically significant data.16  Based on the inferences of the initial chapters, the final part of the thesis makes specific policy proposals with a view to enhancing the oil sectorǯs regulatory governance and its contribution to the countryǯs development. 
The thesis advances two main arguments. First, the current regulatory governance 
setting will have significant drawbacks for the country in terms of investments, production and 
technology – innovation. Secondly, despite potentially contributing towards an increasing 
strategic control of oil and its income, this achievement comes at a significant price for the 
country, a price that could have been avoided with minor legal changes, which are detailed in 
chapter 5. The drawbacks pointed out in the thesis are seen to derive essentially from a top-
down regulatory approach disproportionately dependent on interventionist command and 
control procedures. It is argued that a less intrusive regulatory standpoint using reflexive and 
responsive regulations would be more appropriate in such a dynamic and mutable sector 
because these approaches attempt to direct and influence stakeholders towards a certain 
desirable outcome, indicating the direction, but without interfering excessively in the 
procedures and the content of their activities.17 
Of course there are several other aspects that influence the variables studied in the 
thesis that will not be taken into account. Four important facets will only be tangentially 
                                                          
15 According to the Interministerial Exposition of Motives N. 38 – MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL, 31 of 
August 2009. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/projetos/expmotiv/emi/2009/38%20-
%20mme%20mf%20mdic%20mp%20ccivil.htm> accessed 13 October 2013. 
16 Only one bidding round has been organised in Brazil after the 2010 reform. 
17 Cf. Gunther Teubner, Law as an autopoietic system (Oxford/Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers 1993); John Paterson, ǮReﬂecting on Reﬂexive Lawǯǯ in Michael King and Chris Thornhill ȋedsȌ, Luhmann on 
Politics and Law: Critical Appraisals and Applications (Hart Publishing 2006); Ana Lourenço, ǮAutopoietic 
Social Systems Theory: The Co-Evolution of Law and the Economyǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͵ͷ Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 35; and Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive regulation : transcending the deregulation 
debate (Oxford University Press 1992). 
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addressed: i) government take;18 ii) oil prices; iii) the shift to fossil replacement; and iv) 
corruption. The first reason for this omission is that a considerable amount of detailed studies 
and reports have been made on these topics in the area of accounting, business, economics and 
engineering, with respect to the first three aspects, and in sociology and political science, 
considering the last one. The second motive is that this thesis focuses on broader institutional, 
political and socio-economic aspects of regulatory governance beyond fiscal revenues, prices, 
fossil fuel replacement and corruption. Despite not specifically analysing these topics they are 
pinpointed throughout the chapters whenever necessary to provide a better understanding of 
the impact on the analysed variables.          
The next part of this introduction, section 1.2, explains why the thesis is relevant and 
how it is expected to fulfil a significant academic gap in the field, providing useful tools for 
policy proposals in an essential sector for the future of Brazil. Section 1.3 then addresses the 
methodological framework used in the thesis and further elaborates the research question. The fourth and last part describes the thesisǯ organisation, outlining the main issues in each chapter 
and advancing the most important conclusions. 
1.2 RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis is relevant for several reasons. The discovery and exploitation of Brazilǯs pre-
salt oil layers in 2007 inaugurates a new development pattern for the country, heavily and 
closely associated with a robust oil industry. Sources estimate that the oil and gas sector may 
account for a fifth of Brazil´s GDP in 2020 while in June 2014 it represented 13%.19  In view of 
the expected importance of this industry in Brazil, it is essential to provide for the best use of 
                                                          
18 Government take is a terminology used in oil literature that designs all taxes and state appropriations 
of the oil production. 
19  Cf. Portal Brasil ǮSetor de petróleo e gás chega a ͳ͵% do P)B brasileiroǯ 
<http://www.brasil.gov.br/economia-e-emprego/2014/06/setor-de-petroleo-e-gas-chega-a-13-do-pib-
brasileiro> accessed 08 June 2015.  
 7 
the countryǯs oil endowment so it can actually become a ǲpassport to the futureǳ, as stated by 
President Lula.20  
Until the present time, technical discussions and intellectual production related to the 
regulation of the Brazilian oil sector have revolved around three main avenues. The first avenue 
essentially stresses the macroeconomic repercussions of Brazil as a major economic 
powerhouse and commodity-exporting country. )t mostly focuses on the manufacturing sectorǯs 
competitiveness deterioration, as a result of the ǲDutch diseaseǳ or the ǲresource curseǳ,21 
sometimes also referred to as the ǲparadox of plenty theoryǳ.22 The second avenue is mainly concerned with government revenue or, in other words, how the oil industryǯs income will be 
appropriated by the state at the federal level - through government participation in production - 
and further distributed to subnational entities.23 The third attributes utmost priority to the 
analysis of the increased state ownership and control over strategic resources and their use to 
exert influence to bring about the construction of a robust industry in the oil supply chain.24  
                                                          
20 Authorǯs translation of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Pronunciamento à nação do Presidente da República, 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, em cadeia nacional de rádio e TV, por ocasião das comemorações do Dia 7 de 
Setembro (Presidency of the Federative Republic of Brazil 2008) available at: 
<http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/2o-
mandato/2008/2o-semestre/07-09-2008-pronunciamento-a-nacao-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-
inacio-lula-da-silva-em-cadeia-nacional-de-radio-e-tv-por-ocasiao-das-comemoracoes-do-dia-7-de-
setembro/view > accessed 15 September 2014. 
21 Cf. Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, Escaping the resource curse (Cambridge 
University Press 2007). 
22 Cf. Luciano Losekann and Thiago Periard, Projecoes do Pre-sal: O Brasil sera um petro-estado? (Blog 
Infopetro 2013); Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da 
indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Francesco Caselli and Guy Michaels, ǮDo oil windfalls improve living standards? Evidence from Brazilǯ National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper N 
15550 accessed 18 May 2015. 
23 Cf. Guilhereme Dias and Alfredo Renault, ǮA concentração de recursos na União e as perdas das regiões produtorasǯ in Fabio Giambiagi and Luiz Paulo Vellozo Lucas ȋedsȌ, Petroleo Reforma e contrarreforma do 
setor petrolifero brasileiro (Elsevier Editora Ltda 2013); Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder 
Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); Paulo César 
Ribeiro Lima, Pré-sal, o novo marco legal e a capitalização da Petrobras (Synergia Editora 2011); and 
Edmar Luiz  de Almeida and Vinícius Accurso, ǮGovernment take e Atratividade de )nvestimentos na Exploração e Produção de (idrocarbonetos no Brasilǯ Discussion Paper Ͳʹ/ʹͲͳ͵ - Grupo de Economia da 
Energia 
<http://www.gee.ie.ufrj.br/index.php/component/cck/?task=download&file=textos_discussao_arquivo&
id=452> . 
24 Cf. Marilda Rosado de Sá Ribeiro, ǮSovereignty over Natural Resources )nvestment Law and 
Expropriation: The case of Bolivia and Brazil☆ǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ʹ Journal of world energy law and business ͳʹͻ; 
Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria mundial 
do petróleo (Synergia 2011); Eloi Fernandez e Fernandez, Ǯ)ndustria nacional de bens e servicos nos arranjos produtivos do setor de oleo e gas natural no Brasilǯ in Fabio Giambiagi (ed), Petróleo: reforma e 
contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier Brasil 2013); Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma 
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Little attention has been given until now to an objective study of the current regulatory 
governance of the oil sector in Brazil and how this setting affects essential variables for the 
development of the oil industry and the country as a whole from a legal, economic and social 
perspective.25 Effective regulatory governance contributes to an appropriate legal and socio-
economic environment to extract the maximum benefit from the newly discovered resources for the countryǯs development. This policy pillar has been rather neglected so far. The thesis aims to 
fill this gap. 
Finally, and most importantly, this thesisǯ findings provide useful inputs for policy 
proposals and future assessments of regulatory governance in the oil sector in a more objective 
manner. Rather than providing partisan and dogmatic answers, the hope is to open further 
questions and promote additional debates in a more constructive, pragmatic and policy-driven 
way.     
1.3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This thesis adopts a multidisciplinary approach. The perspective derives from the very 
nature of its central issue – regulatory governance in the oil sector, which transcends the realm 
of Law, thus requiring a more comprehensive, multidisciplinary treatment, in line with this 
methodological proposal.26 
As already mentioned, regulatory governance will be mainly studied through its effect 
upon four key variables. The analytical methodology for the study is conducted in three main ways. First, it examines the oil sectorǯs governance regulatory aspects in primary materials of 
statutes, rules and in the informal interface between institutions. The examination assesses the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ in Edmar Bacha ȋedȌ, O futuro da 
indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013); and Oystein Noreng, ǮBrazil and Norway- Offshore Petroleum Experiences and Lessonsǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͵ͷ Journal of Energy and 
Development 79. 
25 One notable exception, discussed in the course of this thesis, is the study performed by Adriano Pires 
and others. Cf. Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Fabio Giambiagi and Luiz Paulo Vellozo LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013). 
26 Cf. Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ 29. 
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interplay and interaction of institutional agents and what are the underlying incentives and 
disincentives provided by legal provisions, formal and informal norms. 
Most of the theoretical framework for this analysis stems from institutional theories in 
economics and political science. As will be detailed throughout the thesis, these theories 
consider that firms and socio-economic agents react and build their strategies according to their 
respective institutional environment.27 The essential understanding is that the institutional setting shapes the regulatory governance structure, which, in turn, influences companiesǯ 
strategies and their outcomes. 28  One of the main benefits of this approach is its 
comprehensiveness, since it considers legal norms as one among several institutions 
establishing basic rules and procedures for the relationships between and within corporations 
and organisations.29 The approach also attributes special importance to elements such as 
history and culture and how they affect institutions throughout time.  
The second methodological approach is a qualitative research perspective based on a 
series of semi-structured interviews with groups of oil experts. The following groups of 
specialists are interviewed: i) current and former government officials; ii) top executives in 
international and national oil firms; iii) legal advisors; and iv) academic researchers and 
university professors. The goal of this qualitative research is to assess each groupǯs view on the 
regulatory governance of the Brazilian oil sector and how its elements, mechanisms and 
specificities affect the studied variables.  
Thirdly, the thesis also uses a historical and comparative method. It conducts an 
international comparative study of oil regulatory governance in other countries, evaluating 
their experiences and what their influences upon development of the oil sector have been. This 
                                                          
27 Cf. Douglass C North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge university 
press 1990); and Douglass C North, ǮEconomic performance through timeǯ ȋͳͻͻͶȌ The American economic 
review 359. 
28 David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark C Thurber, Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the 
world energy supply (Cambridge University Press 2011) 888. 
29 Avner Greif provides a good definition about institutions: ǲAn institution is a system of social factors 
that conjointly generate a regularity of behaviour. Each component of this system is social in being man-
made, non-physical factor that is exogenous to each individual whose behaviour it influences.ǳ Cf. Avner 
Greif, Institutions and the path to the modern economy: Lessons from medieval trade (Cambridge University 
Press 2006) 30. This topic will be further explored throughout the thesis.  
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comparative study initially provides an international overview of oil regulatory frameworks but 
later brings its focus to bear upon Norway. 
Norway has a historical reputation for successful oil exploitation and is considered as an 
international benchmark by specialists when it comes to oil regulatory governance.30Oil 
exploitation in this country has already reached the maturity phase, which means that it has 
passed through distinct stages of oil exploration, making the study of its oil policies in different 
moments of history particularly enriching and valuable for Brazil.           
As already stated, a considerable part of the analysis conducted in the thesis is 
prospective, since a major change in the Brazilian oil regulatory framework occurred in 2010 
and the influence of this modification upon the variables here considered has not yet produced a 
statistically significant set of data. Interviews with specialists prove very useful here, to grasp 
the actual tendencies and possible future outcomes of the changes, including potential 
difficulties. The international comparison complements the examination, by seeking to 
understand whether the anticipated outcomes have been observed elsewhere and how have 
they been dealt with in other jurisdictions.      
As is frequently the case in social sciences, the thesis does not establish an unquestionable causal relationship between the oil sectorǯs regulatory governance setting and 
the suggested outcomes. A conclusion of this sort would require a quantitative study through a 
multivariate regression model, whereby regulatory provisions and hypotheses could be tested 
and measured using data results. This exercise would be very difficult to perform for two main 
reasons.  
First, regulatory governance aspects with their specificities and nuances are difficult to 
build into a quantitative model with any reasonable degree of precision, especially because they 
often involve important informal elements. Second, there is not yet a significant amount of 
                                                          
30 Cf. Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) 231, 235; Baker )nstitute, ǮBaker )nstitute Policy Reportǯ ȋThe 
Changing Role of National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets, 2007); and David R. Hults, 
Mark C. Thurber and David G. Victor, Oil and governance : state-owned enterprises and the world energy 
supply (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
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observations of the variables here studied since the enactment of the most recent change to the 
oil regulatory framework in 2010. As no clear quantitative causal relationship may be 
established at this stage, the qualitative methodological approach seems to be the most 
appropriate.  
Therefore, this thesis uses existing available data, semi-structured interviews and 
comparative international evaluations to make a critical assessment of the current regulatory framework in the Brazilian oil sector. )t examines the effects of this segmentǯs regulatory 
governance setting on the studied variables and evaluates to what extent these effects 
contribute to the economic development of the sector. The last part of the thesis makes specific 
policy proposals on how to enhance the current regulatory governance setting.  
1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organised in three main parts and 10 chapters. The first part - Legal and 
theoretical foundations for the analysis – provides the necessary framework for the study, 
discussing central theories, describing the main institutions in the Brazilian oil sector and also 
the international experience in oil regulation. It is comprised of four chapters, including this 
introduction as Chapter 1.  
Chapter 2 examines the history of state intervention in Brazil, contrasting it to the 
international context and demonstrating how this evolution has shaped the regulation of the oil 
sector, and, most specifically, the institutions that today form its industry. Three special 
moments assume particular importance:  1988, 1995, and 2010.   
The year 1988 was a landmark in Brazilian political history with the enactment of a new 
Federal Constitution – the first under democratic rule after 21 years of military regime from 
1964 to 1985. In the oil sector, it consolidated state monopoly and sovereignty over natural 
resources. 
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 1995 was a turning point in the Brazilian contemporary economic trajectory.  Market 
oriented reforms were inaugurated, including amendments with respect to the oil monopoly.  
Sweeping transformations were introduced in Petrobras. Modern managerial strategies brought 
innovation to an enterprise well-endowed with human resources (high-level engineers and 
researchers) but blocked with burdensome bureaucratic procedures. Financial advancements opened the companyǯs shares to the private sector, which started being negotiated in main stock 
markets in advanced economies.31 Nowadays Petrobras is a state-controlled company whose 
governmental shares amount to 55,6 % of the voting shares.32 
2010 marked a paradigm shift in oil sector regulation because of the implementation of 
three laws that reformed the industry, asserting increasing state control over oil reserves and 
future production.  
Chapter 3 discusses regulatory theories focusing on the institutional, responsive and 
reflexive conceptual frameworks and how they are specifically applied to the oil sector and to 
the Brazilian context in particular. The principal goal of chapter 4 is to analyse international 
experiments in regulation of the oil sector to extract useful lessons and experiences for Brazil. It 
portrays some relevant features of international experience in regulation of the segment and how they have affected each countryǯs development. The first part of the chapter gives a global 
overview while the second one focuses on Norway.  
Part II of the thesis concentrates on the analysis of how the current regulatory 
governance of the Brazilian oil sector affects its future development. The assessment is 
conducted through the analysis of the regulatory framework and its impact on four fundamental 
variables under consideration: strategic control of oil (chapter 5), investments (chapter 6), 
production (chapter 7) and technology – innovation (chapter 8). It concludes that while the 
current governance setting is likely to have significant drawbacks in the last three variables, it 
                                                          
31 Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G Lazzarini, ǮState-Owned Enterprises in Brazil: (istory and Lessonsǯ 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Workshop_SOEsDevelopmentProcess_Brazil.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 
32 Petrobrasǯ website <http://www.petrobras.com.br/rs2009/pt/relatorio-de-
sustentabilidade/apresentacao-forma-de-gestao-e-transparencia/perfil/estrutura-societaria/ > accessed 
5 May 2013.   
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does also have the effect of increasing governmental strategic control over the production of oil. 
This greater strategic control comes, however, at a price for the sector, especially in terms of 
downsides on investments. Building on the main conclusions of part II, part III subsequently 
presents specific policy proposals. These proposals are detailed in chapter 9, while chapter 10 
concludes the thesis.    
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2 – THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN OIL SECTOR  
This chapter analyses the evolution of state intervention in Brazil, assessing how it has 
designed the regulatory governance of the oil sector in different moments and shaped its 
institutions. Three special periods serve as analytical milestones: 1988, 1995, and 2010.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first analyses the origins of the Brazilian oil 
industry, how it evolved until 2010 and how its principal institutions were formed, taking into 
account the international context. The second details the 2010 reform and how it altered the 
existing institutional framework. The first part constantly refers to historical facts and to the 
evolution of the economics and geopolitics of oil, while the second one is rather focused on the 
legal changes brought in the year 2010.   
2.1 ORIGINS OF THE OIL INDUSTRY AND FORMATION OF ITS INSTITUTIONS 
2.1.1 THE BEGINNING OF OIL EXPLOITATION  
Oil activities have not always attracted state interest. In the second half of the 19th 
century, after its discovery, state interference in oil exploitation was almost nil. The second 
industrial revolution considerably increased the strategic importance of the product. Yet it was 
not until the beginning of the 20th century that oil activities increasingly involved governmental 
interest and its direct interference.33 This progressive intervention reached an upward trend in 
the years that preceded the First World War and continued during the conflict, when control 
over the largest oil reserves conferred significant military advantages to allied countries.34  This 
dominion was an important determinant of their victory, and, to a great extent, among the 
reasons that led to war.35 From that moment on, energy policy became an essential state issue. 
                                                          
33 Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 31. 
34 Maria D'Assuncao Costa Menezello, ǮA regulacao e o direito do petroleoǯ in Carlos Ari Sundfeld ȋedȌ, 
Direito Administrativo Economico (Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Publico - sbdp 2002) 379. 
35 Daniel Yergin, The prize: The epic quest for oil, money & power (Simon and Schuster 2011).  
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At the beginning of the 20th century, three main lines of action were clearly 
distinguished among leading global nations with respect to oil policies. Countries such as the 
United Kingdom and France, which mastered and dominated technology for exploitation and 
had access to oil deposits, because of their colonies, established exclusive production zones 
operated by their oil companies. Germany and Japan, without colonies and in need of petroleum 
for their increasing industrial expansion, were progressively led to imperialist action to control 
the product, evoking antagonism from the former countries. The United States initially resisted 
French and English efforts but later backed the signature of the Red Line Agreement, in 1928, 
between the following British, American and Dutch firms: Compagnie Française des Pétroles, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Anglo-Persian and the Near East Development Corporation.36 According to 
the agreement, the exploitation of petroleum in the Middle East, with the exception of Kuwait 
and Iran, would only take place through consortia of firms belonging to these three countries.37 
After the Second World War, the United States became a net importer of oil. This fact led 
it to a greater expansionist move towards producing countries, mainly those in the Middle East, 
with the highest international oil reserves. Even following the decline of European colonial 
powers after Second World War, the United States did not attempt to increase its influence in 
the Middle East for two main reasons.38 First, its expansion in the region would occur at the 
expense of the United Kingdom and France, allied countries that could help to stall communist 
expansion in Europe. Secondly, increasing American intervention in the Middle East could 
trigger Soviet ambitions in the region and spread its influence among national Arab movements 
at a crucial moment of the Cold War. For these reasons, maintenance of the underlying 
principles of the Red Line Agreement represented a safer strategy. The logic of the agreement 
was therefore preserved through the creation of new holdings with participation of British, 
French and American companies to exploit oil in the Middle East. The power of these countries' 
                                                          
36
 The Near East Development Corporation was formed as an American oil syndicate composed by 
Atlantic Refining (which later became Arco), Socony, Gulf Oil, Jersey Standard and the Pan-American 
Petroleum and Transport Company. In the following years Socony and Jersey Standard acquired complete 
control over the syndicate. Cf. US Department of State: Office of the Historian 
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/red-line> accessed 16 November  2015.    
37 Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 34. 
38 Ibid. 
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main oil companies, which came to be known as the Seven Sisters, was considerably enhanced 
thenceforth.39  
Yet the Seven Sister's power and their significant profits, especially in the Middle East, triggered nationalist sentiments and inspired regional revolts. Oil multinationalsǯ wealth 
contrasted with the iniquitous social conditions of host populations and their lack of voice 
among their governments. International Law had been increasingly taking into account these 
paradoxes, especially after the creation of the UN, and had been constantly evolving by 
increasingly recognising state sovereignty over national resources and their right to self-
determination.40 In 1962, in a landmark decision of its general assembly, the UN acknowledged 
that: ǲthe right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and the well-being of 
the people of the state concerned.ǳ41  
)n Brazil, intense and passionate debates had been taking place since the ͳͻ͵Ͳǯs with 
respect to oil policy. Even though oil reserves were quite insignificant at that moment, one 
group advocated a firmer state intervention through the creation of a national oil company with 
monopoly over resources. Another one, in contrast, supported a more liberal stance to attract 
foreign investment and multinational companies to conduct research for future oil findings.42  
In 1934, the nationalist group with the support of President Getulio Vargas succeeded in 
inserting a clause in the Federal Constitution, which considered all mineral resources in the 
subsoil to be state property. The National Petroleum Council (Conselho Nacional do Petroleo) 
was also created in 1938 holding responsibility over oil policy, through the control of prices and 
production, determining, thereafter, stricter state command over oil production.   
                                                          
39 The term ǲSeven Sistersǳ was first used in the ͳͻͷͲs by Enrico Mattei, President of the Italian oil 
company ENI, to refer to the main oil companies at the time: Exxon, Chevron, Mobil, Shell, BP, Texaco and 
Gulf. Cf. Ibid.37 
40 Maria D'Assuncao Costa Menezello, ǮA regulacao e o direito do petroleoǯ in Sundfeld ȋedȌ, Direito 
Administrativo Economico (Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Publico - sbdp 2002) 380. 
41 General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, "Permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources". Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/Law/resources.htm accessed 28 February 
2012. 
42 Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 40. 
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Later, under the presidency of General Dutra, the 1946 Federal Constitution went on to 
allow companies formed in the country under Brazilian laws to explore petroleum without 
requiring them to be constituted by Brazilians. This clause was subject to vigorous debate 
among the two mentioned groups and encountered fierce resistance of nationalists, who had 
lost part of their influence after the elections of General Dutra.43   
In 1951, Getulio Vargas returned to power and the petroleum industry gained new 
strategic economic relevance.44  Projects were launched for the creation of the Brazilian national 
oil company, Petrobras. This phenomenon had been taking place in several countries, which 
considered control over oil reserves a national security imperative. The National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC), for example, was created in Iran, while ǲYacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscalesǳ 
(YFP) and ǲCorporacion Venezolana de Petroleoǳ (CVP) started operations respectively in 
Argentina and Venezuela. In Brazil, despite nationalist claims involving the creation of 
Petrobras, it was formed as a partially privatised company. The main reason for this decision, 
according to Carlos Eduardo Paes Barreto,45 was the need to raise private funds for the venture 
and to reduce dependency on the national budget, as would be the case of an entire state-owned 
firm. He also cited the advantages of not being bound by public laws and their excessive 
bureaucratic procedures for engaging in contracts and commercial transactions.    
While this wave of national oil companiesǯ creation was taking place, oil contracts, in 
turn, were being progressively renegotiated on a more equitable basis between producing 
nations and international oil companies (IOCs) around the world. Some contracts provided 
royalty payments to governments in the same amount of oil companies' profits (known as the 
50-50 principle). The first country to do so was Venezuela, in 1943, followed by Saudi Arabia, in 
1950.46  In Iran, where the British government and Anglo Persian oil company refused to discuss 
contracts under the new terms, the controversy led to political turmoil and social unrest, 
                                                          
43 Daniela Couto Martins, A Regulação da Indústria do Petróleo: segundo o modelo constitucional brasileiro 
(Fórum 2013)18. 
44 Ibid.18. 
45 Carlos Eduardo Paes Barreto, A saga do petróleo brasileiro:" a farra do boi" (NBL Editora 2001) 33,34. 
46 Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 42. 
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culminating with the 1951 nationalisation of the company, as well as the rise to power of Prime 
Minister Mossadegh. Such iconic change in Iran – with later consequences in the Iranian 
Revolution – was the result of a wide popular movement, while Mossadeghǯs ͳͻͷ͵ downfall and 
the return of shah Reza Pahlavi happened in the context of a ǲcoup dǯétatǳ orchestrated by the 
central intelligence agency (CIA).  
These more favourable conditions to producer countries and the scenario of 
consumption and supply growing at relatively similar paces contributed to relatively stable oil 
market during the 1950's and 1960's, with prices remaining at low levels.  Even the 1960 
creation of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) did not reverse this 
trend. 
2.1.2 THE OIL WEAPON STRATEGY 
In the 1970's the international economic conditions of the oil sector changed radically. 
Low prices of the previous years significantly boosted demand, which tripled in the 1970's. The 
percentage of oil in the world energy matrix also significantly rose, from 37% to 64.4%.47  
Producing countries facing these new market conditions responded through price escalations, 
increasing government revenues and nationalisations. )n ͳͻ͹Ͳ, Muamar Khadafiǯs government 
in Libya increased royalty payments by 20%, while Iran and the other OPEC countries followed 
the move.48 A wave of nationalisations also took place, beginning with Algeria, in 1971, Iraq, in 
1972 (taking control of the Iraq petroleum company) and similarly in that year Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and Venezuela.49  
In 1973, protesting against American support to Israel in the Yom Kippur war, OPEC 
increased its barrel prices from US$ 2.90 to US$ 5.00 and embargoed exports to the US and the 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 42. 
48 Ibid. 43. 
49 Ibid. 44. 
 19 
Netherlands. A 15-20% cut in production followed by a price rise to US$ 11.00, consolidated the 
so-called oil weapon strategy, leading to the first oil shock.50   
The immediate consequences of the shock are well known: a combination of inflation 
and stagnation, which, thereafter, came to be known as stagflation. US GDP was reduced by 6% 
between 1973 and 1975 and its unemployment rate doubled, reaching 9%.51 A similar trend prevailed in Europe: Germanyǯs GDP reduced by ͳ.͸% in ͳͻ͹ͷ and in the UK the decrease 
amounted to 0.7% in the same year.52     
The effects of the first oil shock demonstrated that OPEC's power and capacity to affect 
oil prices had significantly increased. To seek an alternative to reduce its power, the United 
States proposed an international energy conference among the main developed petroleum 
importing countries. The result was the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
which had the main goal of coordinating a strategy in response to the price upsurge.53 The 
inevitable consequences of the first oil shock were a worldwide tendency among consumers to 
reduce oil consumption, the development of national alternative sources of energy programmes 
and the international quest for new petroleum deposits, outside OPEC countries.        
Brazil was particularly affected by the 1973 first oil shock, which considerably shaped 
the main lines of its economic strategy and the style of state intervention. An antidemocratic 
military government then governed the country after a coup in 1964. In the middle of an 
accelerated growth pattern, the so-called economic miracle, the country was heavily dependent 
on oil imports and had an economy with high state investment. In contrast to most oil importing 
countries, Brazil did not implement contractionary fiscal policies, reducing expenditures to 
tame inflation and control trade and budget deficits. Instead, the military government - to a 
                                                          
50  Cf. Munir Maniruzzaman, ǮThe )ssue of Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering and Dispute Management in the Oil and Gas )ndustryǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͷ Texas  Journal of Oil, Gas & Energy Law ͹ͻ; and 
Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas e 
desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 45. 
51 Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 46. 
52 Maurice Vaïsse, Les relations internationales depuis 1945 (Armand Colin 2013) 109. 
53 Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 46. 
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great extent dependent on economic performance for political support, contracted substantial 
international loans to maintain economic activity and preserved government spending at high 
levels. The combination of abundant ǲpetrodollarsǳ, recycled from oil exporting countries to 
international banks, and the scenario of world recession provoked excess liquidity in financial 
markets and led interest rates to fall sharply, which facilitated the Brazilian strategy.54  
The oil shock also stimulated the search for alternative sources of energy in Brazil to 
reduce oil dependence. Several state projects took place to build power plant energy, nuclear 
energy devices and an alternative source of energy based on alcohol extracted from sugar cane 
(biomass). As a result, the Pro-Alcool Programme was launched in 1975.55 Between 1976 and 
1978 the recession scenario faded away and most economies were brought back to their 
previous growth paths. Despite such economic recovery, high oil dependence continued to 
prevail, as later developments would prove.56   
Additional challenges to the world economy came with the 1979 Iranian revolution and 
the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, both showing how oil prices still remained significantly sensitive to 
OPEC's supplies. Iran reduced by half its exports following the revolution and the war with the 
neighbouring country, which destroyed major petroleum installations. The impacts on the 
world economy were disastrous: a nominal increase in oil prices of more than 1,000%, by the 
end of 1981, compared to the previous ten years,57 and a significant plunge of world GDP 
growth rates between 1978 and 1980.58   
Despite such negative impacts, recovery was already visible during the 1980's, since 
most alternative energy programmes launched after the first oil shock had begun to show 
promising results on the oil market. On the one hand, discovery of new oil reserves in Alaska 
                                                          
54 This strategy was one of the main reasons for the Brazilian foreign debt crisis that led to a moratorium in ͳͻͺ͹, because loans were taken at flexible rates. )n the ͳͻͺͲǯs, compelled by new circumstances, the 
rates sharply increased.    
55  Cf. Brasil Portal at <http://www.brasil.gov.br/linhadotempo/epocas/1975/programa-proalcool> 
accessed 20 May 2012. 
56 Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 47. 
57 Ibid. 48. 
58 Ibid. 48. 
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and the beginning of important deposits' explorations along the Gulf of Mexico and the North 
Sea reduced world dependence on OPEC's supply. On the other hand, the overall importance of 
oil in the world matrix had been constantly reducing, mainly due to the use of alternative 
sources, such as natural gas, nuclear energy and coal.59  Brazil is a good example of such changes 
in the energy matrix. Huge hydroelectric power plants – such as the 1979 Itaipu Hydroelectric, 
with 18,000 MW capacity – increased its role in the energy matrix together with alcohol from 
sugar cane due to the 1975 Pro-Alcool Programme. Oil discoveries in the Campos basin, in 1984, and in Albacora and Marlin, subsequently, also reduced the countryǯs dependence on oil 
imports.60   
2.1.3 THE COUNTER OIL SHOCK AND ITS AFTERMATH 
OPEC's unparalleled first decision to reduce prices in 1983 was a turning point in oil 
history. New market conditions in the petroleum industry, may explain this decision. Some 
interpret this moment as the beginning of a counter shock period in which prices followed a 
downward path.61 Oversupply of oil remained during most of the ͳͻͺͲ's, the ͳͻͻͲǯs and lasted 
until the year 2001. In 1999, the price reached a bottom level of US$ 10 a barrel and oil lost 
relevance as a strategic commodity. Tony Blairǯs speech at Davos in the year ʹͲͲͲ is emblematic 
of the prevailing over-optimism: ǲTwenty years from the oil shock of the ͹Ͳǯs, most economists 
agree that oil is no longer the most important commodity in the world economy. Now that 
commodity is information.ǳ62  
 Within this setting, during the 1990's, under the influence of liberal economic policies 
and the so called ǲWashington Consensusǳ several national oil companies (NOCs) were 
privatised or had their main assets sold, such as Yacimientos Fiscales de Bolivia (YPFB). In 
Brazil, the constitutional reform of 1995 allowed private companies to develop oil activities in 
the country. Petrobras was the only authorised company to operate in Brazil until then. Later, in 
                                                          
59 The oil participation in the world energy matrix decreased from 53% in 1978 to 43% in 1985. Cf. Daniel 
Yergin, The prize: The epic quest for oil, money & power (Simon and Schuster 2011)718.   
60 Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 49. 
61 Ibid. 49. 
62 Ibid. 52. 
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1997, the Petroleum Law (Law 9,478) created the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) and set 
forth guidelines for oil exploration through a concession regime open to foreign companies. The 
main characteristic of concession regimes is that the property of the produced oil belongs to the 
operating oil companies, which are chosen in competitive public tenders in Brazil.63 ANP was 
constituted as an autonomous agency linked to the Ministry of Mines and Energy. Law 9,478 
(Petroleum Law) also established the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE), which is an 
advisory council formed by several Ministers.64 Its main role is to propose to the President of 
the Republic energy policies and to issue guidelines about the rational use of energy resources.     
The Brazilian economy had been led until the ͳͻͻͲǯs by significant state regulation and 
direct interventionism, with the presence of state-owned enterprises in most strategic industries. The countryǯs development strategy favoured market concentration, close private 
and governmental connections and recurrent price increases. To tame the resultant explosive 
inflation rates the government frequently negotiated prices with main industrial associations, or 
even established mandatory price and quantity caps, which were the main features of regulatory activities until then. )n the ͳͻͻͲǯs regulation changed its scope, departing from direct 
interference and state production and control to focus on activities of oversight, monitoring and 
competition enhancement. During the first phase, before the ͳͻͻͲǯs, ministerial departments 
were responsible for undertaking regulatory activities.65 In the following years these tasks were 
transferred to independent regulatory agencies, which henceforth had their own assets and 
revenue sources, despite still being formally linked to one ministry of the executive branch.66   
This new regulatory stance was launched as a result of the economic agenda of 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, responsible for controlling inflation and for establishing 
a wide range of liberal and market oriented reforms, including privatisation of state-owned 
                                                          
63 See Appendix for a detailed analysis of the different oil regimes.  
64 Presidential Decree ʹ,Ͳͷ͵, which established CNPEǯs structure and functioning. 
< http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/D3520.htm> accessed 23 December 2013. 
65 Mariana Batista da Silva, ǮO Desenho )nstitucional em Pratica: uma Analise da Governanca Regulatoria e do Desempenho das Agencias Reguladoras Brasileirasǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͵͵ Encontro Anual Anpocs GT ͵ʹ – 
Politicas Publicas <http://www.regulacao.gov.br/publicacoes/artigos/o-desenho-institucional- em-
pratica-uma-analise-da-governanca-regulatoria-e-do-desempenho-das-agencias-reguladoras-brasileiras> 
accessed 15 May 2012.  
66 Ibid. 
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enterprises in utility industries. One essential feature of this set of reforms was the use of 
competition emulation and regulatory oversight as a way to increase Brazilian competitiveness 
and to maintain price stability. Another important aspect is its intrinsic link to a broader 
restructuring of Brazilian society, which included socio-political measures of democratisation, 
political liberalisation and decentralisation of social networks. According to President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, these interconnections were of vital importance to guarantee that the 
privatisation and deregulation processes were oriented by democratic principles, taking into 
account their public dimension and exempting them from private appropriation.67 The use of 
the state for private ends by powerful economic groups in the Brazilian past, demanded, 
according to him, a rupture through democracy, increasing accountability and civil society 
awareness.68     
2.1.4 OIL IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
Promising results followed the constitutional amendment and the 1997 Petroleum Law, 
with significant increases in investments, reserve discoveries, oil production and upgrade of Petrobrásǯ technological standards.69 Many experts claim that the 2007 discoveries in the pre-
salt layers off the Brazilian coast, which places Brazil among the countries with the 10 largest oil 
reserves, were a direct consequence of the success of the 1995 reform.70  
In spite of these favourable results, the regulatory framework was reformed in 2010. 
President Lula's government argued that modifications were necessary in view of the immense 
                                                          
67 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Mariana Magalhaes, ǮDemocracy as a starting pointǯ ȋʹͲͲͳȌ ͳʹ Journal 
of Democracy 5,14.  
68 For a broader discussion about privatisation, democratisation and civil society see Adam Przeworski, 
Sustainable democracy (Cambridge University Press 1995). 
69 Cf. Helder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie Eixos do Desenvolvimemto Brasileiro; Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: 
reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Giambiagi and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013); Adilson De Oliveira, ǮOil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the world energy supplyǯ in David 
Victor, David Hults and Mark Thurber (eds), Oil and Governance (Cambridge University Press 2012), 
among others.  
70 Cf. Helder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie Eixos do Desenvolvimemto Brasileiro; Walter De Vitto and Richard (ochstetler, ǮPerspectivas para os investimentos petrolíferos no Brasilǯ in Fabio Giambiagi and Luiz Paulo 
Velloso Lucas (eds), Petróleo–Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier Editora 
Ltda 2012); and Guilhereme Dias and Alfredo Renault, ǮA concentração de recursos na União e as perdas das regiões produtorasǯ in Giambiagi and Lucas ȋedsȌ, Petroleo Reforma e contrarreforma do setor 
petrolifero brasileiro (Elsevier Editora Ltda 2013). 
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pre-salt layer oil discoveries. The international context had significantly changed since the 
1990's, when the Petroleum Law was enacted and the Constitution amended. At that time, oil 
prices were low, around US$ 20 a barrel,71supply was relatively abundant, and the oil policy 
essentially concerned with self-sufficiency. In 2010 oil prices were relatively high, ranging 
between US$ 73.75 and US$ 91.45 per barrel,72 new deposits limited, with significant 
exploration costs, while Brazil was expected to have considerable oil surplus for exports in the 
near future.  
The turning point in the international oil market occurred in 2001, when the downward 
price path prevailing since 1983 was reverted and a long-term upward trend was inaugurated. 
In 2008 petroleum reached the record price of US$ 147 a barrel.73  Despite a period of 
decreasing prices, during the world financial crisis at the end of 2008, prices recovered in late 
2009 and in March 2012 were around US$ 107 a barrel.74 Such growth was mainly driven by a 
demand escalation, concentrated on emerging countries, especially India and China. High prices 
were also largely due to reduced levels of supply as a result of insufficient investments during 
the soaring price period.75 
Therefore, international market conditions placed Brazil in 2010 in a quite favourable 
position. Moreover, the country presented some other distinct advantages: its solid democratic 
trajectory and relatively reliable institutions, especially when compared with most oil exporting 
countries, as well as its close trade ties with the largest advanced economies, which are 
important oil importing countries. These circumstances provided then substantial bargaining 
power to attract investments and negotiate favourable contracts in the oil industry.  
                                                          
71 Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) varied between US$ 15.10 and 36.02 according to the 
US Energy Information Administration available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M accessed 20 May 2015. 
72 Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel), according to the US Energy Information 
Administration available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M accessed 20 May 2015. 
73 Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira (Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão 2011) 52. 
74 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) website at:  http://www.eia.gov/ accessed 2 March 2012  
75 (elder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie Eixos do Desenvolvimemto Brasileiro. 
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This overall setting certainly influenced the bill proposals of the 2010 reform, which can 
be considered interventionist in comparative international terms, as demonstrated in the next 
sections. The government of President Lula, who proposed the 2010 reform, claimed that it was necessary to increase the stateǯs strategic control over oil and its production process, given the 
new conditions unveiled with the pre-salt discoveries.  
2.2 THE 2010 REFORM IN THE BRAZILIAN OIL SECTOR  
Three main laws changed the legal framework of the Brazilian oil sector in 2010: Law 
12,351, Law 12,304 and Law 12,276. Other infra-legal norms and contracts have also been 
issued under the scope of these statutes. The next section focuses on Law 12,351. This statute 
provided most of the changes in the Brazilian regulatory framework and is, therefore, 
separately analysed.  The other two laws are described below.     
Law 12,304 authorises the Executive branch to create PPSA (Pre-Sal Petroleo S.A), a 
fully state-owned enterprise, linked to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, with the main task of 
managing the production-sharing contracts to be signed under Law 12,351.  
According to Law 12,304, PPSA is under the jurisdiction of private laws since it is a joint 
stock company. As such, it has to follow a statute and has a board of directors and an executive 
board. PPSA has been legally created with the enactment of Decree Nº 8,063, of 1 August 2013.  
Law 12,276 institutes an onerous relinquishment regime in specific areas of the 
Brazilian continental shelf. The regime allowed the transference of 5 billion barrels of 
exploration rights from the Union76 to Petrobras, with due compensation. According to its 
provisions, the national oil company holds ownership of the produced hydrocarbons, which 
should be subject to royalties77 but not the Special Participation Tax.78  
                                                          
76 The Union is a legal entity of public Law vested with the Brazilian Stateǯs sovereignty. Cf. Alexandre De 
Moraes, Direito constitucional (Editora Atlas 2002) 269. 
77 Article 5 of Law 12,276 of 30 June 2010 (Lei No. 12.276, de 30 de Junho de 2010). 
78 The Special Participation Tax is a kind of windfall profit tax applied to production volumes or 
profitability levels considered to be significant.  The threshold for its incidence varies according to the 
complexity involved in the location for oil extraction.  Law N. 9,748 specifies that a presidential decree 
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A troublesome legal aspect of this statute is the concession of these rights to Petrobras 
without any bidding procedures. Some legal specialists claim that this provision undermines the 
constitutional principle of free competition79 and also article 37, XXI of the Federal Constitution, 
which establishes that the government should follow strict procurement procedures for 
contracting services.80   
These legal and constitutional issues can easily raise questions, especially from Public 
Prosecutors and the General Accounting Office (TCU). The General Accounting Office has filed 
some cases at the Supreme Court enquiring about the constitutionality of special bidding 
procedures used by ANP under Law 9,478. Even though most of these cases have been 
dismissed at the Supreme Court,81 the very fact that they have been presented shows that the 
entities that have filed them are vigilant with respect to procurement practices. 
2.2.1 LAW 12,351  
Law 12,351 provided two major changes in the Brazilian oil regulatory framework: the 
exploration of oil and gas in pre-salt and strategic regions according to a production-sharing 
regime; and the creation of a Social Fund to invest a share of the proceeds of oil exploration in 
Brazil. 
The production-sharing regime only applies to areas of the pre-salt and those 
considered strategic. Law 9,478 and Law 12,276 govern all other domains. The former sets forth 
the conditions for exploration of oil according to a concession regime while the latter provides 
for the previously mentioned onerous relinquishment regime.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
will detail the incidence procedures of the special participation in cases of significant profit or production 
volumes of oil. Decree N. 2,705 was enacted for this purpose and provides the details for its application. 
Cf. Article 50 of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997). 
79 Article 170, IV Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (Constituição da República Federativa 
do Brasil). 
80 Cf. Antônio Luís de Miranda Ferreira, ǮProblemas e inconsistências jurídicas do novo marco regulatório: a ótica dos princípios Constitucionais da livre iniciativa, da economia de mercado e do direito comercialǯ 
in Fábio Giambiagi (ed), Petróleo: Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier 2013); Carlos Jacques Viera Gomes and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯ 
(Centro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para discussão, 2009); and Luiz Cezar 
Quintans(ed), Contratos de Petroleo Concessao e Partilha Propostas e Leis para o Pre-Sal (B. Biz Editores 
2011). 
81 Cf. Pedro de Abreu e Lima Florencio, ǮSupreme Court Decisions with Regard to the Brazilian Oil Sectorǯ 
(2013) International Energy Law Review 18. 
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Law 12,351 also clarified competences between institutions and centralised formulation 
and planning functions at ministries, CNPE and the Presidency. This clearer role delimitation 
contributes to a better institutional design, with enhanced levels of checks and balances 
between entities and a more functional, legitimate and predictable demarcation of roles among 
them.  
ANP used to perform planning and policy design functions prior to the 2010 reform, especially before ʹͲͲ͵, during President Cardosoǯs mandate.82 Paradoxically as it may seem, in 
Brazil, the greater autonomy and policy leeway granted to regulatory agencies during President Cardosoǯs term, appears to have been a strategy to maintain a close and strict presidential grip 
over regulated sectors, circumventing a possible influence coming from the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy (MME).  
When in power, President Cardosoǯs party, PSDB,83 formed a coalition with PFL,84 which 
is a party situated at the right of the political spectrum. The MME was allocated to the latter as a 
result of the alliance. Two important regulatory agencies were linked to this ministry: the 
National Petroleum Agency (ANP) and the National Electricity Power Agency (ANEEL). An 
excessive emphasis on agencies, at the expense of Ministries, may have been an attempt to insulate public policies from PFLǯs specific interests, while at the same time aligning them with 
the Presidency of the Republic. It could have been, in this sense, an ingenious way of allotting 
ministries to PFL, while still maintaining a significant control over public policies on the hands 
of PSDB and the President.85  
It is no surprise that President Cardoso appointed David Zylberstajn, with whom he had 
close connections and personal trust,86 as Director General of the National Petroleum Agency. David Zylberstajn stayed for two terms. The second appointee in President Cardosoǯs mandate 
                                                          
82 Edson Nunes and others, Agências reguladoras e reforma do Estado no Brasil: inovação e continuidade 
no sistema político-institucional (Garamond Universitária 2007) 229. 
83 Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy.  
84 Partido da Frente Liberal – Party of the Liberal Coalition. It later became Democratas (DEM).  
85 Edson Nunes and others, Agências reguladoras e reforma do Estado no Brasil: inovação e continuidade 
no sistema político-institucional (Garamond Universitária 2007)223. 
86 David Zylberstajn had been President Cardosoǯs son-in-Law. 
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for ANP was Sebastião do Rego Barros, a diplomat closely linked to the presidency. Even though the National Electricity Power Agencyǯs President was appointed by PFL, the nomination was 
mainly established on technical expertise at the request of President Cardoso. Jose Mario Abdo, 
the president for two terms, was an electrical engineer with extensive experience in the sector. 
He previously had occupied several positions in electrical state companies and did not have any 
party affiliation when appointed.   
The creation of CNPE in 1997,87 jointly with ANP, is an additional element to take into 
account in this setting. Why would the government propose the creation of a council composed 
of Ministries of different areas such as the Ministry of Finances, the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Budget and Planning, among others,88 to act as an 
advisory policy formulator in matters of energy, if there is a specific ministry responsible for 
these issues: the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME)? Even more counter-intuitive is the councilǯs advisory and non-deliberative nature. Why would the government conceive such a 
high profile entity to hold only an advisory role to the President? Other high profile councils and 
chambers such as the National Monetary Council (CMN) and the Foreign Trade Chamber 
(CAMEX) have essentially deliberative functions. The goal of centralising planning and policy formulation functions on the President, diverting it from MMEǯs influence, seems to be a 
reasonable conclusion.89   
Furthermore, CNPE was only constituted in the year 2000, three years after the legal 
provision authorising its creation: Law 9,478.90 Conversely, ANP was swiftly established in 
January 1998, only five months after the enactment of Law 9,478. Specialists consider such 
delay as a tacit renouncement of the formulation policies in favour of ANP, which, according to 
                                                          
87 Article 2 of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997). 
88 Presidential Decree No. 2,457, of 14 January 1999 (Decreto Presidencial No. 2.457, de Janeiro de 1999). 
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/D2457.htm> accessed 23 December 2013. 
89 Bruno Conde Caselli, ǮRedesenho institucional e arranjos contratuais: Uma análise da regulação e da ind’stria de petróleo e gás natural no upstream brasileiroǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de 
Janeiro 2012) 69. 
90 Presidential Decree ʹ,Ͳͷ͵, which established CNPEǯs structure and functioning.  
< http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/D3520.htm> accessed 23 December 2013.  
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them, was the entity actually in charge of these functions.91 Finally, until the enactment of Law 
12,351, ANP has also in practice been responsible for functions that are typically related to 
policy design. These include the decision with respect to the areas to be auctioned92 and the 
elaboration of Tender Protocols and model contracts under the concession regime established 
in Law 9,478, as will be further examined.93  
The above observations regarding presidential influence on regulatory agencies are 
consistent with the studies mentioned in Chapter 3 about political intervention in these entities in Brazil, which emphasise the Executive branchǯs influence and ascendency over them.94 Yet 
the consideration of the Executive branch as a whole homogeneous entity, as has been 
frequently done in the Brazilian literature on regulatory agencies, leads to a great degree of imprecision in Brazil. Since the countryǯs political system favours the formation of coalition 
governments, because of the multitude of parties with weak structures, the ministries are 
allotted to different factions of the ruling alliance.95 In this setting, a whole new dynamic takes 
place within the Executive and its influential focal points towards regulatory agencies tend to be 
diversified and multifaceted. That is why it is important to examine in more detail the Executiveǯs influence over the National Petroleum Agency, distinguishing it according to its 
sources: the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) and the Presidency of the Republic. While the formerǯs ascendancy over ANP has been feeble and reticent, the latterǯs, conversely, has been 
resilient and robust.    
                                                          
91 Edson Nunes and others, Agências reguladoras e reforma do Estado no Brasil: inovação e continuidade 
no sistema político-institucional (Garamond Universitária 2007)243. 
92 Ibid. 229. 
93 Article 8, IV of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997).  
94Mariana Batista Batista, ǮMensurando A )ndependência Das Agências Regulatórias Brasileirasǯ ȋʹͲͳͳȌ  
Planejamento e Políticas Públicas 213. 
95 The existence of a multitude of parties with weak structures in Brazil leads them to form alliances once 
disputing the presidency to maximise their chances of winning. The phenomenon is reinforced when the 
parties get to power, so they can hold a reliable political majority in Congress to pass the necessary bills 
to be able to govern. This phenomenon is referred to and studied in Brazilian Political Science Literature as ǲGovernismo de Coalizaoǳ or ǲCoalition Governanceǳ ȋpersonal translationȌ.        
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Sergio Abranches acknowledges this compartmentalisation tendency within the 
Brazilian government, which he labels as the ǲDivided Leviathanǳ.96 According to him, the 
Brazilian state is subdivided into units holding specific roles, duties and with scarce 
communication between them. Abranches considers that one of the important consequences of 
this phenomenon is an overall lack of strategic dimension in their performed tasks.97 
 Considering such general landscape, some of the modifications provided by Law 12,351 
that more clearly defined competences among state entities in the Brazilian oil sector are 
commendable. This is the topic of the next section.  
2.2.1.1 DELIMITATION OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN ENTITIES 
Law 12,351 delimited competences between entities in the oil sector and shifted some 
of their previously established allocations according to Law 9,478. Unlike other governmental areas where there has been a continuation of former policies between President Cardosoǯs 
government and his successors in the Workers Party (PT), the oil segment has experienced a 
change.98 One of the important modifications provided by Law 12,351 was the shift in 
competences among institutions.  Such modification had two main goals. The first was to clarify 
the roles and allocations between regulatory governmental bodies. The second was to assign 
further policy formulation functions to MME and CNPE, entities directly linked to the 
presidency, leaving ANP, a typical regulatory agency, focused on functions essentially linked to 
regulation, such as the monitoring and enforcement of the established exploration plans and the 
annual working programmes. The change was based on the assessment that during President 
                                                          
96 Personal translation of ǲLeviatã Divididoǳ cited in Edson Nunes and others, Agências reguladoras e 
reforma do Estado no Brasil: inovação e continuidade no sistema político-institucional (Garamond 
Universitária 2007) 222. 
97 Ibid. 222. 
98 Cf. Bruno Conde Caselli, ǮRedesenho institucional e arranjos contratuais: Uma análise da regulação e da ind’stria de petróleo e gás natural no upstream brasileiroǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de 
Janeiro 2012); and Edmar Lisboa Bacha and Regis Bonelli, ǮUma interpretação das causas da desaceleração econômica do Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ ʹͷ Revista de economia política ͳ͸͵.   
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Cardosoǯs term, agencies frequently assumed main policy formulation functions beyond their 
essential roles.99   
Law 12,351 promoted several modifications in the competences of these three entities. 
The first one relates to the signature of oil exploration contracts. While Law 9,478 considers the National Petroleum Agency ȋANPȌ as the stateǯs representative for the signature of contracts in 
the concession regime,100 according to Law 12,351 it is the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) 
that signs production-sharing agreements.101  
Under Law 9,478, before the 2010 reforms, ANP used to propose to CNPE the area of the 
blocks to be auctioned.102 The new statute entrusts this task to the MME. The approval of draft 
Tender Protocols in new auctioned areas was also subject to change. According to Law 9,478, 
ANP is entirely responsible for Tender Protocols while in Law 12,351 it is the MME. Other 
functions that werenǯt clearly defined under Law ͻ,Ͷ͹ͺ were also assigned to the MME in the 
new statute, such as the responsibility over the definition of technical and economic parameters 
for auctions and for production-sharing contracts.103 
Law 12,351 increased, similarly, CNPEǯs functions. These include the power to make 
recommendations to the President of the Republic regarding the following points: technical and 
economic parameters of production-sharing contracts;104 areas of the blocks to be auctioned 
using production-sharing agreements;105 areas to be considered strategic according to the terms 
                                                          
99 Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques ȋOECDȌ, ǮBrazil strengthening 
governance for growthǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ. 
100 Article 8, IV of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997). 
101 Article 8 of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
102 Before the 2010 reforms, Law 9,478 did not explicitly assign to any entity the role of proposal of 
auctioned areas. Yet Article 8, II of Law 9,478 stated that ANP would conduct studies for the delimitation 
of the areas. Even though there was no explicit mention that ANP would be responsible for the proposal 
of the auctioned areas to CNPE in Law 9,478, since it was the only entity conducting studies and no other 
mention was made in terms of proposal, in practice these studies were equivalent to a recommendation.   
103 Article 10 of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010).  
104 Article 9, IV of ibid. 
105 Article 9, III of ibid. 
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defined in Law;106 and areas in which Petrobras will be directly contracted without a public 
tender.107                     
These provisions of Law ͳʹ,͵ͷͳ aim at revamping CNPEǯs role as public policy 
formulator and planner, which had remained rather unclear hitherto under Law 9,478. Even 
though the Council holds only advisory functions, its direct link to the President and 
composition with Ministries and high-ranking officials from different areas, places it in a fairly 
influential position with respect to energy policies. Here again, the objective of the provisions to reduce ANPǯs allegedly excessive roles in planning and policy design seems evident.  
One of the problems of having regulatory agencies responsible for policy formulation 
roles is their lack of legitimacy for accomplishing them. These entities are expected to remain insulated from governmental political influence and private partiesǯ specific interests. That is 
why they tend to have a technocratic structure and design, which aim at safeguarding their 
independence.108  
If regulatory agencies undertake policy formulation and planning functions they risk 
becoming entwined with politics and their perceived autonomy is affected. Moreover, main 
public policies are to be designed by democratically elected governmental institutions and not 
by entities such as regulatory agencies, which are expected to act with independence. This does 
not mean, however, that regulatory agencies should be insulated from stakeholders and interest 
groups. Rather the opposite, they should be constantly taking into account their feedback using 
responsive regulatory strategies.109    
Taking into account these features, the next sections examine next the other two main 
modifications brought by Law 12,351. The first sections analyses the production-sharing 
regime, while the next one examines the Social Fund.  
  
                                                          
106 Article 9, V of ibid. 
107 Article 8, I of ibid. establishes the possibility of directly contracting Petrobras, without a public tender. 
108 See discussions in Chapter 3.   
109 See discussions in chapter 3.  
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2.2.1.2 THE PRODUCTION-SHARING REGIME AND ITS PECULIARITIES IN BRAZIL 
The principal distinguishing feature of production-sharing regimes is that the property 
of the extracted oil belongs to the state.110 After extraction, the production costs, labelled ǲcost 
oilǳ, are reimbursed to the producing oil companies, while the remaining ǲprofit oilǳ is split 
between state and producers. The percentage of ǲprofit oilǳ that goes to each can be determined 
in several ways. In Brazil, an open bidding round, in which competing companies present their 
offers, starting from a minimum level previously stipulated in the Tender Protocol, sets the 
share between state and producing oil companies.111   
Some countries provide for a ceiling, limiting the amount of recoupment for cost oil, to 
avoid moral hazard situations,112in which producers can have an incentive to inflate their 
costs.113  Law 12,351 does not, however, establish this maximum level for cost oil recoupment. 
In the first bidding round for pre-salt areas this amount was inserted in the draft production-
sharing contract of the Tender Protocol.114 The choice of legislators and Brazilian authorities 
seems to have been to leave this issue to be decided on a case-by-case basis, according to the 
particular conditions of each bidding round, instead of defining a general legal cap.  
This decision actually confers more flexibility to public policy formulators. A legal clause 
could establish very stringent or lax terms of risk and return.115 It would make future 
modifications more difficult, requiring a bill amendment to be submitted to Congress. The oil 
sector is a dynamic segment. Its conditions of profitability often change, according to several 
variables such as the discovery of new reserves, price fluctuations and local political conditions. 
                                                          
110 See Appendix for an analysis of the distinction of the different types of oil regimes.   
111 Article 18 of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
112 A situation of moral risk, or moral hazard occurs whenever the existence of insurance to an agent 
impels him to engage in irresponsible and socially undesirable actions. In the present case this action 
would be to exaggerate the costs. Another example in economic theory is when an agent starts smoking 
more and caring less about his health because he has bought a health insurance.  
113 Cf. Paulo César Ribeiro Lima, Pré-sal, o novo marco legal e a capitalização da Petrobras (Synergia 
Editora 2011)49 and also Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim et al. (eds), Marcos Regulatorios da Industria 
Mundial do Petroleo (Synergia 2011) 34.  
114  See the National Petroleum Agencyǯs webpage < http://www.brasil-
rounds.gov.br/arquivos/Edital_p1/Minuta_Edital/minuta_edital_autorizada_09072013.pdf >, accessed 13 
October 2013.   
115 The amount of cost oil to be recouped is an essential variable for the definition of the parameters of 
risk and return of a certain venture. If the recoupment of cost oil is higher the operation will be less risky 
and allow a higher return. If the recoupment were lower the opposite would occur.     
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In principle, it is desirable to employ more versatile elements to establish the parameters of risk 
and return in such a volatile and changing environment, instead of fixed and pre-defined terms, 
which are more difficult to change.   
These features of the Brazilian production-sharing regime do not significantly differ 
from most of the existing models in the world.116 There is one specific peculiarity inserted in 
Law 12,351, however, which is unique to Brazil. It is the operational exclusivity assigned to 
Petrobras in all blocks located in pre-salt domains and in areas considered to be strategic.117In 
other words, Petrobras will be the only authorised company to have operations in these 
locations.  
The pre-salt area is defined in article 2, IV of Law 12,351, according to specific 
geographical coordinates, while strategic areas are considered to be those with high production 
potential, low risk and significant importance for national development. A specific act of the 
Executive Power will determine ǲstrategic areasǳ upon consideration of these elements, 
according to article 2, V of Law 12,351.  
Even though other oil companies cannot operate within pre-salt domains and strategic areas, because of Petrobrasǯ exclusivity, they can participate as investors, via consortia, 
according to section VII of Law 12,351. However, Petrobras is required to have a 30 % minimum 
participation in all consortia,118 which means that these companies will end up disputing the 
remaining 70% share. 
Article 8, I of Law 12,351 also establishes the possibility of directly contracting 
Petrobras without a public tender in pre-salt and strategic areas.119In these instances, the oil 
company will be the only investor and operator in that specific area. The decision to directly 
                                                          
116 Cf. Kirsten Bindemann, ǮProduction-sharing agreements: an economic analysisǯ Oxford )nstitute for 
Energy Studies Oxford <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/WPM25-
ProductionSharingAgreementsAnEconomicAnalysis-KBindemann-1999.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015; and 
Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria mundial 
do petróleo (Synergia 2011). 
117 According to Article 4 of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 
2010). 
118 According to Article 10, III, c of ibid.  
119 According to Article 12 of ibid.  
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contract Petrobras for a certain domain rests upon the Brazilian President, according to a 
recommendation of the National Council of Energy Policy (CNPE). In these cases, the Federal 
government, through the Ministry of Mines and Energy, will sign production-sharing contracts 
with Petrobras. In all other situations, in which public tenders take place, the contracts will be 
signed with the representative of the winning consortium. 
As will be further detailed, these peculiarities of the Brazilian production-sharing 
regime will require significant coordination efforts between institutions in the oil sector and 
will inevitably lead to complicated and imbricated governance structures and mechanisms.120 
This new institutional setting will have a direct impact on the variables studied in the thesis, as 
will be demonstrated. 
Another important issue raised by the 2010 changes is the possible unconstitutionality 
of some of the provisions. The clauses conferring exclusive operational rights to Petrobras 
within pre-salt layers and areas considered to be of strategic importance121 seem to contradict 
the principle of free competition, inscribed in article 170, IV of the Federal Constitution. This 
principle applies to all economic activities, providing open equal opportunities in public 
tenders. Article 37, XXI of the Federal Constitution, under the same logic, requires the 
government to undertake specific procurement rules for contracting services. This requirement seems to have been ignored by the provision establishing Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity.122  
2.2.1.3 THE SOCIAL FUND 
The Social Fund was an important innovation in Brazilian energy policy, which until the 
enactment of Law 12,351, in June 2010, did not have a significant set of consistent programmes 
and actions with social and development purposes.  The Social Fund aims at providing monetary 
                                                          
120 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011). 
121 Articles 2, VI and 4 of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
122Cf. Antônio Luís de Miranda Ferreira, ǮProblemas e inconsistências jurídicas do novo marco regulatório: 
a ótica dos princípios Constitucionais da livre iniciativa, da economia de mercado e do direito comercialǯ 
in Giambiagi (ed), Petróleo: Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier 2013) and  Carlos Jacques Viera Gomes and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯ 
(Centro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para discussão, 2009). 
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resources for social and regional development in Brazil via programmes and projects in the 
following areas: poverty reduction; education; culture; sports; public health; science and 
technology; environment; and climate change.123 
The resources for the Social Fund will come from a percentage of the Signature Bonuses 
of production-sharing agreements, the amount of royalties allocated to the Federal Government 
in pre-salt domains and in areas considered to be strategic and through the revenue earned 
from the commercialisation of oil and gas in kind from the profit oil in production-sharing 
agreements.124  
On ͻ September ʹͲͳ͵, Law ͳʹ,ͺͷͺ established that ͷͲ% of the Social Fundǯs resources 
should be exclusively applied in health and education until the targets of the National Plan of 
Education have been reached.125The statute also provided that royalty revenues and Special 
Participation Tax resources from offshore oil deposits where the declaration of commerciality 
has been issued after 3 December 2012 should be entirely directed to health and education.126   
The capital of the Social Fund will be preferentially invested in secure foreign assets 
with high profitability, to avoid the negative side effects of excessive income volatility.127 Its 
investment policy will be defined by the Social Fund's Financial Management Committee, which 
shall be appointed by the government. Its members will not receive any financial compensation for exercising their functions. The Social Fundǯs Deliberative Council, in turn, will be responsible for proposing to the Executive the destination of the Fundǯs resources.  
 Only funds generated from the return on principal will be used on projects and 
programmes in the previously mentioned areas.128  After the Social Fund has attained its 
                                                          
123 Article 47, VII of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
124 Article 49 of ibid.  
125 Appendix of Law 13,005 of 25 June 2014 (Lei No. 13.005, de 25 de Junho de 2014). 
126 Article 1, I and II, of Law 12,858 of 9 September 2013 (Lei No. 12.858, de 9 de setembro de 2013). 
127 Article 50 of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010).  
128 Article 51 of ibid.  
 37 
ǲeconomic and financial sustainabilityǳ, the Executive will be able to issue a Law proposing the use of a percentage of the Fundǯs principal capital.129  
   The creation of the Social Fund is one of the most important modifications of the 2010 
oil regulatory framework. Brazil is considered to be a buoyant economy, ranking the seventh 
largest GDP in the world,130 with a solid and diversified industrial base and significant 
production of sophisticated goods such as in the aviation and telecommunication industries. Yet 
whenever social aspects are taken into consideration, the country always lags behind most of 
the main world economies. The most problematic issues include inequality of income, health 
and education. The latter two are of poor quality, still supplied in insufficient levels and, above 
all, incompatible with a country having the seventh largest GDP in the world. Concerning 
inequality, despite the reduction of recent years, Brazil is still considered one of the most 
inequitable countries of the world. Its Gini index is currently of 54.7, which ranks it as the fourth 
worse country in a group of 46 countries assessed by the World Bank in 2010.131     
The Social Fund is therefore an important initiative to redress this landscape. One of its 
principal advantages is to provide for an initial phase in which only the return on capital can be used. Provisions of this type have also been used in Norwayǯs oil fund, which has acted as a sort 
of benchmark for Brazil.132 They are important to ensure that the Fundǯs capital will not be 
dispersed irresponsibly. The second phase in which the principal capital may be partially used, 
after the Fund has attained ǲeconomic and financial sustainabilityǳ,133 needs, however, further 
clarification. The use of this broad and vague concept for such an important financial aspect that safeguards the Fundǯs long-term profitability should be further detailed to avoid any kind of 
opportunistic attempt to use its capital in a manner that could affect its long-term profitability. 
                                                          
129 Article 51, sole paragraph of ibid. 
130  World Bank figures available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table> 
accessed 14 April 2015. 
131 Data available from the World Bank:< http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI> accessed 28 
November 2013.   
132 See discussions in Chapter 4.  
133 Article 51, sole paragraph of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 
2010).  
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It is essential, moreover, to establish exactly what will be the maximum percentage of the 
principal that can be used after the fund has attained its ǲeconomic and financial sustainabilityǳ.          
The Social Fund has three main goals.134 First, to supply resources for national and 
regional development. Second, to ensure that future generations will also be able to profit from the countryǯs oil wealth and that the current ones will not squander the resources on 
inconsistent short-sighted and unsustainable projects. In other words, it is a mechanism of 
inter-generation compensation. Third, it aims at mitigating potential problems coming from an 
excessive revenue variation or influx in the economy because of the importance that oil will 
assume in the Brazilian future. In this latter sense it can be considered a typical stabilisation 
fund.135  It intends, more specifically, to minimise one of the recurrent problems of oil exporting 
countries: the so called ǲresource curseǳ, also known as ǲparadox of the plenty theoryǳ.136 
According to this theory, a commodity exporter country tends to stay excessively dependent on 
revenues of this single product and does not develop its industries, infrastructure and social 
standards. In ensuring that resources will be directed to education, science, technology and 
development the fund intends to mitigate this problem, since these elements are expected to increase the economyǯs overall productivity.  
Even though this concern about the resource curse is commendable, studies indicate 
that it might not actually be a significant future problem in Brazil.137 Differently from other 
smaller economies in Africa and in the Middle East, for example, where oil resources account for 
the bulk of GDP and exports, forecasts indicate that the same will not happen in Brazil. Luciano 
Losekan and Thiago Periard demonstrate that since the Brazilian economy is big and 
diversified, oil exports will not represent a significant share of GDP in the country, if compared 
                                                          
134 Article 48 of ibid. 
135 Mark Allen and Jaime Caruana, ǮSovereign Wealth Funds: A Work Agendaǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ ʹͻ )nternational 
Monetary Fund. 
136 Cf. Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, Escaping the resource curse (Cambridge 
University Press 2007). 
137 Cf. Carlos Jacques Viera Gomes and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯ 
(Centro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para discussão, 2009); and Luciano Losekann 
and Thiago Periard, Projecoes do Pre-sal: O Brasil sera um petro-estado? (Blog Infopetro 2013). 
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to other petro-states where the level of dependency with respect to this product is very high.138 
They forecast that in 2035 0.002 barrels of petroleum will be exported for each 1 US dollar of 
real GDP. This indicator is substantially lower than other smaller countries, more dependent on 
oil and with a less diversified economy such as Iraq and Angola, with indicators of 0.02.139  
Analogously, the Brazilian indicator of oil production as a proportion of consumption in 2035 will be ʹ, according to the authorsǯ estimates. This means that the country will produce twice its 
consumption needs in that specific year. Most oil exporters and OPEC countries have an 
indicator greater than 5.140 This mainly happens because Brazil is an industrialised country with 
relatively high consumption levels of oil. Unlike most oil exporters in the world, Brazil 
discovered the bulk of its oil reserves after developing a dynamic and diversified industrial 
economy. This fact diminishes significantly the risks of the country being affected by any sort of 
resource curse because its economic dependency on oil is rather small, compared to most petro-
states, and so is its forecasted exportable oil surplus, according to the abovementioned 
indicators.141      
Since it is unlikely that Brazil will face a resource curse and that oil revenues will lead to 
abrupt oscillations in most of the economic variables such as the exchange rate, inflation and 
GDP, it would be better if the Brazilian Social Fund could concentrate on its social and inter-
generation saving aspects rather than on its stabilisation goals. One of the potential risks for the 
Fund is that its diversified objectives might lead to possible future stalemates or divergences 
that could affect its long-term effectiveness. Actions within its stabilisation scope might include, 
for example, initiatives to remedy short-term oscillations of the exchange rate. If these actions 
are used excessively it is possible that the social and inter-generational goals of the Fund might 
be affected by these short-term economic purposes, under the influence of the powerful 
economic ministries.  
                                                          
138 Luciano Losekann and Thiago Periard, Projecoes do Pre-sal: O Brasil sera um petro-estado? (Blog 
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139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Cf. for example, Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz, Escaping the Resource Curse 
(Columbia University Press 2007). 
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
The Brazilian stateǯs influence in the oil sector has actually shown a pendulous 
movement throughout time, following the international tendency, with domestic nuances. In an initial period, from Petrobrasǯ creation, in 1953, until 1995, state presence has been pervasive 
and strong, with operational exclusivity being granted to the national oil company. Such robust 
interference was important for the formation of the Brazilian oil sector, since the lack of 
promising prospects for oil exploitation in the country would not have interested the private 
sector. The constitution of Petrobras as a solid and technologically advanced corporation 
therefore began with this essential state support, which was predominant until 1995.  
From that moment onwards, the weak governmental financial situation and the 
prevailing economic ideology led to an opening of the oil industry to international oil companies 
and to a change in the regulatory framework. This modification generated very promising 
results, including the discovery of pre-salt reserves in ʹͲͲ͹. )t was part of President Cardosoǯs 
liberal reforms aiming to emulate competition and to increase regulatory oversight as an important means to raise the countryǯs competitiveness and to control inflation. His 
government launched a regulation model with clear predominance of regulatory agencies over 
other entities of the Executive branch, especially in the oil sector.  
The government of President Lula departed from the regulatory model of his predecessor by removing regulatory agenciesǯ allocations and by increasing the influence of 
entities directly linked to the presidency in oil policies. This stricter governmental control over 
the oil sector follows a crescendo, which reaches its peak in 2010, with the regulatory frameworkǯs reform. Such reform to a great extent reflected the favourable new landscape of 
the Brazilian oil sector, with the discovery of promising reserves, in a global context of high 
prices and relative excess liquidity for investments. Yet such backdrop is radically altered in ʹͲͳͶ, with the sharp plunge in crudeǯs price and an overall economic background of recession 
and investment retraction.  
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Until 2010, the oil sector in Brazil had counted with adequate governance structures and 
a set of consistent and successfully implemented policies in the most diverse historical contexts. 
After an initial robust state control over the oil industry during its initial developments, this interference was mitigated in the ͳͻͻͲǯs but in a rational and balanced manner, still 
maintaining state control over the national oil company, while also allowing it to compete with 
other corporations. This governmental grip proved important in bringing to the company a 
strategic long-term dimension, considering national priorities and aspects beyond mere short 
term corporate profitability, as will be further detailed in chapter 4. Hence, when the vast pre-
salt layers were discovered in 2007, Brazil already possessed a relatively well-developed oil 
industry and a diversified and industrialised economy, which mitigated to a great extent the 
resource curse risk.142 This favourable situation is no mere coincidence and actually resulted 
from a set of consistent and well-adjusted past policies.  
Unfortunately the Brazilian 2010 reform is reversing such positive path, despite some 
encouraging aspects here pointed out such as the Social Fund and the greater delimitation of 
competences between regulatory and policy planning entities. Exactly in a moment when the 
upstream sector needs a substantial amount of investment and a boost in technological 
standards due to the important challenges in the pre-salt region, the government promoted 
reforms that lead to significant drawbacks in these areas, as will be demonstrated in part II of 
the thesis. The regulatory framework also significantly restrained competition, precisely when 
the company was more than prepared to successfully face it. Finally, the design of governance 
structures and oil policies that are excessively dependent on one single state-owned company in 
a context in which the oil sector is expected to assume a leading role in the Brazilian economy is 
risky and increases the probability of corruption in the company, as further developments will 
show.              
                                                          
142 Cf. Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, Escaping the resource curse (Cambridge 
University Press 2007). 
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3 - REGULATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS TO THE BRAZILIAN OIL 
SECTOR 
The main goal of this chapter is to discuss regulatory theory and how it is specifically 
applied to the oil sector and to the Brazilian context. Since the thesis does not use an exclusive 
analytical framework, the objective here is to examine the theories that are most pertinent to 
the analysis and how they specifically apply to each context.  
Regulation has been defined in various ways by numerous authors. Despite all 
definitions and their nuances, they all in one way or another relate to the control of an activity 
for the public interest. Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave provide a good explanation. According 
to them, ǲRegulation is often thought of as an activity that restricts behaviour and prevents the 
occurrence of certain undesirable activities.ǳ143Regulation therefore involves an activity 
undertaken by the government, which uses its power to coerce, limit, restrain or control private partiesǯ actions to benefit society as a whole.   
There are several theories that explain the reasons for regulation, how it develops and 
applies in practice. Regulation may arise, for instance, as a result of the pressure that interest 
groups exert on politicians. It may, on the other hand, be the direct consequence of popular 
appeal for intervention to remedy an anticompetitive situation, such as a monopoly, for 
example. Viscusi, Harrington Jr. and Vernon distinguish between situations when regulation 
should take place, called ǲnormative analysisǳ, as opposed to ǲpositive theoryǳ, which explains 
when regulation does actually happen.144 
Normative theories are primarily concerned with the technical justifications for 
regulation, mainly using economic theory, while positive analysis enquires about the motives 
and explanations for regulation. This chapter does not consider normative theories 
concentrating, instead, on the positive approach, in the first sections. Within this setting, 
                                                          
143 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding regulation : theory, strategy, and 
practice (2nd ed. / Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge. edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 2. 
144 William Kip Viscusi, Joseph  Harrington and John  Vernon, Economics of regulation and antitrust (MIT 
Press 2005) 377. 
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interest theories and institutional theories are subsequently analysed, with a special focus on 
the latter, which is one of the main theoretical framework used in the thesis. While considering 
them, constant references are made to how they apply to the oil sector in general, and to Brazil 
in particular.  
Reflexive and responsive theories are analysed in the last part of the chapter. These 
theories transcend the regulatory and deregulatory debate that is normally present in 
normative and interest theories, proposing, instead, new forms of relationships and interactions 
between stakeholders and systems. They will assume specific relevance throughout the thesisǯ, 
especially in chapter 9.  
3.1 INTEREST THEORIES   
 Interest theories analyse how and why regulation takes place, stressing the interest 
behind it as the main driving force. Despite the several existing conceptual frameworks, they 
can all be categorised in two main groups, according to their public and private versions.145    
3.1.1 PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY  
 Public Interest theory considers that regulators mainly act in the public interest on 
occasions when markets fail to yield the optimal social result. Therefore, according to this 
framework, regulation is mainly justified in the situations in which there are technical grounds 
for interventions. For this reason, this theory has also been recently labelled as ǲNormative 
Analysis as a Positive Theoryǳ.146  
 One of the main assumptions of Public Interest theory is that markets tend towards 
allocative efficiency and that government regulatory action is therefore only justified in 
situations of market failure, as a way to remedy them. Since regulation is a specific 
governmental action in response to a social demand for the overall benefit, public interest 
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stands as a presumption of the theory. Therefore, it is assumed that regulatory agencies always 
act for the general well-being and any deviation from this goal is supposed to result from 
inadequate operational and functional problems, instead of deriving from mistaken policy goals. 
 Public Interest theory has faced four significant criticisms. First, it does not test, explain 
or detail why and how regulation takes place to correct market failures, using it, instead, as a 
theoretical assumption.147 Second, and as a direct consequence of the first point, there seems to 
exist a tautological and circular relationship between market failures and regulation that makes 
it difficult to correctly identify if the causation link goes from the former to the latter, as 
expected, or if, instead, the opposite may be happening. 148 Based on this understanding, 
Peltzman et al.ǯ state: ǲTo be sure, a good economist needs no more than fifteen minutesǯ notice to produce a market failure to Ǯexplainǯ any of these interventions. But credulity is strained 
when the list of market failures grows at roughly the same rate as the number of regulatory agencies.ǯ149 
 The third, and main reason for the theoryǯs lack of support among scholars, is the 
significant amount of empirical evidence that rejects it, demonstrating that numerous 
regulatory policies have undesirable social outcomes that benefit certain groups to the 
detriment of others.150 Finally, the theory assumes that state interventionism is always effective, 
neutral and without any social costs. George Stigler and other economists have criticised this 
assumption showing that government action is far from neutral and sometimes generates 
significant social costs, or ǲgovernment failuresǳ, as they label it.151 
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3.1.2 PRIVATE INTEREST THEORIES 
 Private )nterest theories take into account how private partiesǯ interests determine 
regulatory outcomes. They encompass several theoretical variations nominated in different 
ways.152 
 The Capture theory represented a first stark reaction against Public Interest theory. It 
mainly attempted to explain its empirical inconsistencies as well as the statistical evidence 
showing that regulation was favourable to producers and tilted towards increasing industrial 
profits.  
 Capture theory considers that regulation is a direct response to industryǯs claims, which 
would therefore control the regulator in its own best interests. The theory was further refined 
by George Stigler in what has been considered the Economic Theory of Regulationǳ or the ǲChicago School Approachǳ.153 The theory assumes that there actually exists a market for 
regulation between regulated industries and legislators, whereby the former would try to 
influence the latter through financial compensation and votes to extract beneficial outcomes.  
 Sam Peltzman builds further on Stiglerǯs work, demonstrating that regulatory policy is 
not captured by only one groupǯs interest. Politicians attempt to take into account several groupsǯ claims establishing an outcome that satisfies the best overall interest.154 Among those 
groups he included consumers, since they also are a source of revenue and votes. However, according to James Wilsonǯs studies, consumers are not likely to effectively influence legislators, 
since they are not well organised and their potential gain from legislation tends to be 
significantly lower than that of other groups. According to Wilson, regulation tends to favour 
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small and organised interest groups with tenacious and cohesive preferences at the expense of 
large ones with preferences.155       
  Gary Becker refines the argument that several pressure groups influence politicians 
linking it to Normative theories.156 He argues that apart from their own interests, politicians 
also take into account social welfare and efficiency, seeking to maintain a relative balance 
between different pressure groups and also between winners and losers of regulatory action. 
 Private Interest theories have contributed significantly in explaining and understanding 
the reasons behind regulation and how it comes into force. However, these theories have 
several limitations. First, they tend to have a rather narrow and partial view of state institutions 
as formed by individuals who only take into account their self-interest. Public welfare is almost 
neglected and stress is placed on how technically defined regulatory goals are avoided and 
mitigated. Yet individuals are not only driven by welfare maximisation. They tend to have 
diverse and even antagonist interests according to the roles they play as consumers, producers, 
civil servants, politicians and so forth.157 To explain how these sometimes contradictory 
preferences are translated into regulatory outcomes is complicated. Bureaucrats, in turn, may 
not always act in their own immediate self-interest because of greater public ideals, ideology, 
moral imperatives or even lack of expertise and knowledge.158   
 Second, the theory seems to assume that regulatory outcomes derive directly from 
legislators, ignoring the role played by regulators who enforce, interpret and monitor the rules 
and can, therefore, play an essential part in defining their results. Third, the theory leaves rather 
ignored the force that ideas can play in changing regulations. Finally, and maybe most 
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importantly, these theories do not take into account the institutional context in which 
regulatory policies are formulated, developed and enforced.159   
3.2 INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES   
 Institutional theorists argue that regulations are fundamentally determined by 
institutional settings, arrangements and rules, rather than the preferences of individuals that 
maximise wealth. Despite the several strands of the literature with their specificities and 
nuances, one common ground of all theorists is the general idea that institutions influence 
regulation. Numerous have also been the definitions given to institutions in political science, 
sociology, law and economics. Avner Greif provides a comprehensive definition, which has the 
advantage of encompassing concepts from different areas of knowledge in an attempt to unify 
the understanding of the term. According to Greif  ǲAn institution is a system of social factors 
that conjointly generate a regularity of behaviour. Each component of this system is social in 
being man-made, nonphysical factor that is exogenous to each individual whose behaviour it 
influences.ǳ160  
Within this scope, New Institutionalists have more recently driven their focus towards 
delegation problems arising in institutional settings when one agent performs a particular task on another oneǯs behalf. Scholars have dedicated special attention to difficulties in these cases 
coming from principal-agent problems, especially those occurring when elected politicians 
implement their public policies relying on unaccountable agencies.161 The main issue to be 
considered in these cases is the following. The President, the legislative branch, or both 
(principals), delegate power to regulators (agents) for their expertise. The goal is to be able to 
implement better policies and to ensure that the decision-making process will be undertaken 
without undue political interference. However, principals incur two kinds of common risks in 
this delegation process. The first is called an adverse selection risk, defined as the peril involved 
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in nominating regulators with interests that are different from their own. The second, labelled 
moral risk, arises whenever regulators drift from the principal's preferences after their 
appointment.162  
 Several scholars have studied how this apparently conflicting relationship between 
principals and agents develops within the scope of regulatory frameworks. Numerous empirical 
studies have also been undertaken trying to understand from concrete cases whether agencies 
were actually independent and whether legislators, the Executive, or both, manage to exert 
control over regulatory outcomes or not. Three sets of conclusions can be derived from the 
literature.163 A first group, which claims that regulatory agencies are basically independent, a 
second, which posits that principals can effectively control regulatory outcomes and a third 
presents arguments saying that control is possible but uncertain.    
  Among the group that concludes that control is possible, McCubbins et al. draw attention to agenciesǯ and bureaucratsǯ tendencies to deviate from their legislative established objectives 
and claim that an effective solution to this problem is the establishment of rigorous 
administrative proceedings that reduce information asymmetries and create decision-making 
procedures to safeguard the original settings and exercise a higher degree of control.164 
 Other authors claim that this deviation from principalsǯ can be mitigated and 
significantly reduced through the creation of adequate institutional frameworks and agency 
design which prevent future political changes from affecting the original legislative 
understandings.165 Among the authors who argue that control over agencies is not possible and 
that they tend to act independently from principals are Shapiro166 and Wood.167 Hammond and 
Knott168 and Spiller169 present evidence showing that control is possible but rather uncertain.  
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The Brazilian experience demonstrates that total independence is certainly rare and 
that the degree of governmental interference and control in regulated sectors tends to vary 
according to the strategic importance of the industry.170 Control in key sectors is usual and does 
not necessarily represent a drawback, even considering impacts in terms of investments. What 
should be avoided, however, is the discretionary political interference in agencies and regulated 
policies that affect their credibility and the rule of Law. Another aspect illustrated by the 
Brazilian experience is the importance of taking into account the different focal points of 
influence and control coming from the Executive branch over regulatory agencies. In the oil 
sector, for example, the degree of control of the Ministry of Mines of Energy over ANP is small, 
while the opposite is true with respect to the Presidency of the Republic.171  
 Within the neo-institutionalist framework, some scholars widen the scope of the 
institutional context to include other aspects in their analyses such as courts, habits, balance of 
power, focusing on how regulatory actors react in these environments and how can they 
establish reliable commitments to the credibility of the regulatory policy.172The main idea behind these studies is that regulated marketsǯ industries normally have significant sunk 
costs173 and operate in a highly politicised environment, since the provided services and goods 
bring substantial social benefits. Therefore, investments in these areas are considered very 
risky. To be able to ensure that they will be made in the desired amount to guarantee 
satisfactory development levels, host governments have to guarantee contractual and 
regulatory stability and a credible institutional environment. Hence, according to these authors, 
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the performance of agencies and their credibility cannot be exclusively determined by their 
institutional design and regulatory tools and has to take into account the wider institutional 
setting.174  
 Supporters of this view tend to agree that regulation has a higher degree of credibility in 
countries with institutional settings that restrain political discretionary interference over 
regulatory agencies. In these cases, the possibilities of political opportunist behaviour are 
reduced and regulatory governance acts to the benefit of stable and predictable rules.175  
    Institutional concepts have, without a doubt, brought significant contribution to 
regulatory theory, enriching its scope and promoting very fertile interdisciplinary debates. It 
has, importantly, shifted the centre of the discussions from an otherwise excessively 
economically oriented audience to a wider one that now prominently includes political 
scientists and socio-legal scholars. It also has significantly brought into focus the analysis of how 
procedural aspects influenced by the institutional setting affect regulatory outcomes. Yet it also 
has limitations. The first one derives from its excessively broad scope, since it is difficult to 
balance and take into account so many diverse and sometimes contradictory variables such as 
culture, politics and history, among others. As a result, most institutional studies have to limit 
their analyses to be able to make any kind of significant theoretical conclusions from reality. The 
second one relates to the excessive importance that is sometimes placed on the study of 
institutional credibility for regulation and for the preponderance given to investment attraction 
as one of the main focus of regulatory studies. Regulation has several other objectives apart 
from guaranteeing investment, which have to be adequately pondered and considered. 
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3.3 INTEREST THEORIES AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES IN BRAZIL 
 Brazilian scholars studying regulatory issues tend to concentrate on Institutional 
theories and delegation problems arising in specific industries.176 Little attention as yet has 
been given to Interest and Normative theories. As previously stated, one distinctive feature of 
the Brazilian literature is the conclusion that the delegation process in the country mainly 
operates from the Executive branch to regulators, instead of having the Legislative as a starting 
point, as in the North American case. Mariana Prado explains the reasons:  
ǲThe fact that the executive branch was the main proponent of Independent 
Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in Brazil and was the entity conducting the reforms 
shifts the focus of our attention to the President. In the United States, the 
prevalent theoretical approach to regulatory agencies is to model a principal-
agent relationship between the regulatory agency (agent) and the entity that 
delegates its power (principal). In the American scenario, the principal is 
Congress, but in the case of Brazil it is the President.ǳ 177 
 Despite this difference between the Brazilian and the North American models, Mariana 
Prado identifies the tendency in Brazil to copy American regulations through legal transplants 
without taking into account relevant domestic cultural, political and institutional aspects. She 
claims that this trend has considerably hindered some of the positive aspects of the American 
institutional design that aim to guarantee regulatory independence, when applied to Brazil. 
Mariana Prado demonstrates that conferring financial autonomy to agencies is one crucial aspect copied from the US as a means to guarantee agenciesǯ autonomy which has proved 
ineffective in Brazil.  
The presidential control of the federal budgetǯs appropriation process and the 
possibility of limiting the transference of funds through presidential decrees were the 
institutional Brazilian peculiarities that led to the inadequacy of this transplantation, owing to a 
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lack of national adaptations. Mariana Prado shows how the Brazilian Executive branch has 
significantly reduced the budgets of the National Telecommunication Agency and the National 
Electricity Agency between 2001 and 2005 through these measures.178 
 Regina Silva Pacheco179 and Lucia Helena Salgado180 similarly refer to the Brazilian ǲone 
size fits all modelǳ copied form the US as a major drawback in designing independent regulatory 
agencies in the country. They focus in more detail on the problems related to the use of the 
same institutional design for social and economic regulatory agencies in Brazil. Another 
drawback of the Brazilian experience, according to them, is the divestiture of state-owned assets 
and the implementation of privatisation programmes in most industries, without previously 
creating the institutional regulatory framework to foster competition and provide for the 
adequate protection of investors. Specialists in the field tend to agree on the need to avoid these 
situations, referring, in particular, to the negative experience of former European communist 
countries.181            
 Mariana Batista da Silva, while analysing more specifically the credibility of the Brazilian 
regulatory policy according to an institutional framework, questions the level of political 
interference in regulation in Brazil.182 She concludes that there is an excessive concentration of 
powers at the Executive branch, which could negatively impact on regulatory credibility. 
According to her, there are several incentives for the Executive to act opportunistically against the regulatory agencyǯs independence, such as establishing price caps to control inflation rates. 
Yet she claims that this power could in theory be adequately and effectively offset by the 
Judiciary branch, which acts independently in the country and is seen as a possible veto point on the Executiveǯs opportunistic moves. 
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 It is questionable, however, if the Judiciary can actually represent an effective veto point 
on the Executive in its populist drifts, especially in economic issues concerning regulatory 
aspects. As shown by Carlos Ari Sunfeld et al.,183most of the cases in which Executive action have 
been reviewed in the Supreme Court have resolved in favour of the Executive. Specifically in oil, 
case studies demonstrate that the Supreme Court has revealed a cautious stance and extreme 
reserve in interfering in determinations and regulations issued from the Executive branch and 
the ANP, focusing its analysis on formal procedural aspects.184 This is exactly opposite to the 
trend in social areas, such as the health sector, where the Supreme Court has revealed an 
interfering attitude, carefully examining the subject matter under dispute and frequently 
obliging the Executive to provide specific medicines to individuals.185 Research conducted in ʹͲͳͳ at the Supreme Courtǯs electronic database identified only ͳͶͺ decisions related to the oil 
sector.186 Such number is undoubtedly tiny considering that the Supreme Court receives a 
yearly caseload average of 100,000.187Most of these lawsuits refer to appeals against ANP fines in inspections related to the quality of fuel in gas stations and to cases related to civil servantsǯ 
national public contests results in entities of the oil sector. In the few lawsuits with potential to 
impact on oil policy, the Supreme Court has refused to enter into consideration of their subject 
matter and has rather restricted itself to the analysis of strict legality. In some cases this non-
interference is justified with statements such as ǲpolitical decisionsǳ taken by the executive 
should not be re-evaluated by the Judiciary branch.188 
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Mariana Batista also analyses the formal institutional design of regulatory agencies in 
Brazil, attempting to measure their independency levels through an assessment of their legal 
framework. She infers that Brazilian agencies are institutionally designed in an adequate 
manner to guarantee their independence. However, since legal regulatory provisions are 
considered open and vague, they leave quite significant room for the Executive branch to act 
opportunistically. 
 Her conclusions with respect to the vagueness and openness of provisions are 
particularly relevant in the oil sector, where some statutes even involve the interpretation of 
some complex economic concepts such as monopoly, for example.189 To a certain degree most 
economic Law rules have this feature, since they apply to the economic context, which is in 
constant evolution and change, as noted by Teubner.190 When considering the level of political 
interference in regulatory agencies, Mariana Batista191 and Bernardo Mueller and Carlos Pereira 
conclude that the ANP is the agency that has most suffered political intervention from 1998 to 
2008.192  
 If this more interfering stance on the part of the state in the oil sector took place in the 
government of President Cardoso, President Lula da Silva and President Dilma Roussef, since 
her inauguration in 2010, have followed and reinforced it. Apart from the 2010 changes to the 
regulatory framework to ensure even greater state control over exploration and production, 
President Roussef has also been more categorical in her own ascendancy over Petrobras than in 
other state-owned enterprises. One clear sign of this objective was the appointment of a 
personal friend as President of Petrobras.193 
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3.4 REFLEXIVE AND RESPONSIVE THEORIES 
Reflexive and Responsive theories are conceptual perspectives that transcend 
discussions rather predominant in Normative and Interest theories over the desirability of 
regulating or deregulating a certain industry or sector. These approaches, which take into 
account the continuous and fertile interactions among different group of stakeholders and 
systems, tend to envisage a possible middle path between these two extreme perspectives. They 
advocate a versatile, self-imposing and non-intrusive standpoint towards regulations.  
3.4.1 RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
 Responsive regulation is a conceptual framework advocated by Ayres and Braithwaite, 
which questions the dichotomy existent between the free market and state regulation. It 
advocates a regulatory perspective combining state and private regulations, including public, 
private and soft laws. Ayres and Braithwaite claim that the modern world is complex and has 
several stakeholders and interest groups that continuously interact in an environment in which 
regulation, deregulation and re-regulation are simultaneously taking place. They contend that 
we live in ǲan era of regulatory fluxǳ194 where all the spheres of institutional regulatory power 
constantly interact, legitimising and challenging each other.195 
 Responsive regulation establishes an important role for the state in empowering private interest groups in regulated sectors, fostering the congregation of interests, civil societyǯs 
participation and its engagement to enrich governance structures, promoting effective 
mechanisms of checks and balance. This is a view in line with the idea of ǲrepublicanismǳ, to 
which the authors subscribe.196 They argue that the state should attempt to foster and introduce 
mechanisms of self-regulation, according to the principles of democratic republicanism.197    
                                                          
194 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive regulation: transcending the deregulation debate (Oxford 
University Press 1992) 14. 
195 Ibid. 14. 
196 Ibid. 18. 
197 Ibid. 101,133. 
 56 
 One of the essential dilemmas of regulation, according to Ayres and Braithwaite, is how 
to entice collaborative and participatory initiatives, avoiding at the same time capture and 
corruption. They claim that the exact same aspects that contribute to participation also lead to 
regulatory capture and malfeasance. According to them: ǲThis is the policy we seek to crack. 
How do we secure the advantages of the evolution of cooperation while averting the evolution 
of capture and corruption?ǳ198  
As a response, Ayres and Braithwaite propose a three-tiered empowerment model of public interest groups ȋP)GsȌ which provide: iȌ their access to all the regulatorǯs information; iiȌ 
a place at the negotiating table whenever deals are concluded; and iii) equal powers to the 
regulator to sue and/or prosecute.199 According to them, P)Gsǯ main function is, therefore, to act 
as a third player between regulators and regulated actors, undertaking the necessary punitive 
actions whenever required. PIGs would exert the function of enforcers of a metanorm whenever 
the two other groups do not comply with established regulations and norms. The mere 
existence of these punitive actions and oversight would contribute to compliance while also 
allowing PIGs to participate in the regulatory process, providing the necessary feedback to 
regulators towards its increased effectiveness.  
 Yet the authors contend that two important problems arise in such contexts. The first is 
called the failure of trust problem, captured in the question of who guard the guardians?200 It 
essentially questions the paradox in dealing with problems of trust by increasingly adding 
custodians. In other words, if PIGs monitor regulators and regulated entities, who exerts 
oversight on the PIGs? Such questions could be asked indefinitely. The second is how to 
appropriately choose PIGs to be empowered?  
 To tackle the first problem, Ayres and Braithwaite propose to promote open 
competition among PIGs, fostering their contestability in such manner that they are constantly 
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monitored, scrutinised and challenged. Concerning the second question, there can be several 
answers. In a simplest model of empowerment, the state would select the best PIG to exert the 
functions. Despite acknowledging the limitations of this simplest form, Ayres and Braithwaite 
recognise that it favours swift deliberations in situations where no decision making at all would 
be an inferior alternative. Ideally, according to them, PIG selection would depend on each 
institutional and historical context.201  
 Another essential aspect of responsive regulation is that it proposes a regulatory 
strategy in which state intervention through command and control initiatives is avoided and 
only used as a last resort. Ayres and Braithwaite contend that self-regulation and enforcement 
strategies based first on persuasion attract less resistance from regulated companies, fostering 
collaboration and demanding fewer resources.202 Yet they only function appropriately if the 
regulated firms know beforehand that regulators can resort, if needed, to more intrusive models 
and punitive measures, which is the idea behind the metaphor of the ǲbenign big gunǳ.203   
Against this backdrop, they propose a regulatory approach that progressively scales a 
pyramid, departing from the previously mentioned situation of self-regulation and persuasion 
towards increasing levels of state intrusiveness and command and control regulations, with 
punishment and maximum social control located at its apex. The ascendancy of the pyramid would essentially depend on the regulated sectorǯs acceptance of and compliance with the 
respective strategies.  
 As will be demonstrated throughout the thesis, responsive regulation is a quite useful 
model for Brazil after the 2010 reform, which is considered excessively intrusive and does not contribute to collaboration and cooperation of regulated entities. Ayres and Braithwaiteǯs 
conceptual framework is also compelling because it overcomes the excessively reductionist 
liberal notion that the provision of rules and rights, especially for the disadvantaged, are enough 
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to remedy regulatory failures and problems.204  They show that empowerment of interest 
groups is an essential aspect of regulation and in some instances excessive rules, norms and 
punishments are counterproductive and costly.  
Yet one of the theoryǯs limitations is related to its difficult applicability and with the 
problems in creating the appropriate networks of governance for each sector.205Such actions 
involve very complicated decisions and efforts of institutional design aimed at the 
empowerment of the appropriate public interest groups. It is no mere coincidence that Ayres 
and Braithwaite recognise the limitations in deciding which PIGs should be empowered. 
Contestability and constant competition of other PIGs, in turn, might not take place at all 
because of the several problems in organising and maintaining social interest groups and in 
providing effective mechanisms for civil societyǯs participation. At the end of the day, picking 
and choosing adequate public interest groups and forming governance networks for each 
regulated sector could simply be another form of state intrusiveness that could lead to 
corruption and fallouts without contributing to cooperation and inclusiveness.  
3.4.2 REFLEXIVE REGULATION      
Reflexive regulation is a theoretical concept proposed by Gunther Teubner based on Niklas Luhmannǯs systems theory.206 Luhmann argues that social systems are systems of 
communication, which select a limited amount of information to define themselves in contrast 
to the environment in which they are inserted. Therefore, communication is an essential aspect of a systemǯs definition, since it performs the important task of reducing complexity with 
respect to the external world. This process of complexity reduction from a chaotic and 
unintelligible situation is called ǲautopoiesisǳ.207  
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Each system functions according to its own proper codes, its language, which are 
continuously replicated and reproduced through autopoietic closure processes. Because of such 
autopoietic closure, systems operate following communication codes and are unable to understand other systemsǯ codes. Considering, for example, that economics and Law are both 
different social subsystems, the theory argues that they operate according to their own logic and 
do not make sense of each other. According to Teubner, the legal subsystem is defined by a 
binary code of legality and illegality, while the economic subsystem is essentially defined by a 
binary code of payment and non-payment, which follows the language of prices.  
Even though social systems are diverse and unintelligible to each other, they do interact, 
absorb external features and evolve from such interactions. This happens because despite being 
operationally closed, social systems are cognitively open, which allows them to take into 
account perturbations from the external world through a process that Luhmann called ǲstructural decouplingǳ. 
 Against this backdrop, Teubner contends that Law as a social subsystem should not 
attempt to influence other subsystems through command and control structures, dictating its 
own language or logical reasoning because the targeted settings are essentially different and 
operationally closed subsystems, which do not comprehend the legal communication logic. 
Three problems may arise in these cases, according to Teubner:  
1) the Law might not have any influence over the social conduct; 
2) it may distort the practice through incompatible requirements; or 
3) the legal rule may lose its own consistency and coherence by attempting to 
incorporate other elements into its logic.208 
These three problems, which Teubner calls the regulatory trilemma, can only be 
avoided, according to him, through the use of reflexive regulation. In strict opposition to 
command and control models, reflexive regulations advocate the use of self-regulation in an 
attempt to avoid the regulatory trilemma.   
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Under this reflexive regulation logic, Teubner claims that Law should ideally contribute 
to the internal communication of systems and facilitate their coordination.209 Whenever such 
principles are neglected and extrinsic objectives are inserted in legal commands directed to a 
certain setting through intrusive regulations that do not take into account its functioning logic, 
incompatibilities, setbacks and diversions will inevitably follow because of the conflicting 
realities of divergent systemic discourses.210Therefore, reflexive regulation advocates the 
indirect influence of norms, inducing agents to continuously interact in a favourable way for the 
intended outcomes instead of imposing a certain conduct.211  
Analysing the oil sector according to a reflexive regulation and systems theory 
perspective, the conclusion is that it holds features of an autopoietic subsystem. It is essentially 
a self-referential setting, which uses its own procedural logic and communication rationale to 
differentiate itself from the environment in which it operates. The oil sector has its own 
language, its intrinsic logic of self-reproduction, which is operationally closed to other systems, 
even if maintaining considerable cognitive openness towards the environment where it is 
inserted. The oil sector essentially functions according to a logic of oil utility extraction. Within 
this logic, it builds its own structure of meanings, its peculiar language, according to which it 
interprets the world. Therefore, all elements revolving around the idea of usefulness of tapping 
oil would be included in the oil sector subsystem in the same way as the legal system is 
constructed according to the binary code of legality and illegality.212  
Before a person starts studying the oil sector, she/he has to be introduced to certain 
concepts to be able to minimally understand it. Normally books related to oil come with a 
glossary, appendices or notes that detail expressions and measures, which are normally in 
English but identifiable to all those operating in the sector, irrespective of nationality. 
Expressions such as onshore, offshore, logging, government take and reserves, for example, cut 
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across different disciplines but are equally understood by all those in the oil segment. In 
economics, for example, the study of oil is so particular that it is commonly referred to as ǲoil 
economicsǳ. In Law, similarly, such specificities have led to the creation of ǲoil Lawǳ in some 
universities, which include it in their curriculum. An increasing number of oil dictionaries and 
glossaries213 actually reveal the emergence of a specific form of communication in the sector, 
while some specialists have even started studying the influence of ǲpetro-linguisticsǳ in national 
languages and their impact on cultural identity.214     
Hence, considering that the oil sector holds elements of an autopoietic setting215, with its 
own logic and communication rationale, the main goal for regulations according to a reflexive 
and systems theory standpoint should be to foster adequate policy developments, avoiding as 
much as possible distortions and impairments that derive from excessive external intrusion in 
this regulated social subsystem. Regulations must co-evolve with the system to which they 
apply, in a process of ǲreciprocal structural couplingǳ.216 They ought to indicate directions and 
guidelines, without operationally interfering in settings that function according to their own and 
unique logic.217  
Against this backdrop of reflexive regulation, norms should essentially facilitate the 
coordination and coupling between systems, avoiding incongruences and incompatibilities. 
Since the oil sector is essentially mutable, the potential for conflicts is even higher. Therefore, 
the reflexive theoretical framework regulatory approach in such a changing sector, which stems 
from indicative orientations and guidelines that indirectly influence the aimed outcome, with 
minimal intrusiveness and constant adaptability, is quite suitable for several of its aspects. Such 
                                                          
213 Cf. Lalia Phipps Boone, The petroleum dictionary (University of Oklahoma Press 1952); and Schlumberger, ǮOilfield Glossaryǯ <http://glossary.oilfield.slb.com/>  accessed 20 June 2015. 
214 Cf. Suhail Karmani, ǮPetro-linguistics: The emerging nexus between oil English and )slamǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ Ͷ ȋʹȌ 
Journal of Language, Identity & Education 87 Ahmar Mahboob and Tariq Elyas, ǮEnglish in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabiaǯ ȋʹͲͳͶȌ ͵͵ World Englishes ͳʹͺ. 
215 According to Niklas Luhmann, ǮLaw as a social systemǯ ȋͳͻͺͺȌ ͺ͵ Northwestern University Law 
Review 136, autopoiesis is a procedure of filtering and processing of information from the environment 
that defines a certain system. 
216 Gunther Teubner, Law as an autopoietic system (Oxford/Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers 1993) 52, 
53. 
217 Ana Lourenço, ǮAutopoietic Social Systems Theory: The Co-Evolution of Law and the Economyǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ 
35 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 35. 
 62 
an approach is specifically appropriate for technology and innovation, since they are 
increasingly dependent on network structures of a changing and often unpredictable nature, as 
will be demonstrated in chapter 8.  
Yet reflexive regulation also reveals limitations. The two most important ones for this 
thesis are first the excessively abstract nature of the conceptual framework and the difficulty in 
translating it into a set of consistent and concrete systematic policies of effective applicability. 
The second is that in the contemporary real world systems are much more open than advocated 
by Luhmann and Teubner because of the scale, speed and constancy of interactions between 
them, in the most diverse circumstances. As pointed out by Braithwaite, individuals exert 
diverse and multiple roles according to the different situations they encounter.218 If systems 
were in fact as operationally and normatively closed as advocated by Luhmann and Teubner the 
amount and intensity of social exchanges would be significantly reduced and more complicated. 
Actually it is quite common for economists, lawyers and political scientists, for example, to 
share the same discussion table without excessive impediments, discussing issues to which they 
bring quite easily the specific expertise of their areas. Postgraduate courses in some countries, 
similarly, do not even require a previous specialised training in their field of expertise. These 
examples seem to indicate that probably systems are more open than Luhmann and Teubner 
suggest.                 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
As expected, all conceptual frameworks have their own advantages and drawbacks. 
Within this setting and since the topic of this thesis is diverse and essentially multidisciplinary, there isnǯt an aprioristic choice of one specific theoretical model. Rather, the thesis attempts to 
evaluate what is the theory that best explains the different examined situations in each of the 
following chapters and what are those that can make better recommendations in Part III. The 
essential understanding is that no single conceptual framework explains the Brazilian oil sector 
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in all its complex dimensions and is able to provide a unique and adequate response to its 
problems.  
As already mentioned, three specific conceptual frameworks will be more constantly 
referred to: the institutional, responsive and reflexive theories. These theories are deemed more 
important for the current setting of the Brazilian oil sector, which requires more adaptable and 
flexible norms that take into account the implicit influences of the changing institutional 
environment. The first theory will be particularly relevant to grasp the underlying incentives 
and disincentives of the different oil sector stakeholders to each of the regulatory settings and 
situations. This approach will be important when assessing specific governance structures of 
the 2010 regulations, such as the operational committee of Law 12,351, for example.  
The responsive regulation theory is useful to analyse and understand the lack of 
interaction among stakeholders in the current regulatory structures in Brazil and the problems 
derived from that. It demonstrates the advantages of departing from less intrusive and punitive 
regulatory models before resorting to more interfering settings. Differently from the Norwegian 
experience, which can be closely identified with such conceptual framework, since it entices 
different players to closely interact in a participatory manner, the Brazilian regulatory 
framework does not promote systematic and close interconnections between the different 
sectoral and institutional agents. Such limitation leads to drawbacks that are identified 
throughout the thesis.        
The reflexive conceptual framework is particularly useful to contrast the logic of these 
two other theories, which are excessively based on input/output models stemming from regulationsǯ incentives and disincentives coming from the economics subsystem. Even though 
Teubner and Luhman argue that the binary code for the economics subsystem is based on 
payments and prices, it is actually dependent on incentives and disincentives. Everything in 
economics can in fact be translated into these two dimensions, including payments and prices, 
which are specific forms of incentives and disincentives. The same applies to the other relevant 
variables used in the discipline such as profits, costs, wages, interest rates and so forth. This 
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binary code of incentives and disincentives, as used in the institutional and responsive 
frameworks, takes into account straight and linear responses to previous stimuli, which is the 
mainstream logic of ǲLaw and economicsǳ.219  
Social systems theory debunks this direct one-way relationship, advocating, instead, a 
two-way interaction based on structural coupling.220Hence, rather than claiming that a certain 
rule impacts another setting, leading to a specific social behaviour, social systems theory would 
argue that the rule causes perturbations on another social subsystem, being absorbed and 
translated by it according to its own logic. This perturbation assimilation within the affected 
subsystem, would, in turn, determine a specific social outcome.221Such perspective is actually 
more comprehensive than the one way consequential reasoning of the other two theories and 
allows taking into account other aspects that are sometimes ignored in straightforward input-
output model.  
Hence, while the institutional and responsive frameworks are essentially based on 
economic and consequential impact rationales, taking into account how structures react to 
stimuli, the reflexive model supposes an interactive logic of assimilation of external impacts 
which are adapted to different contexts and realities. Another important difference between the 
first two theories and the reflexive conceptual setting is that the latter framework deems 
command and control  regulations as essentially deficient. Therefore, it does not consider their 
use, not even as a last resort possibility, as does the responsive theory. Despite the problems 
associated with command and control norms, as well posed by reflexive theorists, in some 
extreme case scenarios and situations of anomie and disrespect of the rule of law they might be 
the most effective and appropriate answer to these problems.            
In spite of these differences, one of the common grounds of the three main frameworks 
adopted in the thesis´ analysis is their wide regulatory ambit, compared to the traditional 
regulatory theories of narrower scope. As a result, these theories also acknowledge that 
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regulation tends to operate in different and mutable fora, at different levels, with involvement of 
different organisations of various nature, which are in constant interaction. They hence 
recognise regulationǯs inherent tendency to ǲpolycentrictyǳ and ǲhybridityǳ, paradoxically 
creating, in some cases, simultaneous processes of institutional centralisation and decentred 
regulation. 222 
The acknowledgement of such situations have led to proposals that advocate the 
creation of ǲmeta-regulatorsǳ to monitor non-state regulators, leaving the traditional central 
government as mainly responsible for giving the main policy direction, exerting a typical 
steering function.223 In a similar vein, ǲrisk based regulationǳ also recognises the existence of 
several regulatory nodes in the contemporary world and the limitations of providing effective 
state action in all of them. The theory thus seeks to prioritise state regulation in areas which 
pose the highest challenges and risks to the fulfilment of its goals.224 While such approach might 
be procedurally compelling, denoting policy pragmatism, it may also have the undesirable 
consequence of reducing the level of political accountability, since regulators might consider in 
such contexts that regulatory failures are events beyond their control and for which they cannot 
be held to account.225   
Finally, new approaches in regulation have been recently considered in legal theory, 
criticising the top-down command and control traditional model, incorporating several 
elements of responsive and reflexive theories and widening the scope of the analysis to 
essentially concentrate on multi-layer governance settings. Lobel, for example, advocates a 
paradigm shift from what he calls traditional regulatory model to a new governance model.226 
While the former is based on strict, rigid and fixed commands coming from the top in a 
hierarchized manner, the latter is based on decentred flexible procedures essentially 
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determined by multiple levels of governance interplay.227 Collin Scott similarly recognises a shift 
in traditional models of formal state regulation towards regulatory governance settings that 
increasingly take into account the influence of networks and communities, in which regulatory 
activity is performed in a diffuse and interactive manner.228     
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4 - INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENTS IN OIL SECTOR REGULATION 
This chapter analyses international experiments in regulation of the oil sector aiming to 
extract useful lessons and experiences for Brazil and the study performed in Part II of the thesis. 
The first section of the chapter gives an overview of the different international governance 
structures and regulatory frameworks in the oil sector, providing country specific examples. 
The assessment of international institutional designs will be performed through the analytical 
lenses of national oil companies (NOCs), examined within their respective governance settings.  
The study of governance structures and institutional designs of the oil sector is 
considered extremely difficult. There are a great variety of frameworks around the globe, with 
different settings, which makes the examination of local realities particularly important. Yet the 
more one advances on the details and local nuances, the more comparability is compromised 
and increasing efforts are necessary to draw any kind of general robust conclusion.229 By 
pinning down the analytical approach on national oil companies the aim is to confer greater 
clarity and organisation to the analysis without losing track of local particularities. Such approach has also the advantage of facilitating comparisons of these entitiesǯ governance 
experiences with Petrobras to extract useful lessons and to be able to make effective policy 
recommendations in Part III of the thesis.  
The second section of the chapter focuses on the Norwegian regulatory framework. 
Norway has been chosen as a specific case study because it is considered an international 
benchmark in oil exploitation. Its regulatory framework is frequently mentioned in the 
literature as an adequate model of institutional checks and balances to the benefit of resource 
appropriation. It is also considered a successful example in the use of a non-renewable natural 
resource to the overall benefit of the country.230  
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Norway has adopted a concession regime based on licenses, similar to the model used in 
Brazil since 1997.231 The fact that the countryǯs oil production has already attained the maturity 
phase also allows a richer assessment of its framework in different moments and gives a clearer 
picture of how the regulations have evolved in response to the different production phases. This 
analysis provides very useful and enriching insights for nations in their initial production 
stages, such as Brazil.   
In spite of these aspects, the comparison between Brazil and Norway has to be done 
very carefully to take into account the significant differences between these two nations. 
Norway is a small country with a tiny population, which was already developed and had high 
social standards when its main oil reserves were discovered. Brazil, in contrast, is a big 
emerging populous nation with substantial social disparities. Such differences partially explain 
the importance that Brazil gives to the strategic control over oil and to the stateǯs urge in 
appropriating the proceeds from its exploitation. It also explains why discussions over the 
Norwegian regulatory framework were conducted at a slower pace, mainly guided by 
technocrats that carefully presented the technical arguments to politicians, while in Brazil it has 
mainly been politically led and centred around the distribution of resources among federal 
entities, as the following sections demonstrate.     
4.1 INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
The initial aspect to be considered in relation to institutional design is that there isnǯt an 
inherent superiority of one model with respect to others. Each system has its own advantages 
and drawbacks, according to different circumstances and specific national realities. It is 
therefore no coincidence that nations using totally opposite models, such as Norway and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    Oystein Noreng, ǮBrazil and Norway- Offshore Petroleum Experiences and Lessonsǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͵ͷ Journal of 
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Malaysia, are both considered quite successful international examples in terms of exploitation of 
oil.232   
Countries with the most comprehensive and complex institutional structures in the oil 
sector normally have five different types of entities: i) a sectoral ministry, usually the ministry 
of petroleum; ii) a regulatory agency; iii) a national oil company; iv) international oil 
enterprises; and v) supplier and service corporations. Brazil and Norway are the paradigmatic 
examples of this type of organisation. On the other side of the spectrum, Malaysia has a quite 
simple institutional design with a national oil company directly linked to the Prime Minister, 
holding all regulatory functions.233     
In Norway, the regulatory institutional design neatly separates the regulatory, 
operational and policy formulation functions between entities: the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD), the national oil company – Statoil – and the Ministry of Petroleum. This 
clear-cut division is intended to avoid situations of policy conflict that could lead to confusion 
and inefficiency. It also aims to emulate the right checks and balances among entities, enticing 
them to control and exert oversight on each other.  
The creation of the State Financial Interest (SDFI) in 1985 is an example of this 
Norwegian concern and also shows the prevailing preoccupation in curbing excessive state corporate power. )n the ͳͻͺͲǯs there was growing scepticism over the amount of effective 
control over Statoil, which was thought to have become too powerful. International oil companies ȋ)OCsȌ particularly invoked the companyǯs special preferences and veto power on 
operational projects, because of its minimum 50% participation right in all licences, as a 
hindrance to further private investment.234 Civil servants, on the other hand, advocated the need 
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for increasing separation and distinction between the political, commercial and financial roles 
of institutions in the oil sector.235  
Therefore, SDFI was mainly created to overcome these problems and received 50% of Statoilǯs interests in all oil fields. The NOCǯs veto power over future licences was also eliminated.  
SDFI is today essentially an accounting mechanism in the Norwegian national budget which 
assigns to the state a participation right in all oil concession areas and is administered by a fully 
state-owned company: Petoro. Its creation separated corporate-operational functions and 
financial-asset tasks between Statoil and SDFI.236  
Malaysia, Indonesia (until 2001) and Libya, on the other hand, are examples of 
institutional settings where the national oil company essentially holds regulatory powers, 
formulates policies and responds directly to authorities of the Executive branch above the 
ministerial level that do not hold sectoral functions. In Malaysia, as mentioned, the national oil 
company Petronas holds all these tasks and answers directly to the Prime Minister. In Libya, 
after the extinction of the Ministry of Energy in March of 2006,237 its National oil corporation has been linked to the General Peopleǯs Committee, which is the main executive body in the 
country. The Indonesian NOC, Pertamina, until 2001 also reunited regulatory, administrative 
and policy formulation functions and despite being formally linked to the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy, in practice responded directly to the President.238 Such institutional design changed in 
2001, with the creation of a regulatory agency, BP Migas, which aimed at eliminating the conflict 
of interests that arose within Pertamina for its joint activities as oil producer and regulator.239 
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In the midway position between this last group of countries and the first ones, are 
nations such as Angola240and Iran,241 which have institutional architectures with a national oil 
company mainly holding implementation functions and linked to a sectoral ministry, normally 
the Ministry of Petroleum.   
In view of the importance that NOCs have assumed lately and because of their role in 
defining different institutional settings, the next section will analyse them in more detail. The 
study attempts to enquire further on the realities of such enterprises examining internal and 
external governance structures.   
4.2.1 NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES: IMPORTANCE, DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES         
The study of NOCs has become increasingly important in the last years. These 
companies are progressively acquiring worldwide relevance as they control most of the current 
reserves around the globe and have become the major world producers. State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) figure among the 10 top reserve holders with control over 73% of the global 
proved oil reserves and 61% of production.242 Fourteen out of twenty main oil producers are 
NOCs,243 while forecasts from the International Energy Agency (IEA 2008) estimate that they 
will be responsible in 2030 for almost 80% of the increase in global oil and gas output.244 
NOCsǯ goals largely differ from )OCsǯ since they include several non-commercial aspects 
beyond shareholdersǯ returns and company profitability, such as oil wealth distribution, energy 
security, industrialisation and economic development. Shleifer and Vishny argue that state 
enterprises tend to overemploy at higher wages and alternate their pricing policies between 
levels below marginal cost, to gain political support, and monopoly prices, to extract extra 
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rent.245  Hartley and Medlock present empirical evidence showing that NOCs are less revenue 
efficient than IOCs essentially because of these practices.246  
Such policies of maintaining artificially low national oil prices are quite common among 
national oil companies and one of the problems faced by oil producer countries. Despite their 
advantages in providing access to cheap energy sources for industrial policy purposes and in 
avoiding excessive price fluctuations, they can drain important resources from the companies, 
and lead to an artificial demand escalation in energy intensive sectors. This increased artificial 
demand can discourage the pursuit of energy efficiency. It could also lead to the need for 
importing the product, as in Iran, for example.247 The exact same policies had disastrous effects 
in Nigeria causing widespread fuel shortages.248 
Such examples show how important it is for NOCs to also pursue commercial goals and 
to avoid policies that lead to excessive distortions in allocative efficiency. However, even though 
commercial operational goals are essential for NOCs, their importance should not be 
exaggerated or excessively outweigh other legitimate objectives, which normally constitute an 
essential component of their social role and importance to their countries. Several NOCs have 
crucial public goals such as wealth distribution, economic development, promotion of national 
infrastructure and technology, which are often ignored and underestimated in corporate 
efficiency analyses.  
What the case studies show, however, is that these non-commercial goals can be best 
served if they reveal long-term sustainability, without being distorted by short-term political 
demands that excessively drain corporate resources.249 Statoil and Petronas (Malaysia) provide 
illustrative examples of how to balance non-commercial and commercial objectives without 
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compromising corporate efficiency and performance.250 Statoil considerably contributed to 
developing the national supply oil industry in Norway through rational industrial policies of 
national content.251 Malaysia successfully used Petronas to expand and promote its image 
abroad and to develop links with other countries.252 Pertamina (Indonesia) and NNPC (Nigeria), 
on the other hand, show a record of misuse of public funds for short-term and non-commercial purposes that significantly affected the companiesǯ long-term results.253    
Eller, (artley and Medlockǯs econometric analysis also demonstrates that NOCs are 
more likely to underinvest on reserves and to value present resources over future ones, 
compared to their private counterparts.  They contend that the political interests of directors 
and managers, who want to benefit from oilǯs financial proceeds while still in office, would act as 
a deterrent to policies and projects of longer maturity.254  
Yet this inference does not apply to companies such as Petrobras and Statoil, which have 
undertaken significant investments of long-term return throughout their history. Eller, Hartley and Medlockǯs conclusions are based on statistics of several NOCs without however 
differentiating them appropriately, according to their particularities and specific national 
contexts. As a consequence, their results have been excessively generalised. A more careful 
assessment of the realities of the companies would recommend separating them into different 
groups or clusters, according to some of their important features, such as private ownership of 
shares, for example. If that had been done, some categories of NOCs such as Statoil, or even 
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Petrobras, which are partially privatised, might have been considered revenue efficient and not 
necessarily biased towards short-term projects, as they argue.   
Differently from Eller, Hartley and Medlock, Mark Thurber and David Hults posit that 
NOCs such as Petrobras and Statoil reveal a more risk prone attitude than others since they are 
less dependent on immediate short-term oil resources.255 Because of that, they can adopt long-
term strategies, with goals that take increasingly into account industrial development targets 
and objectives of longer maturity to increase domestic technological standards, for example. 
They can also, for instance, spend more resources and time attempting to develop industrial 
infrastructure and local technical expertise that can increase the probability of future 
discoveries in the country. 
That does not mean, of course, that (artley and Medlockǯs conclusions are essentially 
wrong or misguided. Actually the fact that the two most efficient NOCs in their analysis, Statoil 
and Petrobras, are partially privatised and tend to operate more like IOCs than the other ones, 
in a certain way corroborates their main inference that IOCs are more revenue efficient than 
NOCs.  
One possible problem affecting NOCs is that conflicting objectives can significantly 
impair the effective implementation of market strategies, which might, in turn, lead to 
stalemates. Another similar recurrent source of concern is the excessive use of non-commercial strategies and goals at the expense of the companiesǯ production levels and long-term 
profitability.  
The analysis of NOCs demonstrates that the greater the possibility of political 
interference in their daily operational and managerial activities, the higher the likelihood of 
privileging non-commercial goals over commercial ones.256Firms such as NNPC (Nigeria) and 
PDVSA (Venezuela) have had their managerial activities intrinsically influenced by domestic 
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politics and have been facing, as a consequence, administrative hurdles. Other companies such 
as Statoil (Norway) and Petronas (Malaysia), have suffered less interference in their 
management routines.  
In fact, in Norway, there has seldom been governmental interference in Statoilǯs 
commercial and daily operational activities for political purposes, while the company also 
avoids interfering in main state policy decisions.257 Two examples illustrate the degree of this 
corporate political insulation.258 The first was an occasion in which the Ministry of Petroleum 
blocked further developments in the gas field of Troll, claiming recovery harm of the deposits. Despite Statoilǯs dissatisfaction and opposition, it withdrew from the operations. )n a second 
case, the government filed a suit against Statoil for the recovery of US$ 2 billion that the 
company allegedly owed it.259Had the relationships between the government and Statoil been 
closely politically linked, probably the NOC would have succeeded in reverting the 
governmental decision in its favour in both cases.   
There has lately been a tendency among NOCs to incorporate elements of corporate 
efficiency and performance through some private company practices that include, for example, 
the creation of independent corporate boards of directors that aim to improve transparency, 
accountability and performance standards via increasing monitoring and oversight. Statoil, Aramco ȋSaudi Arabiaǯs national oil companyȌ and CNOOC ȋChina National Offshore Oil 
Corporation), for example, have been using these corporate structures quite successfully.260 
Even though the government generally nominates the boards, they can operate autonomously 
and independently when adequately designed. Other mechanisms such as IPOs, partial 
privatisations and commercial bonds improve accounting and financial practices, public 
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reporting, transparency and corporate governance standards, often bringing international 
financial scrutiny to these firms in a positive way. 
Partial privatisation, more specifically, also presents the advantage of relieving the state 
from further capital onus for investment purposes, while still maintaining national mission 
requirements. This gains increasing importance in periods of sharp price drops, when efficiency 
demands are particularly compelling.261 Agency problems, however, tend to increase with 
partial privatisation of the company and even further with total privatisation, since the number 
of shareowners tends to increase. Petrobras particularly has been facing acute agency problems, 
which essentially arise from situations of conflict of interest of governmental board members.262  
Norway, in turn, has a very austere approach towards conflict of interests in their SOEs 
and strictly forbids civil servants from being board members. This requirement had its origins 
in the mining accident of 1962 on the Island of Spitsbergen. On that occasion, the majority state-
owned mining company was held responsible for the incident, when the petroleum minister 
was its chairman. Negligence, pointed out as one of the main reasons for the disaster, was 
associated with the conflict of interest situation resulting from having main appointees in the 
Board from ministries.263  
Yet what the analysis of Norway and Brazil most importantly demonstrates is that state 
support through temporary protective policies, financial transfers and the creation of a NOC 
with operational capacity are important elements for the development of a solid oil industry.264 
The existence of a well-established state enterprise with strong operational activities has been 
an important factor in these countries to guarantee that technological expertise will be locally 
developed, assimilated and transferred to domestic companies. The creation of NOCs intensively 
engaged in production activities has also been a differential element in assuring technology 
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assimilation and in curbing )OCsǯ excessive bargaining power in their relationships with local 
authorities.  
NOCs can actually represent an effective way to gather more information about the countryǯs oil reserves, guaranteeing more control over them and reducing, as a consequence, the 
information asymmetry between states and operating international companies.265 In regulated 
industries, one specific problem that can frequently occur is the existence of asymmetric 
information between regulator and regulated enterprises. While the latter has much more 
information about the market, the former is supposed to use this exact same information to 
control and monitor it. The challenge in these cases is how to ensure that the regulator can 
receive adequate data avoiding the problem of ǲcaptureǳ.266  Another concern for regulatory 
agencies, especially in transition frameworks from a monopoly based system to a competitive 
one, is how to maintain competitive conditions of access to the market when the once 
monopolist has so much detailed information about the area and a natural advantage compared 
to competing firms.267  
Sometimes the existence of a state-owned company is necessary for a thorough 
assimilation, understanding and effective monitoring of the available information on oil 
reserves. The logic of asymmetry reduction underpinned, for example, the creation of Statoil in 
Norway, which had a more effective control over private companies as one of its main goals.  In 
Malaysia, similarly, one of the aims of creating its oil company was the concern that Shell did not 
disclose information on discoveries and production.268      
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In Indonesia the weak presence of its NOC, Pertamina, in upstream production activities, 
substantially impaired the development of the national oil industry in the country, which 
remained below adequate international performance standards.269 The Indonesian national oil 
company held from 1971 to 2001 regulatory functions and was the direct beneficiary of the cost 
oil in production-sharing agreements signed in the country.270 Peratmina revealed a tendency to 
gradually abandon exploration and production activities, concentrating instead on its 
contractual supervision functions, which brought significant and immediate revenues through 
production-sharing agreements.  
In Norway, in contrast, the constant presence of Statoil through joint venture operations 
with IOCs acted as a catalyst for improved industrial performance and technological expertise 
transfer.271 This strategy proved to be important once the domestic Norwegian oil fields 
attained maturity, since it gave the company an important advantage in increasing its 
international presence.  
Expanding now on the analysis already provided on Statoil as a national oil company, 
the next section will analyse the Norwegian oil regulatory framework in more detail, aiming to 
extract useful lessons to Brazil.  
4.2 THE CASE OF NORWAY 
4.2.1 RECENT HISTORY 
The first commercially viable oil discovery in Norway was Ekofisk, in 1969.272 Norway 
was already well equipped to deal with regulatory oil issues when it took place. The country had 
then a trained and competent bureaucracy with expertise in natural resource regulations in 
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areas like hydropower, fishing and mining. The adaptation of this technocratic expertise to the 
new demands of the petroleum sector was done in a well-planned and organised manner.273 
Norway invested substantial resources and time in training civil servants in the 
institutional design of regulatory frameworks and in acquiring tailored expertise on the 
geological and geophysical features of their continental shelf. It was not until the discovery of 
Ekofisk, in 1969, that politicians showed interest in participating in discussions related to the oil 
sector.274 When that happened, however, the amount of expertise in the government was rather 
significant. One of the important consequences of this fact was that the subsequent 
governmental discussions were always conducted having the technical parameters as an 
essential starting point and were to a great extent technocratically led.275 
The comparison of this situation with what occurred in Brazil in the years that followed 
the pre-salt discovery and the regulatory framework change in 2010 is particularly revealing. 
The discovery of Brazilian pre-salt layers was publicised and divulged with vigorous enthusiasm 
by the incumbent government. The immense reserves were claimed to be a ǲlottery ticketǳ, a ǲpassport for a prosperous futureǳ, in view of the significant propagated revenues that could be 
extracted from it. The almost irresponsible political use of the oil discoveries in Brazil is actually 
one of the main reasons behind the current royalties distribution stalemate in the country. All 
federal states now claim a fair share in the ǲpassport for the futureǳ provided by the so-called ǲlottery ticketǳ. Nurtured by the exaggerated view publicised by the government, politicians swiftly engaged in actions to increase their respective statesǯ shares.276 Such initiatives were 
only possible, however, because the government proposed a change in the regulatory 
framework before starting operations in the newly discovered areas. Had the former framework been maintained, each statesǯ percentage share would be already defined and any potential 
discussion for change would not have led to such a deadlock.   
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In contrast to the Norwegian case, in Brazil public discussions were scant, significantly 
politicised and lacked a strong technical foundation. Most worryingly, exaggerated state 
propaganda over oil yet to be extracted has led to a dangerous political deadlock over the 
distribution of royalties between state entities, which has not yet been resolved. Actually the 
Congress only approved the 2010 regulatory reform because the government excluded the 
provisions related to the distribution of royalties in the presented bill of law. This outcome 
largely resulted from the lack of a serious and well-elaborated technical discussion over the 
issue and the careless governmental management of expectations over the newly discovered 
resources.  
Joao de Lucca in an interview with the author, noted that the insertion of the discussion 
over royalty distribution in the proposals for the new regulatory framework completely shifted 
the content of the debates from otherwise technical considerations about the impact on the 
countryǯs long-term development to exclusively short-sighted political issues focused on the 
distribution of future revenues between federal entities.277 Within this setting, Michael Ross 
demonstrates that expectations can pose significant problems to populations of resource rich 
countries, leading to rooted dissatisfaction, whenever not adequately dealt with, even 
sometimes causing social and political unrest.278 John O. Kakonge similarly shows how 
important it is to adequately manage expectations in newly emerging oil and gas producer 
countries.279 He points out that in Ecuador, for example, unfulfilled expectations among 
Amazonian indigenous communities based in oil drilling locations has led to civil unrest which 
halted production.280 He also mentions Nigerian unmet expectations with the use of oil 
resources as one of the main reasons behind the entrenched mistrust between government, oil 
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companies and local communities, which has led to a vicious cycle of violence and upheaval in 
the country.281  
Malaysia, on the other hand, stands as a successful case in dealing with social 
aspirations, mainly because of the strategic role played by its national oil company, Petronas, in 
forming good and reliable links among stakeholders.282 When analysing these factors, Kakonge 
indicates that one of the most important elements to be avoided when dealing with oil policies 
is ǲfuelling distorted public expectationsǳ.283 (e particularly identifies politiciansǯ actions in 
overstating facts to gauge support as one of the most difficult perils to be overcome. That is 
exactly what happened in Brazil.  
One essential dilemma faced by governments whenever dealing with expectations is to 
correctly assess to what extent public disclosure will lead to stricter accountability, due to 
increasing transparency and awareness, without unduly creating unsound aspirations. Probably 
the key to fine tune the exact posture between these sometimes divergent aspects is to disclose 
in a balanced manner all possible information, provided that it is reliable, understandable and 
non-confidential. One of the positive consequences of this initiative is that it feeds in credible 
information to public debates and policy discussions. Hence, the outcomes of the different 
political alternatives on the table will most likely be considered and conducted around more 
reliable and tangible results and scenarios. Actually, one of the key features of the ample public 
debates that followed the Ekofisk discovery in Norway over the regulatory framework was the 
essential role played by bureaucrats in clarifying facts and figures and in conducting the 
discussions around a set of objective, technical parameters.  
In 1971 the government established the main policy guidelines for the oil sector in 
Norway. As a result of these guidelines, Statoil was created in 1972 a fully state-owned enterprise, mainly because the ruling Labour Partyǯs government was sceptical about the actual 
capability of a partially owned governmental entity to effectively take into account essential 
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state public policies beyond market profitability and shareholder return.284The Norwegian 
government already had a percentage share in Norsk Hydro, an industrial conglomerate with 
operations in the oil sector, and one of its policy options was to exploit oil in its continental shelf 
through this company.285 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was later formed as an agency responsible 
for regulation of the sector and with the important task of establishing policies to foster the 
development of a Norwegian petroleum industrial chain.  One essential aspect of the Norwegian 
experience is that even though it created a fully state-owned company to operate in its Continental Shelf it maintained Norsk (ydroǯs operation in Norway as a partially state owned 
enterprise, and also an open and proactive stance towards joint venture operations with 
International Oil Companies (IOCs). This peculiarity of the Norwegian model promoted a 
healthy competitive environment, which forced operating companies to always seek 
improvements and higher efficiency standards.  
Statoil actually performed two important functions after its creation. An active role in exploration and production of petroleum activities and also as the stateǯs representative in 
financial rights and equity capital in joint venture operations with other enterprises. The 
company received an important initial state protection and preferential access to resources and 
capital for its early establishment. Statoil was allowed to have a 50% carried interest in newly 
discovered blocks that could accrue to 80%, according to a sliding scale.286  
By the mid 1980s, the essential aspects of the Norwegian regulatory institutional design 
had already been established, with the separation of the policy formulation, regulatory and 
operational functions among different entities: the Ministry of Petroleum, NPD and Statoil, 
respectively.  The parliament, which was also responsible for deciding about the areas to be 
open for exploration, supervised all these bodies.  
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 )n the ͳͻͺͲǯs a growing distrust of Statoilǯs excessive powers and privileges coincided 
with a shift in the political landscape from the previously Labour cabinet to a Conservative 
government. This group of politicians had previously advocated against the creation of Statoil 
and argued for the development of the Norwegian oil industry through the partially state-
owned company Norsk Hydro.287 )n an attempt to curb Statoilǯs disproportionate political influence, the companyǯs interest in new oil fields was shifted to a newly formed accounting 
procedure, the Stateǯs Direct Financial )nterest ȋSDF)Ȍ, as previously described. 
From that moment on, Statoil increased even further its international operations, which 
steadily grew thereafter. In 2001 the company was partially privatised and in 2006 it merged 
with Norsk Hydro. The main goal of the merger was to create significant economies of scope and 
scale to be able to compete more effectively abroad.288  
4.2.2 CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DESIGN 
The Parliament (Storting), the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE), the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate ȋNPDȌ and the Stateǯs Direct Financial )nterest ȋSDF)Ȍ currently compose Norwayǯs oil sector, together with two state-owned enterprises that operate in the country - 
Petoro and Statoil, the international oil companies and other companies that supply services for 
oil activities.  
The Parliament (Storting) is responsible for the proposal and approval of the legal 
regulatory framework in Norway. It monitors and exerts oversight over the public 
administration, the government and discusses projects of significant impact and issues of 
substantial public interest.289 
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The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is the main entity responsible for the management of oil resources in Norway and follows the Parliament and the governmentǯs 
guidelines. It also has the role of monitoring and exerting control and owner responsibility over 
the state-owned enterprises, Petoro, and the partially owned Statoil.          
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) is a typical regulatory agency, 
subordinated to the MPE. Its main function is to exert managerial and financial control over exploration and production of oil. )t is also part of MPEǯs consultative body.       
The Stateǯs Direct Financial )nterest ȋSDF)Ȍ is an accounting mechanism created in the 
Norwegian national budget, which assigns a percentage right over oil licenses to the state.  It is 
separated from the Norwegian Budget and is similar to a virtual fund. The state uses the SDFI to 
assert its right over strategic licensed oil projects and also to undertake the necessary investments, cost disbursements and profit shares. The net cash flow of SDF)ǯs portfolio is 
automatically transferred to a government pension fund, which previously used to be the 
Petroleum Fund.290 
Petoro is the fully state-owned company responsible for the management of SDFI. It does not hold any interest or participation in the fund. The companyǯs activities are restricted to 
Norway and it is strictly forbidden to undertake operational tasks related to oil exploration and 
production.  
Finally, Statoil is a partially state-owned company with a vertical structure of activities 
from upstream to downstream. As already explained, Statoil currently holds significant 
international operations and a mix of private and public equity. Because of its structure, it 
attempts to maintain high levels of corporate efficiency, while also contributing to some 
essential state goals, such as significantly adding value to the Norwegian petroleum industry.291 
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Despite maintaining a rather armǯs length relation with the state, if compared to most of the oil producer countriesǯ NOCs, especially those in the Middle East, Statoilǯs power and 
influence within the government has varied quite significantly. From the time of its creation 
until the mid-ͳͻͺͲǯs, Statoil constantly struggled for further affirmation and state presence, 
while the MPE and the NPD, had the constant preoccupation of curbing its power with the fear 
that it became a ǲstate within a stateǳ.292 
 The companyǯs power and privileges kept increasing until 1985. Until that moment, 
Statoil successfully expanded its percentage interests in newly discovered blocks under the lead 
of the CEO Arve Johnsen, a member of the Labour party who emphatically lobbied to extend the enterpriseǯs privileges.293 In ͳͻͺͷ the creation of the SDF) abrogated some of Statoilǯs privileges. This coincided with the beginning of the companyǯs more intensive move towards other 
countries, the development of a more performance-oriented commercial culture and the 
maturity phase of the Norwegian oil reserves. 
The geological conditions of the Norwegian oil fields actually impelled Statoil to move 
abroad to continue expanding its reserves. The previous joint-venture activities of the company 
with major IOCs and the former international presence acted as important catalysts in this strategy. This move, together with the partial privatisation of the company in the late ͻͲǯs, 
induced it to adopt an increasing commercially-driven culture with stricter managerial control 
and financial discipline. It also enabled Statoil to more effectively use diverse investment 
options such as capital equity and mergers and acquisitions.294        
The MPE, in its turn, actually performed a quite difficult task in striking a balance 
between a supportive policy aimed at stimulating Statoil to develop a strong Norwegian oil 
industry, while also trimming its powers whenever necessary, so it did not become too 
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prevailing and non-accountable. One episode that illustrates the resolve in curbing Statoilǯs 
excessive powers was the removal of Chairman Hauge, considered to be ǲmeddling 
inappropriately in the political realmǳ.295 Even though this chairman had been a war hero and 
held a high reputation in Norwegian politics, he was required to resign by the Ministry, which changed Statoilǯs whole board to give it a more diverse political composition.      
Therefore, the Norwegian regulatory framework is based on a model of clear separation 
of functions between different entities with the main goal of fostering the appropriate level of 
checks and balances among them. The Parliament sets the main political direction of the 
petroleum policy through legal norms and defines the exploration areas. The MPE, the main 
body of the executive branch, is responsible for governmental policymaking within this branch, 
which should be set in accordance with the guidelines and parameters legally defined. The NPD 
regulates the sector, attempting to maintain its independence and to perform its activities 
avoiding political and corporate interference. Statoil holds operational oil activity functions and Petoro manages the stateǯs financial interests and the cash flow of its portfolio. While NPD, 
Petoro and Statoil are subordinated to the MPE, which exerts oversight over their activities and 
makes sure they are performed in accordance to its policymaking, the Parliament controls and 
monitors all these bodies.  
The Norwegian model was initially envisioned as having an independent board to 
oversee NPD, ensuring its autonomy from politics and any influence that could have arisen from 
its subordination to MPE.296Yet such idea was later abandoned and considered unnecessary 
since in practice NPD was deemed to actually exert its functions with significant autonomy. One 
of the main reasons for this genuine independence in spite of the formal subordination was the Ministryǯs technical dependence on NPD and the widespread view that any initiative to 
undermine independence would essentially destabilise both institutions in the long run.297 
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Actually the NPD in its early years faced significant problems to establish itself as a 
reliable and technically robust institution in Norway. One of the main difficulties it encountered 
was to acquire relevant technical information from Statoil and from MPE. Another one was to 
form a group with the required technical expertise to effectively perform the agencyǯs functions. 
A critical factor for NPD to develop its own specific capabilities, which is one of the most 
important elements of its actual independence, was the significant state investment in the 
agency in its early years. The existence of higher and separate salaries from the MPE was fundamental in this sense. After some years, moreover, NPDǯs existence counted with 
progressive acceptance within MPE, since it allowed the Ministry to focus more on policy design.  
Two basic normative principles guide the legal framework of the Norwegian oil policy: i) 
the acknowledgement that oil and gas resources belong to society as a whole and should 
therefore be adequately managed and explored in a sustainable way, to the benefit of current 
and future generations; and ii) the guarantee that aggregated value in the activities of oil 
production and exploration will essentially accrue to the Norwegian society.298 
Norway has a concession regime with state participation.299 The main Law regulating 
petroleum activities in the country is the Petroleum Act. This statute grants to the state 
exclusive rights over oil resources in situ in the Norwegian Continental Shelf.  
Two types of licences exist, exploration licences and production licences. The latter is 
normally established for a period of three years and does not imply any kind of preference in 
the establishment of the former. The production phase grants exclusive rights in a certain area 
and also in the property of the extracted oil. One difference in the Norwegian production 
bidding rounds, compared to Brazil, is that the choice of the winner is established according to a 
discretionary process of selection of the technically best project.  
Another contrast is that in Brazil concession contracts comprise both the exploration 
and the production phases. In case of successful accomplishment of the exploration stage the 
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company submits to ANP a detailed project for the production phase for its approval. The 
Brazilian model in this particular aspect has the advantage of reducing transaction costs of the 
whole process, if compared to Norway, where a new bidding round has to take place at each 
stage. Another drawback of the Norwegian model is the risk that the concessionaireǯs efforts in 
gathering all the information in the first stage is not adequately compensated by guaranteeing it 
will be selected in the next phase. The risk is that other companies not in the first stage might 
have access to the information collected by the concessionaire of the exploration phase, free-
riding, as a consequence, on its efforts. Concessionaires of the first stage have a natural 
advantage, however, in the bidding rounds for the next one, since they will normally have much 
more information about the area, some of which they might be able to keep secret, and will 
hence submit a more technically sound project.  
A period of negotiation after the submission of the proposal for the production phase is 
another Norwegian peculiarity. This possibility is interesting and might lead to a better tailoring of the project to the countryǯs need, to an increase in government take or even to the elucidation 
of some specific technical aspects that might lead to potential future disputes. In Brazil this 
possibility of negotiation does not exist, since bids are presented in secret envelopes and 
decisions are made in one exclusive round after assessment of the proposals.  
This Brazilian feature reinforces the ǲwinnerǯs curseǳ phenomenon. This phenomenon 
takes place whenever one specific bidder holds more information about the auctioned region 
than all others, as happens with Petrobras in Brazil.300In these instances, according to the winnerǯs curse theory, other bidders tend to reduce their bids in an attempt to avoid losses 
resultant from higher offers than the real value of the oil region under dispute. The existence of successive rounds or of a negotiation process, as in Norway, could reduce the winnerǯs curse 
occurrence in Brazil, since it would allow bidders to adapt their bid offers and strategies 
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accordingly, after having had access to the bid presented by the company which holds more 
information about the auctioned area.301 
The control mechanism available to state entities in all ventures that count with 
participation of the SDFI might also offer guidance to Brazil in the governance structure of 
operational committees. In Norway, Petoro has the possibility of vetoing any decision of the 
Operational Committee in which SDFI has an interest and that is not in accordance with the 
financial interests of the Norwegian state.  This veto power has never been used in Norway but its existence is a manner of guaranteeing that the stateǯs interests can be reassured if needed.  
It is, however, in the area of local content policies that the Norwegian experience is 
particularly valuable to Brazil. Such policies have been considered extremely successful in 
Norway, since the country nowadays counts with a robust and technologically advanced oil 
industry.302 MPE estimated as two-thirds the share of local content in the Norwegian oil sector 
in 2010.303  
The first aspect indicated as one of the reasons for high achievements are the 
partnerships between local and foreign corporations encouraged by authorities.304 A second 
point is the use of local purchases as one of the criteria considered in the selection of public 
auction winners. Hence, differently from the Brazilian current model in pre-salt and strategic 
areas, in Norway authorities did not require mandatory purchase levels and did not directly interfere in companiesǯ purchasing policies. Yet they maintained strict control and transparency 
of all the sales and contracting activities, publicising them to all interested parties, which 
encouraged accountability and oversight. When the country entered the European Economic 
Area (EEA), in 1994, and had to abandon their procurement policy, the Norwegian oil industry 
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was totally prepared for the new competition conditions. The existence of such a deadline for 
the procurement policy actually forced local suppliers to prepare in advance for the new 
circumstances and signalled beforehand that it would be provisional.            
Finally, Norwayǯs regulatory framework has some very important provisions to foster 
research and development. The ǲTraining Agreementǳ, for example, allows the government to 
indicate a certain number of its employees to participate, free of cost, in the training 
programmes of the concessionaire companies.305 The ǲFrame Agreement on Technological 
Research and Developmentǳ stipulates that 50% of the total expenditure with R&D in projects 
related to the concession contract ought to be spent in Norway in cooperation with Norwegian 
suppliers and service companies. These companies should also be guaranteed the right to use 
the offshore installations to conduct their research projects. Hatakenaka shows how these 
provisions have been an important element to foster an adequate environment for the 
development of a competitive and productive oil industry with a high degree of technological 
standard.306 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
Brazil can extract very useful lessons from the international experience in oil sector regulation. First, it should take into account that in spite of NOCsǯ growing importance, this does 
not mean that international oil companies are no longer relevant and cannot exert significant 
roles in national oil policies. Countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil have 
recently engaged in resource nationalist actions307 that risk relinquishing this important 
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contribution of IOCs, through joint venture operations.308 As here demonstrated these can be an 
invaluable source of technological assimilation and transfer, as well as a means of reducing 
overwhelming investment risks and burdens. Normally the most successful regulatory 
experiences around the world rely on joint cooperation between NOCs and IOCs, which are 
often considered complementary.309 
Another risk related to national oil companiesǯ strategies is to concentrate excessively 
on non-commercial goals, relegating efficiency targets and competition parameters to a minor 
role. Case studies of successful NOCs reveal that these elements are essential for developing a 
solid oil industry. Corporate and regulatory adaptability, on the other hand, are also important 
factors to take into account according to the international experience.  
Secondly, the analysis of the Norwegian regulatory framework demonstrated that Brazil 
has more similarities than differences when compared to this country. Both nations have 
different agencies responsible for the regulatory, policymaking and operational functions, with 
a system of checks and balances between them. Brazil and Norway have technologically 
advanced partially state-owned oil companies, which are responsible for most of the production 
in their countries, but also have an important international presence, especially in offshore 
exploration.  
Both countries have implemented state policies with the goal of increasing the 
technological standards of the local industry and its added value to the economy. A concession 
regime with state presence and ownership in situ of oil is another common aspect. Brazil and 
Norway have also shown promising results in oil exploration and production. Most specialists 
consider that a great part of this success can be attributed to a stable and predictable regulatory 
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framework that fostered competition among firms, while also allowing companies to form 
consortia and joint ventures for the bidding rounds and operational activities. Specific public 
policies targeted at their National Oil Companies for their initial developments and 
improvement of technological capabilities is another common trait.     
Yet most useful lessons come from the differences, not the similarities. Probably the 
utmost advantage of the Norwegian regulatory framework compared to Brazil is its 
underpinning on well elaborated guidelines,310 which were extensively discussed and debated 
in a very rational, democratic, transparent and participatory manner. These guidelines set the 
essential principles for the Norwegian oil policy, which have remained rather unchanged in its 
essential foundations. Around this core set of guiding principles, however, specific regulations 
have been enacted to allow for an adequate adaptation of the risk-compensation ratio 
throughout time and for the necessary adjustments to the different circumstances.  
Another essential difference between Norway and Brazil is the amount of discussion, 
debate and transparency that has always prevailed around the definition of the core elements of 
the Norwegian regulatory framework. It is quite impressive that the country has successfully 
accomplished such a degree of openness and transparency at the very same moment when the 
discoveries in the North Sea were taking place. This is a proof of public responsibility and 
competence in dealing with social expectations. To a great extent this success can be credited to 
the technical conduct of the debates by a well-prepared bureaucracy.  
Another important difference between both countries is the constant Norwegian 
concern in not allowing its National Oil Company to become too powerful, non-accountable and 
meddled with political matters. Such preoccupation is often neglected in Brazil and sometimes 
Petrobras is excessively involved in political issues that go beyond its core goals as a NOC.   
Finally, despite the several similarities between both oil regimes, the 2010 regulatory 
modifications in the Brazilian oil regulations have made both models become increasingly 
                                                          
310 Cf. Section 4.2.1. 
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divergent. Unfortunately, that is not a good sign for the Brazilian oil sector, as the next chapters 
will demonstrate.  
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PART II –  REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL AND ITS 
EFFECTS 
This part II of the thesis analyses how the Brazilian regulatory framework affects 
important oil policy variables. The purpose here is to provide a prescriptive analysis of the 
effects on the following parameters: i) investments; ii) production; iii) technology and innovation; and ivȌ strategic control of oil. These variables are fundamental for any countryǯs 
energy policy and Brazilian laws mention them as necessary pre-requisites for the development 
of the sector.311 
Investments are considered according to the classical economic terminology as the sum of inventoriesǯ variation with gross fixed capital formation directed to the oil industry. This 
indicator mainly assesses the funds directed for increasing the production capacity of a 
particular business. Technology and innovation are understood in this chapter in their broadest 
sense as the amount of specialised scientific knowledge and expertise, which usually accrue to 
future increases of production levels. The focus essentially takes into account how the new 
regulations, practices and standards provide adequate incentives and appropriate governance 
mechanisms to foster technology and innovation in the Brazilian oil sector and what are the 
potential limitations and hindrances to this process.   
The same approach is applied to the assessment of production. The analysis of the 
variables therefore goes beyond a mere forecast of production levels, analysing, instead, what 
are the institutional mechanisms and factors that affect these parameters, what are the 
dynamics that foster or thwart them. The analysis of the strategic control of oil considers the government officialsǯ understanding of the term when proposing the 2010 reforms:312the 
possibility of greater influence over the production process and the increasing wealth 
                                                          
311 Article 1, III, X and XI of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997).  
312 According to the Interministerial Exposition of Motives N. 38 – MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL, 31 of 
August 2009. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/projetos/expmotiv/emi/2009/38%20-
%20mme%20mf%20mdic%20mp%20ccivil.htm> accessed 13 October 2013. 
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appropriation coming from the exploration of oil activities. The goal is to examine whether or 
not regulations contribute to these goals.     
As mentioned in previous chapters, the study primarily uses new institutional economic 
theory as its theoretical framework. This approach has the main advantage of considering rules 
and norms not as an end in themselves, with closed and self-contained meanings. It envisages 
them, instead, as one of the several institutions that establish basic rules and procedures for the 
relationships between and within corporations and organisations. This wider interplay, in turn, 
affects the variables being considered here. Another main advantage of this approach is its dynamic and evolving nature, since it takes into account institutionsǯ history, culture and 
specific context, assessing how they affect and are affected by these elements.  
According to North, the main role of institutions is organising social relations and 
reducing uncertainties derived from them.313 In doing so, they provide social agents with a 
structure of incentives that influence industrial and economic performance. In the case of the oil 
sector in Brazil, for example, the legal framework establishes basic parameters for the 
relationships and interactions between main corporations and institutions operating in the 
sector: the National Regulatory Agency (ANP), Petrobras, international oil companies, the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), the National Council of Energy Policy (CNPE) and the 
Presidency of the Republic.  
These legally defined parameters, however, are also influenced by informal rules and 
procedures that come into play not only in the relationships between these entities, but also 
within them. Hancher and Moran state that ǲ… the allocation of power and influence within 
regulatory space is influenced both by legal tradition and by a wide range of social, economic 
and cultural factors that go beyond narrow Ǯrules of the game.'ǳ314 The objective here is, 
therefore, to analyse how all these aspects interact and how they can affect and explain the 
outcomes in the Brazilian oil sector.  The following chapters do not intend to test, examine or 
                                                          
313Douglass C North, ǮEconomic performance through timeǯ ȋͳͻͻͶȌ The American economic review ͵ͷͻ.   
314 Leigh (ancher and Michael Moran, ǮOrganizing regulatory spaceǯ in Leigh (ancher and Michael Moran 
(eds), Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford University Press 1989) 292. 
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clarify any particular theoretical aspect of the new institutional economics theoretical 
framework by analysing the Brazilian oil industry. Rather, the purpose is to use the theoretical 
framework to explain and understand the changes in the Brazilian oil sector and their possible 
implications.  
The responsive and reflexive theories will also be frequently used in the analysis of this 
part II of the thesis. Such conceptual frameworks are useful to demonstrate how the excessively 
intrusive Brazilian regulations create setbacks that could have been avoided with a more 
cooperative and flexible regulatory model.    
The following sections will consider each of the variables, in turn. As discussed in the 
introduction, the effects on the variables will be mainly considered with respect to the upstream 
oil sector, which is the segment mostly affected by the 2010 reform.315  
  
                                                          
315 The upstream sector comprises all the activities of exploration and production.  
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5 – STRATEGIC CONTROL OF OIL 
Oil can be considered the most important strategic resource of the modern world.316 Its 
abundance or scarcity has conditioned economic performance, state interventions and 
geopolitical power since the 20th century.  
Strategic control will be here understood as the actual capacity to influence the 
production process and the appropriation of its financial proceeds according to the different 
specific governmental necessities and requirements. These requirements, as will be further 
discussed, can have the most diverse justifications and serve the best social intentions, such as 
sharing of proceeds among different social and intergenerational groups via the Social Fund, for 
example. This is a discussion, however, related to the use of the strategic control of oil for 
certain purposes, which will be conducted subsequently, since it presupposes the actual 
existence of this increasing command in the first place.  
The study conducted here will demonstrate that the current regulatory framework will 
only achieve its aim of increasing strategic control over oil in some very particular 
circumstances, while also causing substantial shortcomings in the three other studied variables, 
as demonstrated in the next chapters.  
The chapter is subdivided into three main sections. The first two take into account the 
dual central motives given by the incumbent government for changing the regulatory 
framework in 2010: i) the need to improve the stateǯs control of oil production; and iiȌ the urge 
for a greater appropriation of the potential wealth.317 These objectives have been broadly 
categorised as ǲstrategic control of oilǳ. The first section analyses how the state can exert 
control over the production process, whether the regulatory framework enables this increasing 
command and what are the possible implications. The second one examines if the current 
regulatory framework contributes to a greater appropriation of wealth coming from the 
                                                          
316Fernando Pimentel, O fim da era do petróleo ea mudança do paradigma energético mundial: perspectivas 
e desafios para a atuação diplomática brasileira ȋFundaça o Alexandre de Gusma o ʹͲͳͳȌ ͵ͳ. 
317 According to the Interministerial Exposition of Motives N. 38 – MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL, 31 of 
August 2009. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/projetos/expmotiv/emi/2009/38%20-
%20mme%20mf%20mdic%20mp%20ccivil.htm> accessed 13 October 2013.   
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exploration of oil activities. After these considerations, the final section analyses what the 
strategic control of oil can be used for and whether or not the different options are desirable in 
the case of Brazil.    
5.1 GREATER CONTROL OVER THE PRODUCTION PROCESS 
One of the reasons the government presented to change the oil regulatory framework 
was the need to assert greater control over the production process.318 The immediate question 
that arises then is what the expression exactly means. There are several possibilities. This 
control could be exerted over: i) the reserves; ii) the exploration and extraction process; iii) the 
refining of crude; or iv) the commercialisation of oil.   
The following sections will consider each of these distinct options and examine to what 
extent the current regulatory framework contributes to their achievement.  
5.1.1 CONTROL OVER THE RESERVES   
The property over onshore oil reserves in Brazil is a constitutional right established in 
article 176 of the Federal Constitution. According to its provisions:  
ǲMineral deposits, under exploitation or not, and other mineral resources and 
the hydraulic energy potentials form, for the purpose of exploitation or use, a 
property separate from that of the soil and belong to the Union, the 
concessionaire being guaranteed the ownership of the mined product. (CA No. 6, 
1995)ǳ319   
Therefore, the provision explicitly prescribes that property of mineral resources belong to the Union, which is a legal entity of public Law vested with the Brazilian stateǯs 
                                                          
318 According to the Interministerial Exposition of Motives N. 38 – MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL, 31 of 
August 2009. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/projetos/expmotiv/emi/2009/38%20-
%20mme%20mf%20mdic%20mp%20ccivil.htm> accessed 13 October 2013.   
319 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil). 
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sovereignty.320 Since oil is considered a mineral resource, the Union owns its in-situ onshore 
property.  
National sovereignty over mineral underground resources is a common worldwide 
feature. The United States is one of the few exceptions to deeming as governmental property 
subsoil oil reservoirs, which, in that country, are assigned to public or private landowners of the 
surface.321  As demonstrated in chapter 2, oil played a significant role in this process of assigning 
state sovereignty over mineral resources.  
Ownership of offshore reserves, on the other hand, is regulated in Brazil by article 20 of 
the Federal Constitution. This provision is extremely important for the country since 90% of its 
oil reserves are currently located in deep waters off the coast.322 The article sets out:   
Article 20. The following are property of the Union: (CA No. 46, 2005): 
ȋ…Ȍ 
V – the natural resources of the continental shelf and of the exclusive economic zone; 
VI – the territorial sea; 
VII – tide lands and those added to them;  
ȋ…Ȍ 
IX – the mineral resources, including those of the subsoil;323 
  Therefore, offshore resource ownership comprising the territorial sea, the continental 
shelf and the exclusive economic zone also pertain to the Union324 according to the Federal 
                                                          
320 Alexandre De Moraes, Direito constitucional (Editora Atlas 2002) 269. 
321 Cf. Nadine Bret Rouzaut and Jean Pierre Favennec, Petóleo & Gás Natural: Como Produzir e a que Custo 
(Synergia 2011) 59; Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum 
Regulation, Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law International 1999) 120; and Marilda 
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Constitution. The inevitable conclusion is that the Brazilian constitution already provided control over onshore and offshore oil reservoirs since its enactment in ͳͻͺͺ. (ence, it wouldnǯt 
be necessary to reform the existing oil regulatory framework before 2010 to exert greater 
control over oil reserves in Brazil.  
5.1.2 CONTROL OVER THE EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION PROCESS 
Control over the exploration and extraction process can take place in four ways. First, 
via the organisation of bidding rounds, often labelled as ǲbidding policyǳ. Not all countries 
organise public auctions for oil exploration. Brazil, Argentina, Australia and Canada are some of 
the nations that use public auctions to determine the companies that will explore their oil.325 
The advantage of having open public tenders for this purpose is that they emulate competition 
among potential contenders, ideally conferring exploration rights to the company that best 
meets the selection criteria. These can be the payment of royalties, for example, the use of local 
equipment, or even a combination of several parameters. The selection is supposed to take 
place in a transparent, objective and equitable way. Since the property of oil reservoirs in Brazil 
is vested in the state, it is also responsible for the bidding policy. The entity in charge of the 
bidding policy in Brazil is the Presidency of the Republic, which acts upon recommendations of 
the National Council of Energy Policy (CNPE).326  
The second manner of exerting control over exploration and extraction is through the 
direct presence of a national oil company (NOC). Most oil producing countries have a state 
enterprise in the sector. There is, however, a significant worldwide variance in the functions 
performed by these companies. In some countries such as Brazil and Norway, these enterprises 
compete on an equal basis with other private companies in public tenders for oil exploration 
rights. Whenever they are successful, they perform all operational activities for the extraction 
and production of oil. In others, such as Mexico (until 2013),327 Venezuela and Iran, they are 
                                                          
325 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) 45. 
326 Article, 9, I of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
327 The Mexican oil sector has been reformed on December 2013 and it now allows PEMEX, the Mexican 
national oil company to compete with other oil companies.  
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essentially responsible for contracting other corporations, which provide exploration services 
for them. Finally, in some nations NOCs sign joint venture agreements with other firms, which 
generally are selected in bidding rounds. This is the case in Venezuela and Angola.328     
The third way of having exploration and extraction command over petroleum is through 
the presence of a state representative entity that does not hold operational activities as an oil 
company, but monitors, oversees and manages these tasks, which are under the responsibility 
of other corporations. That is the case of PPSA, in Brazil, or Petoro, in Norway, which are both 
entirely state-owned enterprises. These entities can exert their deliberation powers in different 
manners.329  
Finally, state control over crude supply can take place via the approval of the 
development and working plans, as well as through the declaration of commerciality. This role 
is normally assigned to regulatory entities. In Brazil ANP holds these responsibilities. The next 
sections will now analyse these four ways of exerting control over the exploration and 
extraction process in light of the current Brazilian regulatory framework.  
BIDDING POLICY 
The President of the Republic is responsible for approving energy policies in Brazil after examining CNPEǯs proposals. Since the auction of oil blocks is part of the energy policy, the 
President is the ultimate authority in this respect. She is responsible for approving the areas to be offered in public tenders after CNPEǯs recommendation. Before the enactment of Law ͳʹ,͵ͷͳ, 
ANP was responsible for defining the blocks submitted to public auction.330 
Another noticeable modification in bidding policies, which was put in place after the 
discovery of pre-salt layers in Brazil, was the interruption of annual bidding rounds, which had 
been taking place until then since 1999. This frequency had offered predictability to potential 
participants and represented a safety net for those considering investing in Brazil, because they 
                                                          
328 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) 35. 
329 This topic will be further discussed below.  
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knew that further opportunities to operate in the country would be available. The regularity 
signalled to them upfront that further prospects for increasing their reserves in the country 
would be accessible in case they decided to enter the Brazilian market. They could, in that 
instance, use the already available infrastructure in existing projects to carry on further 
ventures.  
There has been an increasing demand in the Brazilian oil industry for the 
reestablishment of a timetable of public auctions in Brazil. The Brazilian Petroleum Institute 
(IBP) has formally presented this request.331 The government has disregarded it, however. Its 
main concern seems to be the incapacity of the local Brazilian industry of suppliers to cope with 
additional projects. The current Secretary of the Ministry of Mines of Energy, Marco Antonio 
Almeida, mentioned that ǲhe could not plan a bidding round considering areas that are not 
interesting and which could overburden the industry of suppliersǳ.332 This explanation indicates 
that the government seems to prioritise the development of a vigorous industry of suppliers for 
the upstream segment rather than increasing production levels.333 Some scholars contend that 
the long interruption of bidding rounds from ʹͲͲͺ to ʹͲͳ͵ results from the governmentǯs view 
that the local industry of upstream suppliers should be given the necessary time to cope with 
the consequent demand escalation for its products and services that will follow from local 
content policies in the pre-salt area.334 
Another possible explanation for not accepting the industryǯs call for a timetable of 
public auctions is the need to perform the necessary studies as to the potential of the offered 
areas. This was the reason given by ANPǯs director general, Magda Cambriard in the event held 
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in London on 13 November 2013 ǲBrazil – UK Oil and Gas Meetingǳ, when asked by the author 
about this topic.335  
The decision regarding the areas to be offered in public auctions and the frequency of 
tenders, defined as the bidding policy, are the most important elements of state control over the 
production process since they will define all other aspects and parameters related to 
production. To put it simply, without auctioned blocks no production is possible. Based on the governmentǯs estimates on the probability of discovering oil on a commercial basis, it will 
conduct public tenders in a certain area. It will set the government take and the basic conditions 
for exploration and production in tender protocols and the draft contract part of them, to be 
signed between the selected companies and the government. These documents distinguish two 
stages: the exploration phase, when oil has not yet been discovered or appropriately tested for 
commercial exploitation, and the production phase, which is launched with the declaration of 
commerciality.  
The monitoring and oversight of these two stages is performed by ANP in Brazil, which 
approves the development and working plans and also the declaration of commerciality of 
exploration blocks, which technically separates the exploration from the production phase. 
Therefore, the agency holds considerable authority in controlling these two stages and also the 
evolution from one to the other. Even though this competence is not technically exerted at the 
moment of public auctions, draft protocols of bidding rounds mention the essential parameters 
and criteria of the forthcoming development and working plans, in accordance with article 29, 
XIII of Law 12,351.  
Taken altogether, the main modification put in place by the 2010 reforms with respect to bidding policies was to revamp CNPEǯs functions in the delimitation of the offered areas, 
centring the decision on the President of the Republic. These modifications are laudable, since 
the definition of auctioned areas is an essential aspect of policy formulation, which should not 
                                                          
335 Organised by the Commercial Section of the Embassy of Brazil in the United Kingdom, the fourth 
Brazil-UK Oil & Gas Meeting took place at the Sofitel London St James on Thursday 13 November 2014. 
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be in the hands of a regulatory agency, as it used to be before 2010.  Yet although ANP was 
responsible for the definition of the auctioned areas before 2010 that does not necessarily mean that the governmentǯs participation in the process was less intense previously. As already 
demonstrated in chapter 2, the agency suffered much more influence from the Executive branch before ʹͲͳͲ. ANPǯs less interfering stance on the delimitation of blocks for public tenders thereafter coincides with the general tendency of President Lulaǯs mandate of shifting of powers 
from regulatory agencies to entities directly linked to the President such as MME and CNPE, and 
to an intensification of this process in the oil sector after 2010.336  Therefore, the government 
has always had control over the bidding process, since the 2010 reform simply shifted 
competences from one state entity to another. 
NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES (NOCS) 
The existence of a national oil company operationally involved at the upstream level can 
confer control over the exploration and extraction process. This degree of state control varies, 
however, according to the governmental share in the company. In theory, partially state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) hold less state command over operational tasks compared to fully controlled 
companies. This conclusion, however, is certainly not absolute and ought to be balanced against 
other elements that come into play. A transparent and accountable partially state-owned enterprise, for example, can exert more command over resources, in line with the governmentǯs 
interests, than a corrupt and captured SOE channelling the interests of specific private groups. 
Yet it is unquestionable that the governmentǯs share in the company is a component that may 
influence the degree of control it can exert on exploration and extraction activities in the oil 
sector. 
Another aspect that should be taken into account are the types of shares that the 
government has in the national oil company, whether they confer voting rights or not. In Brazil, 
the legislation allows for the existence of shares with and without voting rights.337 The Brazilian 
                                                          
336 Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ. 
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Union,338 for example, has ͷ͵.͸͵% of Petrobrasǯ voting capital but only 48.32% of the total 
capital share.339 )n ʹͲͳͲ the Union significantly increased its participation in Petrobrasǯ total 
capital share, from 39.80% to 48.32%, which could lead to the false conclusion that its voice in 
the company had increased. Yet taking into account the Federal Unionǯs voting share in the 
company, there was a slight reduction from 55.6% to 53.63%, showing that actually its 
deliberation power had marginally decreased.340 
 The decision-making process and the governance setting that determines it is also an 
element to be accounted for in partial SOEs. Generally these types of companies have a board of 
directors with shareholders representatives. This peculiarity brings issues of corporate 
governance to the analysis of the degree of state control over operational issues, which can be 
determinant in defining whether the government has actual control over the national oil 
company. Michael Whincop when studying corporate governance in government corporations 
argued that frequently in these companies ǲthe governance game is played Ǯoutside the squareǯ 
of the formal governmental apparatusǳ.341 He explains that governments have multidimensional 
interfaces with their partially-owned corporations, since they perform multiple and frequently 
divergent tasks in the company. They are shareholders, regulators and often customers and 
lenders, among other distinct possibilities. Because of these multifaceted functions and complex 
interconnections between them, the government can often use one of its roles to leverage its 
interests in the SOE.342  
This is exactly what has been happening in Petrobras with its pricing policies since 
2010. As demonstrated in several chapters of the thesis, the government has been using its 
influence in the company to resist necessary price adjustments because it holds majority voting 
share in the Board of Directors and the chair until 26 March 2015 was the influential Minister of Finance. This outcome is particularly striking since, according to Petrobrasǯ bylaws, the Board of 
                                                          
338 As previously explained, the Union is a legal entity of public Law vested with the Brazilian Stateǯs 
sovereignty. Cf. Alexandre De Moraes, Direito constitucional (Editora Atlas 2002) 269 
339 Gesner Oliveira and Sergio Goldbaum, ǮA capitalização da Petrobrás em perspectivaǯ in Giambiagi, 
Fábio: Petróleo: Reforma e Contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Campos 2012)228. 
340 Ibid. 228. 
341 Michael John Whincop, Corporate governance in government corporations (Ashgate 2005) 9. 
342 Ibid. 
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Executive Officers is responsible for the corporationǯs management. )ts article ͵͵, )), ȋcȌ clearly 
mentions that the approval of pricing policies is one of the competences of the Board of 
Executive Officers and, therefore, it is not an issue under the responsibility of the Board of 
Directors.  
This incident illustrates how the governmentǯs influence on the important issue of 
pricing policies has been played not only ǲoutside the square of the formal governmental 
apparatusǳ, as suggested by Whincop, but also outside the formal corporate apparatus. The 
degree of state command over the company with respect to pricing policies has been so blatant that even though the former companyǯs Chief Executive Officer, Gracas Foster, openly defended 
in the media price increases to bring it closer to international levels, the Minister of Financeǯs 
opposition prevented this from taking place. 343 Edmar Luis Fagundes de Almeida stresses that 
the Minister of Finance is who is normally interviewed about oil price increases and not the 
CEO, as may have been expected.344 This is unreasonable, since the CEO is the coordinator of the 
Board of Executive Officers, which is supposed to decide about pricing policies. When asked 
about these procedures with respect to price increases in Petrobras, one of the interviewees for 
the thesis, who had occupied a high position in the firm and required anonymity, asserted that 
pricing policy decisions were taken by the government and then simply endorsed by the Board 
of Executive Officers.            
These actions evidently bring electoral dividends to the government, especially because 
oil prices significantly affect inflation indexes. Yet they also have substantial repercussions for the companyǯs results, especially on its profitability levels, as has already been argued. Most scholars attribute Petrobrasǯ significant share drop until ʹͲͳ͵ to its pricing policies.345 Minority 
shareholders, on their side, have been increasingly concerned about this situation as revealed 
                                                          
343 Cf. Cláudia Sch“ffner, ǮMantega 'vence' Graça no reajuste da gasolinaǯ Valor Economico (Rio de Janeiro) 
<http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/3358736/mantega-vence-graca-no-reajuste-da-
gasolina#ixzz2mM95wFdk> accessed 12 May 2014. 
344 Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida, 'Seminário GEE2013: Os Desafios da Energia no Brasil' (2013). 
345 Cf. Luiz Paulo Vellozo Lucas, ǮA derrota de um modelo de sucessoǯ in Fabio Giambiagi ȋedȌ, Petróleo-
Reforma e Contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier 2012); and Ana Siqueira, ǮO que aconteceu com a Petrobras?ǯ in Fabio Giambiagi ȋedȌ, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor 
petrolífero brasileiro Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier (Elsevier 2013). 
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by the declaration of the workersǯ representative board member Silvio Sinedino. According to 
him:  
"The government has been doing everything it can to suck money out of 
Petrobras to balance its own books. If the government finds the minority 
shareholders or employee representatives or the by-laws to be a nuisance they 
have a remedy: they can fully nationalize the company, buy up the minority 
shares, but as long as they have minority shareholders, they have to obey the 
rules".346  
Against this backdrop, there is an increasing risk of litigation on these grounds, which would add significant judicial uncertainty to Petrobrasǯ already unsteady corporate 
performance. These lawsuits could certainly be filed alleging that majority shareowners (the 
government) have abused their power, according to article 117, paragraph 1 (a) of Law 6,404. 
The provision considers these shareholders liable for guiding ǲa corporation towards an 
objective other than in accordance with its corporate purposes ȋ…Ȍǳ.347 A future landscape of 
reducing profits could certainly trigger these litigations, even though the outcome is rather 
uncertain because it can be argued, on the other hand, that the national oil company as a 
majority state-owned corporation has to accomplish certain state goals which the minority 
shareholder should abide by.348  
Therefore, corporate governance issues are also an essential determinant of the governmentǯs actual capacity to exert influence in a state company. It is perfectly possible, for 
instance, to have a certain NOC with a lower state share than another one, suffering, however, 
                                                          
346 Jeb Blount, ǮPetrobras board member lashes out at gov't over oil planǯ Reuters (Rio de Janeiro) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-petrobras-br-complaint-idUSKBN0F12RI20140626> 
accessed 5 November 2014. 
347 Article 117, paragraph 1 (a) of Law 6,404 of 15 December 1976 (Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 
1976).   
348 This issue has been considered in one case that has been filed by a minority shareholder of one of Petrobrasǯ subsidiary companies, Petroquisa.The plaintiff required indemnification because the company 
had accepted low value federal bonds in exchange of equity. Justice Massami Yueda, the Raporteur from 
the Superior Tribunal of Justice (STJ), considered in his decision that state-owned companies have 
strategic goals that go beyond simple profit considerations.  Yet, since Brazil is a civil Law country, other 
court decision can have a different outcome. Another significant risk of litigation may also arise in other jurisdictions where Petrobrasǯ shares are negotiated, such as in the United States, for example. 
 108 
much more governmental interference than its counterpart because its governance rules and 
procedures allow this greater sway to take place. These rules and procedures include not only 
explicit, formal and statutory elements, but also the informal, tacit, and cultural aspects, as 
previously mentioned.349 
One simple example related to the rules for nominating board of director members in 
NOCs illustrates this point. In Norway, as demonstrated in chapter 4, board state 
representatives in Statoil cannot be civil servants. The main objective of this rule is to avoid the 
appointed members facing situations of conflict of interest dictated by other policy priorities 
not related to the oil business. In Brazil, on the other hand, such restrictions do not exist for 
state appointees in Petrobras and normally influential and high-ranked officials are put forward 
for the position. Therefore, these elements increase the possibility for the Brazilian government 
to exert control over the exploration and extraction process through the national oil company, 
in comparison to Norway. This derives not only from the Norwegian formal rule for its board 
appointees, but also from the Brazilian cultural tradition of indicating influential and high-ranked civil servants for its NOCǯs board of directors. This latter cultural aspect of the Brazilian 
national oil company inevitably imposes a high burden on other board members in challenging 
the deliberations of powerful government officials in that same position. It also minimises the 
risks of having governmental appointees not attuned to main governmental policies.   
The governmentǯs nomination for Petrobrasǯ Board of Directors reinforces a common 
Brazilian corporate governance problem, which also applies to most Latin American countries. 
As noted by Filho and Picolin,350Sanz and Holan351 and Silveira,352differently from the US, where 
                                                          
349 Cf. Charles Oman and Daniel Blume, ǮCorporate Governance: A development challengeǯ ȋOECD 
Publishing, 2005) referred to in Joaquim R Fontes Filho and Lidice M Picolin, ǮGovernança corporativa em empresas estatais: avanços, propostas e limitaçõesǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ Ͷʹ Revista de Administração P’blica ͳͳ͸͵  
1167; Douglass C North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge 
university press 1990); and Joaquim R Fontes Filho and Lidice M Picolin, ǮGovernança corporativa em empresas estatais: avanços, propostas e limitaçõesǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ Ͷʹ Revista de Administração Pública 1163. 
350 Joaquim R Fontes Filho and Lidice M Picolin, ǮGovernança corporativa em empresas estatais: avanços, propostas e limitaçõesǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ Ͷʹ Revista de Administração P’blica ͳͳ͸͵. 
351 Luis Sanz and P Marín de (olán, ǮReconquistando a confiança de acionistas minoritáriosǯ ȋʹͲͲͶȌ ͺʹ 
Harvard Business Review América Latina 36-41 cited in Joaquim R Fontes Filho and Lidice M Picolin, ǮGovernança corporativa em empresas estatais: avanços, propostas e limitaçõesǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ Ͷʹ Revista de 
Administração Pública 1163,1167. 
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the property of corporate entities is diffuse and scattered, in Latin America it is highly 
concentrated. It is usual in these cases for the majority shareholder to significantly exert control over the companyǯs management. Because of this tendency, the usual agency problem between 
management and shareholders is reduced. The main agency dilemma that arises in these 
situations is not, therefore, between corporate management and shareholders, but between 
majority and minority shareholders. This is exactly what happens in Petrobras, where the governmentǯs influence over the CEO is evident and frequently occurs to the detriment of 
minority shareholders. Two of the most evident instances where these dilemmas occur are in pricing and local content policies, where the majority shareholderǯs will prevails at the expense of the minority owners, who tend to be more sensitive to the companyǯs underlying share value 
and its profitability.353    
Finally, the incumbent governmentǯs ideological views also influence the degree of 
control it puts forth on the national oil companyǯs production process. )n Brazil, for example, the 
government started using Petrobras as an important public policy implementer after 2010, 
when the degree of state interference in the economy as a whole and the influence of 
developmentalist theories became more evident.354 This observable interventionist stance in 
Petrobras is radically different from the position adopted from 1994 to 2002, under President Cardosoǯs term. During those years, the company held more operational autonomy from the 
central government and several market-oriented reforms took place.        
This increasing interventionist stance through the use of Petrobras becomes particularly 
evident in the laws enacted by the 2010 reform, especially article 10, III, c of Law 12,351. The 
provision spells out that Petrobras should hold a minimum 30% share in all consortia formed to 
explore pre-salt layers and areas deemed strategic. The Exposition of Motives N. 38 – 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
352Alexandre Di Miceli Silveira, ǮGovernança corporativa e estrutura de propriedade: determinante e relação com o desempenho de empresas no Brasilǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal de São PauloȌ 
referred to in Fábio Viana de Moura and others, ǮConflitos de Agência, Legitimidade eo discurso sobre Governança Corporativa: o caso PetrobrasǯȌ 4.  
353 This happens because minority shareholders are mainly worried about profitability and they are not 
particularly concerned about certain aspects that are really important for the government such as the 
impact of oil prices on inflation indexes or the development of a robust industry of national suppliers.  
354 David M Trubek, ǮDevelopmental states and the legal order: towards a new political economy of 
development and lawǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ ͳͲ͹ͷ University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper ͳ. 
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MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL, which presented the justifications for Law 12,351, contended that this share was a necessary counterpart for Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity in the mentioned 
areas, despite not explicitly detailing the reasons for the exclusivity. Since the document 
mentions that the oil exploration regime should be changed to provide a greater control of the 
overall production process, what can be deduced is that the 30% share with operational 
exclusivity are elements that contribute to this increasing control.      
Paradoxically, even though this provision has been meant to give more strategic control 
to the government over the production process, it will have the exact opposite effect. Because of 
the statutory obligation to be part of all ventures in pre-salt and strategic areas with a 30% 
share, Petrobras will inevitably face financial and operational constraints to keep up with all the 
necessary projects to explore such areas. As mentioned by Armando Guedes in an interview 
with the author: ǲNo oil company in the world has conditions to explore on its own an area as 
big as the Brazilian pre-salt layersǳ,355 also endorsed by Joao de Lucca.356  
Therefore, one of the inevitable consequences of the requirement of having Petrobras in 
all projects in pre-salt and strategic areas with 30% share and operational exclusivity is that the 
exploitation rhythm of these areas will no longer be essentially determined according to the governmentǯs priorities in a well-defined and elaborated policy. Instead, this pace will primarily depend on the Brazilian national oil companyǯs financial and operational possibilities.357 The 
government will lose degrees of liberty in the formulation of an essential aspect of energy 
policies, which is the control over the pace of exploitation. Rather than having more strategic 
control over the production of oil in Brazil, the government will lose it, exactly the opposite of 
its alleged intention with the 2010 reforms.  
This loss of strategic control over the production process would be significantly 
mitigated if Petrobras were an entirely state-owned oil company and had a sound and 
                                                          
355 Interview with Armando Guedes, Former President of Petrobras (Rio de Janeiro, 21 July 2012). 
356 Interview with Joao de Lucca, President of the Brazilian Petroleum Institute (IBP) (Rio de Janeiro, 05 
August 2013). 
357 Walter De Vitto and Richard (ochstetler, ǮPerspectivas para os investimentos petrolíferos no Brasilǯ in 
Giambiagi and Velloso Lucas (eds), Petróleo–Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Elsevier Editora Ltda 2012) 144. 
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sustainable financial situation. In that case, the government would be entirely responsible for all 
corporate deliberations and the enterprise would not depend excessively on financial creditors 
to undertake its decisions. Nevertheless, as detailed in chapter 2, Petrobras is a partially-owned 
state enterprise with 55.63% of voting shares belonging to the Federal Union.358 Therefore, 
even though there is governmental control over the company it is still liable to its minority 
shareholders, according to its by-laws. Even more worryingly, however, Petrobrasǯ exploration 
schedule is in the short term extremely dependent on the availability of funding because of its 
lack of immediate financial resources. The direct consequence of this dependency is that creditors have an important voice and influence on the companyǯs exploitation pace. Quite 
ironically, the provisions requiring exclusivity and a 30% share in all strategic and pre-salt 
areas indirectly transferred strategic control over the production process from the government 
to Petrobras and financial creditors.  
Petrobras is a partially state-owned national oil company, which is not usual in the 
world, where several NOCs belong entirely to the state.359 Notwithstanding the governmental 
control of the company, with 55.36% of voting shares, this majority is not overwhelming. Its 
formal corporate governance rules, in turn, are considered adequate according to international 
standards, in terms of minority shareholder protection and are inscribed in its corporate 
bylaws.360 These factors would normally lead to the inference that the degree of state control 
over the company is not significant, at least by relative global standards. The natural conclusion 
would therefore be that the governmentǯs influence in the production process through the 
company is not substantial, taking only these elements into account. Nevertheless, informal state intrusiveness in Petrobrasǯ corporate governance and the governmentǯs increasing 
economic interventionist stance since 2010, especially in the oil sector, contribute to an 
increasing state command over the production process through the national oil company.  
                                                          
358 Gesner Oliveira and Sergio Goldbaum, ǮA capitalização da Petrobrás em perspectivaǯ in Giambiagi, 
Fábio: Petróleo: Reforma e Contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Campos 2012) 228. 
359 Cf. Valerie Marcel, Oil titans (Brookings Institute 2006); David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark C 
Thurber, Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the world energy supply (Cambridge University 
Press 2011); andBaker )nstitute, ǮBaker )nstitute Policy Reportǯ ȋThe Changing Role of National Oil 
Companies in International Energy Markets, 2007). 
360  Cf. Petrobras, ǮGovernanceǯ <http://www.petrobras.com/en/about-us/governance/> accessed 6 
October 2014. 
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The informal corporate governance element that allows this increasing control is the 
culture of appointing influential high ranked civil servants as board members from the 
economic area. This tradition undermines resistance from minority shareholders and intensifies 
the situations of conflict of interests between corporate and macroeconomic issues.   
Considering state interventionism, historically Petrobras has been deemed a national oil 
company with relatively low degree of government intrusiveness in operational activities, 
compared to other NOCs.361Yet this characteristic has been changing since 2010 because of the 
previously mentioned factors. The interference is particularly acute with respect to pricing and 
local content policies. While in the first case necessary oil price increases have been postponed 
to tackle inflation, in the second one Petrobras has become an essential instrument of 
governmental local content policies, which essentially depend on its purchases in pre-salt and 
strategic areas.362   
The statutory reforms, which aimed to assign a leading role to Petrobras in the 
production process, undermine rather than boost the stateǯs control over oil supply.  This happens because crude supply will vary according to the companyǯs own financial and 
operational possibilities, instead of following main state policies decided by the Executive. Yet 
other elements not inscribed in laws, such as informal corporate government practices and the governmentǯs ideological views towards state interventionism in regulated sectors, have been 
contributing to an increasing state command over production.            
PRESENCE OF A STATE REPRESENTATIVE ENTITY       
The presence of a state-owned enterprise not directly producing oil but essentially 
monitoring, overseeing and controlling the production process is another way of asserting 
increasing command over crude supply.  
                                                          
361 David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark C Thurber, Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the 
world energy supply (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
362 This topic will be further examined in chapter 7.  
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In Norway Petoro performs this task in blocks where the Norwegian state participates via the Stateǯs Direct Financial )nterest ȋSDF)Ȍ.363 Through the SDFI the state obtains rights over 
the oil projects it chooses.364Petoro is responsible for the administration of the SDFI. It does not 
hold operational duties and its ǲmain objective is to maximise the economic value of the state's 
oil and gas portfolio on the basis of sound business principles.ǳ365 Because it has a share in the 
Norwegian blocks it deems financially lucrative with the right to veto any decision of the 
operational committees formed to explore the oil, it can influence production levels in the 
country.366 Yet its veto prerogative has never been used and its intervention is essentially 
focused on the financial profitability of the ventures and on asset management.  
PPSA, in Brazil, is also an entirely state-owned enterprise which holds a minimum 50% 
participation in all the constituted consortia for exploiting oil in pre-salt and strategic areas in 
Brazil. PPSA actually has the ability to influence all major operational decisions in the 
consortium because of its minimum 50% share in the operational committees which should be 
formed to explore oil in pre-salt and strategic areas. Yet PPSA does not exert any operational 
activity.  
The difference between PPSA and Petoro is that the latter participates financially in the 
projects it deems commercially rewarding and also enjoys discretion in deciding the ventures it 
will be part of. PPSA, in contrast, mandatorily joins all consortia exploring pre-salt and strategic 
areas in Brazil, without contributing capital of any kind.  
The creation of PPSA through Decree N. 8,063 and Law 12,304 enables the Brazilian 
state to effectively exert control over the production process. With its mandatory 50% share in 
operational committees, the company can command operational decisions to its own best 
                                                          
363 The SDFI is an accounting mechanism created in the Norwegian national budget, which guarantees to 
the state the right to a percentage share in the oil blocks it deems of its interest. The net cash flow of SDF)ǯs portfolio is automatically transferred to a Government Pension Fund, which previously used to be 
the Petroleum Fund. See discussion in chapter 4.  
364 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011). 
365  Available at: http://www.petoro.no/about-petoro/main-objective--vision-and-values accessed 24 
October 2014. 
366 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) 232. 
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interests, as long as the deliberation quorum forms a simple majority. Chapter 6 will 
demonstrate that this high share can be significantly increased in the governmentǯs interest if 
PPSA votes in accordance with Petrobras, which has a minimum 30% share at the operational 
committee. The next chapter will show that it is not difficult to envisage situations in which 
these two entities might align their interests to deliberate uniformly, especially considering the 
higher governmental influence in the national oil company after 2010. 
The stateǯs actual capacity to influence the production process via PPSA, comes, 
however, at a price, which is the significant drawbacks related to investments, analysed in 
chapter 6, and technology and innovation, examined in chapter 8. The shortcomings essentially 
arise from agency and moral hazard problems created by the statutory provisions that detail PPSAǯs structure and its decision-making procedures in operational committees.  
The desired increasing control over the production process in Brazil could have been 
achieved avoiding these drawbacks. The creation of PPSA for this specific reason is not 
justifiable. Petrobras is a dominant firm in the Brazilian oil sector, with extensive participation 
and command over technology to explore oil fields in the country. Since the state is the companyǯs majority shareholder, it would have been perfectly possible for the government to 
influence crude supply according to its own priorities even before the 2010 reforms.367 On the 
other hand, if the concern is the predatory exploitation of reserves, ANP has the expertise and 
regulatory power to conduct the necessary inspections and take the required corrective 
procedures in these cases.   
Another reason given for the existence of PPSA is the need to have a state entity carefully monitoring and overseeing the exploration companiesǯ accounts, especially their costs. 
As outlined in chapter 2, the main distinctive feature of production-sharing regimes is that the 
property of the extracted oil belongs to the state.368 After extraction, the production costs, 
labelled as ǲcost oilǳ, are reimbursed to the producing oil companies, while the remaining ǲprofit 
                                                          
367 This would have to be done with extreme caution not to undesirably increase the use of Petrbras for 
political issues. All of the undertaken decisions would have to be extensively detailed and justified.  
368 See previous discussion in Section 3.5.  
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oilǳ is split between state and producers. The percentage of ǲprofit oilǳ that goes to each can be 
determined in several ways. In Brazil, an open bidding round, in which competing companies 
present their offers, starting from a minimum level previously stipulated in the Tender Protocol, 
sets the share between state and producing oil companies.   
One of PPSA essential functions as the manager of production-sharing agreements is to 
carefully assess the oil companiesǯ ǲcost oilǳ to make sure it is not inflated or exaggerated. This 
control is certainly important to avoid a moral hazard situation, whereby producing companies 
shrink the level of profit oil left for the state to a minimal undesirable level. Notwithstanding its 
obvious importance, this task need not necessarily be performed by PPSA, since ANP holds 
enough technical expertise for it and is already a consolidated entity in the Brazilian oil sector. 
Actually these monitoring and oversight functions performed by PPSA with respect to 
production-sharing agreements are typical regulatory tasks.369  Hence, ANP could perfectly be 
responsible for them, avoiding, as a result, several problems that the creation of PPSA has 
engendered.  
  
                                                          
369 Antônio Luís de Miranda Ferreira, ǮProblemas e inconsistências jurídicas do novo marco regulatório: a ótica dos princípios Constitucionais da livre iniciativa, da economia de mercado e do direito comercialǯ in 
FABIO GIAMBIAGI (ed), Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro Rio de Janeiro: 
Elsevier (2013) 192. 
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APPROVAL OF DEVELOPMENT PLANS, WORKING PLANS AND THE DECLARATION OF 
COMMERCIALITY 
ANP is responsible for approving the development and working plans, as well as the 
declaration of commerciality in production-sharing agreements.370 These competences confer 
on the agency the actual possibility of exerting indirect control over the production process.371 
In the case of concession contracts, this opportunity is granted first through the assessment of 
the working plans during the bidding process.372  The working plan is a detailed list of 
procedures and activities that the operational companies intend to put into action in the areas 
they will explore. This plan will be further specified at the moment of the signature of the 
contract.373 In production-sharing agreements the annual working plans are prepared by the winning consortium and submitted for ANPǯs consideration.  
At the end of the exploration phase the oil companies can either declare the 
commerciality of the blocks they had been exploring or return them to the Union. In case of 
concession contracts the companies exploring oil declare unilaterally the commerciality of the 
blocks.374 In production-sharing agreements they ought to be approved by ANP, according to 
article 24, III of Law 12,351. Such provision shows again the governmentǯs aim to exert more 
control and oversight in strategic areas. This task is perfectly legitimate and consistent with ANPǯs regulatory functions. Yet one limitation that the requirement entails is the excessive 
bureaucratisation of the approval process, since three governmental entities respectively decide 
on it. First, Petrobras, which is responsible for elaborating a report on the commerciality of a 
certain area.375 PPSA then deliberates on the issue, when it is submitted to the operational 
committee.376 Finally, ANP is the last entity to assess and approve the declaration of 
                                                          
370 Article 11, V and Article 24, III of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de 
Dezembro de 2010). 
371 If ANP does not approve a certain working plan or the declaration of commerciality the proponent 
companies would have to submit new proposals or reconsider even their projects, which in most 
stitautions would affect production levels.    
372 Article 41, I of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997). 
373 Article 43, III of ibid. 
374 Article 24, paragraph 1 of  ibid. 
375 Article 30, III of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010) 
376 Article 24, III of ibid. 
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commerciality. Even though each one of these three entities considers the plan from a different 
perspective, it is undoubtedly counterproductive to have three governmental entities 
deliberating on the same issue. The same procedures apply for the approval of development and 
working plans.  
As will be further proposed and detailed in chapter ͻ, PPSAǯs functions can be perfectly 
eliminated, since the problems they create for a successful governance of the Brazilian oil sector far outweigh any effective contribution. )n this specific case, Petrobrasǯ propositional role when 
elaborating a report on the commerciality of areas and the working and development plans is 
essential because of its operational functions in pre-salt and strategic areas. ANPǯs regulatory 
tasks are also fundamental and cannot be eliminated. Yet the same thing cannot be said about 
PPSA, since its duties in the examination of the declaration of commerciality, development and 
working plans can perfectly be performed by ANP with a clearer purpose, a wider and more 
integrated sectorial approach.  
5.1.3 CONTROL OVER THE REFINING OF OIL  
As previously mentioned, one way for governments to assert increasing command over 
the production process is through the control of the refining of oil. The 2010 reform in Brazil 
did not modify any aspect related to this activity. Therefore, the natural conclusion would be 
that alterations in the regulatory framework did not affect this specific aspect.  
The inference about control of refined oil should, however, be analysed and considered against the backdrop of Petrobrasǯ strategies and actions, considering the whole productive oil 
chain. Since there is a natural limitation to corporate investment capacity, Petrobras as any 
other verticalised oil company, faces opportunity costs when investing in one level of the 
production chain, because financial disbursements on one specific stage mean less available 
funds for other segments of the supply chain. In the case of a company with severe financial 
limitations and overburdened with capital expenses, such as Petrobras, this trade-off between 
the downstream and upstream levels is increasingly acute.  
 118 
The demand for refined oil had been consistently increasing in Brazil until the second 
half of 2014, having surpassed its supply, especially because national prices were compressed, if 
compared to the international market.377This pricing policy had sweeping repercussions beyond 
the immediate short-term corporate losses.  
One of its often-neglected important shortcomings was the gradual shift in Petrobrasǯ 
investment priorities. The increasing demand for refined products at the downstream level, 
because of the subsidies, led Petrobras to progressively transfer part of its focus and funds from 
the more profitable upstream sector, where it holds its most significant competitive advantages, 
to the less promising downstream segment.378 This shift in priorities occurred because of the 
need to provide adequate levels of refined oil supply to the country.  From 2011 to 2014 the 
company has registered an accumulated loss of $26 million at the downstream level.379 Yet even 
more problematic is that because of this policy, other oil companies which had been investing in 
oil refining after the opening of the sector to private enterprises in 1995, have been closing 
down, since they cannot afford to compete with a dominant player consistently subsidising their 
products and even incurring significant losses.380 As a result, today Petrobras is one of the only 
companies refining oil in Brazil, which deviates it further from the lucrative upstream sector 
and intensifies the distortive and dysfunctional effects of its pricing policy in a vicious cyclical 
effect. As illustrated by Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida: ǲtoday Petrobras has to fight a war on 
two fronts in the Brazilian oil sector both at the upstream and the downstream levelsǳ.381 
Another hurdle must be added to this equation. First, because the country has a 
diversified and flexible energy matrix, it is very difficult to forecast the actual demand for 
refined oil because consumers have several options. This demand predictability problem is 
aggravated by the fact that energy policies in the country have been extremely volatile and 
unpredictable, in some moments incentivising the consumption of certain fuels, such as natural 
                                                          
377 Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida, 'Seminário GEE2013: Os Desafios da Energia no Brasil' (2013). 
378 Ibid. 
379  Amrita Sen and others, ǮBrazil's Strugglesǯ Energy Aspects - In Focus 
<https://www.energyaspects.com/publications/view/brazils-struggles> accessed 15 June 2015. 
380 Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida, 'Seminário GEE2013: Os Desafios da Energia no Brasil' (2013). 
381 Ibid. 
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gas (GNV) and biomass alcohol, while abandoning these same policies in other 
instances.382Therefore, Petrobras faces not only the problem of increasing demand at the 
downstream level but also the fact that the demand is volatile and unpredictable.  
(ence, the national oil companyǯs increasing capacity to control the supply of refined oil 
through increasing production amounts actually reduces the command it has at the upstream level, which is the companyǯs core business and where it holds significant worldwide expertise 
and competitive advantage.  Paradoxically and in contrast to the logic of institutional economics, 
which claims that firms tend to verticalise to reduce transaction costs and increase their 
efficiency levels ,383 Petrobrasǯ vertical structure has been significantly affecting its cost upswing 
because of downstream subsidies and the responsibility for matching national demand at this 
level.              
5.1.4 CONTROL OVER THE COMMERCIALISATION OF CRUDE OIL  
The new regulatory framework allowed the state to have a tighter control of the 
commercialisation of crude oil. According to article 45, sole paragraph of Law 12,351 and article 
2 of Law 12,304, PPSA will be responsible for contracting a company to commercialise the oil 
assigned to the state in production-sharing contracts. Petrobras can be directly contracted for 
this task without organising public tenders.384 
As already described, one of the peculiarities of the Brazilian production-sharing regime 
is that the profit oil is not appropriated by the state financially but via tangible crude oil. This 
unique feature certainly allows the state to have physical control over the commodity and 
therefore to strategically command its sale according to its needs. Here again the increasing 
control over the commercialisation of oil comes at a price, which is the creation of a significant 
transaction cost for the government to perform this activity. Instead of the profit oil being 
transferred to the state financially by the producing company, Petrobras, it is given in kind and 
                                                          
382 Ibid. 
383 Cf. Oliver E Williamson, ǮTransaction cost economics: the precursorsǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ ʹͺ Economic Affairs ͹ 
384 Article 45, Sole Paragraph of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 
2010). 
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further sold by a firm that PPSA will hire for this task. The immediate question that arises then 
is what are the advantages for the government to receive this profit oil in kind? Does this benefit 
outweigh the implicated transaction costs in receiving the physical commodity and then 
commercialising it? Section 5.3 will consider these queries.     
5.2 GREATER APPROPRIATION OF WEALTH COMING FROM THE EXPLORATION OF OIL 
ACTIVITIES  
The urge to increase the amount of state appropriation of oil productionǯs proceeds for 
the overall social benefit was the second justification for the 2010 legal changes. The rationale 
for this argument was that the discovery of the immense oil deposits in pre-salt areas presented 
new conditions of low risks and high gains to potential explorers, which therefore demanded 
higher appropriation levels than established in Law 9,478.385 The incumbent government 
claimed that this higher appropriation level would be attained through the legal framework 
established in Law 12,351.  
Paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Exposition of Motives N. 38 – MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL 
clearly set forth this concern of higher rent appropriation. Former President Lula and his 
Minister of Mines and Energy Edison Lobao emphasised this discourse in several other public 
appearances. President Dilma made similar statements in her speech after the first public 
tender using Law 12,351.386  
Paradoxically as it may seem, the abovementioned Exposition of Motives claims that the 
new regulatory framework will allow this higher rent entitlement but does not mention how it 
will take place or what specific provisions or mechanisms will account for a higher share. It 
seems to directly associate a lower government take387 to the regulatory framework established 
                                                          
385 Even though government officials claim that exploration in the pre-salt area presented conditions of 
low risks and high gains, they remain silent about the costs involved in these activities, which are 
considered quite significant. This topic will be further explored in the thesis.   
386 Juliana Braga, ǮÉ 'bem diferente' de privatização, afirma Dilma sobre leilão do pré-salǯ O Globo (21 
October 2013) <http://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2013/10/e-bem-diferente-de-privatizacao-
afirma-dilma-sobre-leilao-do-pre-sal.html> accessed 18 September 2014. 
387 Government take is a terminology used in oil literature that designs all taxes and state appropriations 
of the oil production.  
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in Law 9.748 and a higher rent appropriation to the new one, without detailing or comparing 
amounts or any percentage of fiscal revenues between the two statutes.388 All the explanations 
provided in the Exposition of Motives are superficial and do not address the main issue, i.e.: how 
will the changes provided guarantee a higher government take in relation to Law 9,748? The 
extracts below, from the justifications in Exposition of Motives N. 38 – 
MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL, show the maximum level of detail provided in the explanations: 
ǲThis model,389 in which the concessionaire faces all the exploration risks and 
reaps all the earned benefits, is incompatible with the existing conditions of the 
pre-salt area. ȋ…Ȍ The estimated exploratory risks in these areas are significantly 
low, while the profitability is considerably high. This requires a regulatory 
framework which ensures the predominance of the national interest, through a 
greater control of the potential wealth by the Federal Government and a higher 
share of its proceeds, for an overall social benefit. 
ȋ…Ȍ 
The new contractual design is necessary in a context of low geological risk, with 
significant rent surplus, which should be maximised by the State and reverted to 
the society through actions for poverty reduction and development of the 
education, culture, environmental sustainability, science and technology.ǳ390             
One of the most common criticisms for this explanation is that a simple modification of 
infra-legal norms could have met this objective, without the need to alter existing regulatory oil 
laws.391 Actually, Law 9,478 contemplates the possibility of levying a special participation tax, 
which is a kind of windfall profit tax, to production volumes or profitability levels considered to 
                                                          
388 As previously explained, Law 9,478 does not apply to the pre-salt area.  
389 The regulatory framework established in Law 9.478, where the exploration of oil and gas is to be done 
according to concession contracts.   
390  Personal translation of Paragraph 7 of Interministerial Exposition of Motives N. 38 – 
MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL, 31 of August 2009. Available at < 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/projetos/expmotiv/emi/2009/38%20-
%20mme%20mf%20mdic%20mp%20ccivil.htm> accessed 13 October 2013.   
391 Guilhereme Dias and Alfredo Renault, ǮA concentração de recursos na União e as perdas das regiões produtorasǯ in Giambiagi and Lucas ȋedsȌ, Petroleo Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolifero 
brasileiro (Elsevier Editora Ltda 2013)153, 178.  
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be significant.392 The threshold for its incidence varies according to the complexity involved in 
the location for oil extraction.393 Law No. 9,748 specifies that a presidential decree will detail the 
incidence procedures of the special participation in cases of significant profit or production 
volumes of oil. Decree No. 2,705 was enacted for this purpose and provides the details for its 
application. A simple change in this decree would suffice to meet the goal of increasing the 
government take of oil activities in Brazil. The President, without the need of altering the whole 
regulatory oil framework, could have done this modification. It would have avoided the 
submission of a bill of Law to Congress and the opening of a time-consuming debate about the 
distribution of royalties among federative entities. 
Of course this federative debate about the distribution of state revenues is legitimate 
and desirable, especially in occasions where they are expected to rise significantly, such as after 
the discovery of new and promising reserves. Yet this need to rethink the share of federative 
entities of oil proceeds was never pointed out as a reason for changing the regulatory 
framework. Besides, if that were the case, it could have also been done in the context of an 
amendment of Law 9,478 and would not have necessarily required the enactment of three new 
statutes. 
In interviews conducted by the author with thirty-four oil sector specialists between the 
years of 2012 and 2013, ten interviewees agreed that a simple infra-legal modification could 
have met the objective of increasing the government take of oil activities.394 There seems to be a 
widespread acceptance of this view among oil specialists that are not working as civil servants 
or in Petrobras. Only two interviewees among this group did not explicitly agree with this 
position. Among the group of civil servants and Petrobras employees, those that disagree with 
the statement, do not refute it either, but resort to arguments related to other intentions in the 
legal changes and wider objectives and aspirations of the statutes not necessarily linked to this 
                                                          
392 Article 50 of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997). 
393 In oil fields situated on land, in the first year, special participation payments should occur at the 
production volume of 450.000 cubic meters of equivalent petroleum per quarter. This amount will rise to 
900.000 in areas of the continental platform in depths up to 400 meters, and to 1.350.000, for deeper 
extractions. In the second year of production, all these amounts will be reduced, the same occurring in the 
third year. From the fourth year onwards the amounts will be the same as in the third year.   
394 See introduction for a more detailed explanation about the interviews.  
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specific topic. This group is understandably less vocal in expressing their opinions about the 
topic.   
 Paradoxically, as pointed out by Paulo Cesar Ribeiro Lima,395it is even possible that the 
modifications provided by Law 12,351 decrease the government share over oil activities in 
Brazil. That could perfectly happen for three main reasons. First, unlike Law 9,478, Law 12,351 
does not have any specific provision accounting for a higher governmental appropriation in case 
of significant levels of production or profitability, as the Special Participation tax.396 Second, the 
new regulatory framework does not stipulate a minimum percentage level for royalties or for 
cost oil recoupment, as previously mentioned. Third, investors and oil companies will most 
probably reveal reluctance with respect to the new Brazilian regulatory regime, therefore 
tending to invest less in the Brazilian oil sector after the 2010 reform.397 Fewer investments 
lead to reduced production levels and tax amounts.   
 The absence of a clear, straightforward and rational justification for the reasons 
presented in this section for changing the oil regulatory framework may give rise to two 
assumptions: i) other justifications explain the change; or ii) even though a rational causal link 
between the objectives and the legal change itself has not been provided, it exists and is 
plausible.  
 An analysis of the literature reveals, however, that the second assumption is not 
justifiable. First, there is a clear convergence among scholars around the conclusion that 
different levels of government take can be attained using the concession and production-sharing 
regimes and that there is no inherent superiority of one model in relation to the other in this 
                                                          
395 Paulo César Ribeiro Lima, Pré-sal, o novo marco legal e a capitalização da Petrobras (Synergia Editora 
2011) 27. 
396 Article 45, III of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997). 
397 There is a vast literature in regulation showing that a higher level of state interference in regulated markets decrease ǲcoeteris paribusǳ the amount of investments to that specific sector. Cf. Brian Levy and Pablo T Spiller, ǮA framework for resolving the regulatory problemǯ ȋͳͻͻ͸Ȍ Regulations, institutions and 
commitment 1; Stefan Voigt and Eli M Salzberger, ǮChoosing not to choose: When politicians choose to delegate powersǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͷͷ Kyklos ʹͺͻ. 
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particular aspect.398 Second, there is nothing special in the way the production-sharing regime is 
applied in Brazil according to Law 12,351 that guarantees a superior government take in 
relation to the concession framework used in Law 9,478.399 This position is predominant among 
specialists that have analysed the new Brazilian model.400 In a similar vein, in the interviews 
conducted for this thesis, all experts were unanimous in agreeing with these points. Therefore, 
everything seems to lead to the conclusion that the reasons for the legal change are elsewhere.  
 One possibility is that the motive for the reform is exclusively related to an increasing 
control of the production process, analysed in section 5.1. Another alternative is the existence of 
another explanation for the change that is not evident and could not be clearly publicised by the 
government. Everything seems to indicate that this latter option is what actually occurred.  
One aspect of the change that has never been pointed out by proponents but has been 
detected by Guilherme Dias and Alfredo Renault is the concentration of financial resources in 
the hands of the federal government.401 The regulatory framework enacted in 2010 provided for 
the use of a production-sharing regime in pre-salt and strategic areas. The government take in 
this regime takes place through the payment of royalties and of profit oil in kind. The proceeds 
of profit oil, after its commercialisation, in turn, will accrue to the Social Fund, where the federal 
government has an increasing share. The Special Participation tax, which is levied in the 
concession regime, according to Law 9,478, is not charged in production-sharing agreements 
under Law 12,351. A significant portion of the Special Participation tax is channelled to states 
                                                          
398 Cf. Guilhereme Dias and Alfredo Renault, ǮA concentração de recursos na União e as perdas das regiões produtorasǯ in Giambiagi and Lucas ȋedsȌ, Petroleo Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolifero 
brasileiro (Elsevier Editora Ltda 2013)156; and Edmar Luiz F de Almeida and Vinícius Accurso, ǮGovernment take e Atratividade de )nvestimentos na Exploração e Produção de (idrocarbonetos no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ. 
399 Guilhereme Dias and Alfredo Renault, ǮA concentração de recursos na União e as perdas das regiões produtorasǯ in Giambiagi and Lucas ȋedsȌ, Petroleo Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolifero 
brasileiro (Elsevier Editora Ltda 2013)153,178. 
400 Cf. Paulo César Ribeiro Lima, Pré-sal, o novo marco legal e a capitalização da Petrobras (Synergia 
Editora 2011); Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Giambiagi and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013); Carlos Jacques Viera Gomes and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯ ȋCentro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos 
para discussão, 2009); Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos 
regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Luiz Cezar Quintans(ed), Contratos de 
Petroleo Concessao e Partilha Propostas e Leis para o Pre-Sal (B. Biz Editores 2011). 
401 Guilhereme Dias and Alfredo Renault, ǮA concentração de recursos na União e as perdas das regiões produtorasǯ in Giambiagi and Lucas ȋedsȌ, Petroleo Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolifero 
brasileiro (Elsevier Editora Ltda 2013). 
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and municipalities. Therefore, the non-incidence of the Special Participation tax and the 
financial resources from profit oil channelled to the Social Fund concentrated more resources 
within the federal government. Of course this rationale for changing the framework could not be 
openly divulged because it could lead to a political backlash of subnational entities and create or 
intensify federative political disputes. As already mentioned, this federative clash has already 
been taking place with respect to the discussion of the division of royalties between producing 
and non-producing states. 
Other possibilities for the change in the regulatory framework include the aim to mark a 
clear change with respect to the previous institutional setting, because of the symbolic element 
of a legislation reform with the insertion of social goals. This symbolic message is particularly appealing to the working partyǯs electorate, especially taking into account that the government 
of President Lula had been following an economic policy that departed from the traditional 
leftist agenda. This is a tendency that could have also affected other areas such as foreign policy, 
for example, in which President Lulaǯs discourse is more appealing to the historic agenda of the 
Brazilian working party.402  
5.3 GREATER STRATEGIC CONTROL OF OIL: WHAT FOR? 
 Section 5.2 concluded that nothing guarantees that the 2010 reforms will allow a greater 
strategic control coming from the appropriation of wealth in the exploration of oil activities. In 
contrast, section 5.1 demonstrated that the new framework enables in some specific instances 
an increasing governmental sway over the exploration, extraction and commercialisation of oil. 
Following on from this analysis, this section will examine how this increased control can be 
used and what are the possible implications of its employment. 
Considering, therefore, these possibilities of greater command over the production 
process, the essential question to be asked is: what can this increasing strategic control be used 
for? There are two possibilities: i) the option of having oil inventories for emergency situations 
                                                          
402 Paulo Roberto de Almeida, ǮUma política externa engajada: a diplomacia do governo Lulaǯ ȋʹͲͲͶȌ Ͷ͹ 
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 162. 
 126 
and ii) the possibility of deriving some sort of geopolitical or trade advantage as a result of a 
supposed stricter control of the product.  
The first option of having oil for emergency situations is certainly desirable and 
necessary, considering the essential value of oil for the economy and for the country as a whole. 
Yet this urge does not necessarily require the government to stock oil, hold the product in kind 
or control its commercialisation, as implied by the 2010 reforms. All these activities pose 
significant transaction costs, as already mentioned. It would be desirable to bear these expenses 
if their resultant outcomes more than compensated for the inevitable burden incurred. In other 
words, if oil for emergency situations could not be otherwise supplied at a lower cost. 
Nevertheless, the Brazilian Federal Constitution in its article 17, § 2, I, and Law 9,478, in its 
article 1, V, provide for the guarantee of oil supply in Brazil. For this specific purpose, in emergency situations the President of the Republic upon CNPEǯs proposal can require oil 
companies operating in Brazil to provide part of their production for the proper operation of the 
National System for Fuel Reserves.403  This guarantee has existed since 1995, way before the 
2010 reforms. Since emergency situations are not recurrent but rather isolated and remote, it is 
uneconomical and unreasonable to hold inventories and create a whole new structure with all 
the resultant transaction costs for stocking oil in kind preparing for these infrequent and 
unforeseen circumstances. 
The second alternative of deriving geopolitical or commercial advantages out of an 
increasing control over oil production is certainly desirable, especially by directing exports to 
markets that are geopolitically more important for the country. Yet this initiative has to be 
exerted cautiously, under the overarching principle that these non-commercial aspects cannot 
significantly affect national production levels and long-term profitability. As demonstrated in 
chapter 4, national oil companies such as NNPC in Nigeria and PDVSA in Venezuela have been 
facing excessive interference in their daily routines for the most diverse political reasons, at the 
expense of their operational results.  Other national oil companies such as the Malaysian 
                                                          
403 Daniela Couto Martins, A Regulação da Indústria do Petróleo: segundo o modelo constitucional brasileiro 
(Fórum 2013) 197,198. 
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Petronas, in contrast, have been able to successively reconcile geopolitical non-commercial 
goals with positive corporate outcomes.404  The analysis provided in chapter 4 on national oil 
companies demonstrated that these non-commercial goals can be best attained when they are 
enduringly sustainable and resistant to short-term political urges that excessively drain 
corporate resources. Statoil, Aramco and Petronas, for instance, have been balancing non-
commercial and commercial objectives without jeopardising corporate efficiency and 
performance.405  
As will be described in chapter 6, an episode in 2006 involving the nationalisation of Petrobrasǯ gas installations in Bolivia is an illustrative example of how the geopolitical concerns 
can put corporate priorities at risk in Brazil. On that occasion, despite the national oil companyǯs 
intensified pressure on the government of Bolivia for a fair compensation, President Lula 
adopted a conciliatory negotiating stance. He considered the Brazilian foreign policy interests of 
South-American integration as a priority not to be put at risk, which prevailed over Petrobrasǯ 
corporate interests.406 These actions, when exerted occasionally and for specific strategic purposes that accrue to the countryǯs sustainable benefit are not problematic. Yet if they assume 
a more regular and continuous nature of exclusively short-term gains they can drain invaluable 
resources from the country putting at risk the sustainability of the business.         
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 The chapterǯs main goal was to analyse whether the ʹͲͳͲ reforms provide a greater 
strategic control of oil, considering that this was the principal governmental justification for the 
change. Two main aspects were examined, taking into account what the incumbent governmentǯs understanding of the term strategic control of oil was. First, the need to improve 
                                                          
404 Fred  von der Mehden and Al Troner, ǮPetronas: a national oil company with an international visionǯ 
(The Changing Role of National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets, 2007). 
405 Donald (ertzmark, ǮPertamina: )ndonesia's State-Owned Oil Companyǯ ȋThe Changing Role of National 
Oil Companies in International Energy Markets, 2007). 
406 Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o 
Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil 
thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2010) 181. 
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the stateǯs appropriation of oil production for the overall social benefit; second, the urge to 
provide a greater control of the potential wealth.407  
Nothing guarantees that the 2010 reforms will allow a greater strategic control coming 
from the appropriation of wealth in the exploration of oil activities. The new framework enables 
in some specific instances an increasing governmental control over the exploration, extraction 
and commercialisation of oil. These possibilities come, however, at a price for the sector, 
especially in terms of drawbacks on investments, as will be demonstrated in the next chapters. 
Considering that there is a possibility of increasing control over the oil sector, the natural 
questions that follows is what it should be exerted for. The options examined in the chapter 
demonstrated that the only plausible alternative was the option of deriving some sort of 
geopolitical or non-commercial advantage of a stricter control over oil production. Yet this 
possibility should be exerted with extreme caution so as not to excessively affect production levels and the sectorǯs overall profitability.  
 Therefore, the main conclusion is that the 2010 reform will only allow an increasing 
strategic control of oil in some very specific cases, at a significant cost. The government could 
have reached this exact same objective mitigating the pinpointed shortcomings, had it used a 
less intrusive regulatory model, based on a top-down approach and command and control 
principles. This will be one the arguments of the next chapters, especially chapter 9, which will 
demonstrate what modifications should be made to the current regulatory framework to 
minimise the shortcomings on investments, production levels, technology and innovation.  
  
                                                          
407 According to the Interministerial Exposition of Motives N. 38 – MME/MF/MDIC/MP/CCIVIL, 31 of 
August 2009. Available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/projetos/expmotiv/emi/2009/38%20-
%20mme%20mf%20mdic%20mp%20ccivil.htm> accessed 13 October 2013.   
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6 - INVESTMENTS 
The oil industryǯs upstream segment is highly capital intensive. The sectorǯs capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) to sales ratio is approximately 17%, while the average percentage rate 
for industries in general is somewhere between 6 and 7%.408 Sectoral start-up capital 
requirements are normally so significant that they are considered an important industrial 
barrier to entry.409 Oil companiesǯ stock exchange values, moreover, are directly dependent on 
the amount of proven productive reserves they own. This demands constant investments for the 
discovery of new production areas to replace the old and less productive locations and to cope 
with the depletion rates of current reserves. A standard petroleum field normally has an 
average life span of 15 to 20 years and an annual depletion rate that varies from less than 3%, in 
newer locations, to more than 10%, in more mature areas.410 For a given annual depletion rate 
of 5%, after 10 years 50% of the current production level ought to be replaced by new ones.  
  Oil companies are therefore constantly exploring new production frontiers and 
investing in innovative technologies to gain access to them.  The high risks associated with the 
significant investment amounts are another feature of the oil industry. Assets at the exploration 
and production phase are considered sector specific. Alternative uses are therefore costly and 
rarely possible and sunk costs, as a result, significant. High sunk costs have an adverse effect on 
investment decisions. Geological risks involved are equally paramount. The average exploration 
success rate at the upstream sector in the last 13 years has been of approximately 25%. In other 
words, on average three out of four exploration wells will not lead to oil discoveries in a 
commercially viable amount.411 This is one of the reasons for companiesǯ tendency to diversify 
their activities as much as possible around the globe. By having a diversified international 
exploration portfolio, they reduce the chances of not finding oil in viable commercial amounts.   
                                                          
408 This refers only to Europe and the US. Cf. Nadine Bret Rouzaut and Jean Pierre Favennec, Petóleo & Gás 
Natural: Como Produzir e a que Custo (Synergia 2011) 162. 
409Helder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie Eixos do Desenvolvimemto Brasileiro. 
410Nadine Bret Rouzaut and Jean Pierre Favennec, Petóleo & Gás Natural: Como Produzir e a que Custo 
(Synergia 2011) 161.  
411 Ibid. 162. 
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Technology, in turn, is one of the main investment components in the oil industry and is 
expected to gain even more relevance in the future. Most of the easier exploration oil fields 
around the globe have already been discovered and future findings are forecasted to happen in 
areas of more difficult access, where exploration techniques require sophisticated equipment, of 
higher cost. In the Brazilian pre-salt area, for example, investments in technology are significant 
and considered one of the main challenges for viable future production.412  
It is quite evident, therefore, why investments are so important in the upstream oil 
sector. The discovery of the pre-salt oil deposits has only been possible because of the 
continuous projects undertaken by Petrobras in offshore areas. They all involved significant 
investment amounts and the development of complicated technologies to extract oil at a 5km 
depth, beneath 2 km of thick salt layers. The prospects for developing production further in the 
area, moreover, involve considerable future disbursements. The Brazilian Bank for National 
Economic and Social Development (BNDES) estimates investments of between US$ 264 billion 
and US$ 742.5 billion are necessary in the Brazilian oil sector until the year 2027.413 Petrobrasǯ 
investment plan for the period 2012 to 2016 amounts to US$ 237 billion and is considered to be 
the most ambitious corporate investment programme in the world.414  
One of the important rationales for creating independent and autonomous regulatory 
agencies and delegating to them certain competences that affect market decisions is the 
assurance that these entities will not suffer political pressure to unduly interfere in business 
activities.415 This confers more predictability, certainty and credibility to the sector, fostering, as 
a consequence, investments to the regulated industry. When referring to the delegation process 
from governmental branches to agencies, Paulo Correa et al. suggest ǲThe degree of delegation 
                                                          
412 (elder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie Eixos do Desenvolvimemto Brasileiro. 
413 Edmar Luiz  de Almeida and Vinícius Accurso, ǮGovernment take e Atratividade de )nvestimentos na Exploração e Produção de (idrocarbonetos no Brasilǯ Discussion Paper Ͳʹ/ʹͲͳ͵ - Grupo de Economia da 
Energia 
<http://www.gee.ie.ufrj.br/index.php/component/cck/?task=download&file=textos_discussao_arquivo&
id=452> 3.  
414 Christopher Garman and Robert Johnston, ǮPetroleo: o Brasil no contexto de um panorama global em transformacaoǯ in Fabio Giambiagi ȋedȌ, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Elsevier 2013) 265. 
415 This is one among several of the objectives. Another important goal in creating regulatory agencies is 
to foster competition.  
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reflects the degree to which the executive, the legislature, or both, seek to bind their hands in 
order to acquire credibilityǳ.416  Neo-institutionalists, in particular, contend that regulatory 
frameworks should be sufficiently predictable, stable and protected from governmental and private entitiesǯ interference so as to incentivise investments in institutional settings that 
naturally tend to be risky and prone to political pressures.417  
This rationale has certainly been present in the Brazilian oil sector. As discussed in 
chapter 3, the Brazilian literature recognises that one of the main goals for the creation of 
regulatory agencies in the country was to provide a reliable and unequivocal commitment to 
investors that politics would not interfere with regulated business sectors. This is commonly 
referred to as the ǲCredible Commitment Hypothesisǳ.418 As argued in Part I of the thesis, the ͳͻͻͷ Brazilian regulatory framework has been successful in this respect. )n the authorǯs 
interviews for this thesis, all of the thirty-four interviewees concurred with this point.   
This encouraging scenario, however, will inevitably change. There are several elements 
in the 2010 Brazilian regulatory framework that will discourage investments in the oil industry. 
The following sections will examine each one of them sequentially. First, however, the analysis 
will turn to the main factors that affect investments in the oil sector.  
6.1 INVESTMENTS IN THE OIL SECTOR 
There is extensive economic intellectual production on investment decisions and their 
main determinants. The intention here is not to traverse this vast literature. This section will 
focus specifically on the studies that analyse the main factors influencing investment decisions 
in the oil sector.  
  
                                                          
416 Paulo Correa and others, ǮRegulatory governance in Brazilian infrastructure industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ Ͷͺ  The 
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6.1.1 INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND INVESTMENTS IN THE BRAZILIAN OIL 
SECTOR 
As previously stated, neo-institutional scholars consider that certainty, predictability 
and the existence of independent institutions managing public functions that directly affect 
corporate yield return are essential factors to foster investments in utility and strategic 
industries. Based on this overall understanding, several emerging countries have been engaged in institutional reforms of these sectors from the ͳͻͻͲǯs onwards. The reforms normally 
included the privatisation of state-owned companies, the enactment of new legal regulatory 
frameworks, the creation of independent regulatory agencies and competition advocacy.  
One would therefore normally expect the Brazilian oil industry, as a regulated industry, 
to exhibit these same features and institutional attributes. Yet Lourdes Casanova et al present 
arguments against this standpoint and the neo-institutional theoretical underpinnings. Based on 
a case study in the Brazilian oil sector and interviews with high-ranking executives and top-
ranking specialists in government agencies and trade associations, they argue that corporate 
strategic decisions are not affected by institutional factors in the oil sector.419According to them: ǲthe premises of Hitt & Dacin (2000) and North (2009), according to whom the institutional differences between countries influence firmsǯ strategies, do not apply to the oil industry.ǳ420  
When explaining their conclusion, Casanova et al contend that the oil industry is 
globalised and contingent on several geopolitical factors. The urge to replace reserves and the 
paramount required investments in that endeavour force firms to perform internationally and 
to consider all risk elements and opportunities around the world. Within this setting, 
institutional considerations are deemed less important. They particularly allude to the fact that 
most oil and gas reserves are located in countries with low levels of institutional development 
                                                          
419 Luiz Marcelo Martins Almeida, Luiz Alberto Nascimento Campos filho and Lourdes Casanova, ǮThe 
Brazilian Institutional Environment: The )mpact on Companiesǯ Strategies in the Oil and Gas Sectorǯ 
(2011) Faculty and Research Working Paper - INSEAD. 
420 Ibid., 27,28. 
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in the Middle East and they still receive considerable investments from international oil 
companies.421  
Several other studies, however, present different views. As discussed in chapter 4, when 
comparing National Oil Companies (NOCs) to privately owned International Oil Companies 
(IOCs), Hartley and Medlock show econometric evidence pointing out that the former are less 
revenue efficient than the latter.422 The authors mainly give institutional justifications for the 
disparity. They claim that NOCs tend to overemploy at higher wages and to sell oil products to 
consumers at subsidised prices. These practices considerably affect their efficiency and are 
derived from the need to rally political support from a broad constituency. Shleifer and Vishny, 
similarly, resort to institutional considerations to explain state-owned enterprisesǯ pricing 
policies.423 These practices range from pricing below marginal cost (predatory pricing), to gain 
political support, to the formation of monopoly, for extracting additional rent. 
Other studies also take into account how corporate and institutional settings affect oil companiesǯ strategies and performances. Paul Stevens and the Baker )nstitute of Policy allude to NOCsǯ conflicting objectives between commercial and non-commercial goals and how this 
divergence can affect their operational results.424   Victor, Hults and Thurber, in turn, provide a 
thorough study of 15 of the most important NOCs around the world, attempting to understand 
the main reason for variations in their performances and strategies. Among the conclusions 
presented, two are particularly important for this discussion.425 First, NOCs perform worse than 
IOCs and the most relevant determinant for achievement among NOCs are the goals that 
governments establish for them. Secondly, the consistency and convergence of the relationships 
between NOCs and their respective governments are also relevant explanatory performance 
                                                          
421 Ibid. 
422 Stacy L Eller, Peter R (artley and Kenneth B Medlock, ǮEmpirical evidence on the operational efficiency 
of National Oil Companiesǯ ȋʹͲͳͳȌ ͶͲ Empirical Economics ͸ʹ͵. 
423 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ǮPoliticians and firmsǯ ȋͳͻͻͶȌ The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 995. 
424 Paul Stevens, ǮNational oil companies: good or bad?ǯ National oil companies workshop: Current roles 
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<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.8929&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 
13 May 2014. 
425 David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark C Thurber, Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the 
world energy supply (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
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factors. NOCs in countries with unstable and erratic links with their governments perform 
worse, according to the authors. These are again examples of institutional factors directly 
affecting companiesǯ performance and strategies.   
It is true that these studies are primarily dealing with NOCs, which are normally more 
sensitive to institutional changes compared to IOCs, since they are at least partially, or entirely 
state-owned companies and therefore prone to closer ties with the government and more 
susceptible to political modifications. Yet NOCs are unequivocally important players in the 
industry and relevant actors in most national institutional governance settings. It is quite 
improbable that any institutional context with relevant consequences on NOCs would not at least indirectly affect )OCsǯ performance and strategies.426   
Rather than downplaying the importance of institutional factors such as Casanova et al, 
the interviews for the thesis reveal that they are one among many of the factors to take into 
account when considering investing in a certain country. Since the risks of operating in the 
upstream of the oil industry are significant, the relevance of institutional risks tends to be 
diluted and less apparent if compared to others. Most interviewees for this thesis pointed out that geological risks are predominant in oil companiesǯ investment decisions. They all stressed, 
however, that institutional risks were always taken into account and stated that Brazil is 
considered quite developed in institutional terms, especially if compared to other places around 
the globe that hold significant oil reserves.427  
The opinion of Mauro de Andrade is relevant here. In an interview with the author he 
claimed that a general assumption about Brazilǯs institutional advantages, if compared to other 
oil producing countries, ought to be nuanced and considered with care, on a case-by-case basis, 
considering also the specific applicable conditions to the oil sector.428 He gave the example of 
two African countries to illustrate his point: Nigeria and Angola. One would argue, at first 
                                                          
426 Ibid. 
427 The same conclusion is reached by Luiz Marcelo Martins Almeida, Luiz Alberto Nascimento Campos filho and Lourdes Casanova, ǮThe Brazilian )nstitutional Environment: The )mpact on Companiesǯ 
Strategies in the Oil and Gas Sectorǯ ȋʹͲͳͳȌ Faculty and Research Working Paper - INSEAD. 
428 Interview with Mauro de Andrade, Vice-President of Statoil (Rio de Janeiro, 08 August 2013). 
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glance, that Brazil would hold a significant institutional advantage over both countries in terms 
of general investment destination. When analysing the oil sector, however, the conclusion 
would be that while a great preference exists comparing Brazil to Nigeria in this respect, the same isnǯt true with regards to Angola. According to him, this latter country confers a relatively 
stable and predictable environment for oil companies, despite its overall institutional 
deficiencies.  
(is view is actually similar to Patrick (ellerǯs analysis, which demonstrates that the 
government in Angola has been successful in creating a very investor friendly and attractive 
environment for oil companies, overcoming some of the major institutional setbacks in the 
country.429Patrick Heller claims that one of the most important reasons for this accomplishment 
is the close existing ties between the National Oil Company and its group of well-prepared 
technocrats with the ruling elite, which grants autonomy for the company to conduct its daily 
operational business, oriented by commercial strategies.430 Even though rent seeking exists in 
the country, the government has not allowed it to affect the composition of the NOCǯs 
(Sonangol) technocratic staff and its main corporate decisions.431 
6.1.2 MACRO INSTITUTIONAL AND MICRO INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS Statoilǯs Vice-Presidentǯs statements and Patrick (ellerǯs study are very careful to identify two types of institutional settings, both of which affect companiesǯ strategies and 
performance, in line with the institutional theoretical framework. The first one, at the macro 
institutional stage, applies at the aggregate level of institutions, taking into account, primarily, 
country risk, political stability and macro governance interplay. The second, at the micro 
institutional level, is principally concerned with the conditions that affect a specific industry, the 
applicable contracts, market structure, its competitive determinants, regulations and 
                                                          
429 Patrick (eller, ǮAngolaǯs Sonangol: Dexterous Right (and of the Stateǯ in Victor, Hults and Thurber 
(eds), Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the world energy supply (Cambridge University 
Press 2012). 
430 Ibid. 
431 Of course such policy might have a socially detrimental impact on the country which were not 
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governance mechanisms among sectorial agencies. Of course these two levels interact to a 
certain degree and are affected by one another.  
The first type of analysis at the macro level is mainly based on the studies of North,432 
while the second primarily takes into account Williamson's perspective.433 Williamson also 
extends the analytical framework to reach individuals of specific organisations. Institutional 
influences would therefore apply in different layers, according to the diverse analytical 
dimensions, exerting influence on one another. Scott, in turn, distinguishes these two 
approaches as the followers of historical institutionalism, in the first camp, and rational choice 
theorists, in the second.434 While historical insitutionalists are basically concerned with the 
macro perspective, identifying evolutionary aspects of institutions and how they affect 
individual preferences, rational choice scholars take these individual choices as givens and 
examine how institutions are formed to solve collective action dilemmas resulting from 
individual predilections. While preferences for the first group are endogenous, influenced and 
formed by historical contexts, for the second theorists they are exogenous and predefined.  
Casanova et al's analysis does not appear to distinguish between these two dimensions 
of institutional risks, focusing, instead, only on the macro perspective. This partially explains 
their conclusion about corporate strategic decisions not being affected by institutional factors. 
While macro institutional elements may not play a relevant role for corporate strategies in 
Brazil, as suggested by the authors, at the micro level the situation is most certainly different.  
It is symptomatic that despite reaching the conclusion that institutional differences 
between countries do not apply to the oil industry, Casanova et al. state that: 
 ǲall the respondents drawn from the E&P industry and two of those from 
government organizations (together 6/16 of the sample) stated that the ending 
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433 Oliver E Williamson, Ǯ(ierarchies, markets and power in the economy: an economic perspectiveǯ 
(1995) 4 Industrial and Corporate Change 21 cited in Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e 
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of the upstream monopoly in 1997 and the creation of the National Petroleum 
Agency and clear rules were the main factors for the increased investment in the 
sector.ǳ435 
These legal oil sector changes are a clear example of micro institutional factors 
influencing corporate decisions in the Brazilian oil sector.    
In the interviews conducted for this thesis, all the interviewees questioned about 
institutional and regulatory risk for investments in the country, with the exception of Statoilǯs 
Vice-President, perceived it to mean macro institutional risk.436 Only after further enquiries and 
explanations did they express their considerations about micro perspectives. Since Casanova et alǯs interviews were conducted via questionnaires, it is quite possible that they did not manage 
to carefully explain or detail the difference between macro and micro institutional settings to 
their interviewees.     
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the oil industry is considerably globalised. One 
of the reasons for this international dimension is exactly the need to diversify investment 
portfolios to reduce risk, as also noticed by Casanova et al.,437Felipe,438Thurber and Hults439 and 
all interviewees for this thesis working in exploration areas. Because of these strategies, the 
industry has become less vulnerable to institutional risks. This does not mean, however, that 
they are not important. It just means that the strategy undertaken by oil companies has 
progressively reduced these risks quite effectively over time. Lourdes et al.ǯs static analysis, 
based on a single case study in a country considered macro institutionally stable, such as Brazil, 
missed this point. This inaccuracy could have been avoided in a dynamic and wider enquiry 
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 138 
about institutional aspects that have historically influenced corporate strategies in several countriesǯ oil sectors.  
)t is useful to allude here to Ednilson Felipeǯs work, which also clearly recognises how institutional elements have shaped Petrobrasǯ strategies in Brazil in different periods.440 He 
examines how the company has strategically adapted since its foundation, in 1953, taking into 
account the divergent views of its stakeholders. Based on the findings of Alveal,441 Felipe shows 
that despite this flexibility, Petrobras has been able to create a long-term strategic corporate 
project, which has been consistently followed in a very rational manner. He stresses the importance of the companyǯs versatility when confronted with different institutional settings 
and how it has been able to adapt successfully at different moments, exerting political pressure 
and influence on critical occasions. Felipe resorts to Williamson,442 Spiller and Liao443 to 
illustrate that firms are not only influenced by institutional settings in a passive and reactive 
manner, but they also tend to pro-actively attempt to change the environment to their own best 
interests.  
Guilherme Dias opposes Felipeǯs viewpoint, claiming that the governmentǯs influence 
over Petrobras, as main shareholder, has been the main performance and strategic determinant, rather than the firmǯs ability to implement a corporate long-term strategic project.444He therefore rejects the view that the companyǯs success in implementing corporate strategies was 
the main reason for its performance results, since these internal factors mainly depend on the governmentǯs decision, as main shareholder.      
                                                          
440 Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o 
Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil 
thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2010). 
441 Edelmira del Carmen Alveal Contreras, Os desbravadores: a Petrobrás ea construção do Brasil industrial 
(Relume Dumará 1993). 
442 Oliver E Williamson, Ǯ(ierarchies, markets and power in the economy: an economic perspectiveǯ 
(1995) 4 Industrial and Corporate Change 21, cited in Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e 
Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo 
Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳͲȌ 36. 
443 Pablo T Spiller and Sanny Liao, ǮBuy, Lobby or Sue: )nterest Groups' Participation in Policy Making-A Selective Surveyǯ ȋʹͲ06) referred in Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas 
Empresariais: A Trajetória e o Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente 
Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹ010) 17.  
444 Guilherme Gomes Dias, ǮMudança )nstitucional e Desenvolvimento: O Caso da )nd’stria do Petróleo no Brasilǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ.  
 139 
A more balanced position would attempt to avoid this excessive polarisation between 
the influence of a corporate technocracy and the government, as the respective understandings 
of Felipe and Dias. It would be more realistic to consider, instead, several vectors of influence on Petrobrasǯ performance and strategy coming internally from the company and also from the 
government. Even these vectors, however, have their own subdivisions, since the government 
and the company cannot be envisaged as a whole unified, homogeneous and coherent entity. A 
quite comprehensive explanatory model to examine strategy and performance in the oil sector 
is presented by Victor et al. in the figure below.445 
Figure 1: Institutional model in the Oil Sector 
 
Source: Victor DG, Hults DR and Thurber MC, Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the world energy 
supply (Cambridge University Press 2011), 888. 
 According to Victor et alǯs diagram, state goals, state institutions and the nature of resources, in the left hand box, directly impact on the format of a countryǯs oil sector and its 
main governance mechanisms between the NOC, IOCs, the government and service companies, 
contained in the middle box. The interplay between these actors will, in turn, define the companiesǯ strategic choices and their performance, in the box at the right. )n other words, 
governance mechanisms between main sectorial players influence and determine oil companiesǯ strategies and performances.   
                                                          
445 Victor DG, Hults DR and Thurber MC, Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the world 
energy supply (Cambridge University Press 2011), 888. 
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)n contrast to this more comprehensive analytical framework, Felipeǯs position focuses excessively on the firm, while Guilherme Diasǯ focuses on the government, as if it were totally 
separated from the company, when actually it is not. Besides, the fact that the government is Petrobrasǯ main shareholder and has the final word in corporate decisions does not mean that it cannot be influenced by the companyǯs employees and its specific ethos and corporate culture, 
which could be perfectly reflected on a rational corporate plan, as argued by Felipe.   
What is important to take into account at this point, however, is that institutional factors are important elements in an oil companyǯs strategy and performance. Since decisions about investments are an essential component of any companyǯs strategy and performance, 
investments are particularly reactive to institutional settings. 
The following sections will now consider the aspects in the 2010 Brazilian regulatory 
framework that will affect investment decisions in the Brazilian oil sector. The first element to 
be analysed in section 6.2 are the governance mechanisms among the existent entities in the oil 
sector. Section 6.3 will then turn to Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity. Finally, section ͸.ͷ will 
examine the positive aspects of the regulatory framework.    
6.2 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN THE BRAZILIAN OIL SECTOR  
The Brazilian oil industryǯs main institutions and their respective competences have 
already been described in chapter 2. This section will analyse the interplay among these 
entities, their formal and informal institutional relationships and interconnections and how they 
are likely to affect investment decisions in the sector.  
The regulatory framework established from 1995 to 2010 had some basic features that 
led to a transparent, predictable and balanced governance setting, with effective controlling 
mechanisms between the different component entities. The Brazilian institutional design during 
that period provided for functional separation between the regulatory, policy formulation and 
operational roles, which were assigned to different entities accordingly. This functional 
demarcation between distinct bodies had the advantage of permitting institutional checks and 
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balances between them and provided greater assurance that policies would be implemented without undue governmental and private partiesǯ interference.  
The Legislative branch was responsible for approving laws that would guide policy 
formulation in the sector and the allocated budget for its implementation. The ministries of the 
Executive branch held planning and formulation functions, while the regulatory agency, ANP, 
would be responsible for sectorial regulation, monitoring and oversight, maintaining 
independence from governmental and corporate influence. Petrobras held operational functions 
jointly with other private oil companies, which were all overseen by ANP. These roles, in turn, 
were subject to legislative control and monitoring, tasks performed by this branch with the support of the Federal Governmentǯs National Accounting Tribunal ȋTCUȌ. Whenever cases of 
normative infringement were detected they could be brought to courts, which would therefore 
perform the essential normative and legal oversight functions.  
This structure worked very much in accordance with the Norwegian oil sectorǯs 
framework, as discussed in chapter 4, and has been recognised by specialists for its suitability in 
terms of institutional design.446 In spite of the cited advantages of the legally defined 
institutional governance framework, one should argue whether it actually worked in practice. 
Laws and regulations can be very rationally envisioned and designed but their actual 
effectiveness presupposes adequate implementation and enforcement procedures.447 Otherwise 
they can become ǲlike a beautiful musical instrument that is rarely playedǳ, a problem quite 
frequent in Latin American countries.448 With this goal in mind, the governance interplay among 
institutions will be analysed in the following sections starting first with the landscape before the 
2010 modifications and moving then to the governance setting after that year.  
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In spite of the 2010 regulatory modifications, the basic institutional setting of the Brazilian oil sector was established in the ͻͲǯs, with the ͳͻͻͷ constitutional amendment and the 
enactment of Law 9,478. Hence, the 2010 regulatory framework reform did not revoke or annul 
the previous one, but has rather modified it, maintaining its basic institutions. 
Any legal modification establishing new roles, competences and functions among 
regulatory entities inevitably brings uncertainty to the business environment that can 
potentially affect investment decisions. Yet there are certain elements of the 2010 reform that 
raise even greater concerns beyond the mere apprehension about institutional change. There 
are governance aspects established in the new 2010 provisions that impact negatively on 
investments because of the very nature of the stipulated conditions, the content of their 
provisions and how they effectively come into force. The aim of this section is to take these 
elements into account, examining their repercussions. 
Within this overall setting, the governance interplay among institutions will be analysed 
in four stages in the following sections. The first will take into account the interaction between 
the Executive branch and ANP. The second will analyse the interplay between ANP and 
Petrobras and the third between the Executive branch and Petrobras. The final section will examine PPSAǯs interface with all other relevant entities of the oil sector. Even though these 
interactions seem at first glance to ignore the relationships with the Legislative and Judicial 
branches, that does not happen since the analysis takes into account the influence of laws on the 
current governance setting, considering also their enforcement and litigation aspects.    
6.2.1 INTERFACE BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND ANP 
The analysis in chapter 2 discussed that one of the problems of the Brazilian Regulatory Framework from ͳͻͻͷ to ʹͲͲ͵ was ANPǯs tendency to engage in formulation and planning 
functions, at the expense of the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) and the National Council of 
Energy Policy (CNPE). This is one first aspect to be considered as a dysfunctional application of 
the legally established governance model in Brazil. One of the shortcomings of this setting is 
that regulatory agencies are ideally not supposed to perform these functions because they lack 
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legitimacy. They have not been democratically elected for these roles. Regulatory agencies are required to act with independence from governmental and private partiesǯ interference, 
implementing, monitoring and overseeing the policies designed by the Executive branch. There 
are two possible shortcomings that can arise from regulatory agencies performing planning 
functions, as in the case just described.  
The first is the formulation of excessively technocratic sectorial policies, disconnected 
from stakeholdersǯ needs and demands, for lack of linkages and communication channels with 
these groups and with politicians and ministries of the Executive branch, which have legitimate 
mandates to represent them. The second, in a diametrically different scenario, arises in 
situations of excessively high levels of interconnection between stakeholders and the regulatory 
agency. Such agents in this case actually intensify their clout within the agency, mitigating the 
previously mentioned problem, but causing, instead, a significant reduction of its autonomy, 
potentially leading to capture and corruption. 
The dichotomy between these two extreme positions is one of the main quandaries of 
regulation theory.449 It actually poses a significant dilemma to policy makers, since the very instruments that mitigate stakeholdersǯ lack of participation are the same ones that might lead 
to capture and corruption.450 Tackling this dilemma therefore presupposes considering how to 
promote collaborative and legitimate regulatory policies closely connected to stakeholders, 
avoiding at the same time the risk of capture and corruption.  
Ayres and Braithwaite contend that one of the ways to mitigate this problem is by 
empowering ǲpublic interest groupsǳ.451 The authors advocate that this is an essential step for a ǲresponsive regulationǳ, blending state and private regulations and encouraging collaboration 
between the different stakeholders.452  
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Even though in Brazil there hasnǯt been any initiative of empowerment of public interest 
groups along the lines proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite towards ǲResponsive Regulationǳ, 
there have been signs that from 1995 to 2003 ANP has been quite successful in avoiding the two 
problems cited above. Several scholars and specialists deem this agency to have suffered more 
political interference than others, yet capture and political subordination of ANP are not 
mentioned as a problem in Brazil. Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida is of the opinion that ANP 
has the necessary autonomy to perform its functions.453 Other specialists in the field share the 
same view.454 Furthermore, in spite of the need to increase the engagement levels of certain 
stakeholders within the agency, such as consumers, for example, the interconnection between 
ANP and the oil industry is intense and relatively straightforward, since Petrobras is the 
dominant player in the country in all production stages and has facilitated access to the 
regulator.455  
Given that the two-abovementioned problems of ANPǯs formulation policy proactivity 
between 1995 and 2003 have been avoided in Brazil, how has this fact specifically affected 
investment decisions in the Brazilian oil sector? The influence has been quite minimal. The vast 
majority of scholars and specialists consider the Brazilian regulatory framework to have been 
successful in attracting investment to this sector.456 All the interviewees for this thesis 
concurred in this point. Lourdes Casanova et al reach the same conclusion in interviews with 
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455 This does not mean that the relationship between ANP and Petrobras does not have conflicts, as the 
next sections will show.  
456 Cf. Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); Adilson De Oliveira, ǮOil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the world energy supplyǯ in David Victor, David Hults and Thurber (eds), Oil and Governance 
(Cambridge University Press 2012); Walter De Vitto and Richard (ochstetler, ǮPerspectivas para os investimentos petrolíferos no Brasilǯ in Giambiagi and Velloso Lucas ȋedsȌ, Petróleo–Reforma e 
contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier Editora Ltda 2012); Luiz Paulo Vellozo Lucas, ǮA derrota de um modelo de sucessoǯ in Giambiagi ȋedȌ, Petróleo-Reforma e Contrarreforma do setor 
petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier 2012); Oxford Analytica, ǮThe )mpact of Pre-Salt: A Long-Term Perspectiveǯ 
(A Report Prepared for PETROBRAS, 2010). 
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high-ranking executives and specialists in government agencies and trade associations of the 
Brazilian oil sector.457  
The next immediate question that arises then is why hasnǯt ANPǯs proactivity in policy 
planning functions affected investment decisions? That could have been expected, since the 
agency had been deviating from its essentially regulatory functions, which could have led to 
uncertainty and a higher risk of political interference.  
Three responses can be pointed out. The first and most immediate one is that ANP has 
actually acquired the credentials of a trustworthy and technically competent entity. As stated by Olavo Bentes David, ANPǯs Deputy Attorney General, in an interview with the author: ǲBrazil has 
today two institutions of technical excellence operating in the oil sector: Petrobras and ANP.ǳ458  
The second reason is an immediate consequence of the first. Because of ANPǯs high 
technical standards, expertise and professionalism it has been able to adequately incorporate 
main policy functions among its tasks in a very impartial and proficient manner, safeguarding it 
from political interests that do not take into account the ultimate development of the Brazilian oil sector. )n other words, the policy functions incorporated in ANPǯs agenda have been 
performed in coherence with the main statutory goals of the Brazilian oil policy. When ANP for 
example changed the public tender proceedings to insert local content clauses, in principle an 
action within the policy design realm, the main goal was to foster the Brazilian local industry 
and not to favour some specific political interest group.459 This objective of developing the 
national industry of suppliers is clearly stated in Law 9,478. Several scholars claim that ANP 
assumed policy formulation functions because it was actually better prepared to perform these 
                                                          
457 Luiz Marcelo Martins Almeida, Luiz Alberto Nascimento Campos filho and Lourdes Casanova, ǮThe Brazilian )nstitutional Environment: The )mpact on Companiesǯ Strategies in the Oil and Gas Sectorǯ 
(2011) Faculty and Research Working Paper - INSEAD. 
458 Interview with Olavo Bentes David, Deputy Attorney General of the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) 
(Rio de Janeiro, 24 July 2013). 
459 Local content policies are policies that favour the acquisition of national goods by requiring that a certain percentage of the companyǯs purchase should be made in Brazil. This topic will be further 
explored in the next chapters.     
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functions than the Ministry of Mines and Energy and CNPE. They posit that ANP simply filled a 
functional lacuna because of the urge to undertake these activities.460   
The third explanation is that oil investors envisage Brazil as an institutionally developed 
country, with a credible and dynamic oil sector, where rules tend to be followed, contracts are 
adequately enforced and the risks of nationalisations are slim. These advantages are intensified 
taking into account the comparison with other places around the globe that offer investment 
prospects in the same area. In other words, the opportunity cost of investing in the Brazilian oil 
sector is not significant because compared to other oil producing countries in the world it is 
considered an attractive place in terms of institutional and regulatory risks. 
From ʹͲͲ͵ onwards, when the government of President Lula took office, ANPǯs 
engagement in formulation and planning functions was halted.461 President Lula made several 
speeches after his inauguration in January 2003 against the excessive powers granted to regulatory agencies during President Cardosoǯs term. )n one of his public statements he referred 
to regulatory agencies as an ǲoutsourcing of the countryǯs managementǳ.462 Yet what started as a 
fierce opposition was progressively mitigated in the following months. This oscillation might 
have resulted from an internal division within the government, especially between the Civil (ouse and Ministry of Finance. While the former was more critical about those entitiesǯ 
excessive proactivity, the latter revealed a rather lenient approach towards them, fearing the 
negative consequences of an increasing governmental interference in this area.463  
In spite of these alternations, since 2003 the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) has 
been better equipped, with the establishment of specific careers, an increase in its budget and 
                                                          
460 Cf. Bernardo Mueller and Carlos Pereira, ǮCredibility and the design of regulatory agencies in Brazilǯ 
(2002) 22 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 65; (elder Queiroz Pinto Jr, Ǯ)nstitutional Designs and Regulatory Reforms in the Energy )ndustriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͶȌ ʹ Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal ȋOGELȌ; and Edson 
Nunes and others, Agências reguladoras e reforma do Estado no Brasil: inovação e continuidade no sistema 
político-institucional (Garamond Universitária 2007). 
461 Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o 
Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil 
thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2010). 
462 Edson Nunes and others, Agências reguladoras e reforma do Estado no Brasil: inovação e continuidade 
no sistema político-institucional (Garamond Universitária 2007) 255 
463 Ibid. 258. 
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the creation of the Secretariat of Petroleum and Gas.464 This Secretariat was created to bolster 
planning functions in the areas of oil and gas in the Ministry, which had been hitherto 
excessively focused on the electrical segment. According to Felipe, MME actually started taking 
over, with these actions, the policy planning space that had been formerly occupied by ANP.465 
This new stance became evident in 2004 with the sixth bidding round, when MME changed ANPǯs decision with respect to the offered blocks in the public tender. The episode affected the Agencyǯs image and actually reaffirmed Lulaǯs governmentǯs intention to leave essential 
planning and formulation functions with institutions directly linked to the Presidency such as MME and CNPE. Felipe claims that it represented an inflection point in ANPǯs former proactive 
stance at the expense of MME and CNPE.466  
In another illustrative case, President Lula actively interfered in the agenciesǯ financial 
autonomy when he vetoed a bill proposal that forbade the federal government to modify their 
budgetary allocations coming from fees collections.467 As already analysed in chapters 3 and 4, the control of regulatory agenciesǯ finances limits their independence. One way of 
circumventing such limitations is by allowing them to have some degree of financial autonomy 
through the collection of fees, for example. Yet in Brazil, this financial autonomy is considerably 
diminished because the President can restrain agenciesǯ financial resources through 
presidential decrees. The bill proposal that President Lula vetoed was one unsuccessful attempt 
to solve this problem. 
 In 2010, the enactment of the three laws that modified the legal framework of the 
Brazilian oil sector - Law 12,351, Law 12,304 and Law 12,276 - consolidated the tendency 
inaugurated since 2003 of revamping policy formulation and planning functions of entities 
directly linked to the President. While it is laudable to transfer functions essentially related to 
policy formulation from ANP to entities directly linked to the President, such as MME and CNPE, 
                                                          
464 Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o 
Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil 
thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2010) 107.  
465 Ibid. 
466 Ibid. 
467 Ibid. 107.  
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there is also a risk that the agencyǯs diminished political clout might reduce its regulatory 
capacity, impacting on its effectiveness. This topic is analysed throughout the next sections.  
6.2.2 INTERFACE BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND PETROBRAS 
  The analysis here can be subdivided in two periods: from 1995 to 2003 and from that 
year onwards. While in the first term there has been a tendency of declining governmental 
influence in Petrobras, the trend shifts in the second period and its influence progressively 
increases.  
 During the first period, the government was particularly concerned in creating the 
appropriate conditions for Petrobras to be able to compete with private oil companies. This 
naturally involved reducing its influence in the company, a stricter adherence to corporate 
commercial objectives and the establishment of profound managerial modifications in the corporation. Dias argues that these changes were fundamental for the companyǯs positive 
results in the following years. According to him, they were the natural corollaries of all the 
modifications in the oil regulatory framework launched with the 1995 Constitutional 
amendment, allowing for private oil companies to explore oil in Brazil, and followed by the 
enactment of Law 9,478.468  
Dias places emphasis on normative changes, especially legal ones, as the main performance catalysers, while Felipe, in contrast, argues for the importance of Petrobrasǯ 
corporate adaptability whenever confronted with different institutional settings, as a core explanatory variable for the companyǯs positive performance from 1995 to 2010.469 Dias, for 
example, cites the importance of Decree 2,745 for Petrobras to contract services and purchase 
goods and the provisions in Law 9,478, which allowed it to form joint ventures without Congressǯ prior approval, as main performance boosters. Felipe, in turn, stresses Petrobrasǯ 
                                                          
468 Guilherme Gomes Dias, ǮMudança )nstitucional e Desenvolvimento: O Caso da )nd’stria do Petróleo no Brasilǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2013). 
469 Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o 
Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil 
thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2010). 
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corporate culture, its adaptability and effectiveness in exerting political pressure to the firmǯs 
best interest as the main determinants of the positive corporate outcomes.    
The antagonism between these viewpoints seems again to arise from an excessively 
polarised and exclusionary analytical stance between internal and external corporate factors 
impacting on Petrobras. While Dias takes into account institutional influences at the aggregate 
level, based on the studies of Douglass North, Felipe concentrates on the micro institutional realm, taking into account Williamsonǯs understanding that firms pro-actively endeavour to 
change institutional settings to their own advantage.470  
These standpoints need not be in opposition however. They actually complement each 
other and are variations of the same institutional theoretical framework. Yet one limitation in 
both models is that they equally tend to consider their basic analytical units, the government 
and Petrobras, as homogeneous, uniform and coherent entities, without acknowledging their 
important subdivisions and factions. This shortcoming becomes evident when both authors analyse the possibility of Petrobrasǯ privatisation in the first years of President Cardosoǯs term, in the early ͻͲs. While Felipe attributes the decision not to privatise the company to Petrobrasǯ 
influence on public policies, 471  Dias argues for the governmentǯs perception that the 
privatisation of a monopolised sector would just transfer the monopoly to private hands.472 The debate on Petrobrasǯ privatisation involved several actors and vectors of influence in the 
government and in Petrobras. Therefore, it seems reductionist to attribute the decision of not 
privatising the company to one unique preponderant factor, as the two authors tend to do.   
)n spite of these considerations, the normative changes alluded to by Dias and Petrobrasǯ 
corporate culture and managerial transformations, described by Felipe, both led the company to 
                                                          
470 Oliver E Williamson, Ǯ(ierarchies, markets and power in the economy: an economic perspectiveǯ 
(1995) 4 Industrial and Corporate Change 21, referred to in Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças 
Institucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua 
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471 Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o 
Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil 
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472 Guilherme Gomes Dias, ǮMudança )nstitucional e Desenvolvimento: O Caso da )nd’stria do Petróleo no Brasilǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2013) 130. 
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progressively adopt features of a standard private oil company, with the incorporation of 
performance indicators, tradable shares and corporate governance standards and a consequent decrease of the governmentǯs influence over it. As discussed in chapter Ͷ, several national oil 
companies such as Statoil, Aramco and CNOOC have incorporated corporate efficiency 
standards and performance benchmarks similar to private oil companies. The practices include 
the creation of independent corporate boards of directors to improve transparency, 
accountability and performance standards and also IPOs, partial privatisations and commercial 
bonds issuance. These initiatives tend to improve public reporting, transparency, accounting 
and corporate governance standards. Moreover, they bring increasing international financial 
scrutiny to the firm, improving the incentives for efficiency.473      
In 2003, with the inauguration of President Lula, the situation changes. Petrobras starts 
to be increasingly used as an instrument of public policy implementation and the governmentǯs 
influence on the firm escalates accordingly. This tendency became quite evident when Bolivia nationalised Petrobrasǯ gas installations in the country, in ʹͲͲ͸. Even though the company 
intensified the pressure on the government of Bolivia for fair compensation, President Lula 
adopted a conciliatory negotiating posture, considering the Brazilian foreign policy interests of 
South-American integration as a priority not to be put at risk. This appeasing stance acted against Petrobrasǯ interests.474  
Petrobras also progressively regains the policy formulation functions that it used to 
have before 1995, when it had exclusivity for exploring oil in Brazil.475 Edmar Luiz Fagundes de 
Almeida in an interview on 5 November 2012 with Francisco Ebeling Barros explicitly mentions 
that strategic oil policy decisions in Brazil are taken ǲalmost directly by Petrobrasǳ.476 One of the 
                                                          
473 Cf. Section 4.1.1. 
474 Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o 
Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil 
thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2010) 181. 
475 Interview with Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida in Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade 
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476 Personal translation from: ibid. 
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consequences of the increasing use of the company for public policy purposes is its progressive 
politicisation, due to the importance it assumes within the government.   
As analysed in chapter 4, international governance literature emphasises national oil companiesǯ ȋNOCȌ tendency to get involved with politics, sometimes taking advantage of 
governments to their own benefit. 477 Some NOCs actually become so powerful that they are 
often referred to as a ǲstate within a stateǳ.478 This excessive influence can be dangerous, 
especially if NOCs assume planning functions at the expense of other bodies of the executive and 
legislative branches, which may enjoy a more legitimate democratic basis.  
)n the Brazilian case, Petrobrasǯ excessive influence on public policy design is even more 
troublesome. Differently from most countries, where NOCs are fully state-owned enterprises 
and normally linked to the Executive branch, Petrobras is a mixed state company regulated by 
private laws, with significant private capital and without any formal connection to the 
governmental structure.479 Since the Brazilian national oil company has historically assumed 
planning and formulation functions in the Brazilian oil sector, one faces the bizarre situation 
whereby private investors could potentially have been performing typical governmental tasks.  
Of course, the government is still the companyǯs controlling shareholder with majority 
decision-making power and, therefore, private capitalǯs influence on final decisions is naturally 
nuanced and considered by governmental board representatives before being approved. Yet 
according to corporate governance principles and corporate laws, minority shareholders hold 
fundamental rights that guarantee them a reasonable voice and adequate deliberation channels 
within their companies. Besides, according to these same norms, all shareholders must vote in 
accordance with the corporationǯs interests, which, in turn, should never damage minority 
                                                          
477 Paul Stevens, ǮNational oil companies: good or bad?ǯ National oil companies workshop: Current roles 
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shareholderǯs interests. Article ͳͳͷ of Law ͸,ͶͲͶ, which regulates corporations and joint stock 
companies in Brazil, specifically provides that:  
ǲThe shareholder shall exercise the right to vote in the corporationǯs interest; the 
right to vote shall be deemed abusive if it is exercised with the intent to cause 
damage to the corporation or to other shareholders, or of obtaining an 
advantage for the shareholder or for a third party to which neither is entitled, 
and which results or may result in damage to the corporation or to other 
shareholders.ǳ480    
 It is therefore problematic from a corporate governance perspective for a corporation 
such as Petrobras, which has as one of its duties the protection of corporate interests,481 to exert 
typical governmental functions. It becomes even more troublesome if these tasks involve policy 
design and planning roles that affect important sectors of the Brazilian economy, as is the case 
with the oil industry here considered.      
As discussed in chapter 3, one of the most studied topics in regulation is the problem of 
capture, also referred to as ǲcapture theoryǳ in the literature, which claims that industries tend 
to control the regulator to their own best interests.482)n the case of Petrobrasǯ tendency to exert 
planning and policy design functions for the oil sector, the situation is arguably worse for it is 
deciding about essential policy issues that go beyond regulatory aspects. Policymaking can 
actually shape the very format of regulation. Several specialists consider that not even 
regulatory agencies should be involved in formulation and planning functions, which, because of 
their importance, should be exclusively restricted to entities that are part of the direct executive 
and legislative branches. 483     
                                                          
480  Law no. 6.404 of December 15, 1976, translation prepared by CVM available at: 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/regu/Law6404r.ASP. 
481 Article ͳ of Petrobrasǯ Bylaws. 
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483 Cf. Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques ȋOECDȌ, ǮBrazil strengthening governance for growthǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ; and Edson Nunes and others, Agências reguladoras e reforma do Estado 
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The governmentǯs increasing sway in Petrobras from ʹͲͲ͵ onwards is also reflected in Petrobrasǯ pricing policies. As previously analysed, the maintenance of downstream prices 
below international levels to tame inflation reduces Petrobrasǯ profitability and is one of the main causes of the companyǯs share drop until ʹͲͳ͵.484 Corporate governance problems within 
Petrobras are the main reason behind this dysfunctional and distortive pricing policy.    
Another area where similar situations of conflict of interest can arise within Petrobrasǯ 
Board is taxes. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for tax collection in Brazil and has been 
carefully engaged from 1994 onwards in maintaining a consistent primary surplus. Since 
Petrobras is the main oil company operating in Brazil it obviously suffers most of the tax burden in the sector. Within this setting, Petrobrasǯ Board members from the Ministry of Finance could 
be tempted to favour projects that lead to a higher tax collection in their deliberations, instead of prioritising Petrobrasǯ corporate strategies.485     
The governmentǯs influence over Petrobras is one of the most serious governance issues 
in the Brazilian oil sector for investment purposes. The negative effects of the Brazilian NOCǯs 
pricing policies, which have already considerably affected its share prices and finances, are an important source of concern for investors and Petrobrasǯ minority shareholders.486 The 
minority shareholder representative, Silvio Sinedino, mentioned in an interview that he would 
fight for ǲa more independent Petrobras from the governmentǳ and explicitly pointed to the 
pricing policy by saying that ǲthe government cannot kill its ǮGoose that lays golden eggsǯǳ.487  
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487 Personal translation from: Marta Nogueira, ǮFuncionário eleito para conselho defende Petrobras independenteǯ Valor Economico (Rio de Janeiro). 
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6.2.3 INTERFACE BETWEEN ANP AND PETROBRAS 
 The interconnections between ANP and Petrobras can also be divided into two periods: from the agencyǯs creation, in ͳͻͻ͹, until ʹͲͲ͵, and from that year onwards. The first period 
was a time in which the government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso established the 
regulatory agencies, with the main goal of ensuring that potential investors would be granted 
the necessary autonomy and would have a professional, specialised and qualified staff.  
 Competition emulation was a main aspect of the Brazilian regulatory reforms of that 
time, a period that comprised a wider economic and socio-political project of democratisation, 
political and economic liberalisation and decentralisation of social networks.488 Competition 
concerns were particularly troublesome in the oil sector because they required curbing Petrobrasǯ influence in the sector and also diminishing the governmentǯs sway in the company. 
This initiative would evidently involve political costs, since the corporation was efficient, 
productive, profitable and had been a constant source of pride for Brazilians throughout its 
history.489     
 Therefore, ANPǯs initial challenge was to form a structure capable of regulating and 
monitoring Petrobras, the powerful Brazilian national oil company, which had held a monopoly 
until 1995.490 David Zylberstajn, the first Director General of ANP, in a statement to the 
newspaper ǲFolha de Sao Pauloǳ illustrates such concern: ǲThe national oil company will be 
treated just like any other company that operates in the sectorǳ.491 
Brazil faced the same challenge as Norway in the 1970s, with the creation of its 
regulatory agency, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate ȋNPDȌ. One of NPDǯs main hindrances 
to institutional recognition was its difficulty in forming a specialised and technically qualified 
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staff. Another difficulty was to obtain all the relevant technical information from Statoil and 
from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) to perform its functions.492  
Similarly, in Brazil, one of ANPǯs main concerns in fostering a competitive environment 
in the sector was to have access to important data and reduce the information asymmetries 
between itself and Petrobras, on the one side, and amongst the national oil company and all 
other potential entrant oil corporations, on the other. Utility and energy industries quite 
frequently reveal information asymmetries between regulator and regulated entities.493 The 
latter holds significantly more information about the sector, while the former is supposed to use 
this exact same information to exert its regulatory activities, controlling and monitoring it. The 
problem is worse in transitional industries, with a former monopolistic structure, as in Brazil.494 
Two challenges arise in these cases. First, to promote a cooperative stance between regulator 
and regulated entities, ensuring that all relevant information will be provided to the regulator 
while avoiding, at the same time, the problem of ǲcaptureǳ.495 Second, to maintain competitive 
conditions in the market, in spite of the previous monopolistǯs natural advantage, compared to 
potential competing firms. According to Peter Cameron496 and Daniela Couto,497 the joint 
establishment of antitrust and regulatory policies in the most coordinated and harmonised way 
as possible is an essential step in these transitional industries.  
This initial phase of ANPǯs consolidation as a credible regulatory agency also coincided 
with a posture of decreasing governmental influence in Petrobras and of reducing clout of this 
                                                          
492 See discussions in chapter 4. 
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company, in turn, in the Brazilian oil sector as a whole. 498 From 1997 to 2002, the Federal governmentǯs participation in Petrobras was progressively reduced. Despite still maintaining 
voting power control, with more than 50% of voting shares,499 it passed from 51.5% to 32.6% in 
that period.500 Other actions were taken to bring Petrobras closer to a joint stock company such 
as: enactment of new by-laws, establishment of corporate governance guidelines, best practice 
codes and the approval of normative frameworks for the Board of Directors and its 
Committees.501    
 Several initiatives were similarly undertaken to ǲlevel the playing fieldǳ between 
Petrobras and potential entrant companies in two different ways. First, through actions to ease 
access to prospective competitors in the Brazilian market. Second, by carefully tailoring 
Petrobras to its new functions as a competitor of other private firms.   
 Actions in the first domain include the provisions of Law 9,478 related to the sharing of 
information about the Brazilian basins. Within this setting, article 22, § 1 of Law 9,478 required 
Petrobras to share with ANP all its data on Brazilian sedimentary basins and all other activities 
of research, exploitation and production of oil developed during the period of its exclusive 
operation in the oil sector (before 1995). Article 8, XII, in turn, provided that ANP should 
annually convey and divulge data about the national natural gas and petroleum reserves in 
Brazil. Finally, article 65 of Law 9,478 required Petrobras to constitute subsidiary corporate 
entities to build and operate its ducts, maritime terminals and vessels for oil transportation. The 
provision sought to facilitate market access to entrant companies by ensuring that they would 
contract these services with a subsidiary company, which did not compete with them in the 
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same market.502 This partitioning of activities also reduces the incentives for firms to engage in 
cross subsidies, in which excessive profits in one area, where it faces less competition, can 
leverage lower prices in other markets, where competition is higher. Such practices tend to 
occur in vertically integrated market industries, where each level of the supply chain faces 
different competition conditions.503           
 The initiatives in the second field aimed at giving more managerial and financial 
autonomy and flexibility to Petrobras so it could compete with private firms without having to 
comply with excessively bureaucratic rules and proceedings.504  Two changes were particularly 
relevant in this area. The first was the possibility of contracting services and buying products 
using a special statute with simplified proceedings, Decree 2,745, without having to comply with 
Law 8,666. Law 8,666 applies to all Brazilian state entities for contracting services and buying 
products. It establishes a set of detailed rules and proceedings to be followed that sometimes 
can lead to excessive bureaucracy and, eventually, to delays. Even though the Federal Governmentǯs National Accounting Tribunal ȋTCUȌ has legally questioned Petrobrasǯ use of 
Decree 2,745 instead of Law 8,666, the decisions at the Supreme Court have been favourable to the Decreeǯs validity.505 The second change was the possibility granted in Law 9,478 for 
Petrobras to form joint ventures with private international companies without the requirement of Congressǯ prior approval. 506 This modification proved essential for Petrobras to negotiate its 
strategic alliances with other companies, avoiding the risk of political interference or of lengthy 
deliberations.    
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 158 
 The increasing political clout granted to ANP until 2003 and Petrobrasǯ declining 
influence within the government and in public policy formulation did not influence, however, 
specific legal disputes between these entities. Felipe shows that Petrobras has always succeeded whenever its interests have clashed with ANPǯs in this period.507 The disputes between these 
two entities were more intense in the natural gas sector, where Petrobras did not hold a 
dominant position and ANP had the goal of establishing competitive conditions upfront, 
avoiding any risk of one single firmǯs future dominance.508 Sebastiao do Rego Barros, ANPǯs 
Director-General, in a statement when leaving office in 2005 is illustrative of the concern about Petrobrasǯ political influence: ǲThe doubt about Petrobrasǯ role – is it a company or is it the 
government? – is one of the factors that hinders the establishment of competitive conditions in 
the Brazilian oil sectorǳ.509   
 From the year ʹͲͲ͵ onwards, ANPǯs influence is progressively diminished and its roles 
gradually questioned by the incumbent government. Petrobrasǯ influence, in turn, is 
considerably revamped.510 Another legal dispute between these two entities happened at the 
moment of the eighth bidding round in 2007. On that occasion, one of the clauses inserted in the 
public tender, known as the ǲcompetitive clauseǳ, imposed a maximum number of blocks that 
each company could win. Because of its dominant position in Brazil and its historical prevalence 
in bidding offers, Petrobras was particularly affected by this provision. Felipe even considers 
that Petrobras was actually the specific target of the ǲcompetitive clauseǳ.511 The bidding round 
was suspended because of a court order that considered it to be anticompetitive. ANP appealed 
to the Supreme Court, which decided the case in its favour. Despite this result, the bidding 
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round was annulled afterwards because of the discovery of the pre-salt oil deposits in 2008 and the governmentǯs priority in analysing the convenience of changing the regulatory framework.  
 Petrobrasǯ escalating political clout, its increasing use as a policy formulator and implementer, together with ANPǯs reducing influence, can have negative repercussions for 
companies investing in the Brazilian oil sector and also in those considering investing in 
Petrobras, or even forming joint ventures with the company. The signal that this setting can 
send to potential investors is that the regulator has fewer conditions to control the company, 
which holds an undeniable dominant position in areas governed by concession contracts and 
exclusive operational rights in regions under production-sharing contracts, established in Law 
12,351. The situation is worsened given that the disputes between the two entities have been 
frequently resolved favourably to Petrobras, as discussed by Felipe. 512The regulatorǯs 
decreasing influence is also particularly problematic in view of the agency problems analysed in 
the next section and the significant information asymmetries that exist in the Brazilian oil 
sector, which might signal to regulated companies that the regulatory agency is losing the 
capacity to impose effective sanctions for deviant firms. Ayres and Braithwaite mention that: 
ǲWhat may predict cooperative, compliant outcomes is whether regulatory 
agencies are perceived by industry as benign big guns. That is, if the agency is 
perceived as cooperative even though it may be quite adversarial; if it is 
perceived as willing and able to repay uncooperativeness with awesome 
sanctioning even though it is not, then firms will cooperate and comply.ǳ 513 
 Yet it is relevant here to clearly differentiate between ANPǯs decreasing political 
influence and interaction with the government from its regulatory capacity. While it is 
essentially valid to keep regulatory agencies away from policy formulation functions and 
political influence, guaranteeing their independence, it is equally important to ensure that they 
have the adequate tools and mechanisms in place to provide for effective regulation and 
                                                          
512 Ibid. 110,112. 
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enforcement procedures. To use Ayres and Braithwaiteǯs metaphor they should have ǲbenign 
big gunsǳ.514 This separation between political influence and regulatory capacity represents a 
great challenge to regulatory agencies since these two dimensions are frequently linked. There are signs, from what was described above, that ANPǯs loss of political influence within the 
government has also led to a decrease in its regulatory capacity towards Petrobras, the industryǯs main player. Sergio Abranches, for example, considers that Petrobras still holds 
significant regulatory power in Brazil, which explains why investor companies entering the 
Brazilian market tend to form joint ventures with the company instead of competing with it.515      
Because of Petrobrasǯ importance and MMEǯs and CNPEǯs historical lack of political clout 
in the sector, especially until 2003, the most important interplay to be analysed in the Brazilian 
oil industry is actually between ANP and Petrobras. Normally regulatory agencies are created to 
be shielded against capture and political influence. Capture usually occurs whenever the agency 
takes its decisions guided by the interest of regulated parties, while the political influence 
situation arises whenever the agency strictly follows the political convenience of the 
government. As paradoxical as it might seem, in the Brazilian institutional setting these two 
problems of capture and political influence sometimes tend to be transferred to the relationship 
of ANP with Petrobras. In other words, since Petrobras is a state-controlled company with 
significant powers in the sector and the entities of the Executive branch are rather weak, it is quite natural for the governmentǯs influence over ANP to come not directly from the Ministries 
or entities from the Executive, as normally occurs in text book theoretical models, but directly 
from Petrobras. Furthermore, since this company holds a significant dominant position in 
almost all stages of the production chain, it also presents the highest risks of capturing the 
regulatory agency. Within this setting, governance problems that tend to occur in the interplay 
among regulatory institutions such as capture and political interference have also a tendency to be internalised within Petrobrasǯ corporate structure. This is why it is essential to consider, in 
our specific case, not just the governance institutional structure of the Brazilian oil sector, but 
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also Petrobrasǯ actual corporate governance setting, to where several institutional disputes tend 
to be transferred.      
The interactions between ANP and Petrobras are expected to significantly increase in 
the future, in view of the escalating activities in which the national oil company is engaged in, 
because of the size of the discovered pre-salt deposits and the companyǯs operational exclusivity 
in the area. The 2010 legal changes significantly increase Petrobrasǯ importance, placing it as an essential tool of public policy implementation, while reducing, in turn, ANPǯs roles, especially at 
the policy planning level. The essential question to be answered is whether the changes will reduce ANPǯs actual regulatory capacity. The most problematic issue in this respect are the 
information asymmetries between ANP and Petrobras. If they were already considerable before 
the 2010 reforms, they can be significantly worsened by the operational exclusivity because the 
Brazilian national oil company will face less scrutiny coming from other oil companies, which could contribute to curbing this informational imbalance, bringing important aspects to ANPǯs 
knowledge.   
If the past disputes between these two entities, as previously described, mostly favoured 
Petrobras, a recent case, however, had a different outcome, actually showing that ANP seems 
resolved to effectively perform its regulatory activities, even resorting to litigation, if necessary. 
In an administrative decision against Petrobras, Petrogal and BG, ANP refused to grant them 
permission to divide the block of Lula in two smaller ones: Lula and Cernambi. By splitting the 
block in two, the companies would avoid paying the Special Participation tax, which is levied on 
high volumes of production, according to Decree N. 2.705. The group initiated arbitration proceedings at the )nternational Chamber of Commerce ȋ)CCȌ, questioning ANPǯs decision, but 
the agency filed a case in court seeking the annulment of ICCǯs jurisdiction over the issue. The 
Federal Judge of Rio de Janeiro, Raffaele Pirro, decided the case favourably to ANP and ordered 
the suspension of the proceedings.516 Even though the case will probably be appealed, it shows 
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ANPǯs determination in effectively pursuing its regulatory function, even if it means confronting 
powerful groups, litigating against them.  
Another issue to take into account is that by presenting the case to the International 
Chamber of Commerce, Petrobras seems to have followed its commercial goals, leaving aside one of the Ministry of Financeǯs priorities, which is tax collection, as already mentioned as one 
the areas where corporate governance problems come into play.  
In another area where corporate governance issues are particularly troublesome - 
pricing policies - there has been no compromise after the 2010 reforms between the conflicting interests of the Ministry of Finances, Guido Mantega, and the companyǯs CEO, Gracas Foster, 
who supported an immediate oil price increase bringing it closer to international levels. While 
the appointment of Gracas Foster to the position of CEO gave some hope to investors as to a 
change in pricing policies, since she was close to the President and seemed determined to 
perform this task, recent developments showed that she has been unsuccessful.517 Gracas Foster 
had been advocating the establishment of a clear formula to calculate downstream oil prices, 
which would gradually bring them closer to international levels, aiming at solving the 
previously mentioned distortions. Yet the Minister of Finance fiercely resisted pricing practices 
similar to international levels and the use of any publicly available formula.518 Gracas Fosterǯs 
resolve in changing this situation seemed evident when she started publicising the internal 
division inside the company in this respect to the press. After a series of news reports covering 
this clash, in a meeting of the Board on 29 November 2013, the position of the Ministry of 
Finance prevailed.519 
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6.2.4 INTERFACE BETWEEN PPSA AND ENTITIES OF THE BRAZILIAN OIL SECTOR 
As already described in chapter two, Law 12,304 authorised the Executive branch to 
create Pre-Sal Petroleo S.A. (PPSA), a wholly state-owned enterprise responsible for monitoring 
the production-sharing contracts in pre-salt layers and areas deemed strategic. PPSA was 
officially created in 2013, by Decree 8,063, which detailed furthermore its competences.  
The creation of this new entity in the Brazilian oil industry and the shift in roles of the 
existing ones, as previously mentioned, inevitably adds elements of uncertainty to the 
institutional governance structure in the sector.520 One first aspect that has been worrying 
potential investors, is, therefore, the unpredictability with respect to PPSA.521 This uncertainty 
about such an important agent within the new regulatory framework inevitably adds risk to 
companies considering driving their capital to Brazilian pre-salt ventures. The following aspects related to the entityǯs functions add even further concerns for future investments in the countryǯs oil sector.   
͸.ʹ.Ͷ.ͳ PPSAǯS PRESENCE IN OPERATIONAL COMMITTEES  
PPSA has significant relevance in operational committees, which should be formed by all 
winning consortia operating in pre-salt layers and areas deemed strategic.522 The most 
important decisions of Consortia operating in blocks auctioned under Law 12,351 will have to 
be submitted to the Operational Committee, which will represent the interests of all companies 
in the winning consortium of a certain block in pre-salt and strategic areas. Yet 50% of the committeeǯs votes belong to PPSA, which will therefore have the final say in all important 
operational decisions, even though it is not required to contribute capital of any kind.523 It will 
also indicate the Committeeǯs President, who will hold the prerogative of qualified voting.524 
Petrobras, in turn, which is the exclusive operator in the region, will have at least a 30% voting 
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share, since this is the minimum required percentage for its participation in pre-salt and 
strategic domains, according to Law 10,351.  
This situation creates two kinds of agency problems: one between the operator 
(Petrobras) and members of the operational committee525 and another one between the 
effective agents in the case, with a final say on most important decisions, PPSA, and all investors 
(Petrobras included), the principals on this specific occasion. 
The first agency problem takes place because Petrobras as exclusive operator in pre-salt 
and strategic regions will be acting on the consortiumǯs behalf. Companies considering investing 
in Brazilian pre-salt layers will be more reluctant to do so if they donǯt have the possibility to act 
in operational activities.526 Of course it is always positive to have Petrobras as a partner, 
operating in an area where it has significant know-how and experience. However, this companyǯs exclusive mandatory operation will most certainly prove detrimental to another 
firm's investment decisions because of the difficulty to have access to relevant information 
coming from the daily routine of the activities.527 
Petrobras, the agent, will have access to all daily operational activities having a natural 
incentive to decide all these functional routine issues maximising its own corporate interests, 
even if at the expense of the consortium, considered the principals in this case. Furthermore, the 
fact that Petrobras has a high 30% participation at the operational committee will give it 
significant leverage to use all data knowledge to its own benefit, not necessarily divulging it, not 
even to PPSA, responsible for monitoring production-sharing contracts. There have been 
examples in the past, where Petrobras made decisions in its own corporate interests, ignoring 
environmental determinations because of the impact of the investments on their costs, as 
demonstrated by Carlos Jacques et al.528 
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The second agency problem happens because PPSA with its minimum 50% share and appointment of the operational committeeǯs president will be able to deliberate in several 
situations on the other memberǯs behalf, especially in cases in which the approval quorum is 
established in low percentages (anything above 50%, for example). This agency situation is very 
peculiar because normally the agents take decisions having more information than the 
principals, maximising, as result, their own benefits at the expense of investors. The situation in 
our case is the opposite, since PPSA holds less information than one of the main investors, 
Petrobras (with at least 30%), which has extensive knowledge on the Brazilian sedimentary 
basin and operational exclusivity in pre-salt and strategic regions. 
Most principal-agent problems are considerably reduced by diminishing information 
asymmetries, which normally occur via increased sharing of information from agents to 
principals. Yet in our case increased sharing is required from principals to agents.  What this 
means is that Petrobras will have a natural incentive to provide all necessary data to PPSA to 
reduce agency problems that might adversely affect it in PPSAǯs deliberations. Yet Petrobras 
does not have any incentive to divulge any other information that would negatively affect other 
investors in the consortium, especially if the concealment would benefit it, or even PPSA. This wouldnǯt be necessarily a problem if those other investorsǯ interests were sufficiently aligned with Petrobrasǯ or with PPSAǯs, because agency dilemmas would be reduced in this case. Yet 
there is no evidence or indication that this will necessarily happen.  
Therefore, while there are elements that lead to the decrease in agency problems 
between PPSA and Petrobras, nothing guarantees that these same problems between the 
Brazilian National Oil Company and other investors will have a solution. Petrobras could, for 
example, perfectly hold back information about the commerciality of a certain pre-salt block 
because it intends to concentrate efforts on a commercially more attractive location, such as in 
the areas where it operates according to the onerous relinquishment regime, without paying 
royalties or Special Participation taxes.529 Such decision could be disastrous for international oil 
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companies acting as investors on the ignored block, while for PPSAǯs interests and the 
government it might be more rational to do so, especially in a context of limited resources for 
capital disbursements.   
During the interviews conducted for this thesis, all interviewees not working in 
governmental institutions530 revealed concerns related to these aspects and how they would 
affect the attractiveness of the Brazilian pre-salt basin. Flavio Ofugi, Shellǯs Director of 
Government Relations and Regulatory Affairs specifically mentioned the uncertainty regarding PPSAǯs composition, its structural organisation and decision-making process, as issues that 
hinder an appropriate assessment of the investment risks involved in areas governed by Law 
12,351. Joao de Luca, President of the Brazilian Institute of Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels (IBP),531 contended, similarly, that PPSAǯs presence in the operational committee as it stands will 
certainly deter investors.  
Before the enactment of Law 12,351, IBP actually presented its views on the drawbacks of PPSAǯs excessive powers in operational committees and lack of financial contribution. )t 
claimed that the situation could lead PPSA to take important decisions without duly considering 
all technical aspects potentially affecting companies in the consortium.532 Statoilǯs Vice-
President and the Superintendent of the National Organisation of the Petroleum Industry 
(ONIP),533 Alfredo Renault, also expressed concerns about these aspects in interviews with the 
author. Alfredo Renault was quite vocal in this respect, referring to it as ǲutterly senseless, 
probably only existent in Brazilǳ. Walter De Vitto and Richard Lee Hochstetler refer to PPSAǯs 
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preponderance within the governance structure established in operational committeeǯs 
according to Law 12,351 as the worst aspect of the 2010 oil legal reforms.534    
6.2.4.2 PPSA AND CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 
Contractual liability is another area that considerably affects investment decisions 
because of moral hazard problems. As previously discussed, PPSA does not participate 
financially in the consortia investing in regions under Law 12,351. Yet it has majority-voting 
power in the operational committee, indicates its president and is responsible for managing the 
production-sharing agreements on behalf of the government. PPSA will therefore have decisive voice in the consortiumǯs decisions. (owever, in spite of these roles and according to Article 8, 
paragraph 2 of Law 12,351, PPSA it is not legally liable for potential contractual damages 
affecting operational activities. The provision states that:  
ǲParagraph 2. The public enterprise mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article shall 
not undertake the risks and shall not bear the costs derived from the activities of 
exploration, evaluation, development production and decommissioning of 
exploration and production installations, arising out of production share contracts.ǳ 
Yet the other companies that are part of the consortium can be held liable for damages relating to decisions on which they might not have had the final say, considering PPSAǯs 
decision-making power.535 It is therefore evident that this article actually leads to a seriously 
distortive situation in which those who have majority deliberation power are not liable, while 
those that lack it face the consequences in their place.  
According to economic theory, situations of moral hazard take place when one party 
engages in risky events because of the existence of a safeguard that protects it from hazards 
incurred by another party. In these cases, there is a natural incentive for the protected agent to 
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increasingly engage in riskier activities while the other agent bears the effects of his 
irresponsible behaviour. In the case here mentioned PPSA has all the incentives not to take the 
appropriate legal precautions in its contractual relationships with third parties, since it can 
actually transfer this burden to its partner companies, which are part of the contract.       
This serious liability imbalance acts as an evident deterrent to potential investor 
companies. Moreover, it is contrary to the logic of several public private partnerships around 
the world, including in Brazil, where the risks of ventures are shared accordingly between the 
parties to foster investments in risk-prone sectors.      
Other questions add further concerns to these already highly contentious issues in the 
Brazilian oil sector. PPSA will be interacting with a whole set of consolidated institutions such 
as Petrobras and ANP, with a long history of political links and relationships within the 
government. Petrobras is particularly known for its significant influence in the sector, close 
interconnection with high-ranking governmental officials and for even conducting in some 
instances strategic planning and policy formulation roles, as previously shown. 536  The companyǯs predominance in the sector has been significantly enhanced with the inauguration of 
President Lula and followed thereinafter by his party successor, President Dilma.537 
Petrobrasǯ historical tendency to exert significant influence on main national oil 
policies,538 and PPSAǯs preponderance in operational committeeǯs according to Law ͳʹ,͵ͷͳ 
therefore demand a careful analysis of the interplay between these two companies, which jointly hold at least ͺͲ % of the operational committeeǯs seats.539 In other words, they will 
together have the vast majority and an effective possibility of deciding everything in this forum, 
at the expense of minority investors. 
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6.2.4.3 INTERFACE BETWEEN PPSA AND PETROBRAS 
Petrobras is a dominant company in the oil sector, having direct close connections with 
the Presidency of the Republic and the powerful economic ministries.540 It also holds 
operational exclusivity in pre-salt and strategic areas and some of its current or former staff 
might actually migrate to the recently created PPSA. Against this backdrop, one should enquire 
whether this newly created state enterprise will have effective conditions to formulate an 
independent, grounded and fair position at the Operational Committee taking into account its role as the Federal Unionǯs representative.541   
One inevitable and significant risk that arises in this context, from the viewpoint of 
investor companies, is Petrobrasǯ possible influence over PPSA in all its deliberations, leading 
these two companies to undertake common and jointly decided strategies at the Operational 
Committee. This risk is increased further in view of the previously analysed agency problems. 
As mentioned, while there are incentives for diminishing agency problems between PPSA and 
Petrobras, the same does not happen between the Brazilian national oil company and other 
investors.  
)t is not difficult to imagine situations in which PPSAǯs and Petrobrasǯ interests might be 
aligned at the expense of other consortium investors. Suppose, for example, that international 
oil companies are considering drilling ten wells in a certain pre-salt area to explore oil that has 
already been declared commercially viable. As previously explained, these companies have a 
natural incentive to inflate their costs, since they will be compensated for part of these 
expenses, which are considered cost oil, according to production-sharing agreements in force in 
the pre-salt basin. PPSA, as the Federal Unionǯs representative in the consortium, is responsible 
for surveillance and monitoring of the costs and therefore will tend to oppose increasing 
expenses. Petrobras, in turn, if guided solely by its corporate interests, would normally tend to be aligned with international oil companiesǯ position. (owever, since the company is the only 
                                                          
540 Felipe ES, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais E Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória EO Crescimento Da 
Petrobras a Partir Da Sua Atuação No Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ Rio de Janeiro. 
541 The Union is a legal entity of public Law vested with the Brazilian Stateǯs sovereignty. Cf. Alexandre De 
Moraes, Direito constitucional (Editora Atlas 2002) 269. 
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operator in the vast pre-salt domains, it naturally faces significant opportunity costs in all its 
ventures in the area. In other words, any decision of drilling one additional well in one 
particular area of the pre-salt region will have to be carefully considered by the company, 
because it would reflect on an increasing difficulty in doing so in other areas, in view of the companyǯs severe investment limitations as exclusive operator in a vast domain. Such restrictions are increasingly acute because of the companyǯs current problematic financial 
situation.  
What this means is that Petrobras would reveal a tendency to maintain a rather 
resistant stance towards increasing and concentrating capital expenditures in one specific area 
of the pre-salt region, if compared to other companies with investments in just one block. 
Because of the imperative of maintaining several projects in the pre-salt region and in the 
condition of exclusive operator facing investment constraints, Petrobras would probably display 
a tendency to scatter its capital expenses as much as possible among its several projects in the 
region. This tendency is reinforced by the requirement of submitting to ANP the development 
and working plans, which both set minimal targets to be fulfilled in each field.542 Within this 
setting, Petrobras and PPSA would both be reluctant to increase capital expenses, most 
probably to the detriment of other investors acting in only one project in the pre-salt region. In 
our particular case, both companies could take advantage of their dominance at the operational 
committee to decide that they will only drill two wells, instead of ten, as initially sought. From 
the point of view of other oil companies this decision could mean a lower oil production, and, 
consequently, reduced expected profits. This apparently private loss, moreover, also has a social 
dimension, since the public will not be enjoying the full benefits of the more efficient outcome.  
Another similar situation could easily arise in straddling of petroleum reservoirs, where 
a single petroleum deposit extends into the production area of another block in the adjacent 
area. In these cases, Article 33 of Law 12,351, according to the industrial best practices, 
provides for unitization procedures for oil production to take place. In most unitization 
                                                          
542 Article 24, III and IV of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 
2010). 
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contracts the parties of the different exploration blocks agree to the best form of joint 
exploitation of the adjacent area, minimising their costs.543 The contracts will then detail how 
the oil is to be extracted and how the proceeds are to be divided accordingly between the 
different parties. Normally it makes more sense to have only one well in these cases, to share 
the costs and share the profits between the two groups operating in each block. In the situation 
of two different blocks located within the pre-salt basin, one would have the bizarre 
circumstance whereby PPSA and Petrobras as main representatives of the two different 
operational committees would be at the two ends of the negotiating table, representing different 
consortia. They would then be able to decide an agreement that best fits their interests even if at 
the expense of a certain group of investor companies on one of the sides of the negotiating table 
as their partners.  Here again is a clear example of an undeniable incentive for the two state 
companies to coordinate their position at the expense of investor companies.  
Of course these examples do not mean that Petrobras and PPSAǯs tendency in having 
convergent and aligned interests and in voting similarly at the operational committee would 
necessarily lead to worse deliberations for the country. The exact opposite might happen in 
some situations. Beyond these considerations, however, the point to be stressed here is the 
negative effect that this specific governance setting will have on companies considering 
investing in areas under Law 12,351. This is an essential aspect to be considered in view of the 
urge to develop projects in the Brazilian pre-salt basin and Petrobrasǯ limitations to undertake 
the necessary investments in this vast domain on its own.     
6.2.4.4 INTERFACE BETWEEN ANP AND PPSA 
Regarding ANPs interaction with PPSA, the issue of a potential influence of the former 
on the latter raises far fewer risks and concerns from an investment oriented standpoint, since 
ANP is not part of operational committees formed for oil exploration in the pre-salt basin. One 
aspect that might raise concerns, however, is the blurred and overlapping competences 
between these two institutions.  
                                                          
543 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, 
Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law International 1999) 127. 
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As mentioned by Bruno Queiroz Cunha and Delia Rodrigo, this is a problem that affects 
the Brazilian regulatory regime as a whole.544 The situation is aggravated further because of the 
lack of institutional coordination and leadership on issues related to regulatory governance in 
Brazil.545 In the oil sector, as previously mentioned, there has been some advance in this respect, 
compared to the situation before the 2010 reforms. There has actually been a clearer functional 
demarcation among CNPE, the Ministry of Mines and Energy and ANP. Yet the creation of PPSA 
has not contributed to this enhanced definition of roles, rather complicating it, instead.  
Within this frame, the first doubt that arises is whether PPSA can actually be regulated 
by ANP. Article 7 of Law 9,478 mentions that ANP is the regulatory agency of the oil and gas 
industry, which, in principle, would comprise PPSA, as a state-owned enterprise operating in 
this industry. Yet article 17 of Law 12,304, which authorises the creation of PPSA, remains silent with respect to ANPǯs regulatory roles over this company. The omission contrasts with clear 
references about the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) supervisory roles and the General Comptrollerǯs Office and the Unionǯs General Accounting Tribunal surveillance and oversight 
functions over PPSA.546  
Olavo Bentes David, ANPǯs Deputy Attorney General, in an interview with the author expressed that the dominant view within ANPǯs Attorneyǯs Office is that the agency has effective 
powers to regulate PPSA, since it is an entity of the oil industry. According to him the following 
case could be a practical example of a situation that would require ANP to perform its 
regulatory tasks over PPSA:  
ǲIf PPSA as part of the Operational Committee of a consortium, for example, approves a development plan that ANP deems inconsistent with the industryǯs best 
                                                          
544 Bruno Q Cunha and Delia Rodrigo, ǮRegulatory Governance in Brazil: )nconsistent Coordination, )nstitutional Fragmentation and (alfway Reformsǯ Ͷth Biennial Conference of the ECPR Standing Group for Regulatory Governance <) paper dellǯOsservatorio», Osservatorio sullǯAnalisi di Impatto della 
Regolazione, www. osservatorioair.it> accessed 20 May 2015. 
545 Ibid. 
546 Article 17 of Law 12,304. 
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practices and norms it will require it to be amended. And if it is not amended the 
contract can be rescinded.ǳ 547     
He recognised, however, that this position was not unanimous within the government, 
since some consider that PPSA cannot be regulated by ANP. This confusion could be potentially 
damaging to investors, since they would not be able to adequately know if a certain deliberation 
coming from PPSA could be revised by ANP or not, as in the example cited above. This lack of 
transparency and legal certainty could undermine possible assessments about the 
attractiveness of investment opportunities in the pre-salt basin. 
A second aspect that adds confusion in the competences of these two entities is the 
enforcement of local content rules. Article 4 (c) of Law 12,304 states that PPSA is responsible 
for this role but ANP had been holding these functions hitherto.548 Some legal experts consider 
this provision void, since PPSA as a corporation cannot exert typical policing powers, which 
require Law enforcement, such as in the case of local content rules.549 
When asked about the blurred and overlapping competences between PPSA and ANP, 
Olavo Bentes David considered them to be very few and quite minor. He then added that the 
functional overlaps should not be too problematic from an investorǯs perspective, in view of the credibility that ANP has acquired since its inauguration in ͳͻͻ͹. ANPǯs Deputy Attorney General 
then added that the market basically considers ANP a trustworthy institution with high levels of 
transparency, independence, technical expertise and largely guided by meritocratic principles.  
Even though Olavo Bentes Davidǯs opinion is technically correct about ANPǯs qualities and their positive impact with respect to investorsǯ perception, it is relevant to eliminate these 
overlapping legal competences. If these potential legal incompatibilities are not removed there 
is always the risk that they might be questioned at some moment, causing further uncertainty.  
                                                          
547 Interview with Olavo Bentes David, Deputy Attorney General of the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) 
(Rio de Janeiro, 24 July 2013). 
548 Local content policies are policies that favour the acquisition of national goods by requiring that a certain percentage of the companyǯs purchase should be made in Brazil.   
549 Luiz Cezar Quintans(ed), Contratos de Petroleo Concessao e Partilha Propostas e Leis para o Pre-Sal (B. 
Biz Editores 2011).  
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The issue related to local content enforcement is more complicated and might reveal significant shortcomings from an investorǯs perspective. As will be further seen, the 
development of a national industry of suppliers at the upstream oil sector is a government 
priority since the enactment of the 2010 oil laws. It is also an area that has been highly 
contentious and criticised in academia, the industry and even within the government, in a 
subtler form. It is therefore an intrinsically polemical topic. Because ANP is a regulatory agency, 
which is supposed to act with autonomy from the government and private parties, it would be 
better to have this contentious issue under its exclusive responsibility.  
One risk that might exist in having PPSA enforcing local content policies is that it might 
reveal an excessively stringent stance, under the governmentǯs influence, since it is a totally 
state-owned enterprise, the government appoints all its directors and board members and they 
can be sacked at any moment. The same could happen with Petrobras, which is a state-
controlled company, and as the exclusive operator in pre-salt and strategic areas will be the 
main agent in the implementation of local content policies. Considering that these two state 
companies jointly hold at least 80% of the Operational Committee and there is an underlying 
tendency for their strategies to converge in this forum, as previously described, there is a 
considerable risk that local content purchases might be conducted in a detrimental manner to 
international oil companies investing in regions governed by Law 12,351.                
͸.͵ PETROBRASǯ OPERATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 
Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity in pre-salt domains and strategic areas is set out in 
Article 4 of Law 12,351, which reads as follows:  
ǲArticle 4. Petrobras shall be the operator of all blocks contracted under the 
production-sharing regime, being, for this reason, entitled to minimum interest in 
the consortium provided for in article 20.ǳ550    
                                                          
550 Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
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As previously stated, despite not allowing other oil companies to operate in pre-salt and 
strategic domains, Law 12,351 permits consortia of investors to be formed, as long as Petrobras 
holds a minimum 30% participation of any group.551  
Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity is one of the most criticised points of the 2010 
regulatory framework and certainly has drawbacks that will affect more than one variable 
analysed in this thesis. This section will particularly focus on the effect the exclusivity will have 
on investments.  
Before providing this analysis, however, it is important to understand the context in 
which this operational exclusivity has been enacted, what were the perceptions towards 
investments at the time and how they have shaped the legal provisions. This study is relevant to 
more thoroughly assess possible future effects on investments.   
6.3.1 THE OPERATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY IN CONTEXT 
As discussed in Part I, the opening of the Brazilian oil sector to international investors 
and the operation of foreign firms occurred between the years of 1995 and 1997. According to 
Tolmasquim and Pinto Junior the drivers of institutional change in the oil sector can be 
subdivided into four distinct groups, according to their political, macroeconomic, sectoral and 
international dimensions.552  
Based on this typology, they claim that the overall acceptance of neoliberal ideas in 
Brazil acted as the main political driver of the 1995-1997 regulatory framework reform. With 
respect to macroeconomics, they point to the lack of investments in the oil sector as the leading 
factor for the changes. The authors consider then the low technological standards of the 
Brazilian oil industry and the depressed oil prices as the sectoral drivers of change. Finally, 
                                                          
551 Article 10 (c) of ibid. 
552 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) 2.  
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concerning international aspects, they cite the oil companiesǯ high competition for investments 
in countries with reserves as the most influential element of the 1995-1997 reform.553 
Building on this characterisation, Francisco Barros analyses the drivers of change in the 
2010 regulatory reform. (e considers the ʹͲͲͲ oil price rise and Petrobrasǯ appropriation of 
technological improvements in deep-water exploration as the sectoral factors of change.554 The 
favourable conditions for investment in oil production and the project of using the pre-salt area 
as an essential instrument for socio-economic development are the macroeconomic elements. 
The global difficulty in the discovery of new oil reserves was the international driver of change, 
while the predominance of ideas for socio-economic development via state interventionism 
acted as the political motive for the modification.         
This classification is interesting because it sets out the two contrasting realities of the 
1995 to 1997 and the 2010 regulatory frameworks. While the first was enacted in a context of 
low prices, investment urge and political ideologies of less state intervention, the exact opposite 
factors influenced the enactment of the second regulatory framework.     
While in the 1995 regulatory framework there was a compelling need to attract investments because of Petrobrasǯ financial difficulties and the background of state incapacity to 
undertake them, in view of the large public deficits, the situation in 2010 was considerably 
better. While the state had been running primary public surpluses for the preceding five years, Petrobrasǯ finances were also comparably superior to the situation in ͳͻͻͷ. At the moment of 
enactment of the 2010 Regulatory Framework, there was an overall optimistic perception about 
the future of the upstream Brazilian oil industry. The predominant view was that new 
worldwide massive oil field discoveries were dwindling and that the recently discovered pre-
salt deposits were probably one of the last fields of the sort. The discussions over the new 
                                                          
553Ibid., referred in Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ, 91.  
554 Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ. 
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framework and its enactment were therefore based on this overall perception that the Brazilian 
oil sector was undergoing an especially favourable moment.555  
6.3.2 OPERATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY AND RESOURCE NATIONALISM 
Influenced by this setting, the 2010 regulatory framework contained considerable 
interventionist provisions, which has led some scholars such as Munir Maniruzzaman556 and 
Marilda Rosado de Sá Ribeiro557 to question whether Brazil would be resorting, like some 
neighbouring countries, such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina, to what is labelled in the 
literature as resource nationalism.558 According to Maniruzzaman:  
ǲResource nationalism has historically proved to be a cyclical phenomenon, and 
it is not new. In various geopolitical contexts and situations, it has tended to assert the nation stateǯs sovereign authority over the upstream ȋand often even 
downstream) activities of International Oil Companies (ǲIOCsǳ) in the petroleum 
industry. The spectre of resource nationalism has often appeared with resource 
scarcity (whether manipulated or not) and the consequent increasing energy 
prices in the world marketǳ559  
In some countries resource nationalism is radically manifested through unilateral 
contract modifications or even expropriation of facilities. This phenomenon has been studied in 
Economics by Raymond Vernon and is known as ǲobsolescing bargainǳ.560  It consists of the host governmentsǯ increased bargaining power in oil contracts once petroleum is found and 
                                                          
555 Cf. Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Giambiagi and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013); and Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal 
do Rio de Janeiro 2013).  
556 Munir Maniruzzaman, ǮThe )ssue of Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering and Dispute Management in the Oil and Gas )ndustryǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͷ Texas  Journal of Oil, Gas & Energy Law ͹ͻ. 
557  Marilda Rosado de Sá Ribeiro, ǮSovereignty over Natural Resources )nvestment Law and 
Expropriation: The case of Bolivia and Brazil☆ǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ʹ Journal of world energy law and business ͳʹͻ. 
558 Munir Maniruzzaman, ǮThe )ssue of Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering and Dispute Management in the Oil and Gas )ndustryǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͷ Texas  Journal of Oil, Gas & Energy Law 79. 
559 Ibid. 80. 
560 Raymond Vernon, ǮSovereignty at Bay: the multinational spread of Us enterprisesǯ ȋͳͻ͹ͳȌ ͳ͵ The 
International Executive 1. 
 178 
investments sunk in the development phase. This larger bargaining power explains some governmentsǯ radical moves to ascertain increasing dominance over resources.         
In other countries movements are subtler and generally take the form of increasing 
power of National Oil Companies (NOCs) at the expense of International Oil Companies (IOCs), 
which are restricted in their further access of petroleum reserves. Ross McCracken, summarises 
this new reality well and how it creates new relationships between NOCs and IOCs: ǲSqueezed 
between the twin pressures of resource nationalism and the state-sponsored NOCs of energy-
hungry nations, IOCs are being locked out of the easier-to-exploit resources because NOCs can 
do it themselves, particularly with service companies that have technology to hireǳ.561 
In Brazil, Resource Nationalism took place through increasing governmental 
interventionism in the oil sector, especially through greater power given to the two state-owned 
companies operating in the oil sector: Petrobras and PPSA.562 Petrobrasǯ growing clout over oil 
operations derives mainly from the exclusive operational clause in the pre-salt basin and 
strategic areas. The next sections will examine the impacts of the exclusivity on Petrobras.  
6.3.3 HOW THE OPERATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY IMPACTS ON PETROBRAS     
Normally exclusive operational rights would be considered an extreme corporate 
advantage, allowing firms to extract extensive benefits for lack of competition. It will be argued, 
however, that the operational exclusivity granted to Petrobras through Article 4 of Law 12,351 
will have significant drawbacks for the company.  
There is substantial evidence that Petrobras is in a difficult financial situation. Part of this is caused by the companyǯs investment levels in the last few years and part is the result of 
its pricing policies. The company is facing serious financial problems to cope with its existing 
projects, of which those in pre-salt areas consist a major portion.  Petrobrasǯ business plan for 
                                                          
561 Ross McCracken, Ǯ)OCs, NOCs Facing Off Over Scarcer Resourcesǯ <https://archive.is/RʹfS)#selection-
885.0-892.0> accessed 25 May 2015. 
562 Walter De Vitto and Richard (ochstetler, ǮPerspectivas para os investimentos petrolíferos no Brasilǯ in 
Giambiagi and Velloso Lucas (eds), Petróleo–Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Elsevier Editora Ltda 2012). 
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2014 to 2018 announces investments of US$ 220.6 billion. Exploration and production accounts 
for US$ 153.9 billion, with 60% going to the pre-salt region.563  
In an event organised by the Brazilian government in 2013 in London for potential 
investors - Brazil Infrastructure Forum - Petrobrasǯ financial situation was one of the recurrent issues raised by attendees to the panellists. When specifically questioned about the companyǯs 
difficult financial situation because of excessively high capital expenditures (CAPEX) in view of 
the necessary disbursements for the pre-salt area, government officials and Petrobrasǯ 
representatives answered that the situation was temporary and would be reverted in the 
future.564 
Yet that has still not happened as of April 2015. Rather the opposite, the corporationǯs ratings have been downgraded by Moodyǯs precisely because ǲthe company is likely to take 
longer than previously expected to achieve planned leverage reductions that are needed for a 
material improvement in its financial profileǳ.565Petrobrasǯ high debts are a serious source of 
concern. Its level of net debt-ebitda566 ratio of 3.05 was particularly worrisome and considered 
high for the market in October 2013.567On 19 May 2015 the indicator reached the level of 
4.22.568 The companyǯs lack of short-term earnings actually forces it to raise debt even further to 
continue its ambitious investment plan.  
Petrobrasǯ pricing policy, in turn, is affected by the companyǯs corporate governance 
problems, as already discussed. Its board of directors has ten members. The government 
appoints seven representatives. The minority common stock shareholders and the preferred 
stockholders have one representative each and the decisions are taken according to a simple 
                                                          
563 Cf. Petrobrasǯ website: http://www.petrobras.com.br/pt/quem-somos/estrategia/plano-de-negocios-
e-gestao/ (last visited April 24th 2015); and Amrita Sen and others, ǮBrazil's Strugglesǯ Energy Aspects - 
In Focus <https://www.energyaspects.com/publications/view/brazils-struggles> accessed 15 June 2015. 
564 Magda Chambriard, Marco Antonio Martins de Almeida and Helder Queiroz, 'Brazil Infrastructure 
Forum' (2013). 
565 Moodyǯs )nvestor Services, available at: https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-
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566 Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
567 Cf.Cláudia Schuffner, ǮPetrobras busca mecanismo de reajuste depois de trimestre ruimǯ Valor 
Economico (28 October 2013) <http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/3318172/petrobras-busca-
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568 Aline Cury Zampieri, Ǯ)bovespa cai com pressao de Petrobras, Vale, bancos e siderurgia ǯ Valor 
Economico  <http://www.valor.com.br/financas/4056272/ibovespa-cai-com-pressao-de-petrobras-vale-
bancos-e-siderurgia> accessed 25 May 2015. 
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majority.569 Petrobrasǯ Board had been constantly postponing its price increases until the 
second half of 2014, under the influence of their governmental representatives concerned about 
inflation levels in the country.  
National oil prices have, in turn, been persistently below the international level in Brazil 
until their collapse in the second half of 2014, significantly affecting corporate earnings. Petrobrasǯ downstream sector has accumulated a $ 26 billion loss from 2011 until 2014.570 
These low prices have led to an increase in downstream demand. As discussed in previous 
chapters, Petrobras is a vertically integrated company, having operations from the upstream to 
the downstream sectors. One of its main bottlenecks is at the refinery level. The company has 
been therefore required to import more expensive refined oil to sell it internally at a lower price, until last yearǯs oil price plunge. The corporate losses varied according to the 
international oil price hikes, which meant that despite its oil reserves, Petrobras was negatively 
affected by oil price increases.   
In spite of all these problems, because of the operational exclusivity provisions 
Petrobras is obliged to participate in all pre-salt basin and strategic areasǯ ventures, 
irrespectively of the winning consortium and of its own corporate possibilities. Even if the 
company does not hold conditions to be operationally responsible for certain activities it will 
still need to undertake them because it is the only company allowed to do so. The operational 
exclusivity granted to Petrobras in the vast pre-salt layers therefore restrains its own 
capabilities of rationally exploring all its investment possibilities and deciding the best options 
for the company. It limits corporate strategy choices and imposes on only one company the burden of being responsible for all the countryǯs future oil supply coming from the pre-Salt basin, following the governmentǯs auction schedule and not its own capabilities and strategies.  
Even worse, it opens the possibility for the government to offer a certain block to be auctioned and for a consortium of companies to win it, against Petrobrasǯ interests, forcing the 
Brazilian NOC to begin operations in spite of its reluctance in doing so. In principle one would 
                                                          
569  Article ͵ͳ, paragraph Ͷ of Petrobrasǯ By laws, available at Petrobrasǯ website < 
http://www.investidorpetrobras.com.br/en/governance/petrobras-by-laws/ > accessed 5 May 2013).   
570  Amrita Sen and others, ǮBrazil's Strugglesǯ Energy Aspects - In Focus 
<https://www.energyaspects.com/publications/view/brazils-struggles> accessed 15 June 2015. 
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think that this situation is improbable, since any company considering investing in the pre-salt 
area would have approached Petrobras and thoroughly examined its real capacity in 
maintaining operations in the region. The government, in turn, would not organise a bidding 
round without being totally certain that Petrobras will be able to cope with the projects.  
Yet some countries such as China are in significant need of oil for their national 
development projects and have considerable amounts of available funding through their national oil companies for this purpose. )t is arguable that one of Chinaǯs important concerns is 
to have access to oil reserves in a sufficient amount for the future, 571rather than examining the 
detailed operational conditions of their partners, which could always be resolved via additional 
funding. Of course this reasoning does not apply indefinitely and irrespectively of the company 
with which China is considering doing business with. Yet Petrobras is already an established company in the world market and certainly wouldnǯt represent an excessive risk in this sense 
for Chinese companies considering gaining access to significant oil reserves for their future 
development plans.572 
This gives rise to the risk of the Brazilian government organising an auction according to Law ͳʹ,͵ͷͳ, without being certain about Petrobrasǯ ability to cope with the resulting operations, 
since oil companies establishing excessively ambitious commitments and conditions, at the expense of the Brazilian NOCǯs operational capacities to implement them, could win the tender. )t also raises another kind of problem addressed in chapter ͺ: the stateǯs considerable loss of 
strategic control over oil policies. In other words, because of the operational exclusivity, one of 
the essential aspects of oil policy, which is control over the blocks to be auctioned, will probably 
no longer essentially depend on policy considerations about the desirable and adequate supply of oil to the country. )nstead, it will most certainly vary according to Petrobrasǯ actual 
exploration possibilities, considering that the government will have to take this into account 
before organising a public tender.   
                                                          
571 Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Giambiagi 
and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013) 312. 
572 The recent scandals involving Petrobras certainly affected the companyǯs image but, considering the 
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In the interviews conducted for this thesis, all the thirty-four interviewees except for 
two, who worked at the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), expressed concerns about the 
operational exclusivity. The common view was that Petrobras did not have the operational 
capacity to solely undertake all the exploration and production activities in the immense pre-
salt basin. Joao de Luca, President of the Brazilian Petroleum Institute (IBP), was even more 
emphatic. According to him: ǲ)tǯs not just Petrobras, no oil company in the world holds 
conditions to exclusively operate in the gigantic dimensions of the pre-salt basinǳ.573 He argued 
that the most immediate consequence of the operational exclusivity would be a decrease in the 
exploration pace in the area.574 All the interviewees not working in governmental agencies 
specifically stated that one of the reasons for the suspension of oil auctions since 2008 was that 
Petrobras was not yet prepared to begin operations because of its financial problems.  
The suspension of oil auctions for five years certainly had negative consequences 
because oil companies with investments in Brazil started to leave the country and their cost for 
coming back is higher.575 Moreover, from 2008 to 2014, the period of time during which the 
Brazilian oil bidding rounds have been suspended, the oil market has changed. New discoveries 
have taken place, new technologies developed (including fossil-fuel replacement) and the use of 
shale oil and gas has grown steadily until mid 2014. As claimed by Amrita Sen in an interview 
with the author, ǲthe attractiveness of the Brazilian Pre-Salt area has certainly decreased over 
this periodǳ.576  Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity also explains its international divestment programme, 
since the company has to concentrate its corporate efforts on the pre-salt basin, raising funds to 
cope with the heavy investment burdens in the region. Such requirement has led it to abandon 
international projects that could be commercially attractive.   
Therefore, from what was set out above, the operational exclusivity will significantly restrain Petrobrasǯ corporate strategies while also limiting one of the governmentǯs essential oil 
                                                          
573 Interview with Joao de Lucca, President of the Brazilian Petroleum Institute (IBP) (Rio de Janeiro, 05 
August 2013). 
574 Ibid. 
575 Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Giambiagi 
and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013) 197. 
576 Interview with Amrita Sen, Chief Oil Analyst in Energy Aspects (London, 07 February 2014). 
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policy aspects, which is the plain control over the bidding process.577 Far from a blessing, the 
exclusivity is rather a curse, fettering state and company together to the disadvantage of both. 
From the perspective of an investor in Petrobras the exclusiveness means the loss of plain and 
ample control over the definition of the best corporate strategies. It opens, moreover, an avenue 
for greater governmental influence in the company, which is an aspect always feared by 
investors.         
It is evident that Petrobras needs other partner oil companies to share the burdens of its 
ambitious investment plans in pre-salt layers. If investment prospects for a firm with financial 
and governance problems are already risky, the drawbacks of the operational exclusivity 
increase it furthermore because of the negative impacts on Petrobras.  
6.4 POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE 2010 REFORM IN TERMS OF INVESTMENT 
  Despite aforementioned problems, there are some elements of the 2010 reform that 
might have positive consequences for investors.578 Three main aspects can be identified.  
The first one is the clearer definition of tasks between governmental bodies, with the 
concentration of policy and formulation functions in entities directly linked to the Presidency 
(MME and CNPE), leaving typical regulatory functions with the ANP. This clearer demarcation of 
competence contributes to higher levels of transparency and accountability. It also reduces the 
chances of one specific entity assuming functions which had not been assigned to it because of 
legal loopholes or regulatory lacunas.  
As previously mentioned, that is what exactly happened in Brazil with ANP, from 1997 
until 2003. By ensuring that typical entities of the Executive branch will be conducting policy 
formulation and planning functions, the 2010 reform also gives more legitimacy to public 
policies, since institutions that received a mandate from the population for these roles will 
conduct them.    
                                                          
577 This point will be further examined in more detail. 
578  Amrita Sen and others, ǮBrazil's Strugglesǯ Energy Aspects - In Focus 
<https://www.energyaspects.com/publications/view/brazils-struggles> accessed 15 June 2015. 
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 The second aspect that has a positive impact on investments is the maintenance of the 
previous rules under Law 9,478 in areas not considered strategic and outside the pre-salt 
region, as well as all the resultant contracts that have been signed using this statute. The 
situation for investors would have been considerably worse had the government revoked Law 
9,478 and not respected the existing contracts signed under its concession regime.  
 Finally, the third positive element is that the government has been giving signs that it 
has acknowledged certain drawbacks of the current regulations and has attempted to partially 
redress some of them in the Tender Protocol of the First Production-sharing Bidding Round 
divulged on 9 September 2013. The Protocol also included the draft of the production-sharing 
and the consortium contracts. The former was signed between the winner consortium members 
and the Ministry of Mines and Energy, while the latter had PPSA and the winning group as 
signatory parties.  
These documents included some favourable provisions to potential investors, which partially offset the previously mentioned problems, increasing, therefore, the public tenderǯs 
attractiveness. All the interviewees for this thesis who analysed the documents, except for one, 
expressed this view.579 Flavio Rodrigues was particularly vocal in this respect, stating that he 
had noted a real effort to remedy some detrimental effects brought by the 2010 oil 
regulations.580 Joao de Lucca followed suit, claiming even that the government was convinced of 
certain deficiencies of the 2010 framework, but could not change them because of the high 
political costs involved in the modifications and the implicit recognition of their mistake that the 
action would imply.581 The political shortcomings would be particularly severe, according to 
him, in view of the proximity of the 2014 presidential elections.  
 The first aspect of the draft that acts in investorsǯ favour is clause ͵͵.ͷ of the draft 
contract between MME and the consortium members. The clause allows ANP to suspend the 
contractual timeframe for oil exploration in case of delays resulting from licensing procedures 
                                                          
579 Nine out of ten interviewees that had analysed the Tender Protocol at the time of their interviews.  
580 Interview with Flavio Ofugi Rodrigues, Vice-President of Shell Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 22 July 2013). 
581 Interview with Joao de Lucca, President of the Brazilian Petroleum Institute (IBP) (Rio de Janeiro, 05 
August 2013). 
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conducted by Brazilian environmental authorities.582The provision is important in Brazil, since 
environmental authorisations in the country can be lengthy. It would be, therefore, unfair as 
well as burdensome not to allow contracted parties to be compensated for such delays. This 
positive aspect comes, however, with a caveat in the following clause that detrimentally affects 
investments. Clause 33.5.1 states that consortium members will not be compensated in cases of 
rejected environmental licences based on changes in the rules and criteria used by the 
competent authorities after the signature of the contract.583 
 The remaining favourable provisions for investments are in the consortium draft 
contract, which contains the most significant changes. Clause 6.3 allows members to audit all 
documentation and books of the operator related to the activities carried out on their behalf. 
This initiative is clearly aimed at reducing the previously mentioned information asymmetry 
between the operator, Petrobras, and other consortium parties.  
The rules of the consortium with respect to deliberations have also significantly endeavoured to reduce PPSAǯs influence in the decision-making process, another previously 
analysed significant shortcoming. The establishment of approval procedures and thresholds 
that vary according to the strategic importance and stage of the issue under consideration 
allows consortium members to have a greater voice in deliberations, especially at the 
exploration phase, when their risks tend to be higher.584According to the draft contract, PPSA 
will actually not interfere in deliberations taking place in this stage before the submission of the ǲDiscovery Evaluation Planǳ.  From that moment on, however, its influence in the decision-
making process increases throughout most of the development and exploration phases.  
Within this deliberation structure, the required approval thresholds on issues that PPSA 
holds voting rights were set in high percentages, varying from 82.5% to 91%. In contrast, a low 
quorum percentage of 32.5% was established for decisions where the state-owned company 
                                                          
582  Clause 33.5 of the Draft Production-sharing Contract. Available at <http://www.brasil-
rounds.gov.br/round_p1/ingles_P1/edital.asp> accessed 4th of June 2014. 
583  Clause 33.5.1  of the Draft Production-sharing Contract. Available at <http://www.brasil-
rounds.gov.br/round_p1/ingles_P1/edital.asp > accessed 4 June 2014. 
584 Interview with Flavio Ofugi Rodrigues, Vice-President of Shell Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 22 July 2013). 
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does not vote. The discrepancy actually reveals a governmental attempt to counterbalance PPSAǯs excessive influence in the operational committee, partially offsetting the previously 
mentioned agency problems derived from its high 50% voting share. It also reinforces Joao de Luccaǯs point of view about the governmentǯs acknowledgement of the deficiencies of the ʹͲͳͲ 
reforms and its incapacity to change it in view of the significant political costs in doing so.  
Two relevant considerations arise from the establishment of the high quorum rates in issues under PPSAǯs deliberation scope. The first and most evident one is the considerable reduction of the companyǯs decision-making capacity, which despite holding 50% of the voting 
shares, cannot approve deliberations by itself. Secondly, the risk of decisional deadlock is 
significantly increased, since the attainment of the minimum approval percentage is not 
necessarily guaranteed. This risk increases proportionally to the number of consortium 
members and inversely to the variance of their respective shares. This happens because 
transaction costs are significantly higher and the probability of reaching a common 
understanding also substantially greater the larger the number of actors involved in the issue 
under consideration. In other words, it is easier for four firms holding respectively 40%, 30%, 
15% and 15% each (a low number of companies with a reasonable variance) to reach a 50% 
approval threshold, than for 50 corporations (a high number) holding 2% share each (low 
variance). Therefore, one can argue that if the high established thresholds significantly mitigate 
agency problems between PPSA and consortium members, it comes at the cost of the decision-
making process, raising the risk of deliberation stalemates.  
From a governance contractual standpoint, it is actually illogical and counterintuitive to 
confer high voting shares to an entity in a deliberative forum, while requiring at the same time 
an increased quorum for its deliberations. It would be easier to simply reduce the participation 
of this member and thereby avoid the possibility of decisional deadlocks. One can therefore 
infer that this odd situation was the result of a deliberate governmental intention to 
contractually remedy with high approval thresholds a legally defined situation in which PPSAǯs high shares would have evident drawbacks from an investorǯs perspective.       
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One final aspect that significantly increased the contractǯs attractiveness for investing 
companies is clause 1.21.4 of Annex XI, which spells out the rules for declaration of 
commerciality. A relevant risk for consortium companies pointed out by Flavio Rodrigues in an 
interview with the author is that Pertobras might wish to postpone the declaration of 
commerciality of certain areas because of its financial limitations or even for the urge in 
prioritising other areas where it already operates with high profitability. This risk is certainly not negligible because of the Brazilian National Oil Companyǯs financial problems and its high 
opportunity costs, as sole operator in the vast domains of the Brazilian pre-salt area, as 
previously mentioned. This delay could certainly detrimentally affect other consortium 
members that are expecting a speedy return on their invested capital and also the government, 
which in theory should be interested in increasing production levels. By allowing members in 
the consortium qualified as ǲLevel A operatorsǳ to declare commerciality of exploration areas jointly with PPSA, even against Petrobrasǯ evaluation, the contract considerably reduces this 
risk.585 The consortium members will no longer depend exclusively on Petrobrasǯ decisions for 
the important deliberation about the commerciality of blocks, as could have been the case because of this companyǯs status as exclusive operator.586   
Therefore, everything seems to indicate that the Brazilian government has recognised 
and acknowledged certain drawbacks of the 2010 regulatory framework and has attempted to 
remedy them through the Tender Protocol. This initiative is certainly commendable. Nevertheless, it is inevitably bounded by the oil sectorǯs legal provisions and therefore operates 
within certain limits and constraints. In other words, the Tender Protocol and its contracts can 
certainly increase the attractiveness of investing in pre-salt layers and strategic areas of the 
Brazilian oil sector, but it has to maintain strict adherence to the legal framework and, 
therefore, operates with restrained leeway and limited room to manoeuvre. This limitation 
becomes evident in the draft consortium clauses that increase the deliberation quorum to 
                                                          
585 According to the Tender Protocol, companies will be qualified according to levels, based on the points 
they get according to several qualification criteria. Companies that score the highest according to those 
criteria are considered Level A operators.  
586 The clause also establishes that Petrobras can declare on its own the commerciality of blocks.  
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mitigate PPSAǯs preponderance in the Operational Committee but at the same time increases the 
likelihood of decisional deadlocks, as previously explained.      
6.5 CONCLUSION  
Investment is an essential variable in the oil sector. It is even more important in the vast 
pre-salt domains, where the technological requirements are high and extremely sophisticated. 
The Brazilian National Oil Company, Petrobras, is currently facing severe financial limitations to 
undertake these disbursements. Other oil companies will therefore have to be significantly 
engaged in the endeavour, which reinforces further the importance of attracting investments in 
Brazil. Such imperative is clearly fundamental and goes hand in hand with the countryǯs wider 
goal of increasing the national investment rate, to which the oil sector is supposed to act as a 
fundamental catalyst.587           
This section analysed some important drawbacks of the current Brazilian oil regulatory framework that affect investment decisions. Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity was characterised as a major shortcoming, in view of the companyǯs evident operational and 
financial limitations. The governance architecture established in the 2010 framework can also 
deter investments in several ways, giving rise to agency problems among entities and moral 
hazard situations because of contractual legal liabilities.      
The governance setting established in operational committees is particularly worrying 
for potential investors because of their lack of voice in important decisions. As mentioned by Statoilǯs vice-president, Mauro Andrade, in an interview with the author: ǲwe need to know if we 
will be able to be de facto partners with an effective say in all operational decisions or if we will 
simply be writing blank chequesǳ. There are credible preliminary indications that investors are 
likely to be writing blank cheques, with minor roles in operational committees.588  
                                                          
587 Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ 206. 
588 Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Giambiagi 
and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013) 307. 
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It is telling, in this sense, that the first bidding round in the pre-salt region using the 
2010 regulatory framework, which is considered the most attractive oil region in Brazil in the 
last decades, had only 11 interested companies. Government officials were expecting at least 40 
registered companies, as revealed in their press statements.589  
The presence of two Chinese NOCs is also telling, since they are not particularly 
concerned about the profitability and return of investments, but rather on the safe access to 
future oil deposits.590 Lin Boqiang, Chief of the Chinese Energy Research Centre, in an interview to the Brazilian newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo, explicitly mentions Chinese NOCsǯ priority. 
According to him, despite the uncertainties and problems in the first Brazilian production-
sharing bidding round, the demand for oil in China is so intense that these companies do not 
have a choice and will participate anyway.591  
Brazilian regulations could be, therefore, creating a situation of adverse selection, 
whereby mainly risk-indifferent companies would be interested in investing in pre-salt layers 
and regions deemed strategic. Nevertheless, Shell and Total were also part of the winning 
consortium, with a 20% share each. These firms are naturally more sensitive to profitability and risk, if compared to Chinese NOCsǯ, which are mainly concerned about access to hydrocarbon 
reservoirs. The presence of these private oil companies could be signalling, on the contrary, that 
adverse selection is not taking place. One cannot be totally sure, however, about the exact 
conditions established for Shell and Total to participate in the consortium, since only an extract 
of the contract is publicly available. They could have been offered special and advantageous 
contractual conditions of adherence, in an effort to increase the consortiumǯs diversity. Government officials have constantly and insistently praised this diversity as the Tenderǯs main 
achievement.  
                                                          
589 O Estado de Sao Paulo, ǮProdução no pré-sal está abaixo da expectativaǯ O Estado de Sao Paulo  
<http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,producao-no-pre-sal-esta-abaixo-da-expectativa-imp-
,1116078> accessed 11th of June 2014. 
590 Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ 213. 
591 Marcelo Ninio, ǮEmpresa chinesa no consórcio de Libra é alvo de ampla investigação por corrupçãoǯ 
Folha de Sao Paulo (Beijing) <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013/10/1360771-empresa-
chinesa-no-consorcio-de-libra-e-alvo-de-ampla-investigacao-por-corrupcao.shtml> accessed 11th of June 
2014.  
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Most importantly, however, the public tender had only one offer and the amount of 
profit oil to the government was established at the minimal stipulated level. This result 
contrasted with the global context of escalating oil investment volumes across different 
countries in 2014,592 which would normally lead to expectations of a public tender with several 
offers and a final profit oil result substantially higher than the initially indicated amount in the Tender Protocol. )n spite of the governmentǯs effort to show that the bidding round has been a 
success, it is difficult to understand the underlying reasons.  
Such outcome is even more troublesome considering that from 2008 until 2013, five 
years lapsed without any bidding round in the Brazilian oil sector because the government had 
been discussing the new framework and preparing Petrobras to be able to explore the extensive 
pre-salt basins.593 During this period, companies that were present in Brazil left the country to 
invest elsewhere, as mentioned by Flavio Rodrigues594 and Joao de Lucca595 in interviews with 
the author. They also acknowledged that the cost of coming back for these enterprises is 
significantly higher.  
It is therefore evident that Brazil has to urgently tackle some of the hindrances analysed here to foster the essential required investments in the countryǯs oil sector.  As mentioned by 
Vitto and Hochstetler ǲit is quite ironic that the new regulatory framework severely restrains private partiesǯ participation in the upstream petroleum sector in a moment that requires an 
exponential rise of the investment levelsǳ.596        
There are some credible indications that the government of President Lula 
overestimated the attractiveness of the Brazilian pre-Salt oil discoveries and their capacity to 
draw investments when proposing the 2010 changes. Little attention was given to the careful 
                                                          
592 )nternational Energy Agency ȋ)EAȌ, ǮSpecial Report World Energy )nvetsment Outlookǯ ȋʹͲͳͶȌ 52. 
593 Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Giambiagi 
and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013). 
594 Interview with Flavio Ofugi Rodrigues, Vice-President of Shell Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 22 July 2013). 
595 Interview with Joao de Lucca, President of the Brazilian Petroleum Institute (IBP) (Rio de Janeiro, 05 
August 2013). 
596  Personal translation from Walter De Vitto and Richard (ochstetler, ǮPerspectivas para os investimentos petrolíferos no Brasilǯ in Giambiagi and Velloso Lucas ȋedsȌ, Petróleo–Reforma e 
contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier Editora Ltda 2012) 309. 
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examination of how the framework would affect investors, under the assumption that the 
favourable geological conditions would be sufficiently attractive in themselves. Even though the 
2010 reforms have brought some minor advancements and there have been some signs that the 
government has been recently attempting to mitigate some of the problems here examined, that 
is evidently not enough. The current regulatory framework has to urgently eliminate the 
mentioned investment hurdles to the benefit of the Brazilian oil sector and the country as a 
whole.   
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7 - PRODUCTION  
This chapter analyses the current regulatory frameworkǯs effect on production at the 
upstream level of the Brazilian oil sector.597 This was the segment mostly affected by the legal 
changes since the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, as previously discussed. The goal here is 
not to make forecasts about future production levels, providing a static input-output estimate, 
based on industrial capacity and performance probabilities. Several trustworthy entities already 
competently perform this task.598 Rather, the objective here is to provide an assessment of how 
the regulatory framework affects production, stressing those elements that foster or dampen it. 
The evidence presented here is essentially circumstantial, while the examination will take into 
account not only statutes and subsidiary legislation, but also norms, governance structures, 
interactions among entities and their informal interplay.  This approach is based on the 
understanding that the ǲȋ…Ȍ assessments of regulatory governance need to go beyond formal 
attributes and to deal with actual functioning and effectiveness of rules.ǳ599 
Of course, several other factors inevitably affect and explain oil production in diverse 
ways and different intensities. Detailing all these elements would certainly go beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Moreover, it would add so many variables to the study that its explanatory power 
would be considerably reduced. Using a standard Latin terminology in economics, one needs to 
make ǲceteris paribusǳ assumptions600 to be able to draw consistent conclusions. The focus here 
will therefore be on the institutional aspects introduced by the 2010 reforms, acknowledging 
that other factors also come into play. The limitation of the analytical scope does not by any 
means affect the validity of the conclusions and their importance. Rather, the factors pointed out 
in the thesis will serve as essential starting points for public policy proposals aimed at 
incentivising production levels. In other words, the institutional setting might not be a definitive 
                                                          
597 The upstream sector comprises all the activities of exploration and production. 
598 Cf. International Energy Agency: <http://www.iea.org > accessed 27 April 2015; and Energy Aspects: 
<https://www.energyaspects.com>, accessed 27 April 2015. 
599 Paulo Correa and others, ǮRegulatory governance in Brazilian infrastructure industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ Ͷͺ The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 202. 
600 Assumptions that all other variables are kept constant, except the one being analysed.  
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determinant of production levels but it certainly boosts or deters it. That is the reason it is 
important to detect these catalysts or deterrent factors.    
The main argument presented is that the current regulatory framework will adversely 
affect production levels in Brazil because of four of its aspects: the operational exclusivity, the 
consequent lack of competition it entails, the local content rules and pricing policies. Much of 
the theoretical framework used in the section comes from institutional economics, which 
primarily takes into account how firms and economic agents react and build their strategies 
according to the institutional environment in which they operate.601 The central idea is that the institutional context shapes the countryǯs oil sector and its governance design, which, in turn, influences companiesǯ strategies and their performance. 602  As the 2010 reform provided 
significant alterations in the Brazilian oil sector, creating new entities, contractual conditions and regulations, it will most certainly impact on firmsǯ behaviour and will, therefore, form an 
important explanatory component for the resultant production levels.  
7.1 PRODUCTION IN THE OIL SECTOR 
Production is a central variable in the oil sector, since it is undeniably linked to all other 
parameters considered in regulatory frameworks. Production influences and in turn is 
influenced by all the variables analysed in the thesis. Hence, investment, technology and 
innovation tend to increase production levels, while, on the other hand, they also face 
favourable prospects in sectors where the production perspectives are promising and valuable. 
The last studied variable - strategic value of oil, similarly, gains relevance whenever the 
production projections are favourable, while the higher the strategic importance attached to oil, 
the more its production levels will be incentivised. The following diagram summarises the two-
way relationships between the studied variables and production:  
 
                                                          
601 Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o 
Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil 
thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2010) 275. 
602 David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark C Thurber, Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the 
world energy supply (Cambridge University Press 2011) 888. 
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Figure 2: Interdependency of studied variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-elaboration. 
The diagram therefore shows the interdependency of all these variables and their links 
to production levels. It underlines the importance of considering their joint interplay in a 
comprehensive manner. The transformation of oil, a finite resource, into enduring assets of 
long-lasting social benefits requires a holistic approach towards these key variables. Regulatory 
frameworks should ideally have this conversion as an essential objective to be achieved.603 In an 
interview with the author, Henrique Rzazinscki, energy consultant and former BMG employee, 
alluded to the case of Norway, pointing out how the country successfully used its finite fossil 
                                                          
603 Interview with Henrique Rzazinscki, Energy consultant and former BMG employee (Rio de Janeiro, 08 
July 2013). 
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fuel wealth to transform it into a thriving technologically intensive industry, which nowadays 
exports services and products all over the world.604  
Production should therefore be considered not merely as an end in itself, but as an 
essential variable that influences several others. An understanding of this multiple dependency 
among the studied parameters is fundamental for maximising the elements that foster them 
altogether, minimising, in turn, their potential inconsistencies.  
A regulatory framework that jointly advances all the studied variables mitigates the risk 
of having what has been called a ǲresource curse, also known as ǲparadox of the plenty 
theoryǳ.605  As already mentioned, the theory claims that an excessive dependency on export 
revenues of one single valuable natural resource commodity can deter the development of the countryǯs industries, infrastructure and social standards. This phenomenon has several 
explanatory factors, one of the most important is the so-called ǲDutch Diseaseǳ.606The ǲDutch 
Diseaseǳ results from the appreciation of the countryǯs exchange rate because of the commodityǯs exports. A higher exchange rate boosts imports, at the expense of local 
industries.607 By ensuring that production will not be the only reason of concern but an essential 
element to be considered conjointly with investment, strategic control of the product, 
technology and innovation, the risk of having a resource curse is lessened. This mitigation 
results from fostering several aspects that can leverage other sectors of the economy, which would reduce, in turn, the economyǯs dependence on one single exportable commodity. 
Moreover, soaring investments and high technological and innovation standards in the oil 
sector can have significant spill-over and multiplier effects throughout the economy, mitigating 
further the one-product dependency, encouraging economic diversification instead. The oil and 
                                                          
604 Ibid. 
605 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, Escaping the resource curse (Cambridge 
University Press 2007). 
606 According to Humphrey, Sachs and Stiglitz, other explanatory factors are: unequal expertise between 
governments and private investor companies that explore the natural resource, volatility of the income 
resultant from its exploration, insufficient investment in education, weak and unaccountable states. Cf. 
Ibid. 
607 The term refers to the poor performance of the Dutch manufacturing sector in the 1970s as a direct 
consequence of the evaluation of the exchange rate because of exports of natural gas coming from the 
North Sea.  Cf. Ibid. 5, 6. 
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gas sector has one of the longest and most intensive industrial chains.608 Long supply chains 
reveal greater propensity for creating economic multiplier effects.   
Within this overall setting, the following discussion will examine the elements of the 
current regulatory framework that affect oil production in Brazil, citing, whenever appropriate, the possible repercussions in other areas. The first section will analyse Petrobrasǯ operational 
exclusivity. The second will consider local content policies. The last two sections will examine in turn Petrobrasǯ monopolistic condition and its pricing policies and their respective effects on 
production.   
͹.ʹ PETROBRASǯ OPERATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 
The operational exclusivity has four different direct effects in terms of production and 
one indirect one, resulting from the lack of competition it entails. The four direct outcomes will 
be considered in this section, while the indirect one will be analysed separately in section 6.4.  
The first direct effect results from the evident constraint in having only one firm explore 
an enormous area of 149,000 square kilometres, with hydrocarbon deposits found in depths 
between 5,000 and 7,000 metres, beneath thick layers of 2,000 metres of salt.609Such limitation 
is even more acute for Petrobras, which is facing financial problems, as already discussed, and a 
recent corruption scandal.  
The second one takes place because the requirement to develop this large area in view of the firmǯs financial limitations leads it to redeploy resources from current operational and 
productive domains to pre-salt reservoirs for future extraction. This transference would not be 
a problem in production terms if other oil companies could take over these on-going exploration 
blocks in regions not governed by Law 12,351. There is no evidence, however, that this is 
happening. The production figures show that there has actually been a slight drop in oil 
                                                          
608 Nadine Bret Rouzaut and Jean Pierre Favennec, Petóleo & Gás Natural: Como Produzir e a que Custo 
(Synergia 2011). 
609 Oxford Analytica, ǮThe )mpact of Pre-Salt: A Long-Term Perspectiveǯ ȋA Report Prepared for 
PETROBRAS, 2010) 4. 
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extraction at the Campos Basin610 from approximately 2.2 mb/d in 2011 to roughly 2.1 mb/d in 
2012.611 According to the World Energy Outlook 2013:  
ǲThe challenge that is felt most strongly by Petrobras, Brazilǯs dominant 
upstream player, has been that while the enormous Santos pre-salt projects are 
in their heaviest investment period, the Campos basin is facing its own 
problems, including declining production from some of the more mature 
fields.ǳ612 
In January 2013 ANP expressed concern about the continuous production decrease at the Campos Basin and demanded formal explanations from Petrobras. The Agencyǯs Director-
General, Magda Chambriard, publicly stated that the company should make an ǲadditional 
effortǳ to drill more wells. 613Petrobras claimed that maintenance requirements of important 
platforms had led to the reduction of the production levels.614 Yet its CEO, Graca Foster, later 
recognised that planning and investment problems related to the purchase of important 
equipment were affecting the production decline at the Campos Basin.615  
Therefore, there are indications that the Brazilian National Oil Company has been 
progressively shifting focus from the Campos Basin to the Santos Basin, located in the pre-salt 
reservoir, where the operational exclusivity applies. This rearrangement of priorities could 
explain the substantial drop in production in the first area, which has not been compensated by 
rises in the second one. Such resource redeployment could be one of the reasons for the fall in the companyǯs annual output in the past two years, with reduction rates of ʹ% in ʹͲͳʹ and 
                                                          
610 Even though the Campos Basin is located in pre-salt basins, Law 12,351 and the production-sharing 
regime do not apply to the current production areas, since they have been contracted using the 
concession regime under Law 9,478. 
611 )nternational Energy Agency ȋ)EAȌ, ǮWorld Energy Outlook ʹͲͳ͵ǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ 316. 
612 Ibid. 316. 
613 Sergio Torres, ǮANP examina queda na produção da Petrobrásǯ O Estado de Sao Paulo (9 January 2013) 
<http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,anp-examina-queda-na-producao-da-petrobras-imp-
,982112> accessed 23 June 2014.  
614 Ibid. 
615 Do Rio e de São Paulo, Ǯ)nvestimento alto e produção baixa pressionam resultadosǯ Valor Economico 
(26 November 2013) <http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/3351340/investimento-alto-e-producao-
baixa-pressionam-resultados> accessed 23 June of 2013. 
 198 
1.6% in 2013.616 Of course, several blocks in the Santos Basin are not yet fully operational and 
its production levels are expected to substantially increase in the future. Moreover, Campos Basinǯs blocks are more mature fields with lower productivity rates. Nevertheless, the main point here is that if there hadnǯt been an operational exclusivity, other oil companies could most 
certainly be operating in pre-salt domains, mitigating Petrobrasǯ redeployment of resources 
from the Campos Basin.   
The third effect of the operational exclusivity results from the impossibility of 
adequately exploring all the different areas, with their geological and logistical peculiarities, for 
lack of access to a wide array of technologies and expertise. Companies using other technologies 
and methods, in the absence of the exclusivity operational clause, could explore some domains 
that are not considered operationally viable to Petrobras. Joao de Lucca in an interview with the 
author explained that on some occasions certain blocks might not interest Petrobras but other 
companies may deem its exploration viable through the use of different techniques and know-
how.617    
Finally, the fourth and final direct effect of Petrobrasǯ exclusivity on production has 
already taken place through the interruption of public tenders, in 2008, when the initial 
discussions about a change in the Brazilian oil regulatory framework were launched. This 
interruption will have an inevitable impact in terms of production, since the regular rounds that 
had been taking place since 1999 were discontinued for five years. Initially, the public tenders 
were halted because of the discussions over the bill proposals and the alleged need to 
reformulate the oil exploration regime. However, after the approval of the new regulations, in 
2010, there was no reason for not organising bidding rounds. The government only finally 
restarted the tenders in 2013.  
)t can be shown that Petrobrasǯ exclusivity is inextricably linked with this long 
interruption of public tenders. Two main reasons explain the delay in organising new oil 
                                                          
616 http://www.petrobras.com/en/magazine/post/2013-net-income-of-r-23-57-billion.htm/ accessed 18 
August 2014. 
617 Interview with Joao de Lucca, President of the Brazilian Petroleum Institute (IBP) (Rio de Janeiro, 05 
August 2013). 
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auctions in Brazil. The first is Petrobrasǯ incapacity to cope with additional expenditures, since it 
already has the most ambitious investment plan in the world among NOCs for the period 2012-
2016. Because of the exclusivity, any bidding round in the pre-salt area would impose even 
higher investment costs and expenses on an already overburdened company.  
The second reason is the priority given to the policy of developing a solid Brazilian 
industry of oil equipment, which supersedes the goal of increasing production levels or discovering new production frontiers. )n other words, the incumbent governmentǯs priority has 
been to allow the Brazilian oil supply industry time to develop its capacity so it can adequately 
match the high demand that will naturally arise from the exploration of the Brazilian pre-salt 
basins.618 This demand will be particularly propelled by local content policies adopted in 
Brazil.619  
Evidence that this second point is a plausible explanation for the public tenderǯs five-
year interruption is the fact that the government could have organised bidding rounds in areas 
not located in pre-salt reservoirs and not deemed strategic. For these locations, the already 
existent Law 9,478 would apply. But the government decided not to have public tenders in the 
oil sector. It could also have started bidding procedures in 2010, after the approval of the new 
oil regulations. This again did not happen and they were only resumed in 2013.  
 This long interruption will most certainly affect production prospects in the country. 
Had the bidding rounds not been suspended, Brazil would probably be producing in the near 
future a considerably higher volume of oil, and, consequently, be reaping the resultant benefits 
from the higher outcome via taxes, jobs and investments. Armando Guedes620 and Flavio 
Rodrigues621 mentioned in interviews with the author that Brazil lost a significant window of 
opportunity with the halt of public tenders in 2008.  
                                                          
618 Cf. Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Giambiagi and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013) 265; and Interview with Flavio Ofugi Rodrigues, Vice-
President of Shell Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 22 July 2013). 
619 See discussion below. 
620 Interview with Armando Guedes, Former President of Petrobras (Rio de Janeiro, 21 July 2012). 
621 Interview with Flavio Ofugi Rodrigues, Vice-President of Shell Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 22 July 2013). 
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Besides the evident fact of foregone income, the oil market in 2008 was also 
considerably more favourable for Brazil than it currently is. AS previously stated, new 
discoveries have occurred since then and the oil price has plummeted. Technological 
developments have led to increasing fossil fuel replacement and the use of shale oil and gas has 
significantly expanded worldwide. Several specialists consider that the attractiveness of the 
Brazilian pre-salt area has considerably decreased since 2008.622    
7.3 LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
7.3.1 HISTORY AND RATIONALE 
Local content policies are policies that favour the acquisition of national goods. They aim 
at developing the national industry of suppliers of goods and services through the concession of 
stimuli.623The incentives can take diverse formats such as import tax levies on foreign 
competitors or the requirement that a certain percentage of expenditures be of national content. 
The principle underlying the policy is that the development of the national industry would not 
occur if left exclusively to normal market dynamics.624The implicit logic is that a short-term 
inefficiency will be provisionally tolerated for attaining a more desirable long-lasting goal that 
more than compensates for it in the future. According to Silvana Tordo ǲLocal content policies 
are in essence a trade-off between short-term efficiency and long-term economic 
developmentǳ625.    
 Theorists also stress the relevant task that leading economic sectors perform in 
stimulating industrial development in other segments through the creation of economic 
                                                          
622 Cf. Interview with Amrita Sen, Chief Oil Analyst in Energy Aspects (London, 07 February 2014); 
Interview with Joao de Lucca, President of the Brazilian Petroleum Institute (IBP) (Rio de Janeiro, 05 
August 2013); Interview with Armando Guedes, Former President of Petrobras (Rio de Janeiro, 21 July 
2012); and Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Giambiagi and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013). 
623 Luiz Cezar P Quintans, Direito do petróleo: conteúdo local: a evolução do modelo de contrato e o 
conteúdo local nas atividades de E&P no Brasil (Freitas Bastos Editora 2010) 4. 
624 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮPolítica de Conte’do Local na Cadeia de Petróleo e Gás: Uma  visão sobre a evolução do instrumento e a percepção das empresas investidoras e produtoras de bensǯ ȋA )ndustria e 
o Brasil, 2012) 15. 
625 Silvana Tordo, National oil companies and value creation (World Bank Publications 2011) 9. 
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linkages.626 The use of the oil sector as an industrial catalyst of economic linkages has taken 
place in Norway, for example.627 It has also shaped the design of national content policies in 
Brazil.628 
Despite the validity of local content policies and their effectiveness when adequately 
designed and enforced,629 they encompass a significant risk that the provisional stimuli of the 
targeted sector should become permanent, as a result of political pressure from influential 
interest groups. The enduring maintenance of supposedly provisional industrial protections is a 
recurrent trait of Brazilian economic history.630 National content policies should essentially be 
temporary, otherwise they become a distortive and perverse mechanism of rent transfer.631 In 
the oil sector, this momentary nature is even more compelling because oil is essentially a non-
renewable finite resource. Its industry of suppliers is, therefore, also provisional, unless it 
diversifies activities towards other sectors. Another possible alternative to mitigate this interim 
nature, extending the duration of the suppliers of the oil industry is to export to places that have 
newly discovered areas of high productive potential. As previously demonstrated, that is what 
happened in Norway. Yet this action requires the oil supply industry to be internationally 
competitive and is another important reason for national content policies to contemplate a 
phasing-out strategy and the eventual goal of bringing competitiveness to the targeted sectors.        
                                                          
626 Cf. Paul Stevens, ǮNational oil companies: good or bad?ǯ National oil companies workshop: Current 
roles and future prospects 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.8929&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 
13 May 2014; Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, Escaping the resource curse 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) Albert O Hirschman, Essays in trespassing: Economics to politics and 
beyond (CUP Archive 1981). 
627 Oystein Noreng, ǮBrazil and Norway- Offshore Petroleum Experiences and Lessonsǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ 35 Journal 
of Energy and Development 79.  
628 Ibid. 
629 David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark C Thurber, Oil and governance: state-owned enterprises and the 
world energy supply (Cambridge University Press 2011) 894, 895. 
630 Cf. Tainara Machado, ǮFalta de clareza inibe investimentos, diz economistaǯ Valor Economico (Sao 
Paulo, 11 November 2013) <http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/3334052/falta-de-clareza-inibe-
investimentos-diz-economista> accessed 15 July 2014 Edmar Lisboa Bacha and Monica Baumgarten De 
Bolle, O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013); and Tainara Machado, ǮFalta de clareza inibe investimentos, diz economistaǯ Valor Economico ȋSao Paulo, ͳͳ 
November 2013) <http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/3334052/falta-de-clareza-inibe-investimentos-diz-
economista> accessed 15 July 2014. 
631 Cf. Walter De Vitto and Richard (ochstetler, ǮPerspectivas para os investimentos petrolíferos no Brasilǯ 
in Giambiagi and Velloso Lucas (eds), Petróleo–Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Elsevier Editora Ltda 2012); and Silvana Tordo, National oil companies and value creation (World Bank 
Publications 2011) 10. 
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Local content policies can aim to achieve several goals.  Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes 
distinguishes between two general categories: i) short-term macroeconomic goals linked to 
increasing employment rates; and ii) specific targets of longer maturity directed to the 
development of particular economic segments.632 He claims that policy strategies should be designed according to their respective targets.  Therefore, in the first case, the policyǯs scope 
should have a wider ambit, with additional incentives towards labour intensive sectors. The 
opposite occurs in the second instance, where focus on specific segments is imperative for its 
success. The enlargement of the policy scope in this second case will only unnecessarily burden 
companies required to adhere to local content requirements, increasing economic inefficiency 
and putting the main target at risk.  
Guimaraes shows that lack of policy focus in local content policies can significantly 
undermine them and lead to significant shortcomings.633If the government wishes, for example, 
to develop the subsea and engineering industries in the oil sector it should require firms to 
maintain certain percentage levels of purchase on those specific categories of goods and 
services and not a general rate applied to all their acquisitions. Guimaraes also stresses the 
importance of providing initiatives that foster the productivity of the targeted supply sector 
such as training and capacity building programmes, incentive actions, as he labels it, instead of 
only requiring mandatory purchasing commitments from buyers.634           
 Local content policies have been applied in the Brazilian oil sector since the 1970s. They were at that time established in accordance to Petrobrasǯ purchasing policy because of its 
production exclusivity.635 In 1995, the exclusivity was revoked through a constitutional 
amendment and private oil companies were allowed to operate at the upstream level. National content policies, consequently, could no longer solely rely on Petrobrasǯ acquisition policy. 
Therefore, from that moment until 2003, the policy was essentially conducted via local 
                                                          
632 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ 
in Bacha (ed), O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013) 
336. 
633 Ibid. 
634 Ibid. 338. 
635 Ibid. 
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commitment requirements, which were included as one of the public tendersǯ selection 
criteria.636 These conditions were then established in contracts signed between the winning 
consortium of companies and the Federal Government through obligations of acquiring a 
certain percentage of goods and services considered of national origin.  
Non-compliance fines, in turn, were stipulated in ANPǯs administrative rules ȋPortariasȌ. 
In spite of these penalties, the methodology to assess national content of goods and services had 
not been legally defined or described in regulations and contracts of any kind.637This created a 
great deal of uncertainty for companies attempting to comply with the requirements and also 
posed difficulties for the government in enforcing them.638  
The procedures were modified in 2003, when mandatory minimal local content 
thresholds were introduced, with the possibility of bids for additional proposal commitments at 
the moment of public tenders. The government did not publicise any assessment, report or 
study to justify the established minimal thresholds.639Here again, the terms were then fixed 
between the signatory parties.   
In that same year, Decree no. 4925 created the PROMINP (Programme to promote the 
national oil and natural gas industry), which had the main goal of increasing the share of the national industry of suppliers. One of PROM)NPǯs projects was the creation of a Booklet 
(Cartilha), establishing a methodology to assess the national content of goods and services in 
the oil sector. The assignment was concluded in 2004 and in the following year the 7th Bidding Round provided for the mandatory use of the Bookletǯs methodology. Another innovation in 
that same round was the establishment of maximum percentage amounts for local content 
offers.640  
                                                          
636 Luiz Cezar P Quintans, ǮDireito do petróleo: conte’do local: a evolução do modelo de contrato eo conte’do local nas atividades de E&P no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ. 
637 Ibid. 75. 
638 Ibid. 
639 Ibid. 83. 
640 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ 
in Bacha (ed), O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013) 
335. 
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National content policies changed once again in the oil sector in 2010, with the 
enactment of Law 12,351. The statute excluded local content requirements as a bidding 
criterion. Instead, minimum mandatory threshold levels were introduced. These would be 
defined according to each public tender in its protocol provisions. Since the development of a 
robust local industry of oil equipment is among one of the goals established for the enactment of 
Law 12,351,641local content requirements are expected to become increasingly high. In the first 
bidding round in pre-salt areas the required percentages were between 55 and 59% at the 
development phase and 37% at the exploration phase. 
Apart from the mandatory minimum thresholds, another change brought by Law 12,351 
was the reintroduction of the model existent before 1995, whereby national content policy was essentially dependent on Petrobrasǯ purchases.642 The companyǯs operational exclusivity in pre-
salt layers and areas deemed strategic is the main reason for that. 
7.3.2 POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES IN TERMS OF PRODUCTION The current local content policy will have a detrimental effect on the countryǯs 
production levels at the upstream sector and will affect Petrobras more intensively because of 
its exclusivity. The outcome will result from two complementary effects taking place in the 
context of an escalation of the demand for products in the oil industry, resulting from the 
progressive exploration of the pre-salt basin. 
The first one is the increase in companiesǯ costs because of the requirement of buying 
certain percentages of national goods, which are in most segments more expensive than their 
foreign competitors, or of inferior quality.643 The second is a delay in the supply of machinery 
                                                          
641 See discussions in chapter 6.  
642 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ 
in Bacha (ed), O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013) 
347. 
643 Cf. Eloi Fernandez and Bruno Musso, ǮOportunidades e Desafios da Agenda de Competitividade para 
Construcao de uma Politica Industrial na Area de Petroleo: Propostas para um Novo Ciclo de 
Desenvolvimento )ndustrialǯȌ Estudos e Pesquisas No. ͵ͺͶ )nstituto Nacional de Altos Estudos; Jose Renato Ferreira de Almeida, ǮConclusoes e Recomendacoes de Politicaǯ ȋEstudo da Competitividade da 
Industria Brasileira de Bens e Servicos do Setor de P&G, 2007); Roberta Paduan, ǮO Maior Desafio do Paisǯ 
Exame (27 June 2012) <http://exame.abril.com.br/revista-exame/edicoes/1019/noticias/pre-sal-o-
maior-desafio-do-brasil> accessed 15 June 2015and Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da 
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and equipment because of the lack of productive capacity of some of the national industryǯs 
sectors or even because several local companies are newcomers, inexperienced or not 
sufficiently established in the market.644 
The impact of the national content policy on production levels has been assessed in a 
study conducted by the consultant company Mckinsey, in which two diverse estimated outcome 
scenarios for oil in 2020 are respectively associated with two different local content 
requirement levels in Brazil. In the first case, maintaining the current rules, the oil production 
would be of 4.4 million of barrels a day in 2020, while in the second case, of more permissive 
and less restrictive national content conditions, the forecast would rise to 5.4 million barrels a 
day.645 
Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida similarly considers that there is an inherent trade-off 
between local content requirements and production levels. He claims that companies and the 
government will need to engage in discussions with respect to the repercussions and 
consequences of this trade-off.646 The debate is particularly important in view of the expected rising demand resulting from Petrobrasǯ massive investment programme for the ʹͲͳʹ – 2016 
period, considered the most ambitious in the world, with disbursements amounting to US$ 237 
billion. 647  
Taking into account these investments, Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes calculated Petrobrasǯ expected annual expenditures in Brazil, applying the average local content 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ in Bacha ȋedȌ, O futuro da indústria no Brasil: 
Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013). 
644 Cf. Eloi Fernandez and Bruno Musso, ǮOportunidades e Desafios da Agenda de Competitividade para 
Construcao de uma Politica Industrial na Area de Petroleo: Propostas para um Novo Ciclo de Desenvolvimento )ndustrialǯȌ Estudos e Pesquisas No. ͵ͺͶ )nstituto Nacional de Altos Estudos; Jose Renato Ferreira de Almeida, ǮConclusoes e Recomendacoes de Politicaǯ ȋEstudo da Competitividade da 
Industria Brasileira de Bens e Servicos do Setor de P&G, 2007); Roberta Paduan, ǮO Maior Desafio do Paisǯ 
Exame (27 June 2012) <http://exame.abril.com.br/revista-exame/edicoes/1019/noticias/pre-sal-o-
maior-desafio-do-brasil> accessed 15 June 2015 and Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ in Bacha ȋedȌ, O futuro da indústria no Brasil: 
Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013) 
645 Roberta Paduan, ǮO Maior Desafio do Paisǯ Exame ȋʹ͹ June ʹͲͳʹȌ <http://exame.abril.com.br/revista-
exame/edicoes/1019/noticias/pre-sal-o-maior-desafio-do-brasil> accessed 15 June 2015 46. 
646 Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida, 'Seminário GEE2013: Os Desafios da Energia no Brasil' (2013). 
647 Christopher Garman and Robert Johnston, ǮPetroleo: o Brasil no contexto de um panorama global em transformacaoǯ in Giambiagi ȋedȌ, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Elsevier 2013) 265. 
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percentage requirements of the last bidding rounds. He concluded that the national industry 
will need its supply capabilities to annually be somewhere in between US$16.5 and US$ 18.5 billion to cope with the Brazilian National Oil Companyǯs local acquisitions in the next years. He 
claims that Brazilian producers are not prepared to match such amounts.648 In line with this 
argument, the World Energy Outlook predicts shortages in the supply of subsea equipment, 
support vessels and FPSOs649 in Brazil given the amount of future estimated expenditures at the 
pre-salt basin.650  
 Numerous delays in projects and equipment purchase are already taking place in Brazil, 
while complaints about the surcharge of Brazilian suppliers equally abound.651 Analysts expect 
the situation to worsen in the future with the steep forecasted upsurge in demand coming from 
the exploration of the pre-salt basin.652 Even Petrobras has been having problems in coping with 
its local content commitments and has been fined by ANP in 2011 for non-compliance in five of 
its 44 assessed blocks.653 
The imposition of fines on Petrobras is emblematic, since the company has historically 
been a pivotal implementer of local content policies and a focal point for the government to 
guarantee their success.  It also engenders concerns about their actual feasibility, since the non-
compliance of this key policy implementer entity might implicate that they should be 
reconsidered. 
Petrobrasǯ position with respect to local content policies reveals its dilemmas as a 
partially state-owned enterprise. )f on the one hand it is in the governmentǯs interest to strictly 
                                                          
648 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ 
in Bacha (ed), O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013). 
649 Floating production, storage and offloading. 
650 International Energy Agency (IEA), ǮWorld Energy Outlook ʹͲͳ͵ǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ 374. 
651 Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ 148. 
652 Cf. Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ in Bacha ȋedȌ, O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 
2013) 347; (elder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie Eixos do Desenvolvimemto Brasileiro 27; and Jose Renato Ferreira de Almeida, ǮConclusoes e Recomendacoes de Politicaǯ ȋEstudo da Competitividade da )ndustria 
Brasileira de Bens e Servicos do Setor de P&G, 2007). 
653 Roberta Paduan, ǮO Maior Desafio do Paisǯ Exame ȋʹ͹ June ʹͲͳʹȌ <http://exame.abril.com.br/revista-
exame/edicoes/1019/noticias/pre-sal-o-maior-desafio-do-brasil> accessed 15 June 2015. 
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encourage these policies, on the other hand, this comes at a cost for the company, as previously 
demonstrated. This cost is expected to increase further as the exploration of pre-salt basin 
intensifies.  
The dual instructions coming from the Presidency of the Republic and the companyǯs CEO are symptomatic of Petrobrasǯ ambiguities as a partially state-owned company. In February 
2012, for example, President Dilma gave explicit instructions for Petrobrasǯ CEO, Gracas Foster, 
to prioritise local content policies at a time when the company was facing problems complying 
with its commitments.654 The episode shows not only the degree of presidential interference in Petrobrasǯ affairs, but also how national content policies are deemed important for the government. One month later, however, Petrobrasǯ CEO expressed in an interview to the Brazilian media that these policies could detrimentally affect the companyǯs interests.655 The 
supply industry received her comments with substantial apprehension and started questioning the companyǯs actual engagement with national content policies. The situation escalated to an 
extent that required the intervention of the Secretary of Oil and Gas, from the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy, Marco Antonio Almeida, who gave an interview stating that Petrobras remained 
strictly engaged and committed to its local content duties.656  
Local content requirements in the first public tender in pre-salt areas in 2013 were 
maintained at similar levels to the last bidding rounds using the concession regime, with rates 
varying between 55 and 59%, at the development phase, and 37%, at the exploration phase. In 
spite of this fact, if supply problems are already taking place with the current levels of purchases 
from the upstream sector they are expected to intensify in the future with the estimated 
forthcoming upsurge in demand for exploring further the pre-salt basin.  
                                                          
654 Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ ȋDphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ148. 
655 Cf. Marta Nogueira e Rodrigo Polito, ǮPetrobras vai exigir conte’do localǯ Valor Economico (Rio de 
Janeiro, 26 March 2014) <http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/3494426/petrobras-vai-exigir-conteudo-
local> accessed 13 October 2014; and Equipe do Rio de Janeiro, ǮMercado espera clareza sobre reajustes da Petrobrasǯ Valor Economico (Rio de Janeiro, 12 December 2013) 
<http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/3369618/mercado-espera-clareza-sobre-reajustes-da-petrobras> 
accessed 12 July 2014. 
656 Marta Nogueira e Rodrigo Polito, ǮPetrobras vai exigir conte’do localǯ Valor Economico ȋRio de Janeiro, 
26 March 2014) <http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/3494426/petrobras-vai-exigir-conteudo-local> 
accessed 13 October 2014. 
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One of the most common criticisms of the Brazilian local content policy is its lack of 
focus.657 As stated by Alfredo Renault, in an interview with the author, it is impossible to be 
competitive in everything, so the policy should ideally assess those products and services that 
hold conditions to compete internationally and prioritise them.658 All other interviewees for the 
thesis not working for the government who expressed views on the topic shared his opinion. 
One of the seventeen government officials interviewed expressed his criticisms about the policy 
under condition of anonymity and asked them not to be detailed.  
Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, in turn, criticises the lack of transparency with respect to local content oil policiesǯ goals.659 He contends that the wide scope of the contemplated sectors would only make sense if the policiesǯ objectives were to reduce unemployment. Yet in that case 
other labour intensive economic segments should also be included and not only the oil sector. 
On the other hand, if the goal is to build a robust oil supply industry, he claims, the lack of focus 
on some selected strategic sectors undermines the policy as a whole, since less productive 
segments will drain resources from the more productive ones, which have the effective 
conditions to face foreign competition in the future, thereby overcoming the initial protection. 
)n spite of these facts, the delay in the national industryǯs supply of material and 
equipment, its higher prices and the detrimental effects in terms of production levels do not 
appear to raise significant concerns within the government. As previously mentioned, the 
government seems to prioritise the development of the local industry of suppliers, a rather 
                                                          
657 Cf. Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ in Bacha ȋedȌ, O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 
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659 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ 
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long-term goal, over other targets of increasing production levels.660 Some specialists consider 
even that this is one of the reasons for the five-year bidding round time lapse in Brazil.661  
The goal of allowing the industry of suppliers time to adapt to a new reality of increasing 
demand is certainly commendable and has been effectively used in other places such as 
Norway.662  Yet it should be implemented with adequate actions for capacity building and 
minimising possible fallouts.  
In the Brazilian case, for example, completely ceasing public tenders for these purposes 
is certainly not appropriate and can even be counter-productive.663 A more recommendable 
policy would be to provide a gradual increase in the national content requirements, allowing the 
supply industry progressive time to adapt. Another possible option would be to continue with 
the auctions, offering smaller blocks, encouraging the industry to steadily adapt its production 
levels, while gradually signalling what are the suitable investment levels to be undertaken in the 
future. These initiatives would confer greater predictability to investment decisions, allowing 
for a continuing fine-tuning of the required investment amounts to match future demand, while 
also minimising the shortcomings on production levels.  The opposite occurs if public tenders 
are completely halted, since the supply industry in this case will certainly face problems in 
planning its future investment amounts to meet forthcoming purchases because of the difficulty 
in estimating prospective demand.  This drawback is particularly compelling in Brazil, since 
according to a thorough study conducted by Oliveira within the PROMINP project, one of the 
important hurdles for increasing local industrial capacity in the country is uncertainty about 
future demand.664  
                                                          
660 Christopher Garman and Robert Johnston, ǮPetroleo: o Brasil no contexto de um panorama global em transformacaoǯ in Giambiagi ȋedȌ, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
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661 Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Giambiagi 
and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013) 
662 Oxford Analytica, ǮThe )mpact of Pre-Salt: A Long-Term Perspectiveǯ ȋA Report Prepared for 
PETROBRAS, 2010) 20. 
663 The argument that the government stopped public tenders to allow the national industry time to 
develop is not unanimous and there are some credible elements that show that it might not apply. See 
previous discussions.   
664  Jose Renato Ferreira de Almeida, ǮConclusoes e Recomendacoes de Politicaǯ ȋEstudo da 
Competitividade da Industria Brasileira de Bens e Servicos do Setor de P&G, 2007) 19. 
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The government is certainly right to favour long-term policies with long lasting effects 
on its industrial structure over short-term initiatives and actions that boost production, for 
example. Yet this preference does not require radical initiatives such as the interruption of 
public tenders.665 Rather, it demands consistent and studied actions that confer leeway and 
room to manoeuvre for the industry of suppliers to meet its targets, and, most importantly, a 
consistent programme of incentives for increasing its productivity levels.  
National content policies in the industry of suppliers to the upstream sector have been present in Brazil since the ͳͻ͹Ͳǯs and they are not a completely new initiative that requires 
starting-up or reinventing local manufacturing. Therefore, policies targeted to this sector should 
primarily focus on the improvement of the existing structure, in actions that foster the increase 
of its actual capacity to meet current and future demand. The industry should adapt to a new 
productive reality instead of being reformulated. The policy requires more actions to boost 
sectorial productive capacity instead of those aimed at creating a protective and captive market. 
Another essential shortcoming of the current local content policy is its excessive 
reliance on only one company, which has been facing significant financial hurdles, as previously examined, and difficulties in coping with the policyǯs current requirements. Even more 
worryingly, if the situation is already problematic in the present context, it is expected to 
worsen significantly in the future because the massive investment levels required to explore the 
pre-salt basins will implicate a substantial increase in demand of local supplies, which if not met 
will lead to additional fines and further financial constraints for Petrobras. Even though there is 
the possibility of applying for a waiver of local policy commitments in cases of ǲsignificant 
supply delaysǳ or when Brazilian prices are considered ǲexceedingly highǳ, compared to the 
international market, these procedures take time. Moreover, they involve a subjective 
evaluation of vague terms - ǲexceedingly high pricesǳ and ǲsignificant supply delaysǳ, which 
                                                          
665 As discussed in section 8.2, theorists consider that one of the reasons for suspending public tenders 
was the goal of allowing time for the national industry of suppliers to develop.  
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require ANPǯs approval.666 The outcome of any application, as a consequence, is far from 
predictable and raises significant uncertainties.  
More importantly, Petrobras will be the only upstream company affected by local 
content policies in the vast pre-salt basins because of its exclusivity in the area. In other words, 
the Brazilian National Oil Company will be bearing the immediate alluded policy drawbacks, via 
higher costs, potential delivery delays and quality concerns. It is quite illustrative that Petrobrasǯ costs have risen by more than 30% per year from 2010 levels.667   
The excessive reliance on one sole firm at the upstream level for the policy exacerbates 
another problem that has already been affecting the supply industry in Brazil.  Providers 
become totally dependent on Petrobrasǯ demand, which takes place throughout the year 
according to peaks and troughs that vary according to its own corporate requirements and 
priorities.668 Local suppliers therefore plan their sales based on an estimated average demand 
and, as consequence, cannot reap the benefits of economies of scale of all possible transactions. 
Moreover, at times of high demand, Petrobras needs to import products because national 
providers cannot meet its requirements.669  
Analysts have suggested some mechanisms to circumvent this problem such as spreading Petrobrasǯ purchases more evenly throughout the year so as to enable suppliers to 
take advantage of economies of scale.670 This suggestion might suit providers, yet it will most 
probably shift the problem to Petrobras instead, since it will possibly lead to a significant cost 
                                                          
666 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ 
in Bacha (ed), O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013) 
344. 
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668  Cf. Jose Renato Ferreira de Almeida, ǮConclusoes e Recomendacoes de Politicaǯ ȋEstudo da 
Competitividade da Industria Brasileira de Bens e Servicos do Setor de P&G, 2007); Helder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie 
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Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013) 
669  Jose Renato Ferreira de Almeida, ǮConclusoes e Recomendacoes de Politicaǯ ȋEstudo da 
Competitividade da Industria Brasileira de Bens e Servicos do Setor de P&G, 2007). 
670 Cf. Ibid.; (elder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor 
Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie Eixos do Desenvolvimemto Brasileiro; and Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ in Bacha ȋedȌ, O 
futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013). 
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for the company in storing material and equipment during idle periods. It might also significantly escalate transaction costs within the firmǯs different corporate units, in preparing a 
complex planning schedule to accommodate and fine-tune its business, financial and 
commercial policies accordingly throughout the year in a manner compatible and harmonised with suppliersǯ requirements.  
(ere again Petrobrasǯ exclusivity has substantial limitations for the national industry of 
suppliers, since the presence of several operating upstream companies would mitigate the 
problem of having demand peaks and troughs, reducing, at the same time, the risk of relying on 
only one buyer. It could, moreover, bring local suppliers closer to foreign upstream companies, 
facilitating future joint international projects.671 Petrobrasǯ exclusivity in Law ͳʹ,͵ͷͳ therefore 
reinforces one of the bottlenecks for the existence of a vigorous local industry of suppliers in 
Brazil. The maintenance of the current national content policy without eliminating or reducing 
this bottleneck or fostering the production capability of local suppliers will only worsen the 
current problems of delay, overpricing and quality, at the expense of oil production at the 
upstream level.      
Another hindrance of local content policy which results from Petrobrasǯ exclusivity is 
that it creates a legal monopsony in pre-salt basins and strategic areas, which enables the 
company to take advantage of its market power to reap favourable deals, detrimentally affecting 
national suppliers.672 Ironically, local content requirements could aggravate the expected 
drawbacks following from this market structure, since the Brazilian National Oil Company could 
perfectly attempt to compensate for its additional costs in areas where it is committed to 
national purchases, by imposing its bargaining power for the reduction of prices in areas where 
the requirements do not apply. Depending on the extent to which these practices affect the 
supplier industry the drawbacks could even surpass the benefits accruing from the local content 
policy, thereby totally undermining it.  
                                                          
671 Eloi Fernandez e Fernandez, Ǯ)ndustria nacional de bens e servicos nos arranjos produtivos do setor de oleo e gas natural no Brasilǯ in Giambiagi ȋedȌ, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero 
brasileiro (Elsevier Brasil 2013) 109. 
672 Oxford Analytica, ǮThe )mpact of Pre-Salt: A Long-Term Perspectiveǯ ȋA Report Prepared for 
PETROBRAS, 2010) 25. 
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Finally, one should always bear in mind that local content policies can also act as an 
effective means to reduce the risk of having a resource curse in oil intensive countries. Yet its 
effective achievement requires fostering the long-term competitiveness of national firms, an 
action that reduces the excessive dependency on exports of one sole commodity. In this sense, it 
is essential to promote activities that i) increase the productivity of local suppliers; and ii) 
support a progressive phasing out of the dependency on the captive market created with 
national content requirements.  
This presupposes actions that reduce production costs, increase labour force 
qualification standards in the sector and provide innovation stimuli, but also an endeavour to 
mitigate all aspects that affect the overall competiveness of the national industry as a whole, 
such as access to funds and loans on competitive terms, improvement of the national infra-
structure and of the educational levels. A certain number of initiatives have already been launched in Brazil within this in mind, such as the escalation of BNDES and F)NEPǯs capital 
funds for loans directed to companies aiming at investing in technology and innovation and the 
creation, in 1999, of CT-Petro, and of PROMINP, in 2003.673 CT-Petro funds projects with the 
goal of increasing the productivity and quality of products in the oil industry, as well as reducing 
its costs and prices. PROMINP is a programme that seeks to increase the share of the national 
industry of suppliers. These projects are important first steps that should be further stimulated 
to become national priorities.  
It is also essential to signal to firms targeted by national content policies that the 
protection is, above all, temporary, and a means to achieve an ultimate goal: competitiveness 
and non-dependence on the local market. Unfortunately, nothing has been done in this sense 
hitherto in Brazil. When conducting the interviews for this thesis the author inquired about the 
existence of any phasing-out initiative, but the interviewees were not aware of anything, which 
is particularly worrying.  Ignoring this important aspect will inevitably affect the local content policy and the national industryǯs capacity to adequately supply the upstream sector in the 
                                                          
673 Francisco Ebeling Barros, ǮA Governança do Pré-Sal: Uma Análise sob a Ótica da Literatura das Variedades de Capitalismoǯ (Dphil thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2013) 145,148. 
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future, leading it to enduringly depend on the captive market created by the protection, at the 
long-lasting expense of production at the upstream sector.  
͹.Ͷ PETROBRASǯ MONOPOLISTIC CONDITION AND ITS PRODUCTION EFFECTS  
The operational exclusivity, in itself, confers substantial limitations on the competition 
conditions in pre-salt layers and strategic areas. Even though some degree of competition is still 
possible at the moment of the auctions, when the different consortia are formed, rivalry is 
significantly reduced because Petrobras is required to have at least a 30% share in all groups. 
Therefore, scarce are the incentives for more than one group to be formed in each public tender, 
because all partners will naturally prefer to be with Petrobras, which not only has operational 
exclusivity, but also is a firm with extensive and detailed knowledge in Brazilian basins. 
Petrobras, in turn, will also be inclined to choose only one consortium, which offers the best 
conditions, or may even suggest the dismantlement of certain groups and the formation of new 
ones based on the negotiations it has with other companies before the auctions.  
The 2010 regulations reinforce one of the problems that had already been taking place in Brazilian oil sectorǯs public tenders until then: the ǲwinnerǯs curseǳ.  According to the winnerǯs curse theory, in auctions where one of the firms holds significantly more information 
about the real value of the auctioned object than others, there is a tendency for the other 
bidders to reduce their bids for fear of offering a higher value than the real one, facing, as a 
consequence, losses. This explains the term ǲwinnerǯs curseǳ, which basically is a loss derived 
from an excessively high bid for lack of information.674 Cesar Mattos points out that one of the reasons for Petrobrasǯ success in public tenders in the Brazilian oil sectors since ͳͻͻ͹ is other 
companiesǯ fear of the winnerǯs curse.675 This phenomenon is significantly bolstered with the 
2010 reform because reluctance to bid will naturally follow from the companies that have not 
received formal acquiescence from Petrobras in the pre-negotiations to the public tender, when 
forming the consortia groups. The fact that the first bidding round in pre-salt layers using the 
                                                          
674César Mattos, ǮLicitações da ANP, PETROBRAS e a ǲMaldição do Vencedorǳǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ MARCOS 
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675 Ibid. 
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2010 regulations has had only one bid and one consortium group might be an illustration of this 
fact.      
Therefore, the 2010 regulations create a situation in which Petrobras holds a ǲde factoǳ 
economic monopoly in pre-salt basins and in areas considered strategic. Even the scarce 
possibility of having some competition during the bidding rounds is significantly hampered by the winnerǯs curse phenomenon and by the fact that other oil companies only participate 
financially.  
The ǲde factoǳ monopoly has severe consequences for production and innovation. As 
eloquently stated by Armando Guedes in an interview with the author, one of the worst effects 
of the operational exclusivity established in Law 12,351 is that the company will lose 
competitive references and will therefore be induced to operate less dynamically.676 Flavio 
Ofugi, also shared this opinion.677 They both recognised the positive aspects brought by 
competition within the Brazilian concession regime, which has been significantly reduced in the 
2010 regulations in force in the pre-salt basin and in areas deemed strategic.678    
Within this setting, Petrobras will certainly face fewer incentives to increase its 
productivity and to invest in innovation of its services and quality standards, if compared to a 
scenario of open competition with other oil companies. This discouragement will have 
inevitable impacts on production levels. The outcome is reinforced by the fact that the 
operational exclusivity will inevitably lead Petrobras to divest in other countries and locations 
in view of the urge to develop pre-salt basins and areas deemed strategic, as previously 
explained. The Brazilian National Oil Company has already engaged in a vast divestment 
programme with significant reduction of its international exposure. 679  The substantial 
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constriction of Petrobrasǯ operational capabilities and options undermines its ability to 
adequately explore the best corporate possibilities and joint venture activities, according to its own financial and strategic priorities. This restriction inevitably undermines the companyǯs 
production capacity. Furthermore, by concentrating all of its activities in one exploration 
frontier, where it acts as an actual monopolistic firm, the company significantly elevates its risks 
and cannot adequately share the productive and investment burdens with other partners, as it 
has effectively done in the last 20 years.680 As already mentioned, diversification is very 
important in the upstream oil sector because the success rate of exploration activities is rather 
low, around 25%.681 Oil companies therefore reduce the chances of not finding oil in viable 
commercial levels, by having a diversified international exploration portfolio.   
Felipe682, Wagner Freire683 and Luiz Paulo Vellozo Lucas684 show how Petrobras has benefited from competition in the oil sector from ͳͻͻͶ to ʹͲͳͲ.  The situation in the mid ͳͻͻͲǯs 
posed the same type of challenges to the current ones faced by Petrobras. At that time there was 
also an urge to explore a vast offshore area: the Campos Basin. The difference, however, was 
that the model established in 1997 allowed for the presence of other operator companies with 
which Petrobras could share all of its operational and financial risks. The framework also 
contemplated competition between firms in public tenders as an essential element, which does not completely happen with the current regulations because of Petrobrasǯ operational 
exclusivity and the several limitations imposed on other oil companies that participate as Petrobrasǯ financial partners in consortia. )n contrast to the sombre predictions made by some critics at the time, competition in the ͳͻͻͲǯs significantly boosted Petrobrasǯ performance.  
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  )n radical contrast with that situation, Petrobrasǯ present ǲde factoǳ monopoly in the 
pre-salt basin and in areas deemed strategic, together with its current financial and operational 
constraints, will most probably lead to a perverse outcome whereby the company will have a 
natural incentive to concentrate on projects with greater profitability, while leaving other less 
attractive ones for the future. The adverse consequences of this occurrence have already been 
cited in the last chapter concerning investments. There is also a considerable effect in terms of 
production that should be equally taken into account. It is therefore likely that the Brazilian 
National Oil Company will focus its activities in areas under the onerous relinquishment regime, 
where the Special Participation tax is not levied,685 leaving other ventures to be developed at a 
slower pace or at a second stage.  There are consistent signs that this might already be 
happening and may be one of the reasons behind the previously mentioned shift of resources 
from the Campos Basin to the Santos Basin. While the former area is under a concession regime, 
where the company pays the Special Participation tax, all blocks under the onerous 
relinquishment regime are located in the latter locations.  Once again, this perverse production 
disincentive could be perfectly avoided if other companies were allowed to operate at the pre-
salt basin and in areas deemed strategic.    
The operational exclusivity therefore creates a perverse vicious cycle for Petrobras, 
since its own existence requires significant investment amounts of one sole firm in an enormous 
area. Because of this investment obligation, the company is required to substantially escalate its 
production levels to create the necessary funds to match such necessities, especially considering 
its difficulties in raising further loans because of financial problems. Yet this very exclusivity hampers, on the other hand, the companyǯs ability to plentifully develop its productive capacity.  
7.5 PRICING POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION 
Petrobrasǯ pricing policies will also affect its production capacity. As previously 
explained, the company has been shifting resources from its core business and more lucrative 
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upstream sector to the less rewarding downstream segment.686 This is a result of the increased 
downstream demand, as a direct consequence of the pricing policies until the second semester 
of 2014 that consistently maintain prices below international levels. One of the results of this 
shift is, therefore, a reduction of the upstream production levels.  
 Despite this negative consequence in production terms, one could argue that there could 
be a socially positive element to the pricing policy engendering it, if the contemplated price 
reduction was meant to offset an excessive monopolistic charge, to costumersǯ benefit. Yet that 
is not the case, since the subsidy does not benefit the socially disadvantaged and tends to 
benefit the better–off, instead, creating a typical socially regressive policy. This is because 
consumers who most intensively use oil products as a percentage share of their income are 
wealthier.687Moreover, since Petrobras is a state-controlled enterprise, the Federal Government 
loses valuable revenue with the pricing policy that could be otherwise spent in social 
programmes.  
 The IMF in 2013 conducted a study on energy subsidies showing how regressive these 
policies were, since they tended to ǲdivert public resources away from spending that is more 
pro-poorǳ.688 According to the IMF:  
ǲIn many subsidizing countries, equity could be improved by reallocating outlays 
toward better targeted programs in health, education, and social protection. 
Over the longer term, the removal of subsidies, accompanied by a well-designed 
safety net and an increase in pro-poor spending, could yield significant 
improvements in the well being of low-income groups. In oil-exporting 
countries, subsidies are often used as a tool for sharing oil wealth with its 
citizens. But given the high share of benefits that accrues to upper-income 
groups, the inefficiencies that subsidies create in resource allocation, and in 
some countries the large share of the expatriate population, energy subsidies are 
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a much less effective policy instrument for distributing wealth than other public 
spending programs.ǳ689 
Therefore, Petrobrasǯ current pricing policies not only have detrimental effects on 
production at the upstream level but they also are an ineffective mechanism of wealth 
distribution to the poorest.  
7.6 CONCLUSION 
The current regulatory framework will impact production in several ways. Because of Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity, the company will not have resources to explore by itself such 
a vast area and this limitation will inevitably affect Brazilian production levels. Other 
consequences resulting from the exclusivity are the interruption of bidding rounds for five 
years, the impossibility of counting with a diverse range of firms with different use of 
technologies and the transference of resources from current operational domains to pre-salt 
reservoirs for future extraction. All these factors negatively affect oil output at the upstream 
level.  
The current local content policy is another source of problems. Despite the validity of 
such policy as an essential means to develop a robust industry of national suppliers to the 
overall benefit of the country, it has been applied in a way that overburdens production at the 
upstream level, without showing significant signs of contributing to the effective development 
of a vigorous long-lasting local industry.  
Because of its exclusivity in pre-salt basins and in areas deemed strategic, Petrobras will 
be particularly affected by the drawbacks of such policy. Part of these costs, however, will be 
borne by the Federal Government, since a portion of the companyǯs expenses in case of 
commercial discovery can be recouped via cost in oil, according to article 6 of Law 
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12,351.690Local content policyǯs main problem is the lack of focus and the fact that it does not 
contemplate any phasing-out strategy or shows signs of being limited in time.   
Finally, the lack of competition and pricing policies will also affect production. While in the first case Petrobrasǯ de facto monopolistic condition will lead it to lose competitive 
references, affecting its dynamism and, therefore, its future output, in the second one it causes a shift in the companyǯs resources from the more productive upstream sector to the less lucrative 
and vigorous downstream segment.  
The shortcomings presented in this chapter are particularly troublesome because, as 
argued in the introduction, production is a variable that directly affects all other studied 
parameters. Hence, if the production prospects are not favourable, technology-innovation, 
investments and the strategic control of oil will inevitably incur the negative consequences of 
such shortfalls.    
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8 – TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 
Brazil has been successful in developing a national oil company with leading 
technological and innovation standards in deep water oil exploration. As demonstrated in 
previous chapters, this achievement has been the result of well-designed public policies since the companyǯs creation, in ͳͻͷ͵.691 Certain critical moments have been decisive in this success 
story. The corporate decision in the 1970s to concentrate on upstream activities is an 
example;692the resolution to launch offshore exploration after coming to the conclusion that 
onshore prospects in the country were limited and scarce, is another.693 This chapterǯs main 
goal is to examine how the 2010 changes in the Brazilian regulatory oil framework affect 
technology and innovation in this sector, responding to the central question if it can be 
considered another positive milestone.  
All industries face crucial moments when strategic decisions alter their structure, 
considerably affecting thereafter their growth patterns and performance levels. The strategic 
deliberations in these critical instants have enduring long-term impacts. They differ from the 
daily business decisions with short-term repercussions of brief cyclical effects. To use former President Fernando (enrique Cardosoǯs metaphor, it is the difference between choosing what to 
have for dinner and deciding whom to marry.694 The change of the 2010 regulatory framework 
is one of these important moments that will certainly have substantial long-term consequences 
for technology and innovation in the Brazilian oil sector.  
The next sections will demonstrate how the new framework will have detrimental 
effects on technology and innovation in this sector. The shortcomings essentially derive from 
four of its aspects: i) the operational exclusivity; ii) the governance structure of the operational 
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committee; iii) local content policies which lack adequate focus and strategic planning; and iv) 
financial resources. All these elements actually stem from an excessively intrusive regulatory 
approach, within a typical top-down model, disproportionately reliant on command and control 
procedures. As will be demonstrated, the Brazilian oil sector requires more versatile and 
flexible regulations that respond to a changing and dynamic environment, with increasingly 
diverse stakeholders. A less intrusive regulatory framework, based on reflexive and responsive 
regulations is more suitable in this context, since it induces agents to continuously interact in a 
favourable way for the intended outcomes, instead of imposing norms and rules on them that 
most probably lead to other undesirable consequences.695 
8.1 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION IN THE OIL SECTOR           
Chapter 5 has already demonstrated that the oil sector is highly capital intensive and 
that technology and innovation account for a great part of the capital expenditures in the segment. One of the main reasons for this feature is that oil companiesǯ stock values depend on 
the levels of booked reserves they own.  Corporations are therefore constantly in search of new 
production areas to replace the old and less productive ones, with high depletion rates. Since 
most of the easier to explore petroleum reserves with lower costs are already under 
exploitation, the exploration frontier is currently located in areas with difficult access, which 
demand more intensive levels of technology to be able to produce at a reasonable and profitable 
cost.696  
 Another feature of the upstream oil industry is a progressive technological 
specialisation of the different stakeholders.697 This process has led to a greater interdependence 
                                                          
695 Cf. Gunther Teubner, Law as an autopoietic system (Oxford/Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers 1993) 
and Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive regulation : transcending the deregulation debate (Oxford 
University Press 1992). 
696 Cf. Nadine Bret Rouzaut and Jean Pierre Favennec, Petóleo & Gás Natural: Como Produzir e a que Custo 
(Synergia 2011) and (elder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie Eixos do Desenvolvimemto Brasileiro. 
697 Nadine Bret Rouzaut and Jean Pierre Favennec, Petóleo & Gás Natural: Como Produzir e a que Custo 
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among them and to increasing levels of operational outsourcing.698 The next sections will 
demonstrate the prevailing tendency in the oil sector towards the formation of new governance 
structures with several stakeholders holding greater expertise.699  
Institutional economics claims that on occasions of bounded rationality, uncertainty and 
divergent interests, firms have a tendency to coordinate their interactions to minimise 
transaction costs.700 Institutional scholars cite two paradigmatic governance structures that 
prevail according to the existing transaction costs in the coordination between firms: markets 
and hierarchy. While the first modality tends to be used when products are relatively 
standardised, economies of scale relevant and monitoring costs of suppliers considered low, the 
opposite happens in the second case. Hence, when the supplied product becomes customised and specific to the buyerǯs need and monitoring of the supplierǯs goods is required, transaction 
costs increase and so does the likelihood of vertical integration of firms, in a typical hierarchical 
market organisation form. On the other hand, when monitoring is not necessary, goods 
relatively standard and the suppliers abundant, transaction costs are deemed low and firms are 
more likely to use the market for their negotiations.  
More recent institutional scholarly research has added two other coordination forms to 
the previously mentioned ones, which stand in a mid-way position between markets and 
hierarchy, according to the degree of control of the buyer over its supplier and the inherent 
                                                          
698 Cf. Virginia Acha and Lucia Cusmano, ǮGovernance and co-ordination of distributed innovation 
processes: patterns of R&D co-operation in the upstream petroleum industryǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ ͳͶ Economics of 
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and co-ordination of distributed innovation processes: patterns of R&D co-operation in the upstream petroleum industryǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ ͳͶ Economics of )nnovation and New Technology ͳ, 6. 
700 Cf. Oliver E Williamson, ǮMarkets and hierarchiesǯ ȋͳͻ͹ͻȌ ʹʹ ȋʹȌ Journal of law and economics ʹ͸; Oliver E Williamson, ǮTransaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relationsǯ ȋͳͻ͹ͻȌ Journal 
of law and economics 233-261; and John (umphrey and (ubert Schmitz, Ǯ(ow does insertion in global value chains affect upgrading in industrial clusters?ǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͵͸ Regional studies ͳ017. 
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transaction costs of the operations.701 The first one, called quasi-hierarchy, takes place in 
situations when the buyer still considers the transaction costs quite significant but not as high 
to justify a vertical integration. Therefore, he employs his bargaining power to exert strict 
control over his suppliers, detailing the features of the products he will need and defining 
specific standards to be followed. In the second one, labelled as networks - or quasi-market for 
some authors702- suppliers and buyers are dependent on one another and in close cooperation 
for the development of the provided products. Quasi-hierarchy coordination tends to occur 
when the client is in a dominant position with respect to his supplier and has questions 
regarding his competence, reason why he exerts strict monitoring and control over his 
activities. This stricter oversight increases transaction costs. In networks, on the other hand, 
supplier and buyer tend to have rather similar bargaining power and the client has confidence 
in the quality of the supplied products. Since monitoring and tight control are not necessary, 
transaction costs diminish accordingly. The market is not used in this specific case because the 
nature of the supplied products requires close interaction between agents, especially for 
information exchange. This type of coordination tends to prevail in highly technological sectors.  
Acha and Cusmano when analysing the oil sector in the North Sea demonstrate that 
there has been a process of outsourcing of technological operations taking place in the region, in 
a progressive shift from hierarchical governance structures to a ǲquasi-marketǳ architecture.703 
They show that service and supply firms in the oil sector have been increasingly assuming 
control over the coordination of the supply chain, mitigating the otherwise hegemonic position 
of the upstream oil companies in the command of technology and innovation throughout the 
industry. These service and supply firms such as Norske Veritas and Stolt Comex Seaway are 
providers of integrated solutions for the upstream companies and are replacing previous 
relationships based on a multitude of companies with narrower specialised know-how and 
technical expertise directed towards the upstream client. The new governance structure in the 
                                                          
701 John (umphrey and (ubert Schmitz, Ǯ(ow does insertion in global value chains affect upgrading in industrial clusters?ǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͵͸ Regional studies ͳͲͳ͹, 1023. 
702 Virginia Acha and Lucia Cusmano, ǮGovernance and co-ordination of distributed innovation processes: 
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North Sea is consistent with the theoretical framework presented in previous paragraphs. The 
rising importance of suppliers, the increase in their technological standards, the progressive 
reliance on their performance and the gradual reciprocal dependency between them and 
upstream firms are conducive to network relationships or quasi-market interactions.  
The situation of the Brazilian oil sector is quite different in technological governance 
terms, when compared to the North Sea experience described by Acha and Cusmano. In Brazil 
there is a neat and widespread predominance of the upstream firm, Petrobras, throughout the 
industry. The Brazilian national oil company actually controls and commands the whole 
technological supply chain, exerting a position of clear hegemony.704 Therefore, the governance 
architecture for technology and innovation in the Brazilian oil sector is based on a quasi-
hierarchical model, since the leading firm exerts strict and close control over its suppliers, 
centralising the supply chain according to its specific needs.  
As demonstrated by Humphrey and Schmitz when analysing coordination mechanisms 
in global value chains, companies inserted in quasi-hierarchical governance structures are more 
likely to upgrade their products, shifting to better and more sophisticated goods. 705 Firms in 
networks, on the other hand, tend to reveal more facility to upgrade functionally, in a process 
whereby they incorporate or acquire distinct functions in higher value activities, increasing 
their overall expertise. The authors point to a specific limitation of the quasi-hierarchy 
coordination model, which actually represents one of its dilemmas, or a ǲtwo-edged swordǳ as 
they label it. While quasi-hierarchical models effectively assist supply companies to gain access 
to new and dynamic markets to which they probably would not have access if unassisted, they 
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to prospective capacity to innovate the technical frontierǯ Observatorio de Politica Estrategica de 
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also limit their possibilities in diversifying their client base, leaving them often tied to a group of 
powerful buyers.706     
To illustrate their point Humphrey and Schmitz contrast the experience in the Brazilian 
shoe sector at the Sinos Valley with the electronic manufacturers in Taiwan. In Brazil, shoe 
suppliers of the Sinos Valley reaped the advantages of being part of the prosperous American shoe business in the ͳͻͺͲǯs. )n return for this facilitated access to their dynamic market, 
American clients would specify the standards, develop the models, oversee and control the 
quality and chose the technology and production model that the Brazilian suppliers would have to follow. )n the ͳͻͻͲǯs these Brazilian firms progressively lost their place in the prosperous 
American footwear value chain to Chinese producers, who were able to supply the US market at 
better prices. Since the dependence of Brazilian companies upon American clients was very 
high, the industry declined as it lost market share to Chinese competitors. It has been unable to 
adequately recover since then. In sharp contrast with this case, in the Taiwanese electronic 
sector, suppliers were able to replicate production improvements for one customer to other 
ones, diversifying their expertise and increasing their client base and bargaining power.707  As a 
result, they did not remain captive to one sole big and dynamic client. They were able to 
diversify further their activities towards functions of higher added value and technological 
complexity.             
To a great extent one of the limitations of quasi-hierarchical governance structures is 
that lock-in effects tend to be more present for supplier companies in these settings and more 
difficult to eliminate. This happens because of the often high dependence of vendor companies 
on their clients in this governance model, such as in the example of the Sinos Valley in Brazil.  
Lock-in effect is a concept linked to the theory of path-dependence of technological 
innovations. The development of the idea in Economics had the important contribution of Paul 
David, whose work has demonstrated how knowledge in one specific moment is extremely 
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dependent on events of the past that actually limit the available technological options for the 
future.708 Hence, after adhering to a certain technological path, investing in it and creating strict 
and rigorous industrial routines that considerably affect the future creation of knowledge, 
companies remain locked-in this specific development track. Technology at a certain moment in 
time is therefore strictly dependent on and determined by past experiences and choices. Paul 
David analysed the lock-in concept through the study of the keyboard standard QWERTY of 
letter ordering. He claims that despite not being the ideal layout format for keyboards this 
model has persisted throughout time because of its adoption as a standard model in the past, 
which has been widely replicated afterwards.709 Hence, nowadays all computers still use the 
very same keyboard model simply because it has been adopted as a standard in the past and the 
switching cost for users is significantly high.710           
Against this backdrop, one of the greatest challenges of quasi-hierarchical coordination 
models is for supplier companies to avoid lock-in effects, so they can successfully diversify their 
client base, attempting to evolve towards a network model and promote functional upgrading of 
their activities in the future. Humphrey and Schmitz demonstrate that this shift is perfectly 
possible because governance is a dynamic process and supplier firms in quasi-hierarchical 
coordination structures are able to develop new capabilities and increase their bargaining 
power in relationships with their clients. That is what actually happened with the Taiwanese 
electronic sector, mentioned above. Moreover, the continual maintenance of quasi-hierarchical 
governance architectures is costly for clients, so in theory they also have an interest that their 
providers evolve towards new coordination relationships in the future. One effective strategy 
pointed out by Humphrey and Schmitz for supplier companies in quasi-hierarchical structures 
is that they assume functions that their clients are eager to abandon so they can focus on their 
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core-business. That is what happened in the North Sea, according to Acha and Cusmano.711 
Humphrey and Schmitz demonstrate that one of the critical elements for firms to upgrade to 
other governance settings is the existence of strategic intent.712 They show that this strategic 
intent ought to be used to replicate acquired corporate knowledge in supplying other smaller 
markets that can be progressively extended and widened afterwards.  
As will be argued below, the current Brazilian legislation for the oil sector imposes 
severe restrictions for firms to evolve from the current quasi-hierarchical governance structure, 
revolving around Petrobras, towards a network architecture, where companies stand at more 
equal levels of bargaining power and in joint collaboration for the development of higher levels 
of technology and innovation. One of the starkest limitations is the current local content policy, 
which instead of fostering elements for supplier firms to evolve towards new functions and 
clients, reinforces, instead, their dependency towards Petrobras. The next sections will 
demonstrate that the current regulatory oil framework in Brazil does not encourage 
stakeholders to form and develop dynamic network governance structures that contribute to 
future technological upgrading.                     
As the network governance structure is particularly more conducive to activities of 
higher added value, likely to incorporate greater technological standards, the literature on 
technology and innovation has been recently focusing on the importance of forming these 
networks for the acquisition and transfer of technology.713 Within this setting, scholarly 
research on ǲnational innovation systemsǳ claims that technological innovations do not 
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exclusively depend on firms that introduce original products in the market. They also require 
the intensive participation of other institutions.714 Three specific organisations are particularly 
relevant in this process of creation and diffusion of knowledge: academia, industry and the 
government.715 Studies focusing on the interactions among and between these institutions 
mention the importance of forming a dynamic and interactive model of cooperation between 
them in a process which has been labelled as a ǲTriple Helixǳ.716    
Hatakenaka when comparing the dynamics of innovation in the Norwegian oil sector 
and in the United Kingdom demonstrates that both countries have developed triple helix 
industrial formations.717 Yet while in the former case there has been a strong supporting and 
steering role exerted by federal and local governments, using inputs coming from research 
centres and universities, the process in the latter has been rather market driven, with less 
governmental interference. This difference in the innovation settings in both countries has 
shaped their current technological and innovation standards in different manners. Therefore, 
whilst the oil cluster in Aberdeen, Scotland reveals comparative advantages in terms of 
operational costs and production processes, the hub in Stavenger, Norway, is more competitive 
in the introduction and development of new technologies.718      
There is some initial evidence demonstrating that a cluster might be forming around the 
city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, with the presence of triple helix model involving Petrobras, local 
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service and supplier companies and the Federal and State Universities of Rio de Janeiro.719 
While the region holds adequate conditions to develop an exploration hub for oil in close 
connection with academia and other important stakeholders, as will be further detailed, 
Brazilian regulations impose serious limitations on these grounds.720  
The Brazilian triple helix path is certainly closer to the model used in Norway, with 
defined steering functions proactively exerted by the government in close collaboration with 
research centres and universities. Yet the approach used in Brazil exaggerates in its state 
intrusiveness and in the stiff rigidity of its requirements, rules and norms, leading to significant 
shortcomings in a segment that is essentially dynamic and mutable. Before considering these 
limitations in the next section, the analysis will turn to Petrobrasǯ innovation policy.  
8.1.1 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION IN PETROBRAS 
 Petrobrasǯ innovation policy has shifted several times since its creation in ͳͻͷ͵. )n its 
first years the company directed almost all its technological efforts towards the downstream 
sector. Since prospects for discovering onshore oil in the country were scarce and the 
availability of private investors reduced, because of plunging oil prices, the rationale was to remove Brazilǯs significant dependence on oil derivatives imports for its development 
strategies.721 The company received substantial government support for its endeavours and 
autonomy to develop projects. It built refineries and exerted close oversight on the construction 
of the necessary infrastructure for fuel supply in the country.722Since its early years Petrobras 
also invested substantially in the qualification of its workforce, sending staff to study abroad 
and also hiring international specialists to provide technical support and advice whenever 
required. Moreover, the company has always promoted close cooperation with local 
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universities, stimulating them to offer specialised courses for the corporationǯs needs such as 
geology and chemical engineering.   
At the end of the ͳͻ͸Ͳǯs the newly appointed President of the company, General Geisel, who later became President of the Republic, tacitly announced a shift in the companyǯs focus towards the upstream segment. (e declared in his inaugural speech that the corporationǯs 
priority would thereafter be to ǲguarantee the domestic supply of oil productsǳ.723 The 
statement implied that Petrobras would seek to minimise its import dependency upon crude 
and search for the product wherever it was most likely to be found, be it offshore, or even 
abroad. Soaring oil prices after the first oil shock, in 1973, impelled the company further in this 
quest for large oil reserves as a response to the significant upsurge of national trade deficits due 
to rocketing crude imports to sustain the national industrialisation programme. As part of this 
strategy General Geisel created a subsidiary company, Braspetro, with the main objective of 
seeking international oil reserves.   
The development strategy for the oil sector actually followed closely the countryǯs 
economic policy.724 Instead of limiting its investments and expenses due to the budgetary 
constraints and growing trade deficits of the 1970s after the first oil shock, Brazil did the 
opposite, increasing its capital expenditures to build a solid industrial structure and mitigate the 
excessive dependency on imports in the future. Hence, the strategy was mainly focused on the 
long term, aiming at building economic structures of high added value for the Brazilian 
economy. In the oil sector, similarly, eliminating national constraints and the excessive 
expenditures with oil imports meant going offshore and abroad, as well as developing new 
technological standards to build a solid industry for the exploitation of new petroleum frontiers. 
The economic plan therefore hinged on intense investments for industrial development, taking 
advantage of cheap petrodollars in the international financial market and aiming at reducing the 
import dependency of the country on industrialised goods and oil.  
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The decision to explore a new and unknown region, full of technological challenges in Brazilǯs offshore region demanded a stark change in the innovation policy followed until then by 
Petrobras. From a strategy based on the assimilation and importation of existent worldwide 
technical expertise, the company moved to insource development of a new programme to be 
able to exploit deep water offshore oil: PROCAP 1000.725 The projectǯs goal was to advance the 
necessary technology for oil exploitation in depths of 1000 metres beneath the ocean floor. 
Essential, in this respect, was the existence of previous expertise and accumulated knowledge in 
offshore areas, which had been developing at CENPES, a research centre created in 1966 for the 
development and assimilation of technological expertise in the oil sector. CENPES was 
responsible for coordinating PROCAP 1000.    
The new programme in deep water exploration also took advantage of an important previous shift in CENPESǯ competences from the downstream, according to Petrobrasǯ initial 
strategies, to the upstream, following the new orientation. Another relevant alteration took place in the research centreǯs posture towards technology and innovation. Differently from the 
standpoint carried out until then, in which CENPES mainly assimilated and incorporated 
existing techniques, the move to a new and unexplored frontier in deep waters called for the 
creation and development of new technologies. This modification represented an essential milestone in the companyǯs technological history that significantly shaped its future thereafter. 
It actually meant the first step towards the development of insource independent technology.726   
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The move to offshore limits was uncertain and risky, especially taking into account the 
international economic environment of stagflation, the countryǯs growing trade deficit and 
foreign debt that followed in the 1980s. The effort required essential governmental support and 
tenacity to overcome the cyclical problems without losing track of the stipulated strategic goals. 
This persistence became quite relevant when oil prices stumbled in the counter oil shock of the ͳͻͺͲǯs. First, because it made recoupment of the significant investments more difficult and 
costly; second, due to the widespread urge to minimise production costs. Felipe727 and 
Oliveira728 show how this governmental support did not falter even in a context of fiscal 
constraints and scarce foreign reserves. While investment in most state-owned Brazilian 
companies dropped significantly, Petrobras maintained its capital expenditure level, which 
denotes its strategic relevance for the country.    
Based on this governmental support Petrobras successfully concluded PROCAP 1000. 
Subsequent projects followed with the same goal of producing at increasingly higher depths. 
Against this backdrop came PROCAP 2000 and PROCAP 3000, respectively aiming at being able 
to successfully tap oil at 2000 and 3000 metres beneath the ground sea level.729 The discovery 
of the pre-salt region and the effective exploitation of the area, which requires drilling 5,000 
metres beneath the ground sea level and passing through 2,000 metres of thick salt 
formations,730 are clear signs of the companyǯs effective grip over deep water drilling technology 
that followed from all these programmes.  
Yet the development of this new gigantic oil region opens new technological and innovation challenges for Petrobras. )n spite of the companyǯs unquestionable accomplishments 
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Rabah Arezki and others, Beyond the curse policies to harness the power of natural resources (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011).  
730 International Energy Agency ȋ)EAȌ, ǮWorld Energy Outlook ʹͲͳ͵ǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ316. 
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and its leading worldwide know-how in deep-water exploitation, it still has some limitations 
that hinder further developments. 
One first aspect that has been pointed out by Oliveira and Rubiano is the technological 
disparity between Petrobras and its supplier and service firms operating in Brazil. 731This 
discrepancy has been imposing significant transaction costs on the Brazilian national oil 
company. The transaction costs result from the close monitoring and control that Petrobras has 
to exert over providers so they can meet their quality standards. This requirement also explains, 
as previously mentioned, why the Brazilian governance structure operates according to a quasi-
hierarchical model with a clear and overwhelming presence of Petrobras.  
Analysing further Petrobrasǯ innovation policy, Oliveira and Rubiano classified 
equipment and services used by the company according to their degree of customisation and 
technical complexity, as shown below in figure 3.732  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
731 Adilson De Oliveira and Diana  Rubiano, Ǯ)nnovation in Brazilian oil industry from learning by using to prospective capacity to innovate the technical frontierǯ Observatorio de Politica Estrategica de Producao e 
Inovacao no Brasil <http://www.redesist.ie.ufrj.br/p14-resultados/p14-artigos-publicados> accessed 1 
July 2015. 
732 Ibid. 
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Figure 3: Technological Dimensions of Supplied Services and Equipment to Petrobras 
 
 Source: De Oliveira A and Rubiano D, Ǯ)NNOVAT)ON )N BRAZ)L)AN O)L )NDUSTRYǯ ͳʹ 
Four different possible quadrants can be depicted, according to the provision of services 
and equipment to Petrobras. The first quadrant represents mature technologies of widespread 
applicability across different sectors. The second one stands for specific technologies of low 
complexity. The third quadrant portrays provisions of services and equipment involving radical 
innovations specific to the oil sector, whilst the fourth one shows materials and services of high 
technological standards that can be used in different segments.733   
Oliveira and Rubiano demonstrate that Petrobras has rightly concentrated its 
innovation policy cooperation with firms located in the second and third quadrants, to 
maximise corporate benefits while minimising costs. Most of the corporations portrayed in 
these quadrants are multinationals.734 Despite the accomplished technological improvements in 
                                                          
733 Ibid. 13. 
734 Ibid. 16. 
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the relationships between Petrobras and its suppliers so far, Oliveira and Rubiano show that 
most of the achievements are still excessively reliant on the passive incorporation of expertise 
through ǲlearning by usingǳ strategies of imported utensils and appliances.735 According to 
them, the Brazilian national oil company is disproportionately dependent on foreign innovative 
equipment provided by corporations that are not part of any strategic alliance. Even worse, however, these companiesǯ provisions cannot be accounted for as local content purchases. 
Therefore, one of the most dynamic and prosperous commercial links for technology and innovation in Petrobrasǯ acquisitions are not contemplated in the current national content 
policies. The absence of this technologically vigorous sector in the main governmental policy to 
develop the Brazilian oil industry of suppliers can dangerously affect the future prospects of 
innovation in the oil industry, as will be further detailed.736 
The most rewarding quadrant in terms of added value is the third one, which stands at 
the frontier of technological development and hinges on radical innovations of direct 
applicability to the oil sector. Corporate relationships at this level require a significant degree of 
risk sharing. According to Oliveira and Rubiano, Petrobras has hitherto engaged in projects of 
risk sharing with domestic providers that are excessively focused on the companyǯs own 
specificities and particular requirements.737  This feature has exacerbated the suppliersǯ 
dependence on the national oil company and limited their future international expansion. As 
previously mentioned, one of the restrictions of the quasi-hierarchical governance setting is the 
tendency to create lock-in effects from a disproportionate dependence on a single client. This is 
exactly the problem in this case. Oliveira and Rubiano rightly contend that strategies to 
increasingly move the industry of suppliers to the third quadrant require a joint participation of 
these firms, Petrobras and the government in risk mitigation. Yet they have ignored in their 
analysis considerations about elimination of the lock-in effects, which are an essential 
constraint for the future technological development of the Brazilian oil industry. As will be 
further discussed, one of the ways to minimise this limitation is to increasingly foster the 
                                                          
735 Ibid. 
736 Ibid. 
737 Ibid. 24 
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formation of joint ventures, operational consortia of firms, encouraging interactions between 
them and their respective research partners. Unfortunately, the Brazilian regulatory framework 
is going in the opposite direction, as the remainder of the chapter will demonstrate.         
 The following sections will now analyse the aspects in the 2010 regulatory framework 
that will affect technology and innovation in the Brazilian oil sector. The first element to be 
examined is the operational exclusivity in section 8.1. Section 8.2 will then consider the 
governance structure of the operational committee, while 8.3 will examine local content 
policies. Finally, section 8.4 will evaluate the financial resources directed to activities of 
technology and innovation.    
8.2 OPERATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 
A first aspect that is a direct consequence of the operational exclusivity with negative effects in terms of innovation is the excessive concentration of Petrobrasǯ tasks in one region 
and the process of international divestiture that it entails. As already discussed in previous 
chapters, these two outcomes result from the operational exclusivity because the company has 
limited resources for investments and it is the only corporation allowed to operate in the vast 
pre-salt region, considered a state priority for the future of the Brazilian oil sector. Even though 
Petrobras can rely on consortium partners to share the required investment onus in this area, it 
is still legally bound with a minimum 30% participation.738 The disproportionate corporate 
focus on one domain limits the companyǯs possibility of operating in a diverse range of blocks, 
with different features and peculiarities. This restriction hinders the greater development and assimilation of a wider range of technologies, making the companyǯs know-how excessively 
limited to the reality and specificities of one region.      
Norway provides a good example of a national oil company operating through joint 
ventures with other private international companies for the creation of a fruitful environment 
                                                          
738 Article 10, III, (c) of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
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for technological innovations. 739 Statoil has been forming strategic partnerships with 
international oil companies since its creation, in 1972. The strategy proved particularly 
rewarding when the Norwegian oil fields reached the maturity phase, since it facilitated the corporationǯs international expansion, which was conducted on an already solid existing 
network of worldwide partnerships. Furthermore, despite these technological advantages, the 
formation of joint ventures in Norway permitted risk sharing and mitigation of investment 
burdens.  
A constant concern of Norwayǯs oil policy has been the maintenance of several oil companies operating in the countryǯs continental shelf. Different oil locations present their own 
specific geological and logistic features, which generally require particular know-how and 
applied expertise. Normally oil companies have their own niches of operation, where they hold 
competitive advantages in relation to their competitors. A corporation with experience in oil 
exploitation in the Brazilian sedimentary basin is not necessarily the best firm to operate in the 
Gulf of Mexico, for example. Therefore, by having several companies operating in the country 
the Norwegian government maximised the probability of finding the best match for each oil blockǯs features. )n striking contrast with the Norwegian experience, the Brazilian ʹͲͳͲ 
regulations excessively limit the effective use of the worldwide existing technology because of Petrobrasǯ mandatory operational exclusivity in pre-salt domains and areas considered to be 
strategic.  
Petrobrasǯ international divestments, especially in the Western African Coast,740are also 
particularly troublesome. Innovation and technological leadership in the oil industry arise not 
only from the control of pioneering technology but also from its effective application to very 
peculiar local conditions, which vary according to geological and geophysical peculiarities. The 
                                                          
739 See discussions in chapter 4.  
740 Cf. Petrobras, ǮEsclarecimentos sobre a formação de Joint Venture para atuação na Áfricaǯ 
<http://www.petrobras.com.br/fatos-e-dados/esclarecimentos-sobre-a-formacao-de-joint-
venture-da-petrobras-para-atuacao-na-africa.htm>  accessed 15 June 2015; and Diego Escosteguy and others, ǮO feirão da Petrobrasǯ Epoca (28 March 2013) 
<http://revistaepoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2013/03/empresas-da-petrobras-vendidas-pela-
metade-do-preco-um-amigo-de-cristina-kirchner.html> accessed 10 January 2015. 
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Western African Coast is deemed to have similar geological formations to the Brazilian 
Equatorial Basin, considered by specialists the next national exploration frontier. The control 
and command of technology for exploitation in these areas in Africa could not only allow 
Petrobras to move in the future to the Brazilian Equatorial Basin with reduced costs, but would 
also enable it to retain an important international presence in a promising area. This 
international exposure could confer on the company extremely useful leverage in the future, 
facilitating expansions abroad once the Brazilian sedimentary basin attains its maturity phase.  
Oil companies also hold different levels of expertise, built according to the places where 
they operate. Their cooperative interaction allows them to share experiences, methods, 
procedures and technologies when confronted with diverse problems. This technical exchange 
puts corporations in contact with their different groups of collaborators, such as research 
centres, suppliers and service firms, opening avenues for new network contacts, prosperous 
relationships and information interchange. This valuable exchange will be substantially mitigated with Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity in pre-salt and strategic areas.    
Lourdes Casanova et. al in interviews with high-ranking executives and specialists in 
government agencies and trade associations in Brazil show how they value cooperation 
between firms as a means of technological improvements.741 Ten out of sixteen of their 
interviewees claimed that partnerships between domestic and foreign firms are an important 
way to access cutting-edge technology. In an interview with the author, Armando Guedes was 
similarly of the view that joint operations bring technological progress and have been recurrent 
sources of technological assimilation for the company in the past. Guedes mentions that this 
collaboration will be significantly reduced with the operational exclusivity.742 Mauro Andrade 
also points out that each company has its own competitive advantages and can aggregate value 
in certain peculiar fields. Therefore, according to him, the operational exclusivity limits the 
                                                          
741 Luiz Marcelo Martins Almeida, Luiz Alberto Nascimento Campos filho and Lourdes Casanova, ǮThe Brazilian )nstitutional Environment: The )mpact on Companiesǯ Strategies in the Oil and Gas Sectorǯ 
(2011) Faculty and Research Working Paper - INSEAD 22. 
742 Interview with Armando Guedes, Former President of Petrobras (Rio de Janeiro, 21 July 2012). 
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attainment of increasingly higher innovation levels since it hinders this functional exchange of 
experiences.743  
Oil specialists outside Brazil also share the opinion. In interviews with Valerie Marcel 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Companyǯs executives express a clear preference for partnerships that 
bring together several foreign firms, with access to numerous technologies, instead of a model 
whereby only one company would be granted operational exclusivity.744 
 Companies tend to invest more in innovation to be able to produce better and cheaper 
goods so they can reap higher profits, outpacing their competitors. Markets facing lower levels 
of competition have fewer incentives to invest in technology. Most scholars recognise that the 
opening of the Brazilian oil sector in 1995 is one of the elements that most contributed to its 
innovation development745Armando Guedes and Flavio Rodrigues both mentioned in interviews 
with the author that one of the worst aspects of the 2010 regulatory framework was the 
limitation it imposed on competition, because of the operational exclusivity, with negative 
repercussions for technology and innovation.      
 The operational exclusivity in the Brazilian regulatory oil framework therefore presents 
substantial downsides from a technological and innovation viewpoint. These shortcomings arise 
from excessively intrusive regulations, which limit the productive structures of firms interested 
in holding operations in the Brazilian pre-salt area. Chapter 5 considered the possible 
justifications for such interventionism. In spite of the possible motives and their 
reasonableness, what is important to take into account in this chapter is that an excessively 
invasive regulatory model, irrespective of its goals, normally leads to contradictions, distortions 
and unintended consequences beyond its aimed target. These divergences are increased 
furthermore in the oil industry, in view of its shifting and unpredictable nature.     
  
                                                          
743 Interview with Mauro de Andrade, Vice-President of Statoil (Rio de Janeiro, 08 August 2013). 
744 Valerie Marcel, Oil titans (Brookings Institute 2006). 
745 Cf. Adriano Pires and others, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro 
(Giambiagi and LUCAS eds, Elsevier Brasil 2013). 
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8.3 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMITTEE 
The governance structure of the operational committee that is formed to explore pre-
salt and strategic areas also poses significant obstacles for technology and innovation in the 
Brazilian oil sector. According to current regulations, PPSA, the entirely state-owned company, has a ͷͲ% share in the committeeǯs decisions, while Petrobras holds a minimum ͵Ͳ% 
participation.746 Therefore, these two institutions jointly amount to 80% of the operational 
committee, which leaves other oil companies with the remaining maximum 20%.747  
Companies with such a low share will evidently have less of an incentive to contribute 
with relevant technology, especially considering that they will have minimal deliberative power 
at the operational committee. As argued in chapter 5, this decision-making imbalance is 
reinforced by agency problems arising from the fact that PPSA has a 50% share, despite not 
contributing capital of any kind.   
Oil companies are also discouraged from innovating because they canǯt hold producing 
activities. Any corporation aiming to decisively contribute to innovation in pre-salt consortia 
would therefore have to maintain a rather restricted technological role because of the 
impossibility of handling and applying technological solutions to the daily operational routine. 
In some specific circumstances in which they hold superior technical expertise and 
technological solutions to Petrobras, they will have to hand them to the Brazilian national oil 
company, which will be responsible for operating them, with high possibility of assimilation and 
incorporation of the received innovations. 
The present setting of the operational committee thus leads to a situation of adverse 
selection of consortium members in terms of technology and innovation. Companies less likely 
to contribute with technology and innovation will be the most probable and likely interested 
                                                          
746 Article 10, III, (d) and Article 23, sole paragraph of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, 
de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
747 The threshold of 20% is considered to be the maximum level because Petrobras might havea higher 
share than its mandatory legal minimum level – 30%.   
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partners under the applicable rules, considering the disincentives established on these grounds 
in the current regulatory framework. 
8.4 LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES 
Local content policies in Brazil also present severe limitations for the development of 
technology and innovation in the oil sector. The problems arise from two of its aspects i) the 
comprehensiveness and lack of focus; and ii) the excessive dependence on one sole firm, 
Petrobras.  
  Chapter 7 argued that Brazilian local content policies in the oil industry do not focus on 
sectors and products that reveal greater potential to become internationally competitive and 
that have better conditions to aggregate value to the economy. Instead, they are excessively 
comprehensive and do not have a clear and transparent objective.748 This feature of the 
Brazilian policy significantly impairs the technological development of sectors with higher 
innovation potential. These sectors have to compete in local content for an overall share of their clientsǯ purchases with suppliers that are less prone to technological development and some of 
which will never become competitive. By not prioritising the sectors that can become internationally competitive and that will contribute more to the countryǯs future development 
through increasing technical expertise, the policy loses the potential to more effectively 
promote these segments.749  
The excessive dependency on Petrobras, gives rise to additional shortcomings. The first 
one is the lock-in effect from the subordination of supplier companies to Petrobras. This 
dependency that was already acute before ʹͲͳͲ, because of the companyǯs high market share in 
the Brazilian upstream oil sector, increased significantly after the enactment of the new 
regulatory framework in that year. According to the new regulations Petrobras will be the only 
                                                          
748 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ 
in Bacha (ed), O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013). 
749 Ibid. 337. 
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upstream oil client in pre-salt and strategic areas.750 These areas are supposed to become the 
most dynamic producer regions in the country. As already mentioned, governance structures 
excessively reliant and focused on one client reduce the opportunities for provider firms to 
functionally upgrade to activities of increasing added value, with higher technological levels. 
Moreover, for Petrobras itself, these structures impose significant transaction costs. These 
result from the obligation to purchase services and equipment that are normally of higher cost 
and lower quality, but also from the monitoring activities that the national oil company has to 
frequently perform to ensure compliance with minimum quality standards.         
The high dependency also permits Petrobras to use its monopsonistic position in pre-
salt and strategic areas to force suppliers to sell products at lower prices. This pressure might 
affect the technological investments of the provider companies in their resultant effort to 
reduce their costs and prices.751 Since Petrobras has to comply with national content policies it 
will have an economic incentive to use its monopsonistic power whenever it passes the overall 
minimum threshold percentage limit of acquisition of national goods.752 The supplier companies most likely to surrender to the national oil companyǯs pressure for price reductions are those 
with lower bargaining power, which normally are the less efficient corporations, unable to 
supply other clients and to export. These firms are usually the most dependent ones on national 
content policies and those that require more investments in technology and innovation to be 
able to eliminate their dependency on these policies and to supply new markets. Ironically, the 
combination of strict local content policies lacking focus with a monopsonistic upstream company creates incentives for the maintenance of Petrobrasǯ purchases at the minimum 
percentage limit required for national content policies. This happens because as soon as the 
company surpasses this boundary it will most probably use its dominant position to force prices 
to be reduced. This pressure, in turn, acts with most intensity on supplier corporations that are 
                                                          
750 Article 4 of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010).  
751 Carlos Jacques Viera Gomes and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯ 
(Centro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para discussão, 2009)40. 
752 The basic formula for calculating the national content percentage is: NC=(1-x/y)*100; where 
NC=national content; x=total value of imported components; and y=total sale price. Cf. discussions in 
chapter 6 and also According to Luiz Cezar P Quintans, Direito do petróleo: conteúdo local: a evolução do 
modelo de contrato e o conteúdo local nas atividades de E&P no Brasil (Freitas Bastos Editora 2010)132.  
 244 
the most dependent on national content policies. Therefore, the overall structure contributes to 
the maintenance of these firms in a weak position instead of encouraging them to progressively 
diminish their dependency on local content policies, creating a vicious cycle for the enduring 
maintenance of these policies rather than stimulating their gradual elimination.  
It is uncertain if Petrobras will actually use its monpsonistic power, since it is a state-
controlled company and at the end of the day the rationale for the preservation of local content 
policies might supersede the corporate logic of increasing profits or reducing losses. Yet the 
tension between its broader state policies and more specific market realities will always exist 
and it is most probable that at least on certain occasions the latter will prevail over the former. 
As discussed in chapter 5, Felipe753 and Gomes754 demonstrate that the corporation has on some 
occasions ignored state preferences, maximising its own corporate interests instead.755  
Finally, the national content policy in the oil sector should attempt to encourage leading 
technological firms to enter the Brazilian market. As already mentioned in section 8.1.1, most of Petrobrasǯ supplier companies that bring radical innovations of direct applicability to the oil 
sector are in fact multinationals. Most of these corporations are not accounted for in the national oil companyǯs local content purchases because they are not based in Brazil, or because 
their products might have a high level of imported components. Therefore, the current national 
content policies should exert constant and strict oversight over the possibility of innovative 
standards in the oil industry being reduced for not including a set of technologically dynamic 
firms. Ideally, the policy should entice these multinational innovative firms to establish 
themselves in Brazil, if possible via associations with national enterprises.756       
  
                                                          
753 Cf. Ednilson Silva Felipe, ǮMudanças )nstitucionais e Estratégicas Empresariais: A Trajetória e o 
Crescimento da Petrobras a Partir da sua Atuação no Novo Ambiente Competitivo (1997-ʹͲͳͲȌǯ ȋDphil 
thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2010). 
754 Carlos Jacques Viera Gomes and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯ 
(Centro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para discussão, 2009). 
755 Petrobras for example did not comply with a decision issued in 2002 by the National Environmental 
Council (CONAMA) capping sulphur levels in diesel production because of the impact that the required 
investments would have in its costs. Cf. Ibid.40. 
756 This topic will be further explored in chapter 9, when specific proposals will be made for the Brazilian 
oil sector.  
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8.5 FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Technology and innovation knowingly requires significant disbursements that do not 
always pay off at the desired and expected level. One important source of financial funds for 
technology and innovation in the Brazilian oil sector comes from the requirement inserted in 
concession contracts for concessionaires to spend on these activities 1% of their gross earnings 
in operational blocks, whenever the Special Participation tax is levied.757 Concession contracts, 
established in Law 9,478, do not apply to pre-salt and strategic areas, which are governed by 
Law 12,351, and where production-sharing agreements are in force. As the development of the 
dynamic pre-salt and strategic regions are undertaken, fund returns from this 1% contractual 
fee are expected to progressively decrease in relative terms, unless they are also inserted in 
production-sharing agreements.  
Hence, unless compensated elsewhere, the prospect of diminishing fee collection for 
activities of technology and innovation is not good news for an industry that requires significant 
disbursements in these areas. Another possible reduction of financial resources for such 
activities comes from the destination of the royalties that are due to the Federal Government.758 
Before 2010 part of these financial resources were allocated to a Fund – CT Petro, for financing 
innovation programmes in the oil industry, in universities and research centres. After the 
enactment of Law 12,351 these resources were all assigned to the Social Fund. Since the Social 
Fund can also be applied to science and technology, this shift does not necessarily mean that the 
amount of resources is going to unavoidably diminish, as claimed by Eduardo Guimaraes.759 Yet 
one problem that the legal change causes is that activities of technology and innovation will now 
have to compete for financial resources with other areas, such as education, sport, culture and 
health, among others.  
                                                          
757 According to Article 50 of Law 9,478  of 6 August 1997 (Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997), the 
Special Participation is levied when the production volume of a block or its profitability is considered 
high. Decree N. 2.705 spelled out the specific conditions of applicability of the tax.  
758 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮPolítica de Conte’do Local na Cadeia de Petróleo e Gás: Uma visão sobre 
a evolução do instrumento e a percepção das empresas investidoras e produtoras de bensǯ ȋA )ndustria e 
o Brasil, 2012) 43. 
759 Ibid. 
 246 
If at first glance this seems inappropriate, considering that the oil industry is a 
technologically intensive sector, on the other hand, ring-fencing resources considerably 
restrains governmental action, limiting its disbursements according to the different 
circumstantial priorities. Moreover, the Brazilian oil industry has been receiving significant 
resources for technology and innovation in the last few years, so lack of financial capital has not 
been a limitation so far.760 Most certainly a worse problem is the rational and effective 
application of these assets in areas that contribute to the creation of an industry with 
pioneering technological standards. 
Against this backdrop, one of the most severe shortcomings in technology – innovation 
in Brazil has been the lack of interaction between the different institutions involved in 
technology and innovation in Brazil: universities, research centres, oil companies and the 
government. While these entities separately hold adequate financial resources, technical 
expertise and relevant applied knowledge in technology and innovation in their respective 
domains, they still lack the appropriate degree of effective interconnections and collaboration 
towards the furtherance of cutting edge technology.761 Therefore, even though there are 
elements for the development of a triple-helix model of scientific research in the country, as 
previously mentioned, significant hindrances still exist for the effective flow of information 
between the vertices of the triple helix.762 In other words, component institutions of the triple 
helix framework provide quality products and services but the transmission of information and 
technical expertise between institutions is still deficient. Unfortunately, the current regulatory 
oil framework and the oil policy in general do not contribute to this increasing institutional 
interaction. Hence, the Brazilian oil policy should increasingly consider the development and 
                                                          
760 Carlos Eduardo Lopes da Silva, Ramon Baptista Narcizo and Rodolfo Cardoso, ǮThe proximity between 
Academy, Industry and Government: towards a more sustainable development of a Brazilian oil regionǯ 
(2012) 52 Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences 100, 101; and Interview with Olavo Bentes David, 
Deputy Attorney General of the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) (Rio de Janeiro, 24 July 2013). 
761 Carlos Eduardo Lopes da Silva, Ramon Baptista Narcizo and Rodolfo Cardoso, ǮThe proximity between Academy, )ndustry and Government: towards a more sustainable development of a Brazilian oil regionǯ 
(2012) 52 Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences 100. 
762 Adilson De Oliveira and Diana  Rubiano, Ǯ)nnovation in Brazilian oil industry from learning by using to prospective capacity to innovate the technical frontierǯ Observatorio de Politica Estrategica de Producao e 
Inovacao no Brasil <http://www.redesist.ie.ufrj.br/p14-resultados/p14-artigos-publicados> accessed 1 
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reinforcement of ǲnexus agentsǳ763 in the country. These agents could perform the fundamental 
function of coordinating, linking and facilitating technical advancements and innovations 
between the several entities of the system, acting also as ǲknowledge translatorsǳ.764  
8.6 CONCLUSION 
The overall technological standards of the Brazilian oil industry are considered 
advanced in international terms. The country undoubtedly holds leading innovation levels in 
deep-water exploration. This prominent role largely results from important past strategic 
decisions that relied on significant state presence and support. The corporate move to the 
offshore through the development of in-house technology would never have taken place 
without state backing and the vital investments that followed. As demonstrated in this chapter, 
the initiative was certainly risky, unmatched and involved strict tenacity to a well-designed 
long-term strategic plan. The efforts were successful, having led to the discovery of the pre-salt 
exploration frontier.  
The development of such a huge exploration frontier now opens new challenges and 
great opportunities for the Brazilian oil industry in terms of technology and innovation. The opportunity that arises is for Brazil to develop even further its oil industryǯs innovation 
capacity, becoming a world provider of cutting edge technology. Yet some important challenges 
lie ahead. The first one is the disparity that exists within the Brazilian oil industry as a whole. 
While the upstream sector is dynamic, efficient and innovative, its national supplier companies 
still lag behind. The solution to this problem obviously does not involve lowering the capacity of 
the upstream national oil company but demands, instead, endeavours to effectively develop 
local providers upwards to meet Petrobrasǯ standards.  
Unfortunately the Brazilian 2010 regulatory framework and the oil policy that it entails 
seem to be going in the opposite direction. Petrobras has been increasingly overburdened 
                                                          
763 Virginia Acha and Lucia Cusmano, ǮGovernance and co-ordination of distributed innovation processes: 
patterns of R&D co-operation in the upstream petroleum industryǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ ͳͶ Economics of Innovation 
and New Technology 1, 19. 
764 Ibid. 19, 20. 
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because of national content policies that lack focus and adequate strategic planning. The excessive reliance on the national oil companyǯs resources for such policies seems to ignore that 
the existence of a dynamic and technologically advanced upstream oil corporation is essential 
for the development of a local oil industry of suppliers with similar standards and with effective 
conditions to become internationally competitive.  
A second challenge that exists is for Petrobras itself to evolve further, developing 
increasing levels of autonomous and pioneering technology, non-dependable on imports and on 
strategies of learning by using or learning by doing. Cutting edge and radical innovations rely on 
initiatives that promote scientific knowledge that can be replicated afterwards to the oil 
industry. It presupposes evolution from assimilative and imitative techniques towards a pro-
active innovation stance that dictates future standards for the oil industry. Petrobras has been 
increasingly developing these activities in the last decade. Yet a step further in this direction 
would require effective strategies of risk sharing and an endeavour of collaboration and 
interchange with leading international stakeholders. Again, the Brazilian regulatory framework 
does not contribute to this outcome.  
This chapter has argued that the current regulationsǯ, which are excessively intrusive, 
based on a top-down regulatory approach, through command and control strategies, will lead to 
significant drawbacks in technology and innovation in Brazil. Such shortcomings will inevitably 
affect Petrobras. Even worse, however, they will not guarantee the development of a dynamic 
and sustainable industry of suppliers. Instead of using Petrobras to propel its industry of 
providers towards higher technological standards, suppliers will be dragging the national oil 
company downwards at the expense of the whole sector. One aspect of the new framework, 
however, stands as an important exception: the Social Fund, which lists science and technology 
and education as essential target areas of the projects with its revenue.    
Chapter 9 will demonstrate with specific proposals that the Brazilian oil sector, 
especially in technology and innovation, demands a more versatile, adaptable and flexible 
regulatory model, in which the different stakeholders reiteratively interact, learn from each 
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other and provide the necessary changes to the governance setting according to the different 
required situations and challenges. The existence of such approach is not inconsistent with the 
maintenance of genuine state objectives of an increasing state share in oil activities or for its fair 
distribution among social groups and coming generations. The state has performed essential 
roles in the past for the development of a dynamic oil industry in Brazil. It now needs to adapt 
to a new reality, in which its role is still fundamental, but rather different. Instead of dictating it 
should be stimulating, instead of requiring it should be relying, instead of controlling it should 
regulating.       
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PART III –  TOWARDS A BETTER GOVERNANCE SETTING 
The first part of the thesis provided the legal and theoretical foundations for the 
analysis, discussing central theories, describing the main institutions in the Brazilian oil sector 
and also the international experience in oil regulation. Part II analysed how the Brazilian 
regulatory framework is expected to affect important oil policy variables: i) investments; ii) 
production; iii) technology and innovation; and iv) strategic control of oil.   
Given that the analysis has already been made in the first two parts, the goal of this part 
III is to propose the way forward. It aims at improving the current governance setting of the 
Brazilian regulatory framework through several proposals, described in chapter 9, and to 
conclude the thesis in chapter 10, explaining why the current model is inadequate and how the 
provided recommendations will improve it.   
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9 – PROPOSALS 
This chapter presents specific proposals for the Brazilian oil sector, which should be 
considered alongside the other recommendations made throughout previous chapters. The 
proposals are based on four essential premises. First, their main objective is to overcome the 
limitations and problems pinpointed throughout the thesis. Secondly, they seek plausibility and 
applicability, avoiding recourse to ideal-type situations of difficult implementation. Thirdly, they 
go against a myth and common understanding that the problems of the regulatory framework 
essentially reside in their contractual regime, according to concession or production-sharing 
agreements. An inherent superiority of a regulatory framework cannot be claimed on the 
grounds of its contractual regime.765 This view is shared by several oil specialists and also by all 
the interviewees for this thesis who expressed their opinion on the topic.766 Finally, the 
suggestions revolve around the idea that the regulatory framework should avoid radical 
changes, drastic disruptions and respect all existing contracts, conferring predictability and 
certainty to stakeholders.  
Against this backdrop, regulations should attempt to avert intrusiveness and imperative 
commands without taking into account the environment to which they apply. Rather, they 
should be constantly interacting with it, receiving and processing the inputs of different 
stakeholders and considering the required adjustments. A dynamic sector susceptible to 
constant changes such as the oil industry demands in most situations a versatile regulatory 
approach instead of a stiff and rigid command and control model. This does not mean that 
regulations should merely have a passive function, reacting to the different subsystems with 
which they interact. They can actually perform an important steering and guiding role, directing 
                                                          
765 See Appendix for a comparison on the different oil regimes and their respective contractual 
frameworks. 
766 Cf. Michael Likosky, ǮContracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͳͺ Transnational Corporations ͳ; Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and 
Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 115,159; Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos 
regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Daniel Johnston, International 
petroleum fiscal systems and production sharing contracts (PennWell Books 1994). 
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and enticing stakeholders to desirable outcomes, as the subsequent propositions will seek to 
demonstrate.767  
The chapter is subdivided into five main sections. The first recommends the abolition of 
operational exclusivity. The second proposes the deactivation of PPSA and the reorganisation of 
the governance structure of the operational committee. The third suggests changes in local content policies. The fourth section addresses necessary modifications in Petrobrasǯ governance 
structure, while the fifth presents other specific proposals that do not require legal 
amendments.         
9.1 ABOLITION OF THE OPERATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 
As constantly referred to throughout the thesis, operational exclusivity is the most 
detrimental aspect of the 2010 regulations because it entails significant drawbacks in terms of 
investments, production and technology-innovation. Even worse, however, the operational exclusivity does not contribute to the governmentǯs goal of asserting more strategic control over 
oil, as demonstrated in chapter 8. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the first 
recommendation here is for its abolition. As demonstrated in previous chapters, the exclusivity 
provision goes against the interests of Petrobras, international oil companies and local 
providers of services and equipment.  
The easiest way to eliminate the operational exclusivity is through an amendment of 
Law 12,351. Its approval requires a simple majority in the chamber of deputies and the 
senate.768Yet even though there are robust reasons for the revocation of operational exclusivity, 
several politicians might still resist the idea, especially those supportive of the government. 
Their opposition might be propelled by a certain degree of support that they may receive 
because of the popular appeal that the exclusivity might have. The attractiveness could derive 
                                                          
767 John Paterson, ǮReﬂecting on Reﬂexive Lawǯǯ in King and Thornhill ȋedsȌ, Luhmann on Politics and Law: 
Critical Appraisals and Applications (Hart Publishing 2006) 16. 
768 Article 47 of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (Constituição da República 
Federativa do Brasil). 
 253 
from the idea that the exclusivity promotes the corporate interests of a cherished and symbolic 
company to Brazilians.  
This is certainly a potential source of problems. It can, however, be circumvented with 
rational public discussions and debates that pinpoint the hindrances that the provision causes. 
In 1995, for example, bill proponents were successful in demonstrating in the Brazilian 
Congress that the sector needed opening up to international oil companies to attract investors and share Petrobrasǯ investment burdens. Of course, the ideological environment at that time, in the ͳͻͻͲǯs, was more favourable to initiatives of regulatory reform, if compared to nowadays. 
Yet the recent scenario of a steep oil price plunge and the increasing onus that national oil 
companies are facing might facilitate the political ambience towards the elimination of 
exclusivity. 
The reform should ideally focus on establishing provisions that do not excessively 
hinder the possibility of corporate adaptability as a response to the diverse market realities. The 
drawbacks associated with the operational exclusivity are an instructive example of the 
importance of allowing flexibility in the regulatory framework for changing economic scenarios. 
In 2010, when the provision was enacted, the attractiveness of the Brazilian pre-salt area was 
certainly high, as already mentioned in previous chapters. It was one of the only newly 
discovered big and promising oil regions in the world. Brazil had been facing a relatively 
promising economic situation and oil prices were around US$ 100 per barrel. In January 2015, 
the price dropped below US$ 50 and the market started facing oversupply because of the shale 
oil boom in the US and the contraction of international demand.769 Therefore, the attractiveness 
of Brazilian pre-salt oil blocks significantly reduced during this period. If the operational 
exclusivity might have not been a deal breaker in 2010, because of the circumstances at that 
time, in the year 2015 it most certainly is a factor that will significantly hinder future investments in the region, since Petrobrasǯ operational and financial capacity is significantly 
restrained. Had the Brazilian regulatory provisions allowed for a greater flexibility, this 
                                                          
769 Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) reached US$ 47.76 in January 2015 according to the 
US Energy Information Administration available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M accessed 20 May 2015. 
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limitation of exclusivity could have been at least temporarily suspended, or could have counted 
with a similar procedure of non-applicability.   
One last point should be made before turning to the next section. According to the 
premises described at the beginning of the chapter, predictability and respect of the existing 
contracts are essential to ensure that the regulatory framework will not send the wrong 
message to the different stakeholders about unilateral and arbitrary modification of contractual 
conditions. Therefore, the first and only contract that has been signed under the exclusivity 
requirement should maintain the original agreed conditions. Nothing impedes, however, parties 
from being offered the option of discarding the exclusivity clause as long as there is a joint and 
mutual agreement for change. There are good reasons to predict that if offered this option the 
parties will accept it, since they can both benefit from its elimination. 
ͻ.ʹ PPSAǯS D)SSOLUT)ON   
The second proposal is for PPSAǯs dissolution. )ts existence causes significant problems 
as extensively demonstrated in previous chapters. The worst one is related to the governance 
structure imbalance in the operational committee, which creates substantial drawbacks in 
terms of investment, technology and innovation.  
The other shortcomings derive from the functional overlap with governmental bodies 
such as in the enforcement of local content policies. According to Article 4, I, (c) of Law 12,304 
PPSA should perform these functions, but historically they have been under the competence of 
ANP. As normal regulatory tasks, these roles could have been better performed by ANP, a typical 
regulatory agency, instead of PPSA, a state enterprise.770 
Close monitoring of producing companiesǯ costs is another of PPSAǯs competences.771 As 
previously examined, in production-sharing agreements firms have a natural incentive to inflate 
                                                          
770Antônio Luís de Miranda Ferreira, ǮProblemas e inconsistências jurídicas do novo marco regulatório: a 
ótica dos princípios Constitucionais da livre iniciativa, da economia de mercado e do direito comercialǯ in 
Giambiagi (ed), Petróleo: Reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier 2013). 
771 Article 4, I, (e) of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
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their costs, since they will be reimbursed for them (cost oil).772 Close oversight is therefore 
necessary to avoid this moral hazard situation. In spite of the relevance of this function, it is 
again a typical regulatory function, which could have been perfectly performed by ANP.  
Regulation is a fundamental state function, normally involving administrative police 
power such as the enforcement of rules. Corporations cannot perform such functions, even if 
they are state owned enterprises, such as PPSA. Notwithstanding being a fully state owned 
enterprise, PPSA is still under the jurisdiction of private laws since it is a joint stock company.773 
Furthermore, if all these essential tasks could have been more effectively performed by ANP, 
there is no need for the existence of this state-owned company, especially considering all the 
drawbacks it causes.  
Here again, the abolition of PPSA would have to come through a legal amendment of 
Law 12,351, which would require a simple majority in the Chamber of Deputies and in the 
Senate. Similarly to the removal of the exclusivity, a certain reaction to this proposal can be 
expected in the political spectrum, especially coming from deputies and senators tilted towards 
leftist positions. Since the entity has already been created, resistance can also arise from its 
staff, which might have important political connections, reinforcing further the opposition.  
Yet, apart from these actors, all other industrial stakeholders are expected to support 
the initiative. Therefore, a political case for this amendment can be made if conducted with 
serious discussions of all the drawbacks associated with PPSA. Concerning the existing contract 
that has been signed, in which PPSA has an important role, it can be easily renegotiated with the 
agreement of the involved parties, since they are all expected to benefit from the modifications. 
The fact that PPSA did not participate in the consortium with financial contributions of any kind 
and holds 50% of deliberative power in the operational committee would facilitate the process. 
The overall corporate structure of the consortium could be easily modified by simply doubling each partyǯs share to compensate for PPSAǯs dissolution.  
                                                          
772 Article 29, IV of ibid. 
773 Article 3 of Law 12,304 of 2 August 2010 (Lei 12.304, de 2 de Agosto de 2010) . 
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9.3 CHANGE IN LOCAL CONTENT REGULATIONS IN THE OIL SECTOR         
 Local content regulations are another example of an intrusive regulatory approach that 
leads to significant shortcomings. Therefore, the proposals here described all seek to eliminate 
this authoritative nature of the regulations, suggesting a more participatory model of incentives 
and inducements towards previously established goals.774Within this setting, the utmost 
priority of any change to the current policy should be to eliminate its two major problems: i) 
lack of focus; and ii) excessive reliance on one sole company.775  
Concerning the first shortcoming, the priority should be to create a technical working 
group within the Brazilian government, which would be responsible for identifying supplier 
sectors in the oil industry that hold two basic characteristics: i) the condition of effectively 
becoming internationally competitive in the medium term; and ii) the ability to aggregate 
significant levels of technology and innovation to the production process. The group would 
contract leading consultant companies in the sector and invite relevant organisations to 
contribute with their feedbacks, such as the National Organisation of the Petroleum Industry 
(ONIP) and the Brazilian Institute of Petroleum (IBP), for example. Entities would each prepare 
their separate reports, which would be thoroughly considered by the group. Based on the cohortǯs discussions and on the feedback received from organised public hearings, the sectors 
would be then ranked in order of priority, with reasons given. Whenever two sectors remain at 
the same level, priority should be afforded to the one that potentially contributes more to 
employment creation. The process would also have to be conducted with the broadest transparency and the groupǯs reasoned deliberations would have to be shielded from political pressure, maintaining, above all, itǯs essentially technical profile. 
The sectors included in the list would then receive governmental incentives for their 
development. Considering the availability of funds, the government will assess whether it is 
possible to cover all the sectors or not. Required cuts in funding will first affect segments 
                                                          
774 Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ 
in Bacha (ed), O futuro da indústria no Brasil: Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013). 
775 See discussions in section 7.3. 
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located at the bottom of the priority list. The idea is to design policies that can boost the recipientsǯ productive capacity instead of creating a captive and reclusive market for them, as 
the current local content policies do. The initiatives would essentially build on already existing 
projects, actually increasing their scope, magnitude and focusing them on the selected sectors. 
Therefore, according to a cost-effective logic, there is no need to create additional structures for 
these actions but only to build further on the existing ones, for instance: CT-Petro, PROMINP 
and the funds coming from BNDES and FINEP. These are important initiatives that should be 
further expanded and increasingly directed to the mentioned specific targeted sectors.  
As already described in chapter 6, CT-Petro is a fund which aims at boosting the 
productivity of the oil industry, the quality of its products and in reducing its costs and prices. 
PROMINP, in turn, seeks to increase the participation of local suppliers in the national oil 
industry. BNDES is the Brazilian national development bank, which provides loans using lower 
interest rates, while FINEP is a public enterprise responsible for managing a fund that provides 
resources for initiatives in research and development.  
It is also fundamental to make clear upfront to beneficiary companies that the incentives 
are temporary. They will therefore work to a previously determined deadline and with a 
mechanism of progressive phasing-out of the incentives, so the companies can gradually adapt 
to new conditions without facing considerable adversity. The existence of such time limit would 
eliminate one of the most recurrent problems of local content policies in Brazil, which is their 
tendency to become permanent. As already mentioned, these policies should be provisional; 
otherwise they become a pernicious mechanism of rent transfer between contemplated sectors 
and consumers.776     
Another goal of the previously mentioned working group should be to determine which 
players in the Brazilian oil sector can best perform the function of ǲnexus agentsǳ, disseminating 
                                                          
776 Cf. Oystein Noreng, ǮBrazil and Norway- Offshore Petroleum Experiences and Lessonsǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͵ͷ 
Journal of Energy and Development 79;  Walter De Vitto and Richard (ochstetler, ǮPerspectivas para os investimentos petrolíferos no Brasilǯ in Giambiagi and Velloso Lucas ȋedsȌ, Petróleo–Reforma e 
contrarreforma do setor petrolífero brasileiro (Elsevier Editora Ltda 2012) and Silvana Tordo, National oil 
companies and value creation (World Bank Publications 2011) 10. 
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knowledge and technical innovations throughout the supply chain. As demonstrated in chapter 
7, one of the hindrances to further innovation improvements in the Brazilian oil sector is that 
while universities, research centres, companies and governmental bodies individually hold 
relatively adequate standards for technological development, the innovation flow within them 
still lacks volume and steadiness. A specific policy endeavour focused on creating the conditions 
for a systematic and constant flow of knowledge and expertise among these institutions should 
be created to overcome such limitation.  
Previous chapters demonstrated that supplier companies such as Norske Veritas and 
Stolt Comex Seaway in the North Sea are increasingly performing this role of nexus agents. They 
provide integrated solutions to their upstream oil company clients.777 Building on the 
experience of the North Sea, a specific policy should be designed in Brazil to foster the 
formation of joint ventures between these international companies and their national 
counterparts. Chapter 7 set out the importance that joint ventures perform in the transfer of 
technology between firms. They also are an effective method that established leader companies 
in other jurisdictions use to enter new markets, especially in situations of uncertainty and 
institutional instability.778Hence, this proposal would most probably be in the common interest 
of international and local supplier companies since one would benefit from the possibility of 
technological transfers while the other would have a national partner with established 
experience in local conditions.      
Excessive reliance on one sole upstream firm also significantly exacerbates one of the 
main problems of the oil supply industry in Brazil. As mentioned in chapter 6, national supplier companies are excessively dependent on Petrobrasǯ purchases, which occur in peaks and troughs, according to the companyǯs needs.779 Since national providers organise their selling 
                                                          
777 Virginia Acha and Lucia Cusmano, ǮGovernance and co-ordination of distributed innovation processes: 
patterns of R&D co-operation in the upstream petroleum industryǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ ͳͶ Economics of )nnovation 
and New Technology 1. 
778Mike W Peng, Ǯ)nstitutional transitions and strategic choicesǯ ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ ʹͺ Academy of management 
review 275, 286. 
779  Cf. Jose Renato Ferreira de Almeida, ǮConclusoes e Recomendacoes de Politicaǯ ȋEstudo da 
Competitividade da Industria Brasileira de Bens e Servicos do Setor de P&G, 2007); Helder Queiroz Pinto Jr and Mariana )ooty, ǮPerspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Setor Petróleo e Gás no Brasilǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͷ Serie 
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plans following the forecasted average demand, they do not benefit from all possible transactionsǯ economies of scale. Even worse, however, in peak situations Petrobras has to 
import products for lack of national capacity.780  
Petrobrasǯ operational exclusivity worsens this dependency of national providers and 
the problems related to peak and troughs in its purchases. The best way to mitigate this 
dependency is to allow for the presence of several operating upstream companies, since 
different firms have diverse demand needs throughout the year. This solution could also 
contribute to an increasing interaction of national providers with international oil companies, 
facilitating future joint worldwide projects.781 Therefore, the revocation of the operational 
exclusivity provision would assist significantly in mitigating this problem.     
Finally, there is one last fundamental proposed modification that seeks to incorporate 
the steering and guiding role of regulations, without intruding excessively in the corporate daily 
routine of regulated stakeholders. The recommendation is for all purchases of oil companies 
and their suppliers to be notified to ANP through the filling of an electronic spread sheet, which 
would detail their operations and their respective providers. This information would be 
considered strictly confidential.782 While completing the document the companies would have 
access to a list of local suppliers in each segment and to their selling conditions, such as prices 
and delivery time frame, through direct links to these corporationsǯ webpages. Whenever not 
opting for the listed national firms, oil companies would have to provide the reasons for not 
doing so. All this information would be then sent electronically to ANP, allowing it to perform a 
constant monitoring of relevant data and the presented motives for not buying from Brazilian 
firms. The government would also express beforehand that it will give priority in future bidding 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Eixos do Desenvolvimemto Brasileiro; and Eduardo Augusto Guimaraes, ǮUma avaliacao da politica de conteudo local na cadeia do petroleo e gasǯ in Bacha ȋedȌ, O futuro da indústria no Brasil: 
Desindustrialização em debate (Civilização Brasileira 2013). 
780  Jose Renato Ferreira de Almeida, ǮConclusoes e Recomendacoes de Politicaǯ ȋEstudo da 
Competitividade da Industria Brasileira de Bens e Servicos do Setor de P&G, 2007). 
781 Eloi Fernandez e Fernandez, Ǯ)ndustria nacional de bens e servicos nos arranjos produtivos do setor de oleo e gas natural no Brasilǯ in Giambiagi ȋedȌ, Petróleo: reforma e contrarreforma do setor petrolífero 
brasileiro (Elsevier Brasil 2013) 109. 
782 Because the information will be considered confidential and only ANP will have access to it, the 
initiative does not facilitate collusive practices nor raises competition concerns.  
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rounds and in coming governmental procurements to corporations that source their equipment 
and services from national providers.  
Such preference does not mean that current public tendersǯ criteria for selecting the 
winning consortium for operating in pre-salt and strategic areas would no longer apply. In pre-
salt and strategic areas the choice could still be determined by the highest profit oil accruing to 
the state, but it would also allow the consortium group with the highest use of local content 
products and services to have a preference in its bid.783 The preference would come in form of a 
percentage bonus that would be added to the percentage amount of the profit oil. Thus, if a 
company offers 40% of profit oil to the government and has the right to a 10% bonus because of 
its local content purchases, its final offer would be of 50% (40% + 10%) and it would be able to 
win a bid over another corporation that presents a 45% offer in profit oil but does not have any 
bonus. In the case of a consortium of companies presenting a bid, the final bonus of the group 
would be determined according to a weighed average, based on the volume of purchases of each 
company. CNPE would decide, in turn, the maximum bonus amount allowed to be used in each 
bid, according to the specific conditions of each public tender and taking into account the governmentǯs circumstantial requirements and needs.  
The applied percentage would not be publicised, the same applying to each companyǯs 
national purchases, informed to ANP via the cited spread sheets. The reason for not disclosing 
this information is to encourage competitors to increasingly seek higher levels of national 
purchases, driven by the goal of outpacing their competitors for lack of knowledge of each otherǯs level of local acquisitions.  
Another possibility is to create a list of companies according to their respective 
purchases of strategic local content equipment. The preference bonus would be given to the 
companies in decreasing percentage levels according to their placement in the list, until a 
certain threshold number previously established by the government, following its own 
                                                          
783 Areas not governed by Law 12,351 do not have a fixed and pre-detertmined bidding selection 
criterium such as the one established in this statute, which is the highest percentage of profit oil to the 
government. Cf. Article 18 of Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 
2010). 
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circumstantial possibilities. Hence, the first company with the highest level of local purchases 
would be given, for example, a 20% bonus, the second, a 15% one, and so forth until a minimal 
pre-decided threshold level. Maintaining the competition emulation logic of the previous 
proposal, this list would be confidential until the date of the bidding rounds and all relevant 
material would only be publicised afterwards, when explaining and detailing the reasons for the 
choice of the winners.       
The advantage of such approaches is that oil companies will be induced to progressively 
move towards local suppliers, since they will expect to receive a future compensation for this 
revealed preference. The expectations in this sense would lead to an effective competition 
between oil companies for increasing local acquisitions. Moreover, whenever national providers 
cannot adequately match demand at a competitive and desired level, their clients will not be 
excessively penalised for this fact, since they will be allowed to import these items. Yet they will 
need to provide justifications for not buying local. This only requirement would allow 
authorities to closely and timely monitor these reasons and to continuously attempt to tackle 
existing problems.  
Hence, the proposals allow for a gradual and smooth adaptation of the supply and 
demand for local products and services without excessive impositions that hinder the sector as 
a whole as the current national policies do. Following the rationale that has been successfully 
implemented in Norway, the logic is to induce and promote local purchases instead of 
intervening and requiring specific levels and percentages of sales.784 
One final aspect to be considered is that such proposal will gain effectiveness in the 
context of abolition of the operational exclusivity, since several oil companies would be then 
holding activities in pre-salt and strategic areas of the Brazilian upstream oil sector and would 
therefore be presenting their percentage levels of national purchases in these locations. Yet 
even if that is not the case, the recommendation is still valid, since companies would still be 
buying local in areas not under the jurisdiction of Law 12,351. These companies would be 
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presenting then their respective percentage levels of national purchases together with 
Petrobras, as part of a consortium, since the Brazilian NOC has to mandatorily participate in all 
formed consortia disputing public tenders in the country.785    
9.4 MODIFICATIONS IN PETROBRAS   
Petrobras requires urgent modifications in its bylaws to reduce problems of conflict of 
interests arising from governmental board representatives. As extensively demonstrated 
throughout the thesis, one of the fundamental reasons for the company not to have provided 
necessary price adjustments in the downstream oil segment is the disapproval of the former 
president of the board of directors, the Minister of Finance, who had been primarily worried 
about inflation control.786  Support for his position had been facilitated because other 
governmental board representatives also came from economic areas and he had the President of the Republicǯs essential backing.  
To avoid these kinds of situations of conflict of interests, Petrobrasǯ bylaws should be 
amended to forbid the indication of government representatives holding state commanding 
positions.787 This proposal is similar to Norwegian rules, which forbid civil servants to be board 
members in state companies.788 Yet the recommendation here does not go as far as the 
provision in Norway, since a significant amount of specialists in Brazil holding profound and 
detailed knowledge in the oil sector are civil servants. Therefore, not considering them eligible 
for board positions would excessively restrain the choices and relegate the selection to a limited 
group of oil market executives and academic specialists. Moreover, most of the civil servants in 
Brazil are considered to have a significant degree of autonomy, rarely revealing historical and 
close political links and affiliation. Differently from other Latin American countries, civil 
                                                          
785 Article 20 of Law Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010 (Lei No. 12.351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010). 
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servants in Brazil have to pass a competitive selection exam and they are chosen according to a 
meritocratic selective process.  
Yet one relevant aspect to be considered in this proposal is whether the government 
would lose its capacity to defend its legitimate interests in the company whenever needed. 
Though this possibility always exists, even if remotely, the fact that the government is 
appointing board members with profiles it deems appropriate, significantly mitigates it. These 
board members will represent the government and will therefore have legitimacy to pursue 
state political goals. Yet in cases in which these targets clash with other company objectives or 
affect the corporationǯs performance, they will be required to specifically state the reasons for 
following the political route in their deliberations, demonstrating how the country will benefit 
from the decision and what will be the consequences for the company.789 The goal of this 
requirement is to increase accountability standards and transparency by correctly 
distinguishing ǲsovereign ownerǳ functions, exerted on behalf of the nation and ǲcompany 
shareholderǳ functions.790 This requirement will increase transparency and accountability, indicating to different stakeholders what the national oil companyǯs non-commercial targets are 
and how will it deal with trade-offs arising from conflicting goals. Moreover, it attempts to 
exclusively restrain the use of political motives to cases of justifiable national interest, with 
prior assessment of the corporate impacts of the deliberations.     
Another essential aspect to be considered by Petrobras is its pricing policy, which lacks 
transparency and has been following different governmental priorities beyond the corporationǯs 
finances. As extensively argued, such policy has disfavoured minority shareholders and potential future investors, who are extremely concerned about the companyǯs profitability. Petrobrasǯ oil pricing policy, which aims at providing a convergence between domestic and 
international prices in the long run, is not essentially bad since it reduces, in principle, excessive 
volatility. 791  The oil price is fundamentally unstable 792  and this instability has severe 
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detrimental effects in planning, business performance, national finances and investment.793 
Therefore, initiatives that reduce it are not necessarily inappropriate.  
There are two key problems with Petrobrasǯ pricing policies. The first one has already 
been addressed: the excessive use of the company and its resources for political goals that 
excessively affect its profitability. By not allowing its downstream prices to be adjusted to 
international standards the corporationǯs profitability has been significantly impaired. )n net 
terms prices have been kept artificially low, which has led to an accumulated loss of $26 million 
at the downstream level, from 2011 to 2014.794 The second one is the lack of transparency as to 
how and when will the aimed price convergence to international levels be attained. Such opacity 
has caused subsequent delays in the convergence, which, in turn, have considerably affected the companyǯs profitability.  
Taking into account that the current pricing policy is not theoretically and intrinsically unsuitable, the proposal here is for the companyǯs downstream price to follow a pre-established 
weighted average of international prices, allowing a certain percentage band variation, which 
would be determined each year by the companyǯs board, according to market specificities.795 
The Brazilian national oil company would ensure that its price would be maintained within this previously defined band. Therefore, Petrobrasǯ interference in prices would only be triggered in 
cases of excessive oscillation. Such a measure would give predictability to industrial 
stakeholders while also shielding them from the drawbacks of excessive volatility. Moreover, 
the pre-establishment of the percentage terms by Petrobrasǯ board each year would allow the 
company to make the necessary periodical adjustments so its profitability is not unduly affected 
by unpredicted and unforeseen circumstances.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
792 Cf.Nadine Bret Rouzaut and Jean Pierre Favennec, Petóleo & Gás Natural: Como Produzir e a que Custo 
(Synergia 2011); and Rosélia Piquet, Mar de Riqueza, Terras de Contrastes: O Petróleo no Brasil (Mauad 
Editora Ltda 2011) 88. 
793 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, Escaping the resource curse (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 267. 
794  Amrita Sen and others, ǮBrazil's Strugglesǯ Energy Aspects - In Focus 
<https://www.energyaspects.com/publications/view/brazils-struggles> accessed 15 June 2015. 
795 Since refined oil products are commodities with their prices essentially determined by the international supply and demand, such policy would ensure that Petrobrasǯ prices would not depart 
excessively from international market conditions.   
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9.5 OTHER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS  
Finally there are some other specific proposals that do not fit in the broad categories 
cited above. Most of them involve procedural changes not requiring legal amendments or 
institutional modifications. Therefore, such proposals can be implemented via administrative 
rulings and do not depend on congressional approval.  
The first is the setting of a timetable for bidding rounds. This has been a recurrent claim 
of the oil industry operating in Brazil. As previously demonstrated in the thesis, the main reason for not carrying out this auction timeline is the governmentǯs priority to first develop a robust 
industry of suppliers to match the demands that will follow from successive bidding rounds. 
This standpoint is counter-productive and represents a clear inversion of the industrial logic of 
creating linkages and spin-offs throughout the economy, in which the supplier companies 
respond to an existing demand.796 David Zylberstajn, ANPǯs first Director General put it in 
simple and direct terms: ǲThe local industry of suppliers ought to follow the pace of the 
upstream petroleum industry. Not the opposite.ǳ797  
Therefore, it is essential to provide a clear roadmap for future public auctions, allowing 
potential interested parties to prepare in advance for the bidding rounds. Such a programme 
would offer predictability for companies considering forming consortia for the tenders and 
would also ensure that future opportunities will be available in the country in upcoming bids. 
This guarantee is important for corporations because it opens up the possibility of using 
equipment and capital from one block in other future ones. The measure is also extremely 
favourable to supplier firms. As previously mentioned, one of the most significant problems for 
                                                          
796 Albert O Hirschman, Essays in trespassing: Economics to politics and beyond (CUP Archive 1981) cited 
in Paul Stevens, ǮNational oil companies: good or bad?ǯ National oil companies workshop: Current roles 
and future prospects 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.8929&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 
13 May 2014. 9. 
797 Personal translation from Andre Ramalho and Rodrigo Polito, ǮOposição 'acolhe' propostas do setor do petróleoǯ Valor Economico (Rio de Janeiro) <http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/3719328/oposicao-acolhe-
propostas-do-setor-do-petroleo#ixzz3EzzPwef8> accessed 4th of February 2015.  
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provider companies in the Brazilian oil sector is the uncertainty of forthcoming demand.798The 
existence of a timeline of public auctions in the oil sector would reduce this unpredictability.  
Finally, the last recommendation involves the creation of stimuli for the establishment 
of refining companies in Brazil. If more companies enter this market, Petrobras will be able to 
focus further on the more profitable upstream sector,799where it holds greater competitive 
advantages. Actually the mere fact that Petrobras will cease the policy of postponing necessary 
price adjustments of downstream oil prices would act as an important incentive for refining 
companies to enter the market, as long as they consider that there will not be a future reversion 
to the preceding situation. As previously mentioned, one of the facts that has led refining companies to abandon the sector in Brazil is Petrobrasǯ pricing policies, consistently below 
international standards. The withdrawal of this subsidy policy would also reduce demand and diminish Petrobrasǯ necessity of refining oil, acting as a further incentive for it to concentrate on 
the upstream segment.  
9.6 CONCLUSION 
These proposals seek to eliminate the principal drawbacks of the current regulatory 
framework in Brazil by inserting provisions that encourage versatility, adaptability and a higher 
level of interaction with stakeholders.  They centre on those recommendations most likely to 
eliminate the worst shortcomings of the current regulatory framework.800Several other 
proposals that could have been made concerning aspects analysed in previous chapters were 
relinquished to focus upon the recommendations most likely to eliminate the worst 
shortcomings of the current regulatory framework.  
                                                          
798  Jose Renato Ferreira de Almeida, ǮConclusoes e Recomendacoes de Politicaǯ ȋEstudo da 
Competitividade da Industria Brasileira de Bens e Servicos do Setor de P&G, 2007) 19. 
799 Cf. Rosélia Piquet, Mar de Riqueza, Terras de Contrastes: O Petróleo no Brasil (Mauad Editora Ltda 
2011) 23; and Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida, 'Seminário GEE2013: Os Desafios da Energia no Brasil' 
(2013). 
800 Other proposals are contained in other parts of the thesis. Cf. section 2.2.1.3, concentration of the 
Social Fund on its social and intergeneration saving aspects; and section 4.2.2, the possibility of 
conferring a negotiation phase in Brazilian bidding procedures to avoid the winnerǯs curse phenomenon.  
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During the writing of the thesis numerous Bills were presented to the Brazilian 
Congress, related to many aspects of oil regulation.801 This demonstrates that the political environment has become progressively more favourable to reforms. Senator Serraǯs Bill is the 
most significant in view of the importance it assumed in Congress from April 2015 onwards.802 The Bill suggests the elimination of the operational exclusivity and Petrobrasǯ mandatory ͵Ͳ% 
share in pre-salt and strategic regions.  
While the Bill was limited to the reform of these two features, and failed to address 
other detrimental aspects of the regulatory framework, it goes in the right direction. Senator Serraǯs stated objective was the importance of removing obstacles to investment and yet he did 
not propose   the abolition of PPSA, which still maintains a 50% share in  operational 
committees and therefore retains the possibility of aligning its interests with Petrobras.  
Another problematic aspect of the Bill is that, like the  2010 reform,  it is being conducted 
hastily, without the appropriate level of debate and discussion required for these complex 
issues.803         
Senator Serra has stressed that the reforms are necessary in light of the prevailing 
economic and financial circumstances facing Petrobras, including the changing international 
conditions, the corruption scandals and the difficulties it is having raising funds. It is recognition 
that future reforms should be mindful of the dynamic nature of the oil sector and avoid an 
excessive focus on the short term. They should be flexible while also maintaining the necessary 
degree of predictability. The reform proposals presented in this thesis similarly advocate the 
need for flexibility and adaptation to the changing conditions facing the Brazilian oil sector. 
                                                          
801  Cf. PROJETO DE LEI DO SENADO No 131, DE 2015 available at: 
<http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t=162135&tp=1 > acccessed 2 June 2015; 
PROJETO DE LEI DO SENADO No 254, DE 2015 – COMPLEMENTAR available at 
<http://www.senado.leg.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t=164782&tp=1> ; PROJETO DE LEI DO 
SENADO No 400, DE 2014, DE 2014 available at: 
<http://www.senado.leg.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t=158511&tp=1> acccessed 2 June 2015.  
802   PROJETO DE LEI DO SENADO No 131, DE 2015 available at: 
<http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t=162135&tp=1 > acccessed 2 June 2015. 
803 On 16 August 2015 urgency requirement for voting the bill of law was approved by the Senate. Cf. Raquel Ulhoa and Vandson Lima, ǮProjeto que muda regra do pre-sal ganha urgenciaǯ Valor Economico 
(Brasilia, 17 June 2015) <http://www.valor.com.br/politica/4097216/projeto-que-muda-regra-do-pre-
sal-ganha-urgencia> accessed 20 June 2015. 
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10 – CONCLUSION 
Brazilǯs oil policy is currently at a crossroads. While in the past its aim was at oil 
dependency reduction and self-sufficiency, in the future the possibility exists to become an 
important oil exporter with a solid and technologically advanced industry. The country is 
presently experiencing the confluence of these two distinct moments, the important starting 
milestone being the discovery of pre-salt deposits, in 2008, and the resultant 2010 regulatory 
reform. The extent to which these future prospects will actually materialise is heavily 
dependent upon how the issues raised by this thesis will be tackled.  
Strikingly, the enquiries here formulated were not publicly debated or discussed to the 
extent necessary between 2008 and 2010. These concerns were largely neglected and bypassed 
by the discussion over the share of royalty revenues among federal entities. This was essentially as a result of the governmentǯs inadequacy in dealing with expectations after the pre-salt 
discoveries. ǲLottery ticketǳ, ǲpassport for the futureǳ were terms indiscriminately used to refer 
to the oil findings, advancing the idea of immediately available riches, free of cost. Such a 
governmental approach at the very moment when it proposed a change in the regulatory 
framework channelled the discussions towards short-sighted and excessively narrow political 
struggles over the financial proceeds of oil yet to be extracted. Debates reduced further after the 
2010 reform laws were enacted. The sentiment that seems to have prevailed is of a fait 
accompli, of improbable reversion, which diminished the interest in the topic. The recent corruption scandals involving Petrobras will most probably reinsert this thesisǯ discussion 
topics on to the public agenda, since they will most certainly emphasise and precipitate some of 
the outcomes here forecasted, advancing the thesisǯ main conclusion that the current regulatory 
governance framework will lead to substantial shortcomings in terms of investments, 
production and technology – innovation.  
The 2010 reform took place when Brazil was considered extremely attractive for the oil 
business: prices were high, few vast discoveries such as the pre-salt had been made in the world 
and the country was considered institutionally stable, with a solid and reliable industry. 
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Petrobras, in turn, was the vector of this success and a source of pride for all Brazilians. The 
modifications to the national oil regulatory framework were conceived within that context and 
as a result now take on an excessively intrusive and rigid approach, based on hierarchized 
command and control provisions. The main goal was to attain a greater strategic control over 
oil. Little attention was paid to a careful assessment of other undesirable consequences of the 
modifications or structural shifts in the trading environment itself.  
The new regulatory framework will have significant drawbacks in three of the four 
variables analysed in the thesis: investments, production and technology-innovation, essentially 
because of its excessively interfering and rigid approach. In line with the responsive and 
reflexive theoretical frameworks,804 all the predicted consequences can be broadly categorised 
into three dimensions, considering whether the shortcomings derive from: non-intended side-
effects, lack of collaboration of affected stakeholders or from an increase in monitoring and 
enforcement costs.805  
In terms of investments, the most important drawbacks derive from Petrobrasǯ 
operational exclusivity and the governance setting of operational committees. In the first case, if 
no company in the world would be able to explore the vast area of the pre-salt on its own, 
Petrobras with its evident financial limitations is certainly not prepared for the task. The significant drop of oil prices and the downgrading of the firm´s rating by Moodyǯs )nvestors 
Service, in February 2015, and Standard and Poor´s, in September 2015, makes this task even 
                                                          
804 Cf. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive regulation: transcending the deregulation debate 
(Oxford University Press 1992); John Braithwaite, ǮResponsive regulation and developing economiesǯ 
(2006) 34 World Development 884; Gunther Teubner, Law as an autopoietic system (Oxford/Cambridge, 
Blackwell Publishers 1993); and Gunther Teubner, How the law thinks: toward a constructivist 
epistemology of law (Springer 1990). 
805 As explained in chapter 3, Gunther Teubner claims that three problems may arise when command and 
control regulations are used, which he calls the regulatory trilemma: 1) it might not have any influence on 
social conduct; 2) it may distort the practice through incompatible requirements; or 3) the ruling may 
lose its own consistency and coherence by attempting to incorporate other elements into its logic. Cf. Ralf 
Rogowski, Reflexive labour law in the world society (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 37.    
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harder.806   Such constraints will inevitably affect not only the companyǯs investment capacity, 
but will also reduce its ability to attract partners and potential interested investors.  
The governance of operational committees, in turn, is problematic for potential investors because PPSA holds a ͷͲ% share despite not contributing capital. Petrobrasǯ 
participation is equally high, amounting to a minimum 30%. If these two state-owned 
companies act jointly on the operational committee they will at least hold an 80% share, which 
leaves other potential interested investor companies with the remaining 20%. Considering that 
these investor enterprises are not allowed to operate in pre-salt and strategic areas, one can 
infer that they would therefore be contributing financially to a venture in which they do not 
have significant decision-making power and cannot hold operational activities. In other words, 
they face the risk of writing blank cheques to Petrobras and PPSA, as alluded to by Statoilǯs Vice-
President, Mauro Andrade.807 
If this situation is negative for investors, it gets worse taking into account the two types 
of agency problems that arise from the governance setting of operational committees. The first 
involves Petrobras, as exclusive operator, and all other members of the operational committee. 
The Brazilian national oil company will have relevant information from its operational routine 
as operator that will not necessarily be available in the required detail to its partners, unless it 
openly discloses it. Petrobras could actually have at certain times an incentive to hold back 
strategic data, since it can benefit from its prioritised access to information, at the expense of its 
partners. The other agency situation arises between PPSA, the agent in most deliberations 
because of its 50% share in the committee, and all other investor partners, Petrobras included.  
The peculiarity of this second agency situation is that the agent, PPSA, holds less 
relevant information to take its decisions than one of the principals: Petrobras. Therefore, the 
Brazilian national oil company has a natural incentive to disclose all relevant information to PPSA that might affect its interests in this companyǯs deliberations. Yet the same does not apply 
                                                          
806
 Will Connors ǮS&P Downgrades Brazilǯs Petrobras to Junk Statusǯ The Wall Street Journal (New York) 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/s-p-downgrades-brazils-petrobras-to-junk-status-1441918321> 
accessed 23 November 2015. 
807 Interview with Mauro de Andrade, Vice-President of Statoil (Rio de Janeiro, 08 August 2013). 
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to all other companies of the consortium, since Petrobras would not have an incentive to unveil 
relevant information to PPSA that would benefit them. It could, for example, conceal important 
data about the commerciality of areas, at the expense of its partners. Such a strategy would 
make sense for the Brazilian NOC because it might be interested in postponing investments to 
concentrate upon other areas of the Brazilian pre-salt, where it does not have to pay the Special 
Participation Tax.808 While this strategy could be compelling for Petrobras, with heavy 
investment burdens and required to operate in the vast pre-salt domains, it would be disastrous 
for its partners who are normally interested in the fast recoupment of their investment.  
PPSA, in turn, could also be aligned with Petrobrasǯ strategy. The entity represents the governmentǯs interests on the operational committee and is also responsible for enforcing local content policy requirements. (ence, PPSA could perfectly agree with Petrobrasǯ postponement 
strategy to allow the national industry of suppliers more time to adapt to a future forecasted 
increasing demand.809 As a government representative it could also be simply advancing the 
view that strengthening another state-owned companyǯs financial situation in more attractive 
areas is more important than carrying on with capital disbursements in other less promising 
regions, in financial terms.    
Therefore, the final message that this governance setting sends to potential investors is 
that while Petrobras and PPSA jointly have major deliberative power, agency problems also 
impel the Brazilian NOC to hold back important information from its partners, while in some 
situations there are even incentives for it to strategically act together with PPSA at the expense 
of other consortium members. If such scenario was already negative with oil price barrel over 
US$ 100 it becomes unsustainable with the price plunge below US$ 50 at the end of August 
2015.   
                                                          
808 In areas under the Onerous Relinquishment Regime, according to Law 12,276, as detailed in chapter 2, 
Petrobras does not incur in payments of the Special Participation Tax.  
809 See discussions of local content policies in chapter 6. 
 272 
The expected drawbacks in terms of production are equally important. They essentially 
derive from the operational exclusivity, the consequent lack of competition it entails, and from 
the local content and pricing policies being applied in the country in recent years.  
Petrobrasǯ lack of resources to exploit on its own the vast pre-salt region affects 
Brazilian production levels because other companies could be contributing to the endeavour if 
the operational exclusivity did not exist. Moreover, the exclusivity actually confers to Petrobras 
a de facto monopolistic condition in pre-salt and strategic areas, which entails a consequent loss 
of competitive references, affecting its dynamism.  
Local content policies as applied in Brazil negatively impact production levels since they 
increase cost at the upstream sector and cause substantial delays. Despite the validity of such initiatives as a way to develop the national industry, the Brazilian policyǯs lack of focus and of 
any phasing-out strategy hinders its consistency, leading the national industry of suppliers to 
resiliently depend on the captive market created by the protection it entails, at the continuing 
expense of production in the upstream sector. One of the essential logics of local content policies 
is to admit a short-term inefficiency to the benefit of a development goal which compensates for 
it in the long-term.810 Yet this rationale is absent in Brazil, which simply stays with the 
supposedly temporary incurred costs.     
   Petrobrasǯ pricing policies equally impact on production capacity. The company had 
been diverting until the second semester of 2014 resources from the lucrative upstream sector 
to the less promising downstream segment because of the requirements to cope with an 
increasing demand that has arisen from reduced and subsidised prices at this level.811 This shift has reduced the upstream production potential, which is the companyǯs core business sector.  
The shortcomings of the current regulatory framework on technology and innovation 
are in principle more harmful than on production and investments for their rather enduring and 
protracted effects. Drawbacks on these variables can be offset more easily than on technology 
                                                          
810 Silvana Tordo, National oil companies and value creation (World Bank Publications 2011) 9. 
811 Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida, 'Seminário GEE2013: Os Desafios da Energia no Brasil' (2013). 
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and innovation since they respond faster to their respective institutional settings and any 
modification or adjustment related to these parameters can be more easily implemented, if 
compared to technology and innovation. Because of lock-in and path dependency effects, 
technology is significantly dependent on past experiences and choices, which tend to affect 
future outcomes more intensively than the other two variables.  
Further to this tendency to long-lasting effects, the current policies that lead to negative 
impacts on technology and innovation are also departing from a previous successful historical 
path, which has led the Brazilian oil industry to occupy a prominent international role in deep 
water oil exploitation. That outcome largely resulted from past strategies with substantial state 
support, which has varied and adapted in time to adjust to the different contexts. Hence, the 
move to offshore exploration through the development of in-house technology in the 1970s was 
only possible because of the essential state steering role, as well as its backing and assistance in 
providing the required investment amounts. Yet in 1997, when in need of increasing 
international investment to share the risks of exploring the Campos Basin, substantial reforms were implemented to the stateǯs intervention model in the sector, allowing for private and state 
capital partnerships.  
Unfortunately, the 2010 reform departs from this successful and adaptable stance of 
state intervention, since it provides an excessively intrusive and rigid approach that limits the 
versatility required by technological developments in mutable and changing environments. 
Petrobras has thus been overwhelmed by stringent national content policies without focus and 
strategic planning, which have been affecting its ability to form and engage in technologically 
advanced networks of suppliers. The excessive use of the national oil company as a means to propel national providersǯ innovative standards is hindering, instead, Petrobrasǯ developments 
in the area, without credible signs of meeting its target. The 2010 provisions equally thwart 
effective initiatives of risk sharing, collaboration and interchange with leading international oil 
companies and stakeholders. This constraint limits the required progress from the current 
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prevailing assimilative and imitative techniques of the Brazilian oil industry towards an 
essentially pro-active innovation stance that dictates future standards for the oil industry.    
All these drawbacks in terms of investments, production and technology–innovation 
could in theory be justifiable if the main state goal of ensuring and increasing strategic control 
over oil could be attained and vindicated, thus compensating for these disadvantages. Yet that is 
not the case. The current regulatory framework only allows an increasing strategic control over oil production in some very limited circumstances, mainly through PPSAǯs influence in decisions 
at the operational committee of consortia exploring oil in Brazil. This possibility could have easily been attained through the use of the stateǯs voice in Petrobras or even via ANPǯs oversight 
roles in the oil sector. In other words, the same governmental goal of exerting increasing 
influence and control over oil production could have been reached in a manner that would have 
avoided all the previously mentioned shortcomings.  
Paradoxically, the ʹͲͳͲ reforms can actually diminish the stateǯs strategic control over 
oil in Brazil in some situations, instead of increasing it. Since to a great extent the national oil 
policy now depends on one single company, Petrobras, most of the decision making in the sector will mainly vary according to this corporationǯs own possibilities, instead of being 
determined by governmental decisions, according to national priorities. Therefore, essential 
deliberations in the Brazilian oil sector such as the resolution to explore a certain new block in 
the pre-salt region will essentially depend on Petrobrasǯ capacity because of the operational 
exclusivity.  The recent corruption scandals that substantially affected the companyǯs finances 
highlighted such limitations of the Brazilian regulatory framework and its excessive dependency on one sole company. Because of Petrobrasǯ difficult financial situation as a result of the scandals and its impacts on the companyǯs ability to raise funds in financial markets, 
prospects for further exploration activities in pre-salt and strategic regions are very limited and 
improbable. Unless the government contemplates a change in current regulations, it will not be 
able to organise future public tenders in the Brazilian pre-salt in the short term simply because 
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Petrobras cannot financially and operationally cope with further ventures given its current 
situation.   
As previously mentioned, the cited drawbacks of an excessively intrusive regulatory 
model can all be broadly categorised according to shortfalls coming from unintended side 
effects; the lack of collaboration of affected stakeholders; or an increase in monitoring and 
transaction costs. Based upon this inference, the proposals advanced in chapter 9 attempted to 
mitigate such aspects, advocating suggestions that avoid intrusiveness and authoritative 
commands which ignore the environment to which they apply. Rather, the option has been for a versatile regulatory approach, through solutions that take into account the oil sectorǯs dynamic 
and mutable feature. The understanding is that the responsive and reflexive theoretical 
frameworks are more adequate to the changeable nature of the oil industry, since they allow for 
a degree of flexibility and promote fertile interactions between the different involved 
stakeholders.      
   Within this setting, the proposal for suppression of the operational exclusivity seeks to 
diminish the non-intended side effects caused to investment, production and technology-
innovation, aiming also to regain the collaboration of other international oil companies and 
their supplier enterprises towards an increasingly participatory and inclusive model which 
would allow for several companies to operate in pre-salt and strategic areas. Similarly, against 
this backdrop of mitigating fallouts from an interfering approach comes the suggestion for PPSAǯs elimination, which is expected to contribute to a better governance structure within 
operational committees, with the suppression of their agency and moral hazard problems and a 
clearer delimitation of competences among institutions of the Brazilian oil sector.  
The proposed change in local content regulations has the same overall concern of 
reducing unintended side-effects and also aims at diminishing the excessive monitoring and 
transaction costs of the current policy. Therefore, its main goal is to provide the adequate 
incentives for local companies to gain long-term competitiveness in specific targeted sectors 
where the country holds competitive advantages, rather than establishing mandatory 
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purchasing levels of national content to a wide range of products without prior consideration of 
whether they can eventually become internationally competitive. The current obligations 
significantly increase monitoring and transaction costs, since they demand complicated and 
bureaucratised procedures for calculating the national percentage of goods, which in turn 
require strict surveillance and control over their enforcement.  
Hence, the logic of the recommendations is of encouraging and stimulating, rather than 
protecting and requiring, in line with a less intrusive regulatory approach. The proposal of 
previously announcing that companies buying local be offered a bonus in public tenders 
attempts to incorporate such rationale.  It seeks to promote an effective competition between oil 
firms for increasing local acquisitions. The suggestion for all purchases of oil companies and 
their suppliers be notified to ANP through the completion of an electronic spread sheet, in turn, 
would most certainly reduce monitoring costs. It would allow the regulatory agency to be 
constantly informed of the evolution of local sales, enabling it to take prompt action whenever 
required, simply by checking an electronic system. The recommendations attempt to encourage 
a progressive adjustment of supply and demand for local products and services, avoiding 
stringent requirements that overburden purchasers, at the overall expense of the industry.  
Finally, the suggestions directed to Petrobras have the essential goal of creating effective mechanisms for reducing the governmentǯs inappropriate interference in the company. The first 
proposal aims at reducing the conflict of interest of government board members by requiring 
them not to hold state commanding positions.812 The second recommendation is for the national 
oil company to allow its price to freely fluctuate within an established band around 
international prices. The goal is to confer predictability on industrial stakeholders, avoiding 
excessive variations, while also ensuring that disproportionate internal price distortions that 
affect firm profitability will not be tolerated.   
In spite of all these aspects, the Brazilian regulatory framework also has certain positive 
features that do not require change. The two most important ones are the creation of the Social 
                                                          
812 State commanding positions in Brazil are known as ǲcargos de DASǳȋDireção e Assessoramento 
Superior). 
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Fund and a clearer and increasing delimitation of competences between regulatory entities of 
the oil sector.813 The Social Fund marks a valuable shift in Brazilian energy policy priorities, 
since it for the first time provides a significant set of consistent programmes and actions with 
social and development purposes. Beyond its intrinsic value in reducing social disparities in an 
extremely unequal country with dismal social indicators, the fund also reveals substantial 
benefits for the variables analysed in the thesis.   
The Social Fund contributes to reducing one typical problem of oil exporting countries: 
the ǲresource curseǳ, also known as ǲparadox of the plenty theoryǳ.814 The theory advocates that 
commodity exporter countries tend to rely disproportionately on oil revenues, while their 
industries, infra-structure and social standards are not adequately developed. The Fund 
mitigates such risk by guaranteeing that resources will be directed to education, science, technology and development, therefore contributing to an overall increase of the countryǯs 
productivity levels.815  
The 2010 reform also clarified institutional competences, increasing transparency and 
centralising formulation and planning functions at entities directly linked to the Presidency.  
This contributes to institutional design, enhancing checks and balances between different state 
bodies and gives further predictability to stakeholders. These positive aspects are certainly 
commendable and should be further stimulated.  
Despite such specific advantages of the 2010 reform, the general conclusion is that the 
changes only contribute to its main goal of asserting increasing strategic control over oil in very 
limited circumstances, which could have been avoided, while revealing, in turn, substantial 
drawbacks in essential variables to the sector. The overall outcome that was certainly negative 
and un-rewarding in 2010 becomes even worse in a context of oil prices below US$ 50.00 per 
barrel since investments will shrink even further in tandem with Petrobras´ financial problems.  
                                                          
813 Such inference is not absolute, since the creation of PPSA, for example, led to a confusion of 
competences instead of a more transparent and clear-cut separation.    
814 Cf. for example, Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph E Stiglitz, Escaping the resource curse 
(Cambridge University Press 2007). 
815 Even though the risk of Brazil facing a resource curse is limited, as explained in chapter 2, it is always 
praiseworthy to count with effective mechanisms that mitigate even further this possibility.   
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There are initial signs that some of the shortcomings mentioned throughout the thesis 
are already beginning to occur. Regarding investments, for example, in the first bidding round in 
the pre-salt region on 21 October 2013, when the Brent oil price was high, around US$ 109 per 
barrel,816only 11 companies registered their interest. The Government was expecting at least 40 
interested companies to register, since the pre-salt region is considered the most promising oil 
area in Brazil.817 Only one bid was made at the public tender and the amount of profit oil to the 
government was established at the minimal initial level.  
In the 13th bidding round, two years later, under the concession regulatory framework, 
the results were equally unsatisfactory. The government had been expecting bonuses to reach a 
figure between R$ 1 and 2 billion but the tender only collected R$ 121.1 million. Moreover, only 
37 of the 266 blocks were acquired and for the first time in history Petrobras did not participate 
in the public tender.818 Of course, to a great extent the results of this bidding round reflect the 
depressed oil prices and the increasing difficulties of Petrobras because of the corruption 
scandals and the recession scenario of the Brazilian economy. One could thus argue that they 
are not directly linked to the 2010 legal reforms, especially because the tender was conducted 
under the concession regime. Yet it is unquestionable that the specific features of the Brazilian 
regulatory framework also played a role in such outcome, considering how they affect 
Petrobras´ financial situation and its investment capacity.    
In production terms, evidence equally suggests that Petrobras has been shifting focus 
from the Campos Basin, where Law 9,478 is in force, to the Santos Basin, located in pre-salt 
domains. Such priority shift is probably the reason for the significant production plunge in the 
former area, not yet offset by upticks in the latter region. The resource rearrangement could also explain Petrobrasǯ annual output dip between ʹͲͳʹ ȋʹ% decrease) and 2013 (1.6% 
                                                          
816
 US Energy Information Administration available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M accessed 20 May 2015. 
817 O Estado de Sao Paulo, ǮProdução no pré-sal está abaixo da expectativaǯ O Estado de Sao Paulo  
<http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,producao-no-pre-sal-esta-abaixo-da-expectativa-imp-
,1116078> accessed 11th of June 2014. 
818
 Rodrigo Polito e André Ramalho ǮPetrobrás fica de for a e leilão da ANP arrecada apenas R$ ͳʹͳ milhõesǯ Valor Econômico (Rio de Janeiro) <http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/4261746/petrobras-fica-de-
fora-e-leilao-da-anp-arrecada-apenas-r-121-milhoes> accessed 23 November 2015. 
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drop).819 Absent the operational exclusivity requirement, most certainly other oil companies 
would be operating in pre-salt domains, mitigating Petrobrasǯ redeployment of resources from 
the Campos Basin.   
The recent corruption scandals that affected Petrobras and the context of depressed oil 
prices will certainly exacerbate most of the shortcomings already discussed, leading to 
increasing questionings and debates on the suitability of the current regulatory model. Most 
importantly, however, what the recent crisis reveals is that an excessively intrusive model 
disproportionately dependent on one single firm is risky because the expected pay-offs of 
corruption increases and the whole oil sector can be significantly affected by problems with the 
national oil company. The moment is extremely relevant for discussions such as the one 
provided in this thesis. Public debate and scrutiny should be further stimulated not just as a 
general principle of justice820 but also as an essential means to attain a better regulatory framework with effective conditions of contributing to the countryǯs development.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
819 http://www.petrobras.com/en/magazine/post/2013-net-income-of-r-23-57-billion.htm/ accessed 18 
August 2014. 
820 Amartya Sen, The idea of justice (Harvard University Press 2011). 
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APPENDIX 
REGULATORY REGIMES FOR EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OF OIL   
The main goal of this section is to study the types of existing regulatory oil regimes in 
the world. Regulatory regime will be here understood as the set of laws, administrative 
decisions, rules and practices designed for regulation of the oil activities in a certain country.821 
The literature on regulatory regimes for the oil sector is by no means convergent. Most 
specialists stress the extreme difficulty in establishing a long-lasting and uniform classification 
of regulatory models, given that national variations inevitably occur and that regulations tend to 
change over time.  
Moreover, different political-legal systems and the peculiarities of each national oil 
industry shape them in diverse and specific manners and often countries tend to use hybrid 
models, whereby they merge distinct aspects of regulatory regimes.822 For this reason, many of 
the recent studies related to the analysis of regulatory frameworks in the oil sector have been 
done using national contexts as a starting analytical point. Another common feature in the field 
is to assess the different regulatory frameworks essentially through the types of allowed 
contracts between states and exploring firms. 823  This peculiarity often leads to some 
imprecision and to a certain degree of generalisation.  
 Daniel Johnston, taking into account the different institutional, legal, fiscal and 
contractual settings, establishes one of the classical categorisations for regulatory regimes in 
the oil sector.824According to him, they can be classified into concession and contractual 
systems. Bernard Taverne also distinguishes between licence and contractual regimes 
according to the types of authorisations granted to explore oil activities. Despite the utility of 
                                                          
821 Cf. Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, 
Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law International 1999) 115. 
822Ibid. 21,42. 
823 Cf. Ibid. and Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da 
indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011). 
824 Daniel Johnston, International petroleum fiscal systems and production sharing contracts (PennWell 
Books 1994). 
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these classifications, they have one major drawback, which is to ignore that concession (licence) 
regimes can also be built upon contracts.825 Moreover, both authors agree that the main 
difference between the two systems is related to the property of the extracted oil.826 
 For these reasons, the categorisation here established for the different regulatory oil 
regimes will be based on a three tier analytical system used by Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim et 
al. considering: i) the types of contracts; ii) the existence of state participation; iii) exclusivity of 
state exploration and production.827 
 Most specialists in the field tend to consider the existence of four (4) different types of 
contracts in the oil sector for exploration and production purposes: Concession, Production 
Sharing Agreements(PSA), Joint-Ventures (JV) and Services.828 
The following analysis will have the different types of existing contracts for exploration 
and production of oil as a starting point for defining the different regimes, since it is where most 
of the differences are located. From there on, the study will consider the other analytical levels. 
  
                                                          
825 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) 22. 
826 Ibid. 21. 
827 Ibid. 24 
828 Cf. Michael Likosky, ǮContracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͳͺ Transnational Corporations ͳ; Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and 
Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 115,159; and Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos 
regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011). 
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1. CONCESSION REGIMES829                 
 Concession regimes are the oldest type of oil agreements and have been used since the 
beginning of the 20th century. The modern concession frameworks are very different from the 
old versions, since this type of agreement has evolved significantly through time. In concession 
contracts the property of the extracted oil belongs to the concessionaire company, which is used 
to recover its costs and profits. Concession contracts normally last between 30 to 40 years and 
they often involve mandatory exploration work programmes, the payment of ordinary taxes, 
royalties and cash bonuses.830  
 The mandatory work programme is normally one of the elements of the bidding process 
and the continuation of the concession after an initial phase is usually linked to its satisfactory 
fulfilment. Royalties are payments calculated as a percentage of oil produced by the 
concessionaire and are normally payable in cash. Cash bonuses are amounts owed to the state at 
certain times during the contract, normally when it is signed (Signature Bonuses), or when the 
production reaches a certain amount (production bonus). Cash bonuses and royalties are also 
usually elements of the competitive bidding.  
 Concession regimes can be classified into two types: the pure regimes and those with 
state participation, which usually takes place through a state-owned enterprise that becomes, 
consequently, a co-concessionaire.831 The concession model is used in Brazil under Law N.9.478, 
the Petroleum Law. Oil exploration and production in the United States, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Argentina and Colombia also take place through the pure concession system. 
                                                          
829 Cf. Michael Likosky, ǮContracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͳͺ Transnational Corporations ͳ; Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and 
Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 115,159; Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos 
regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Daniel Johnston, International 
petroleum fiscal systems and production sharing contracts (PennWell Books 1994).  
830 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) 31. 
831 Ibid. 31,33. 
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Examples of the concession regime with state participation can also be found in the 
Netherlands, Norway and the United Arab Emirates.832  
2. PRODUCTION SHARING REGIMES (PSR)833  
 In production-sharing regimes (PSR) the extracted oil is considered state property. The 
produced volume is shared with the contracted firm for the recovery of its exploration and 
production costs as well as for the payments made for government participations and taxes. The 
so called ǲCost Oilǳ is the production amount transferred to the contracted company for the 
recovery costs (for development, exploration, operation and abandonment). The rest of the 
production quantity is called ǲprofit oilǳ. The profit oil will be shared between the contracted 
company and the government according to the established contractual conditions.834  
 At the beginning of the production phase the amount of cost oil tends to be significantly 
higher, since the contracted company has increasing costs when operations are launched. At the 
end of the Production Sharing contract the cost oil is reduced and the profit oil tends to 
increase. The Production Sharing model has been used in Brazil since 2010, in subsalt layers 
and in areas considered to be strategic, governed by Law 12,351. Indonesia, Angola, Azerbaijan, 
Casaquistan, India, Libya, Nigeria and Russia are other examples of countries to use this 
regime.835      
  
                                                          
832 Ibid. 31,33. 
833 Cf. Michael Likosky, ǮContracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͳͺ Transnational Corporations ͳ; Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and 
Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 115,159; Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos 
regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Daniel Johnston, International 
petroleum fiscal systems and production sharing contracts (PennWell Books 1994). 
834 Normally the share of the profit oil is defined in competitive bidding procedures, whereby companies 
compete, offering higher percentages of the share.    
835 Cf. Michael Likosky, ǮContracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͳͺ Transnational Corporations ͳ; Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and 
Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 115,159; Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos 
regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Daniel Johnston, International 
petroleum fiscal systems and production sharing contracts (PennWell Books 1994). 
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3 JOINT VENTURE REGIMES (JV)836 
 Joint Venture (JV) agreements are also called ǲAssociation Contractsǳ. In these contracts, 
the host state, normally through state-owned companies, act jointly with other firms in 
exploration and production activities, allocating costs and risks according to each onesǯ agreed 
contractual shares. Some countries like Nigeria allow joint ventures to be formed through 
consortia and business contracts, while others, for example Venezuela, require them to formally 
establish a new business enterprise.837 
 The main difference between JV and PSR is that while in the former the state 
participates directly in the undertaking, investing and sharing risks, in the latter it does not. In 
Joint Venture agreements, moreover, the participation in financial results of the association will be split according to each companyǯs shares.         
4 SERVICES REGIMES838 
 In service regimes the state signs a contract with an oil company, which explores and 
extracts the oil and will receive an agreed financial compensation for these services. This type of 
regime usually takes place in regulatory frameworks where the state has exclusive exploration 
and production rights over oil, and, therefore, the extracted oil is considered state property. In 
these cases, normally a state-owned company also performs these activities and the use of 
service contracts provides a possibility to have other companies in oil activities without having 
to change laws or constitutional provisions where state exclusivity is granted.  
                                                          
836Cf. Michael Likosky, ǮContracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͳͺ Transnational Corporations ͳ; Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and 
Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 115,159; Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos 
regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Daniel Johnston, International 
petroleum fiscal systems and production sharing contracts (PennWell Books 1994). 
837 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) 35. 
838 Cf. Michael Likosky, ǮContracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͳͺ Transnational Corporations ͳ; Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and 
Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 115,159; Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos 
regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Daniel Johnston, International 
petroleum fiscal systems and production sharing contracts (PennWell Books 1994). 
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 There are two types of service regimes: with or without risk. In the first case, also 
known as pure service regime, the company has its costs reimbursed and also receives a fee, which is considered the firmǯs capital payout. In the second case, the contracted firm is paid 
according to its performance or receives a financial share of the production amount. This 
system is used as a way to stimulate the firm to control its costs, reducing as a consequence the 
moral risk.   
5 COMPARISONS BETWEEN OIL EXPLORATION REGIMES839 
 No one type of regime can be considered superior to others since they all reveal certain 
advantages and drawbacks, depending on the situation. Maybe that is the reason for the 
tendency of oil producing countries to allow for two or more types of contracts, or even to use 
hybrid models combining them. Brazil is an illustrative example, where production sharing 
agreements apply to subsalt layers and in areas considered to be strategic, while concession 
contracts are used elsewhere.840 The following countries also adopt these two regimes: Russia, 
Oman, Thailand, Vietnam, Algeria, Angola, Congo and Nigeria.841  
Concession regimes are generally more attractive to international oil companies because 
they have property of the extracted oil and are able to negotiate it in their best interest, taking 
into account the most suitable market conditions. According, for example, to their forecasts for 
the price of oil, they can decide to store the product or sell it in higher volumes. Another 
advantage that property gives is the possibility of registering the production capacity of a certain concession area in the companyǯs accountability, which will in turn facilitate its capacity 
to attract financial resources through loans and investments, for example. Even though this 
registration technique is possible in PSRs, through a contractual mechanism called ǲentitlement 
                                                          
839 Cf. Michael Likosky, ǮContracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industriesǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͳͺ Transnational Corporations ͳ; Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry, and 
Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics, and Government Policies (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 115,159; Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos 
regulatórios da indústria mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Daniel Johnston, International 
petroleum fiscal systems and production sharing contracts (PennWell Books 1994). 
840 The onerous relinquishment regime is also in force in some regions of the pre-salt basin. 
841 Nadine Bret Rouzaut and Jean Pierre Favennec, Petóleo & Gás Natural: Como Produzir e a que Custo 
(Synergia 2011) 230, 232. 
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oilǳ842, which guarantees property transference, this instrument is less certain and more risky 
than the property that concessionaires hold, which normally are inserted in laws.843 Moreover, 
differently from concession agreements, PSR gives entitlement to only part of the production. 
Therefore, the firm will benefit less from its reserves for financial leveraging purposes 
compared to firms in a concession agreement. 
From the governmentǯs perspective, pure concession agreements are favoured because 
all the risks are borne by concessionaire companies and if oil is successfully extracted it can 
receive revenues through royalties, cash bonuses and other ordinary taxes. In concession 
contracts with state participation the government will face part of the risk according to its share in the undertaking. The same will happen in joint venture agreements, where the stateǯs risk 
will be proportionate to its share in the agreement. 
In PSR, even though exploration and operational risks are borne by international oil 
companies, if successful in extracting oil, they are reimbursed. This reimbursement certainty 
imposes a higher burden on governments if compared to concession agreements, especially at 
the initial production stages, when the investment amounts and costs tend to be significantly 
higher. Exactly the opposite happens towards the end of the contract. As a result, state financial 
revenues tend to vary significantly in time in PSRs, compared to other regimes, where revenues 
are likely to be more constant. Another consequence of this cost recovery is that it imposes 
higher monitoring and auditing duties on government officials, since companies may face an 
incentive to inflate their costs,844 in view of inherent contractual moral risks. 
Since concession regimes do not have a cost reimbursement guarantee, companies will 
have to assess more precisely the probability of oil findings beforehand, considering whether 
future revenues will allow the recovery of these expenses. This uncertainty may negatively 
                                                          
842 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) 39. 
843 Having the property defined in legislation confers more certainty and guarantee to owners because 
breaking the law is considered worse than breaking a contract.  
844 Cf. Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) and Carlos Jacques Viera GOMES and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯȌ ͸Ͷ Centro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para 
discussão. 
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impact on their bidding offers to certain areas, especially those with insufficient information 
about the conditions of the explored areas. 
In pure concession agreements the level of state intervention over the production and 
operational activities is minimal and may only take place through the rhythm of block offers via 
public auctions and through the approval of working and development plans.845 Concessions 
with state participation obviously allow the government to exert more control over operational 
activities. In PSRs and JVs the government interference increases, since usually a state-owned 
enterprise represents it in the negotiations with partners and can more easily discuss 
contractual terms and conditions of each venture. In JV the state company may also participate 
directly in operational activities while in PSRs this is seldom the case.846 
Another considerable advantage of PSRǯs from the governmentǯs perspective is the 
strategic control of supply of oil that it allows without demanding investment efforts, since a 
percentage of the production will always belong to the state. The downside of this control is that 
it increases transaction costs for commercialising this oil. It may also demand the creation of a 
state-owned company to perform this task on the governmentǯs behalf, increasing also 
bureaucratic costs.847 Service regimes and systems of exclusive state exploration and production 
allow for the greatest control and governmental interference over activities.848 While in the 
second case the reasons are obvious, in the first, normally services are contracted through state-
owned enterprises allowing for a strict follow-up of operational routines. 
                                                          
845 Cf. Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) and Carlos Jacques Viera GOMES and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯȌ ͸Ͷ Centro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para 
discussão, 2009). 
846 Cf. Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011); and Carlos Jacques Viera Gomes and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta 
para o marco regulatório do pré salǯ ȋCentro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para 
discussão, 2009). 
847 Cf. Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011) and Carlos Jacques Viera GOMES and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯȌ ͸Ͷ Centro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para 
discussão, 2009). 
848 Mauricio Tiomno Tolmasquim and Helder Queiroz  Pinto Junior, Marcos regulatórios da indústria 
mundial do petróleo (Synergia 2011). 
 313 
One final distinction should be made between concessions and all the other regimes. 
Even though some concessions require the signature of a contract, such as in Brazil under Law 
9,478, they are generally granted through licences, which are regulated by specific legal 
provisions. The other systems are usually less meticulously detailed in statutes and tend to have 
their major aspects established in signed contracts instead of laws. Therefore, states normally 
face lower litigation risks in concession regimes since they can rely more on laws for potential 
disputes, instead of contracts, where they stand in an equal situation with opposing parties.849 
 
  
                                                          
849 Carlos Jacques Viera GOMES and others, ǮAvaliação da proposta para o marco regulatório do pré salǯȌ 
64 Centro de Estudos da Consultoria do Senado federal Textos para discussão. 
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